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Abstract
Humility is a defining attitude of Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism.
His formal writing asserts humility as a divine grace that transforms the
Christian's personal life and as a political virtue essential to meeting
Christian social responsibilities. If the formal work develops the theological
framework of humility his prolific incidental work illumines its operation
within the exigencies of political life. Over his lifetime Niebuhr penned
thousands of essays, articles and editorials on the issues of the day. For
many American Christians and public intellectuals this body of his work
provided insights of faith through which they read the signs of the times.
This dissertation examines the incidental writing from 1941-1952 to
discern the relevance of humility in guiding American power during the
20th Century's most tumultuous era. From the incidental writing of this
period four case studies are drawn in which we examine the operation of
humility and its attitudes upon Niebuhr's insights into American power and
international responsibility. In the first study humility is examined for its
insights into Christian responsibility and the conduct of war. In the second
we examine insights of humility that informed Niebuhr's understanding of
the relationship between US power and the United Nations. The third case
study examines the operation of humility in his account of the development
and implementation of the Marshall Plan. And in the fourth the lens of
humility is applied to the relationship between democratic self-criticism
and the just use of power. The purpose of the case studies is not to claim
that humility provides Christian realism a theological formula or policy
blueprint for political action. Rather the cases demonstrate the operation of
humility and its attitudes in Niebuhr's understanding of the facts,
circumstances and foreseeable consequences necessary to discern a just use
ofAmerican power in particular contexts.
The discernments of humility reflected in the case studies are then applied
to issues of contemporary America power. Here humility and its attitudes
provide a lens through which we examine elements of the 2002 National
Security Strategy, a document that embodies the Bush Administration's
vision for the international role of American power today. Elements
examined include the document's assertion of a distinctly American
internationalism and its embrace of a preventative war doctrine. The
conflict in Iraq provides the immediate context in which the lens of
humility is applied to the National Security Strategy.
The dissertation concludes that Niebuhr's insights regarding the operation
of Christian humility upon Christian responsibility inform a relevant
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The Origins of Humility in Niebuhr's Christian Realism
Aware of our own infirmity we are moved to compassion to help the
indigent, assisting them in the same way as we would wish to be
helped ifwe were in the same distress—and not only in easy ways, like
"the grass bearing seed", but with the protection and aid given with a
resolute determination like "the tree bearing fruit" (Gen. I: 11). This
means such kindness as rescuing a person suffering from injustice
from the hand of the powerful and providing the shelter ofprotection





"He being dead, yet speaketh
Reinhold Niebuhr believed that relevance to the human condition is the true test of
any theological or philosophical system. Finding idealistic expressions of his
inherited liberal Christian tradition inadequate, he sought an expression of faith that
could give both meaning and guidance to the exigencies of 20th Century life.
Niebuhr's expression of faith came to be called Christian realism, a perspective on
Christian social responsibility shaped by a dialectic of Biblical faith and human
experience. His prophetic vocation was to speak the truths of this faith to several
generations of Americans. He applied these truths to the crises of his own time in the
voluminous body of his incidental work. Appearing in the journals, periodicals and
newspapers of the day, these writings made Niebuhr the most prominent theologian
in mid-20th Century American intellectual life. He was at the height of his intellectual
powers and influence during the crisis-ridden era, 1941-1952.
The Theological Grounding of Humility in Niebuhr's Christian Realism
It was during these years of crises and the growth of American power that Niebuhr's
incidental work frequently, if often obliquely, posits the essential relevance of
Christian humility to the responsibilities of Christian realism. Initially, depending
upon one's understanding of humility, Niebuhr's insistence on its relevance to
political responsibilities may appear somewhat paradoxical. Those who associate
humility with subservience, a lack of commitment and confidence, or even
obsequiousness are unlikely to appreciate its relevance to making hard political
choices. Although Niebuhr, like Augustine, never specifically defines the word, he
always views humility and its attitudes positively, as essential gifts of divine grace
that illumine Christian responsibility. In this light humility provides a lens through
which Niebuhr's work is most richly discerned.
1 Hebrews 11:4
Humility provides such a lens because it emanates from the heart of Niebuhr's
theology. The grounding of humility and its attitudes in Niebuhr's theology is largely
developed in his formal writing. An analysis of the origins of humility and its
operation in Niebuhr's Christian realism is the task of Part One of this dissertation.
Niebuhr himself traces much of his mature theological development to his study of
Augustine who he called the West's first great realist. Accordingly Chapter One
examines Augustine's influence on Niebuhr's understanding of humility even as it
presents Niebuhr's critique of Augustine, particularly his doctrine of grace. In this
regard, some attention is given to recent debates over Augustine's justification and
use of coercion against religious dissent.
Although Augustine provides no specific definition of humility Niebuhr follows his
insight that it is a gift of grace. In Augustine humility is seen as the ground of human
wisdom because it opens human beings to the wisdom of God. As this wisdom
illumines our true relationship with God it becomes the self-knowledge in which we
know ourselves as sinner, confess this fact, accept our finitude, experience
forgiveness and learn our worth as God's beloved and redeemed creatures. Thus
acknowledgement becomes knowledge that issues in confidence even as awareness
of the sinful self militates against sinful pride that transforms confidence into self-
righteousness. While Augustine assigns an essential role to reason in human
understanding, he remains aware that reason can be corrupted by pride and always
requires humility's correction. The fruits or attitudes discerned in the grace of
humility include patience, toleration, contrition, forgiveness, compassion and
Christian responsibility itself.
While his critical study of Augustine provides a reliable foundation for assessing the
significance of humility in Niebuhr's Christian realism, a deeper understanding is
provided as the elements of what he calls his Biblical or prophetic faith are analyzed
in Chapter Two. Perhaps the heart of Niebuhr's theology is revealed in his
interpretation of the "myth" of Atonement, an understanding that provides the lens
through which he discerns all Christian truth. Here we gain his deeper insights into
his theological understanding of sinful human nature, grace, and Christian humility.
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These discussions provide the context in which Niebuhr understands pride in its
various guises and its antithesis in the attitudes of humility.
Chapter Three explores the operation of humility within the development of
Niebuhr's mature Christian realism. The underlying purpose is to establish the
relevance of humility and its attitudes to responsible Christian action, a motif that
can be traced to Niebuhr's earliest published works. An examination of Niebuhr's
Christian realism necessarily entails some discussion of his rejection of the religious
and liberal idealism of early 20th Century America. Having found idealistic
expressions of faith irrelevant or even harmful to social justice, he sought a Christian
faith that accepted Christian responsibility for justice and understood the
implications of sinful human nature in meeting that responsibility. Here Niebuhr
looked to the truths that political realism offered to such an expression of faith.
Through his continuous dialogue with political realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau
and George F. Kennan, Niebuhr critically adopted a political realism that was always
in a dialectic relationship with his prophetic faith. While like these realists he
accepted the reality of the national interest in international relations, Niebuhr always
discerned the national interests through the lens of humility.
As Chapter Three attests, Niebuhr's mature Christian realism developed in relation to
the international crises that culminated in WWII. Throughout the two decades
preceding the war he had prophetically attacked America and the Western
democracies for the unjust peace following WWI. Although Niebuhr had no doubts
regarding the greater evil represented by Nazism, he reminded the Western
democracies of their own complicity in that evil. Though always suspicious of
America's power he came to insist that it accept responsibility commensurate with its
wealth and power. He did not retreat from his insistence that all power is morally
ambiguous. But he also reminded his fellow Christians that there is no escape from
guilt, whether incurred by action or by inaction on behalf of justice. As America's
wealth and power became determinate factors in global life Niebuhr's Christian
realism and prophetic vocation sought to make the truths of faith relevant to the
realities of American power. At the heart of these truths we find humility and its
attitudes.
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The Case Studies in Humility
The purpose of the case studies in Part II is to examine the political relevance of
humility in the understanding and use of American power. The case studies in
humility are largely taken from Niebuhr's voluminous incidental writing from 1941-
1952, though several significant earlier pieces are cited. While Niebuhr published
well over a thousand articles, editorials and "editorial notes" during this period, the
case studies focus upon those that treat with American power and its international
responsibilities. However, reading the material on the many issues Niebuhr
addressed during this period underscores the pervasiveness of humility in this body
of his work. Although humility glints throughout the incidental work it often appears
obliquely as one of its attitudes.
Preceding the case studies is a brief contextual analysis presented in Chapter 4. The
intent here is not to provide a comprehensive history of American power in the post-
WWI era. Rather, I examine the issues and events that appear most significant in the
development of Niebuhr's own understanding of power and America's international
responsibilities. He was bitter at America's complicity in the unjust peace imposed
upon German following WWI, a war he supported. A radical socialist throughout the
1930s, he was convinced that the nation was in thrall to its commercial interests.
These factors created an abiding suspicion of American power on the international
scene and led to his wavering counsels regarding American international
responsibilities. He variously embraced a peculiar form of pacifism and called for an
"aloofness" from international conflict—even as he scorned the nation's post-WWI
isolationism. As late as 1938 he opposed, somewhat hysterically, Roosevelt's modest
proposal to strengthen America's decaying military capabilities. Only after Munich
and the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was Niebuhr convinced that American
power, despite its moral ambiguities, was essential to the more just cause of the
Western democracies. In something of a Damascus road experience, Niebuhr shifts
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from seeking ways to avoid the use of American power to discerning the resources of
faith that illumine its responsible use in the cause of justice. Chief among these
resources is the grace of humility.
The case studies in Chapters Five through Eight are central to the purposes of this
dissertation. They examine the role of humility and its attitudes in guiding American
responsibility during WWII and the early years of the Cold War. The purpose of the
studies is not to argue that humility presents a blueprint for Christian action.
Niebuhr's Christian realism rejected moral absolutes and rigid formulae in meeting
Christian responsibility. Rather, the case studies attest to the practical and political
relevance of humility in guiding the responsible use of power within particular
contexts. The four topics addressed in the case studies—the conduct of war, the
United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and democratic self-criticism—were selected in
part because they are prominent and recurring issues in Niebuhr's incidental writing.
In part, I selected these topics with issues of contemporary American power in mind.
Rather than an historical analysis of the issues themselves, the studies undertake to
demonstrate the combination of political and theological insights that characterize
Niebuhr's approach to discerning the responsible use of American power.
The cases reflect Niebuhr's insistence that Christian responsibility requires an
understanding of facts and context. Beyond that they demonstrate the practical
relevance that Niebuhr ascribes to the grace of humility in discerning both the
responsibilities and limits of great power.
Applying the Lens of Humility: The National Security Strategy
In Part III the insights of humility discerned in the case studies are applied to the
Bush Administration's National Security Strategy, an audacious piece of public
diplomacy that purports to guide American power and interests in the age of terror.
While an overview of the strategy is provided no comprehensive analysis is
undertaken. Rather the insights of humility provide the lens through which I examine
selected elements of the strategy. Particular interest is given to the strategy's
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proclamation of a "distinctly American internationalism," the assertion of a doctrine
of preventative war, and the role it appears to envision for the United Nations in
American international responsibility.
Initiated shortly after the Bush Administration promulgated its National Security
Strategy, the Iraqi conflict offers itself as a test of the strategy's effectiveness in
guiding global American power. This necessarily entails an examination of issues,
events and human errors not anticipated by the strategy but that have deeply affected
its practical and political operation. These notably include the failure of US and
Western intelligence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, issues
surrounding the Guantanamo Bay internees and the abuse of Iraqi prisoners in the
Abu Ghraib prison.
Because Niebuhr's Christian realism insists that theological insights be informed by
political understanding, the analysis in Chapter 10 draws upon a range of
contemporary political and diplomatic thinkers.
Reading Niebuhr for Today: Lessons in Humility and the Iraqi Conflict
My analysis of the significance of humility in Niebuhr's Christian realism began a
year prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC. To
say, as some do, that the attacks "changed everything" is hyperbolic because they
certainly did not change human nature. Nor did those attacks fundamentally change
the lives of those who have lived with the reality of terrorism since long before 9/11.
But the events of that day did change America's view of the world and the role of its
power within the international community. That America is the world's lone
superpower doesn't change everything, but it does change a great deal.
A recurring motif in Niebuhr's appeal to humility is that America's power often
appears to exceed its wisdom. He believed that humility and its attitudes provide the
insights that enable a wiser and more just use of American power. Pride, on the other
hand, mistakes power for wisdom and thereby obscures the limits of all human
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power. Although he accepted the necessity of power to establish a just order, he was
its watchful, insightful and at times impassioned critic. In this prophetic role he
insisted that the grace of humility offered lessons to the powerful willing to humble
themselves sufficiently to learn them.
The concluding section of this dissertation draws upon Niebuhr's insights to examine
the lessons we may learn even now from the on-going conflict in Iraq. If that
conflict demonstrates the global reach of American power it also demonstrates its
limits. Certainly the failure to find weapons of mass destruction demonstrated the
limits of our Intelligence Community. The Iraqi experience confirms that America's
military power and technology can destroy a detestable regime: the Bush
Administration's prideful error was its apparent belief that this power would carry all
before it in the more important task of rebuilding a ruined state. The inadequacy of
post-war planning, particularly the failure to secure the Iraqi people, has deeply
eroded American moral authority there and within the international community. This
error was in part due to the Administration's initial refusal of any role for the UN in
rebuilding Iraq's political institutions. The critical role that UN intervention played in
establishing the interim Iraqi government offers a salutary lesson for a notably
unilateralist Administration. Reflecting Niebuhr, we need not idealize the UN to
recognize that it can provide wisdom and forms of power beyond our own.
My conclusions reflect on Niebuhr's incidental writing to underscore the great
importance of humility in times of national crisis. His insight is particularly critical
here because it brings humility to bear upon the use of power that national crisis
often entails. Humility offers wisdom to avoid mistakes and allows us to learn from
those we inevitably make. And as times of crisis inspire American patriotism the
grace of humility illumines a properly ordered love of country. This is a self-critical
patriotism that understands that spiritual pride leads to the sin of national idolatry and
the unjust use of power. It understands that pride betrays strength into weakness and
error. Christian patriotism can never confuse its ultimate loyalty to God and the
things ofGod with the duties owed to a beloved nation.
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A brief epilogue highlights current scholarship on Niebuhr and the continuing debate
over the theological grounding of his public theology. Here recent work by Robin
Lovin also provides a thoughtful look into the future ofChristian realism.
An Autobiographical Note
Having come late to the study of theology and Niebuhr's Christian realism, my
analytical perspective necessary reflects a first career in politics and public service,
including service as a commissioned officer in the US Air Force. Most of my first
career was devoted to service as a senior professional staff member in the US House
of Representatives. This experience has both helped and hindered my study of
Niebuhr. On the one hand, my experience on Capitol Hill provides a practical
measure for critiquing his Christian realism as a political strategy for the just use of
power. On the other hand, years of involvement in the highly partisan atmosphere of
the House inevitably instilled political perspectives and partisan loyalties. On a
political level, at least, Niebuhr's early radical socialism and later close affiliation
with radical elements of the Democratic Party discouraged my study of his work. My
late immersion in his work was possible only after I left the daily exigencies of
political life.
The opportunity to live and study in a nation other than my own has helped me see
myself and my country as others see us. Given the controversies surrounding US
actions following 9/11 this has not always been a pleasant experience. But viewed
through the lens of humility it has nearly always been good.
Ironically, in view ofmy earlier concerns, my immersion in Niebuhr has underscored
the significance of politics in meeting Christian responsibility. I now see that I
created too great a distance between the demands of faith and political
responsibilities. This was in part due to an innate wariness of inflicting my religious
views on others; it was due as well to a lack of conviction regarding those views. I
had not anticipated that my research in Niebuhr would lead to a spiritual conversion
that has renewed my life and deeply influenced my understanding of his work. At the
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heart of this experience is the profound encounter With God and a faith perspective
that must transcend political and partisan loyalties. Here we may discern a God's eye
view of faith's responsibilities while avoiding prideful and destructive self-
righteousness.
It is this perspective that Niebuhr's Christian realism demands we seek but never
claim to achieve.
One of the mysteries of evil is that men who worship the true God still
have one further possibility of covert idolatry when they too simply
identify their interest and their cause with God's will instead of
allowing the encounter with the Divine to break the pride and
pretension ofman.2
2 "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis 12, no. 11 (June 23, 1952): 82.
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Chapter One
Niebuhr and the Augustinian Tradition in
Christian Humility
I know how great is the effort needed to convince the proud of the
power and excellence of humility, an excellence which makes it soar
above all the summits of this world, which sway in their temporal
instability, overtopping them all with an eminence not arrogated by
human pride, but granted by divine grace.1
Augustine
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is four-fold. The first is to place Niebuhr's understanding
of humility within the ancient tradition of Christian humility developed within the
work of Augustine of Hippo.2 The second is to examine Niebuhr's critique of
Augustine's understanding of humility and its theological origins. This will entail a
brief discussion of Augustine's doctrines of grace and of sin. The third, because
Augustine himself does not offer any precise definition of humility, is to tease out the
attitudes of Christian humility that emerge from Niebuhr's analysis of Augustine.
The fourth purpose, given Niebuhr's designation of Augustine as the West's "first
great realist," is to discern the relevance of Augustine's understanding of humility
within the Christian's social task.
1
Augustine City ofGod, trans. Henry Bettenson (Pelican Books, 1972; London: Penguin Classics,
1984), preface to Book I. Unless otherwise noted all references to City ofGod in this dissertation are
to the Bettenson translation.
2
In the original planning of this chapter I examined the attitudes ofhumility reflected in the Rule ofSt.
Benedict and in the work of Simone Weil, principally her book "The Need for Roots." While my
examination of the Rule proved a rich source of knowledge in the wider Christian traditions in humility
(e.g., Cassian) it provided no significant insights to the understanding of humility that Niebuhr draws
from Augustine. As a young contemporary ofNiebuhr's, Weil offers insights on humility from the
perspective of defeated and dispirited France. Most intriguing are her thoughts on humility and the
possibilities of a Christian patriotism in post-war France. Because of the limits imposed by the scope
and focus of this dissertation, however, I decided that an analysis ofWeil's work on humility would
have to await another day.
Encounter with Augustine
Niebuhr's understanding of the significance of humility in Christian life and
responsibility developed substantially with his rediscovery of Augustine's work. In
his 1956 "Intellectual Autobiography" Niebuhr wrote that only after his appointment
to the Union faculty was he introduced to the "main outlines of Biblical faith and to
the classical texts of Christian theology." His embarrassment was particularly acute
regarding his earlier failure to have studied carefully Augustine's work.
The matter is surprising because the thought of this theologian was to
answer so many of my unanswered questions and to emancipate me
finally from the notion that the Christine faith was in some way
identical with the moral idealism of the past century.3
This critical encounter with Augustine occurred as Niebuhr was completing his break
with the liberal worldview and Christian idealism that he had found inadequate to the
realities of 20th Century social life.4 Augustine thus re-entered Niebuhr's life as he
was struggling to articulate a faith perspective relevant to what he considered the
contemporary Christian's social task. This perspective came to be called Niebuhr's
Christian realism. In Augustine Niebuhr believed that he had encountered the West's
first great realist: "His picture of social reality in his civitas dei," Niebuhr wrote,
"gives an adequate account of the social factions, tensions, and competitions which
we know to be well-neigh universal on every level of community."5 The reader
3 "Intellectual Autobiography," in Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed.
Charles Kegley and Robert Bretall ((New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), 9.
4
Niebuhr, preface to Leaves from the Notebook ofa Tamed Cynic (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1929: Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1980), 1. Arthur Schlesinger, historian, New Deal intellectual
and Niebuhr's friendly critic provided a succinct if somewhat polemical characterization ofNiebuhr's
Social Gospel heritage: "The laws of the Kingdom were identical with human nature and society; the
Christian ethic and the commandment of love were directly applicable to social and political questions;
and that Christian policies offered practical alternatives to secular policies in specific situations.
Charles M. Sheldon's question—"What would Jesus do?"—was considered the key which would
unlock social and political perplexity." "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in American Political Thought and
Life," in Kegley and Bretall, 128.
5 Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), 120-21.
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familiar with certain recurring motifs in Niebuhr's work will readily recognize their
antecedents in Augustine's rejection of mind-body dualism, the Neo-Platonist idea of
human autonomy and freedom as rationally determined, and the ideal of perfectibility
in human affairs.6
A significant element in Niebuhr's search for a Christian realism was Augustine's
linkage of Christian humility with Christian social life. Just as Augustine was for
Niebuhr the West's first great realist, the Bishop of Hippo had also discerned "with
greater depth than any of the Fathers before him how uniquely important humility is
for the Christian life."7 In Augustine humility is the disposition of grace through
which the love of God is encountered. It is the attitude wherein man "acknowledges
his creaturely status and dependence upon his creator, so that he receives God's
illumination and enlightenment."8 Augustine discerned that the true love of God
encountered in humility is the supreme virtue, or good for humankind from which all
other virtues are derived: "The perfect love of God" is "to love Virtue, to love
Wisdom, to love Truth."9 Humility is that essential marker on the path to true faith:
This way is first humility, second humility, third humility....If humility
does not precede and accompany and follow every good work we do,
and if it is not set before us to look upon, and beside us to lean upon,
and behind us to fence us in, pride will wrest from our hand any good
deed we do while we are in the very act of taking pleasure in it.10
6 Carol Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 114. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the conflicts that Niebuhr discerned
between "Augustian and Thomistic" thought but they require acknowledgment: "It is in fact
something of a mystery how the Christian insights into human nature and history, expressed by
Augustine, could have been subordinated to classical thought with so little sense of the conflict
between them in the formulations of Thomas Aquinas; and how they should have become so
authoritative in Roman Catholicism without more debate between Augustinian and Thomistic
emphases." Christian Realism and Political Problems, 133-34.
7 Adolar Zumkeller, Augustine's Ideal of the Religious Life (New York: Fordham University Press,
1986), 238.
8
Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth, 83.
9
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When Niebuhr speaks of the "grace of humility" he reflects the intricate relationship
between Augustine's understanding of humility and divine grace in the Christian life.
Here his "teaching on man's total dependence on the grace of God plays an important
part in his account of humility and its effect."11 A brief examination of Augustine's
doctrine of grace is thus necessary to any consideration of his understanding of
Christian humility.
Humility as a Gift of Grace
Thanks to Augustine's Confessions we know more of his tortuous journey to faith
than any other major figure in the history of Christian thought. Written near the
height of his theological and ecclesial career, the Confessions reveal in detail the
struggles of a remarkably sensitive man against his own highly sensual nature and
prideful ambition. Yet the work is not simply a confession of faults. It is also one of
Christianity's great confessions of faith. It is, in Chadwick's estimate, "a prose-poem
addressed to God, intended to be overheard by anxious and critical fellow
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Christians." Moreover, only after Augustine came to understand the role of God's
grace in his conversion of 386 was he able to write his Confessions.13 There as
elsewhere in his writing Augustine discerned that human beings are unable
themselves to assume and sustain caritas-enabling humility; only through God's grace
as revealed in Christ is such humility a possibility. "You wanted to show me how you
'resist the proud and give grace to the humble' (1 Pet. 5: 5), and with what mercy you
have shown humanity the way of humility in that your 'Word was made flesh and
dwelt among men.'"14 In City of God, Augustine wrote that while God's grace had
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effectual" in history when Christ the Son of God appeared in the form of a humiliated
servant.15
Only His love in taking on humanity and in dying for us can our true
caritas be evoked. Caritas does not come by man striving but by God
relating man to Himself. Charity toward God is produced by gratia,
God's free gift ofHimself to man through the charity of Christ.16
It was through Christ's humility and sacrifice that the fountain of God's grace was
opened to all humanity.17 Here the image of a free-flowing and continuous fountain
fits perfectly with Augustine's concept of divine grace:
God creates, sustains, redeems, and consummates, not of necessity or
because of human merit, but out of spontaneous love and goodness.
Man's very being is a work of grace and his salvation is God's gracious
gift. Augustine thus interprets the whole range of human existence in
the light of this inclusive conception of the identity of God's action
and His grace.18
Grace is essential; first to man's love of God and then to all human progress toward
the good. Just as the robber's half-dead victim needed "the initial intervention and the
continuing providence of the gracious Good Samaritan," humankind requires God's
grace first to be rescued from pride and then sustained in the Christian life of
humility.19 Augustine insists that Christians understand that moral effort alone is
insufficient, that salvation depends on divine grace. Yet he discusses grace in ways
that may lead to some confusion over its role. From the perspective ofman's joyous
gratitude to God for his reconciliation and salvation, "grace is wholly God's gift." But
attendant to the subtle ways in which pride infects and corrodes humility, Augustine
reminded the faithful that God's gracious gift is a mercy they have neither earned nor
15 Albert Outler, "The Person and Work ofChrist," in A Companion to the Study ofSt. Augustine, ed.
Roy Battenhous (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1955): 349.
16 Thomas Bigham and Albert Mollegen, "The Christian Ethic," in Battenhouse, 375.
17
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merited.20 As Wolf observed of Niebuhr's analysis of human nature, pride's most
insidious (and ironical) guise is the disease of self-righteousness that infects a
theology or "the very channels of grace in a religion which seeks to redeem man from
pride."21
Yet Niebuhr strongly critiqued aspects of Augustine's doctrine of grace because it
"blunts and obscures the complex relation between grace as power and grace as
pardon." 2 Niebuhr believed Augustine's doctrine had merged "the self esteem of
classical man" with the biblical understanding of sinful human nature. In the merger
self-esteem predictably seized more readily upon grace as power than as forgiveness
and mercy; the consequence was the medieval church's subordination of man's
justification to his sanctification.23 This reflected an error in which Augustine did
not see that human beings "may be redeemed in the sense that they consciously turn
from self to Christ as their end, and yet they are not redeemed from the corruption of
egotism." In the two loves that distinguish Augustine's two commingled cities, love
of God and love of self, he did not recognize that "the commingling is due, not to the
fact that two types of people dwell together but because the conflict between love and
self love is in every soul," even the redeemed soul. It is at this point, in Niebuhr's
thinking, that Augustine's doctrine does not adequately resolve the problem that
sinful human nature presents to his understanding of the transforming power of
20 Outler, "The Person and Work ofChrist," in Battenhouse, 359.
21 William Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man," in Kegley and Bretall, 239.
21
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grace; that, in the words of Luther, even saints may be "righteous and sinners at
once."24
The essence of Augustine's error, Niebuhr wrote, is the belief that through grace sin
is overcome "in principle"; that the sin residual in the redeemed person was
incidental, or "venial." While Augustine insisted that forgiveness of venial sin was
always to be sought, such "expressions of self-love, after redemption," were not to be
seen "as the expression of a basic attitude."25 Such a person, in Augustine's view,
may be said "to walk blamelessly ... free from damnable sins and at the same time not
neglecting to cleanse by almsgiving such sins as are venial."26 Though aware of the
Church's important distinction between mortal and venial sins, Niebuhr finds here
that the Augustinian idea of sin being overcome '"in principle' actually asserts that
the power of inordinate self-love is broken 'in fact.'" Niebuhr found this idea
contradicted by the more than incidental expressions of pride and self-will among
blameless and redeemed bishops, theologians, and businessmen; indeed, by the
spiritual arrogance of the Church itself. "These are not mere defects," Niebuhr wrote,
"They represent the basic drive of self-love operating upon whatever new level grace
has pitched the new life."27
Predictably, Niebuhr's reformed hackles were also raised by Augustine's appeal to
almsgiving. "The idea that almsgiving can cleanse the soul of venial sins is the
camel's nose of 'righteousness by works' entering into the tent of grace."28 The beast
itself, of course, is the belief that people can be justified by good works or saved by
their own merits, so long as they recognise that their merit is an operation of God's
grace. For Niebuhr this formulated the Catholic understanding of the relationship of
grace and merit to salvation; an understanding in which he found Aquinas and
Augustine in agreement:










Man by his own will performs works which are worthy of eternal life;
but, as Augustine says, for this is it necessary that the will of man
should be prepared by grace...."It is certain that eternal life is given as a
reward for good works; but those works for which it is granted belong
to the grace ofGod."29
At issue here, in Niebuhr's view, is the central question of whether humankind's
prideful will "by any discipline of reason or by any merit of grace" can in its earthly
existence conform essentially to the will of God.30 The answer from what Niebuhr
calls his Biblical perspective is an unqualified no. But in the Augustinian tradition,
particularly with the Church's medieval accretions, the response is a barely qualified
yes; excepting venial sin expiated through almsgiving, the redeemed are essentially
sinless. In medieval doctrine Augustine's reservations were forgotten; the Church
became identified with the Kingdom of God and proclaimed itself the sole dispenser
of divine grace. Here the Church became mired in spiritual pride and demonstrated
"in fact" the ironical pretension of a religion which claimed to have overcome
pretension "in principle."31 This result was inevitable, Niebuhr wrote, "because man's
self-esteem resists that part of the truth of the gospel which is set against all human
achievements and discovers the sinful element of self-aggrandisement in them."
If he found Augustine the most reliable of Christian thinkers, Niebuhr prophetically
cautions against a too "slavish" embrace of his insights.33 He thus believes a critique
of Augustine's doctrine of grace is essential to address the "qualified optimism" that
had resulted from the Church's emphasis on grace as sanctification.34 Herein an
essential truth is obscured. Though the redeemed have had their spiritual orientation
29
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changed they remain subject to the incessant tensions and temptations of pride and
self-righteousness. Thus Augustine's qualified optimism was, to use Niebuhr's
phrase, another camel's nose probing beneath the tent, a snout of the belief that
human beings can reach moral perfection through moral exhortation and education.
From his prophetic perspective Niebuhr insisted that self-regard is never
extinguished but accompanies the soul to each new level of spiritual achievement.
This was the view of the human condition he found vindicated by experience and
history. It was essential to understand this, particularly in approaching social and
political analysis. "Nothing is more obvious," Niebuhr observed, "than that personal
dedication is no guarantee against the involvement of the dedicated individual in
• T S
some form of collective egotism."
What light does Niebuhr's criticism shed on Augustine's understanding of humility?
Niebuhr's critique affirms Augustine's understanding of the pervasiveness and guile
of self-regard in human nature. But Niebuhr, largely following reformed tradition,
believed that sinful pride inserted itself into the very doctrines that Augustine and the
Church had constructed to defeat it.36 Against Augustine's belief that pride could be
overcome in principle, Niebuhr insisted that the perniciousness of human self-regard
remains able to corrupt the will of even the most wary. Those redeemed by God's
grace remain, in this life, sinners in principle. Nor could there be any question of the
Church or any human construct dispensing divine grace, a pretentious snare into
which those who considered themselves redeemed in principle fell. Here is yet
another attempt by human self-regard to refute its finitude and subject faith to human
ordering and control. Here, in Niebuhr's view, is a failure to understand that,
The faith and grace by which we stand beyond the contradictions and
ambiguities of history are no simple possession, but rather a having
and not having; and that, claimed as a secure possession, they become
a vehicle of the sin from which they ostensibly emancipate ,37
35 Christian Realism and Political Problems, 138.
36Niebuhr thought Luther was "convinced that the pretension of finality and perfection in the Church
was the root of spiritual pride and self-righteousness," Destiny, 192. For Niebuhr's critique of
Reformation doctrines, see Destiny, Chapter 7.
j7Destiny, 152.
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Nevertheless Niebuhr may be seen as following Augustine's view that the grace of
humility opens the self to the right relationship with God and illumines the Christian
social task. Indeed, given Niebuhr's objections to Augustine's idea of humankind
being redeemed in principle, the importance of humility to faith and action is given
increased immediacy. On balance it is prudent to keep at hand his critique of
Augustine's doctrine of grace but to remember as well Niebuhr's over-all regard for
38
Augustine as the most insightful of Christian thinkers.
Pride: An Antithetical Approach to Defining Humility
While humility and attitudes associated with it are pervasive motifs in Augustine's
work, he provides no detailed definition of the word. The approach here to
understanding the various ways in which Augustine uses the word entails an analysis
of what he saw as humility's antithesis, pride or self-regard, as humankind's basic
For Niebuhr a distinguishing feature of Augustine's realism is his biblical
understanding of human nature, "with the ancillary conception of the seat of evil
being in the self."40 Experience, history and biblical understanding taught that the
evil in the self had profound implications for human beings as social creatures. While
human beings are by nature social creatures, their sinful nature creates "the ills which
abound in human society."41 In Augustine's thinking on conflicted human nature the
tension was always present: "for the human race is, more than any other species, at
38 His sharp critique notwithstanding, Niebuhr launches a strong defence of Augustine: "Whatever the
defects of the Augustine approach may be, we must acknowledge his immense superiority both over
those who preceded him and who came after him....A generation which finds its communities
imperilled and in decay from the smallest and most primordial community, the family, to the largest
and most recent, the potential world community, might well take council of Augustine in solving its
perplexities." Christian Realism and Political Problems, 145-146.
j9 At Confessions 5. 9. 16 Chadwick notes Augustine's first use of the term "original sin" to "describe
inherent human egotism, the inner condition contrasted with overt actions." 82, note 13.




once social by nature and quarrelsome by perversion."42 Any realistic assessment of
social conflict required an understanding that the root cause of discordance among
human beings distinguished by free will is pride or self-regard. Humanity's prideful
nature impedes the relationship with God and thereby disorders all human
relationships. Human self-regard, in Augustine's view, is the reason human beings
cannot govern themselves without some sufficient force to maintain a just social
order.43
Augustine's City of God provides tin analysis of human political behaviour from his
theological perspective in which there are two ultimate human communities:
One, the city of those whose wills are submissive to God; the other,
the city of those who will to rival him. The first consults the common
welfare for the sake of celestial fellowship; the other grasps at selfish
control for the sake of arrogant dominance. By their loves men
distinguish and declare their separate destinies. Those who love the
good of neighbour as much as the good of the self and therefore love
according to God will grow in peace and at last reign eternally with
him; while the city of those who love self above the neighbour and
love according to man will be self-divided by wars and suffer eternal
punishment with the devil44
Where, as here, Augustine speaks of the loves that determine humanity's ultimate
destiny he is speaking of the will. As Harrison observed of Augustine, human love
and will are identified. For human beings to will is not simply a matter of rational
consideration and choice: "rather it is to love something and to he moved to act on
the basis of that love." This willing love is not incidental but lies at the heart of
human existence. The will is ever active and eventually leads us to one of the two of
Augustine's cities. Those whose love is oriented toward God and neighbour are
persons of good will who love charitably. Love oriented toward the self, toward
things, and toward other persons as they may serve the self, is described by
42 Ibid. 12.28.
43 Elaine Pagels, "Augustine on Nature and Human Nature" in LeMoine and Kleinhenz, 96.
44 Cited in Battenhouse, 52-53.
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Augustine as cupidity, concupiscence, or lust.45 These attitudes of ill will are all
expressions of sin that, for Augustine, "is nothing but the evil assent of free will,
when we incline to those things which justice forbids and from which we are free to
abstain."46
The sensual direction of these loves of ill will point to Augustine's understanding that
as love is misdirected toward creatures and the created, the love and awareness of the
Creator declines; our love of God is diminished in proportion to our inclination
toward the things of the senses. Yet the body, as part of the creation that God
pronounced good, is not in and of itself morally bad. Rather, it is man's ill will that
corrupts the body47 Thus "fleshly desire" is understood as a symptomatic
manifestation of the deeper and central disorder that can "baffle, confound, and
defeat our best attempts to defeat them."48
The immoderate love of the things of the sense is derivative, however,
and rests upon a foundational defection, namely, self-love or pride. It
is through pride that man consents to the affections of the sense.
"Pride is the beginning of all sin; and the beginning of man's sin is a
falling away from God."49
In falling away from the love of God prideful humans further compound their sin in
the idolatrous embrace of "inferior things." Here man becomes ever more embroiled
in confusion of his own making: "thinking that he possesses the same nature of his
Creator, he turns to himself, cuts himself off from the truth and becomes blind."50
Augustine thus observes that sinful humankind prefers "imitating God to serving
45 Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth, 94-95.
46
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God."51 Pretension that impedes the right relationship with God blinds human beings
to their limited perspective and finitude. In their narcissistic concentration on self
they become spiritually isolated from others.52 Harrison notes that Augustine likens
the finite perspective of man to a statue fixed in the corner of a building: "He can
o
only see what lies in his immediate vicinity, he can see parts but not the whole."
Seeking to overcome their finite perspectives human beings construct false eternals
out of inferior things and convince themselves that they comprehend the whole and
not the part.
Opposed to the disorder of prideful self-love is the love of God above all things finite
and perishable. Only in the love of God can humanity find the truth that properly
orders all other loves and relationships. In Augustine's view, truly ordered love "is
founded upon man's humility and subjection to God, whereby he acknowledges his
creaturely status and dependence upon his creator, so that he receives God's
illumination and enlightenment."54 The perfect love of God is man's supreme virtue,
the ultimate human good from which all other goods are derived. To love God is "to
love Virtue, to love Wisdom, to love Truth, to love with all your heart, and with all
your soul, and with all your mind."55 Prideful self-love is the disease of sin that
impedes this love; the grace of humility is its cure. "Cure pride and there will be no
more iniquity," Augustine wrote, "for this is the commendation of humility, whereas
pride doeth its own will, humility doeth the will of God."56
Christology of Augustine's Humility
While the significance of humility in Augustine's writing is explicit he provides no
51
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precise definition of the word. We know humility as a gift of grace that opens human
beings to the love of God. It orients sinful man toward the divine relationship that
properly orders all human loves. It is the essential attitude from which all human
goods flow. In Augustine humility is best understood through its characteristics and
attitudes, most importantly as he finds them exemplified in the life ofChrist. Indeed,
the defining characteristic of Augustine's humility is "above all, Christocentric. Its
core is the figure of the 'humiliated Christ.'"57 In his sermon On the Gospel ofJohn
Augustine speaks in the words of Christ:
I came not to do my own will but the will of Him that sent me. I came
humble, I came to teach humility, I came a master of humility; he that
cometh to me is made one body with me; he that cometh to me
becomes humble; he who adhereth to me will be humble, because he
doeth not his own will, but the will ofGod, and therefore he shall not
f o
be cast out for when he was proud he was cast out."
Although he found the essential characteristics of humility in the life of Christ,
Augustine of course saw Christ as much more than a teacher and exemplar of
humility. Using Augustine's image, Christ is "the hand of God" extended to sinful
man. This image vastly enlarges Augustine's understanding of the grace of humility
as God's "redeeming act of divine self-abnegation." In the life and death of Christ,
the character of the "humble" God is most fully revealed.59 Using another of the
medical allusions of which he was fond Augustine reflects that the nature of man's
pride is so disordering that it "brought down the almighty physician from heaven and
humbled Him." So virulent a disorder, he observed, required "so strong a
medicine."60 Augustine understood that the disease of human pride was curable only
through the humility of Christ who, "although He was the high exalted, He
57
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descended into abjection."61 The humble spirit and its attitudes are the gift of God's
grace through Christ.
If humility in imitation of Christ is for Augustine the defining pattern for Christian
living, it necessarily accepts the possibilities of suffering, shame and humiliation. But
humble acceptance of such possibilities is not to be identified simply with abject
self-abasement. The attitudes of humility in Augustine reflect both "abasement and
exaltation: abasement as opposed to an overweening pride, yet exaltation, for
humility bestows on man true worth and wisdom."62 To be emphasised here is that
Augustine's idea of abasement is understood within the entirely positive orientation
that Augustine assigns to humility. Self-abasement in sin may be seen as a
punishment that fits the crime. But through grace abasement before God leads human
beings to Him and through Him to their highest and best potential as His beloved
creatures. For this reason abasement before God does not require a denial of
whatever goodness or gifts we may possess. Indeed, Augustine observes that, "the
man who loves God is not wrong in loving himself,"63; but the humble spirit militates
against gifts becoming a source of pride and acknowledges them as an operation of
God's grace.64
For Augustine Christian humility is the ground of wisdom because as human beings
confess their sinful inadequacies they come to know their true worth as God's
beloved creatures. In humility before God they recognize that wisdom and
self-knowledge flow not from the meretricious vanities of self-will but from divine
grace imparted to the humbled spirit. 5 Whereas intellectual pride, in its selfish
desire to dominate and exploit, is an expression of ingratitude, the humble spirit
accepts its intellectual gifts with gratitude and directs them toward the things of
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God.66 Through the grace of humility human beings are opened to the wisdom of
God through which they gain true knowledge of Him and themselves. Here
knowledge issues in acknowledgement, the essential role of reason in human
knowledge, always hostage to the temptations of intellectual pride, finds correction in
humility.67
Humility and Loving Service: Discerning True Peace
Humility received through grace and patterned after Christ also shapes and illumines
our relationship with others. It is manifest in what Augustine called "love that
serves." The willingness to serve others as Christ did in washing the feet of the
disciples, exemplifies humility of the heart. For Augustine humility's willingness to
render loving service reaches far beyond monastic life to distinguish Christian life in
all human collectives.68 Other-directed service indicates the good will of those who
belong to God's kingdom. While those in the earthly city "lust for domination," in
the city ofGod,
Those put in authority and those subject to them serve one another in
love, the rulers by their counsel, the subjects by obedience. The one
city loves its own strength shown in its powerful leaders; the other
says to its God, I will love you, my lord, my strength.69
Augustine's idea of loving service evolved from his understanding of humankind's
social nature and its highest good. This "final good," Augustine wrote in The City of
God, "is that for which other things are to be desired, while it is itself to be desired
for its own sake."70 For Christians the final good is the love of God. In the City of
God Augustine followed philosophy's insistence that any society's daily existence
66Cushman, "Faith and Reason," in Battenhouse, 301.
67 Ibid., 310.
68





reflected the ultimate good to which it devoted its aspirations and vitalities. But
whereas Augustine believed God to be the ultimate human good not achievable in
history, philosophers variously taught that peace or justice were the highest human
goods achievable in this life and by human effort. Here Augustine held that
philosophy was refuted by both history and contemporary experience. Neither peace
• 71
nor justice as idealised by philosophy had been realised in any human society. In
this regard, Augustine's understanding of peace and justice enriches his idea of loving
Christian service.
In City 19.12 Augustine wrote, "there is no man who does not wish for peace."
Peace, he observed, is "the instinctive aim of all creatures, and is even the ultimate
cause of war." Like all creatures human beings seek that peace in which they are
most secure. The problem is not that human beings do not want peace but that they
desire their peace embracing their particular needs, their particular ambitions and
their particular security. Because all human conceptions of peace are tainted with this
self-interest and prideful particularity no human ideal of peace can claim to be a
universal good.
For even the wicked when they go to war do so to defend the peace of
their own people, and desire to make all men their own people, if they
can, so that all men and all things might together be subservient to one
master. And how could that happen, unless they should consent to a
peace of his dictation either through love or through fear? Thus pride
is a perverted imitation of God. For pride hates a fellowship of
equality under God, and seeks to impose its own dominion on fellow
men, in place of God's rule. This means that it hates the just peace of
God, and loves its own peace of injustice. And yet it cannot help
loving peace of some kind or other. For no creature's perversion is so
contrary to nature as to destroy the very last vestiges of its nature.72
It follows that the Christians' highest good cannot be earthly peace and justice, even
that of their own design, because there is no escaping the finite and prideful
self-interest of human nature. As pilgrims advancing toward the city of God,
71




Christians seek the perfect and just peace that flows from humble obedience to God's
perfect will. Yet the pilgrims will find true peace only when they reach the City in
-7-1
which the Ultimate Good, untainted by human sin, is to be found. From the divine
perspective humanity's finite notion of peace is merely the "shadow peace"
exemplified by Rome's prideful will to dominate.74 Even so, as Christian pilgrims
sojourn in the earthly city they too benefit from its partial justice and imperfect
peace; they recognize with Augustine that without just order, kingdoms are simply
"gangs of criminals on a large scale."75 Accordingly, and consistent with a rightly
ordered love of God, the Christian "makes use of the earthly peace and defends and
seeks the compromise between human wills in respect of the provisions relevant to
the mortal nature ofman."
Augustine acknowledges that although human institutions reflect sinful pride they are
nevertheless essential to any semblance of the order essential to any relatively just
peace. Because Christians and the Church have an interest in these proximate goods,
Christians may owe the state obedience and service, even military service and the use
of force, consistent with their first and highest allegiance to God. Thus Augustine
leads Niebuhr in realising that the Christian's obligation to achieve proximate goods
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may entail having to do bad things. While responsible Christians recognise this
necessity they nevertheless hate what it may require of them and cry to God for
forgiveness.78 All such service should be patterned after the just and humble man's
household, wherein those who give orders are the servants of those they command:
"For they do not give orders because of a lust for domination but from a dutiful
concern for the interests of others, not in pride in taking precedence over others, but
















responsibility, even that of the emperor, is to be characterised by humility and
contrition.80
We may say that Augustine's idea of loving service is expressed as humility in
action. Niebuhr followed Augustine in understanding the love commandment the
truest Christian definition of justice: that rendering others their due is perfectly
expressed in loving God and in loving the neighbour as oneself. For Augustine,
"Love in its beginning is justice in its beginnings; love progressing is justice
O 1
progressing; great love is great justice; love perfected is justice perfected." Thus
love's requirements transcend the partial and socially relative requirements of justice.
The law of love is ever "the defining factor and lowest common denominator for all
• • 89
Christian conduct in every age and every society."
Augustine's understanding of prideful human nature nevertheless disallowed the
notion that the law of love negated the need for social structures that impose a
relative just order. While he saw monastic life as a vent for those seeking individual
perfection, Augustine emphasised the wider Christian duty "to perfect the peace of
oo
the city of this world." Love might require the use of coercion and force, e.g., the
loving father punishing the wayward son or the nurse restraining a delirious patient.84
As we noted, Niebuhr followed Augustine in understanding the necessity of coercion
and force in the pursuit of social justice. Niebuhr affirmed Augustine's acceptance
that peace and justice in conformance with the law of love cannot be achieved in
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Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth, 211. For Niebuhr the law of love provides the transcendent
norm, the "impossible possibility", by which Christians measure all attempts at justice. "Love is thus
the end term of any system ofmorals. It is the moral requirement in which all schemes ofjustice are
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83 Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, 131.
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Augustine has to say about life of the Christian within the world," the same may be
said ofNiebuhr.8"7
There are nevertheless distinctions between Augustine and Niebuhr regarding the
appropriate Christian attitude toward social goods such as peace and justice.
Augustine's pilgrims benefit from the imperfect peace of the earthly city and may
rightly have an obligation to preserve it. For Augustine, however, the end of such
service is not to achieve secular peace and justice but to safeguard the Church. The
pilgrims are not passionately interested in secular peace and justice as social goods
per se. In Augustine social responsibility "never achieves the absoluteness of a
command from the God whose Kingdom breaks into and transforms history." Here
Niebuhr follows not Augustine but reformed tradition. As Bingham and Mollegen
note this tradition recognizes that while perfect peace is beyond human possibilities it
must be pursued "through the earthly order ... [that] the City ofGod comes upon the
07
City ofEarth to judge it and to transform it, as well as to uplift it to God."
For Niebuhr the love commandment requires the Christian's passionate responsibility
for justice however imperfectly it can be achieved in history. It is in seeking justice
that the love commandment of Christ is fulfilled in Christian life and made relevant
to the whole of human society.88 The attitudes of humility characterise Christian
responsibility because they militate against the misuse of the power essential to any
earthly approximation of a just peace. These attitudes point always to the perfect
love ofGod in which all human endeavours are judged and found wanting.
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understanding of the "dynamic" and anarchic" elements in political life far superior to "classical
political theories." Destiny, 283-84.
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Ibid., 394 (Emphasis mine).
88 Niebuhr's most sustained treatment of the relationship between love and justice is found in Chapter
Four, "The Relevance of an Impossible Ethical Ideal," in An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics
(Harper & Row, 1935; New York: HarperCollins, 1987), 62-83.
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Attitudes of Humility in Augustine
We have seen that the attitudes of humility are pervasive within Augustine's
understanding of Christian life. The grace of humility opens human beings to divine
love. It is the ground of the ultimate human good, the true love of God, from which
all other human goods flow. The love of God orders all human relationships and
illumines the proper value of the lesser goods that are constituents of humankind's
finite existence. In addition to opening us to divine love, the grace of humility
discerns the obligations of faith and characterises loving service. Through grace,
humility illumines and safeguards the path to God along which pride and self-regard
are incessant, seductive and potentially mortal snares.
If Augustine was the West's first great realist, as Niebuhr believed, his insights
regarding humility hold particular relevance to Christian social responsibility.
Perhaps these insights also may be called the fruits of humility. Augustine's humility
is the ground of human wisdom because it opens us to the wisdom of God. Through
divine wisdom we began to see as God sees; we gain self-knowledge of our true
relationship with God and with others. In self-knowledge we confess our sinful
selves before God and accept our finitude even as we learn our worth as His loved
and redeemed children. Thus acknowledgment becomes knowledge. Knowledge of
God's redemptive love and grace through Christ is the ground of Christian confidence
while knowledge of the sinful self militates against pride that transforms confidence
into self-righteousness. And though knowledge gained in the right relationship with
God values the essential role of reason in human understanding it knows as well that
reason can be corrupted by intellectual pride and always requires humility's
89
correction.
Humbly accepting the finite nature of all human knowledge opens our minds to other
perspectives and strengthens the bonds of our common humanity. Thus in Augustine
patience is another attitude of Christian humility. In his monastic vocation he placed
a premium on patience "as a duty of mutual toleration" among those sharing the
89 Cushman, "Faith and Reason," in Battenhouse, 310.
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monastic life. Such patience is a significant sign of one's love for Christ and its
absence indicates an absence of humility in the self. "Do you not have something
about you that someone else has to bear with? I exhort you all— no, it is God's voice
exhorting you all—bear with one another."90 Patience is especially required of the
powerful who in fulfilling their responsibilities "must be ready to wield discipline
and impose fear."91
While the relationship of patience to toleration appears evident, particularly as
Augustine characterised monastic patience as forbearance, his understanding of
toleration is to be viewed in the wider social and political context. When he wrote in
City 19.7 that Christian social responsibility entails a circumscribed compromise
with the views of others and respectful obedience to secular authority Augustine
reflects a distinctly Roman understanding of toleration.92 Augustine's toleration thus
links the idea of patience with discipline and force. His understanding was further
shaped in his protracted and increasingly bitter confrontation with the militant
perfectionism of Donatism. In the early stages of the confrontation with the Donatists
Augustine used personal relations, writings and public debate to persuade them of
their errors. In the end, however, Augustine called for their suppression by state
intervention (which the Donatists themselves had sought unsuccessfully against the
Church). His position, according to Limirande, was grounded in Augustine's regard
for "the irreplaceable character of truth":
This conviction about truth entails for him that, since the Catholic
Church is the one dwelling place of truth on earth, actual membership
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a conquered peoples "so long as they did not threaten allegiance to Rome and its Gods." Harrison,
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The Saint Augustine Lecture 1974 (Villanova University Press, 1975), 12. In Sermon 15.6 Augustine
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is necessary for salvation. Among all religious institutions, she is the
only subject of right, and she is bound to protect all her children
against error. It was no paradox for Augustine to affirm that correction
and coercion were an imperative of charity.94
Having rejected Augustine's doctrine of the Church as earthly dispenser of divine
grace, Niebuhr finds in its further claim to possess absolute truth the powerful engine
of spiritual self-righteousness. The Church's pretension to possess what cannot be
humanly possessed reflects the prideful foundation of all religious intolerance. That
this claim was used to justify the crusades and the Inquisition demonstrates the evil
potential inherent in all such pretension.95 Its pretension to absolute truth was the
basis for Niebuhr's description of the Catholic Church as "collectively and officially
intolerant," despite the unquestioned humility and contrition he personally found
among its members.96 Niebuhr quickly observes, however, that the Roman Church
has no franchise on prideful pretension. Some in the Reformation ironically fell into
the evils of religious self-righteousness. Niebuhr notes that because some reformers
were barren of "the humility which betrays the 'broken spirit and the contrite heart,"'
the fanaticism that tainted aspects of the Reformation "disturbed the peace of both
Q7
the church and civil society no less than did Catholic intolerance." Thus in both
Roman Catholic and Reformed traditions Niebuhr finds the seductive power of self-
94 Ibid., 72-73. In The Children ofLight and the Children ofDarkness Niebuhr cites Leo XIII's
encyclical Immortale Dei: '"It is a sin in the state not to have care of religion ... or out of the many
forms of religion to adopt that one which chimes with the fancy, for we are abound absolutely to
worship God in that way in which He hath shown to be His will.' According to the Catholic doctrine
'no state is justified in supporting error or in according error the same recognition as truth'; the truth,
of course, being embodied in the Catholic faith.'" 88-89.
95
Destiny, 229-230. "In this claim in the realm of culture [the Church] obviously destroys the Biblical
paradox of grace. It pretends to have as a simple possession, what cannot be so possessed. It may
vary in its attitude slightly towards other versions of the Christian faith from time to time, but it is
completely consistent and unyielding in its conviction that it alone possesses the truth and the whole
truth." Destiny, 229. It will be remembered that this was written in 1939, decades before the
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righteousness sufficient to pervert even a faith based in God's absolute love and
no
forgiveness into "furious religion."
What of forgiveness, the attitude of humility that Niebuhr posits the "crown of
Christian ethics"?99 If the significance of forgiveness in Augustine's thought is not
as explicit as in Niebuhr's it is sufficiently implicit to be identified as an essential
attitude of humility. In Augustine the grace of humility brings sinful humanity into
its proper relationship with God that properly orders all human relationships. Here, in
Niebuhr's view Augustine had "restored the biblical understanding of the divine-
human encounter."100
The biblical message is of forgiveness by God toward man and the
corresponding forgiveness which men must practice toward one
another and will practice the more successfully if they realize the
fragmentary character of their own virtues and achievements.101
The attitude of forgiveness appears inextricably related to each of the attitudes of
humility discerned in Augustine's work. Despite their official designation as heretics,
Augustine's attitude toward the Manicheans approaches a degree of toleration akin to
our contemporary understanding: they should be corrected "not by contention, and
strife, and persecution, but by kindly consolation, by friendly exhortation, by quiet
discussion.102 Much of his attitude toward them was the result of Augustine's
reflection upon his own struggle with their faith:
98 The Desecularization ofthe World, ed. Peter Berger (London: Eerdmans, 1999), 2.
99 "The crown of Christian Ethics is the doctrine of forgiveness. In it the whole genius of prophetic
faith is expressed. Love as forgiveness is the most difficult and impossible ofmoral achievments. Yet
it is a possibility if the impossibility of love is recognized and the sin in the self is acknowledged.
Therefore an ethic culiminating in an impossible possibility produces the choicest fruit in terms of the
doctrine of forgiveness, the demand that the evil in the other shall be borne without vindictiveness
because the evil in the self is known." An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, 137.
100 Brown , Niebuhr andHis Age, 199.
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I can no account treat you angrily; for I must bear with you now as
formerly I had to bear with myself; and I must be as patient towards
you as my associates were with me, when I went madly about and
• *103
blindly astray in your beliefs.
Finally, in Augustine compassion and responsibility emerge as attitudes of Christian
humility. This follows in part from what has been said regarding the relational
dimensions of humility that have their origin in the right human-divine relationship.
Through the grace of humility Christians discern humanity's true condition before
God as both sinners and His beloved and forgiven creatures. The new life
characterized by love and gratitude to God issues in the desire for loving service to
God and to others.
Aware of our own infirmities we are moved to compassion to help the
indigent, assisting them in the same way as we would wish to be
helped if we were in the same distress—and not only in easy ways,
like "the grass bearing seed", but with the protection and aid given
with a resolute determination like "the tree bearing fruit" (Gen. 1:11).
This means such kindness as rescuing a person suffering injustice
from the hand of the powerful and providing the shelter of protection
by the mighty force of good judgement. 104
Contemporary Perspectives on Augustine and Coercion
Recent scholarship has struggled with Augustine's justification and use of coercion
against religious dissenters. Given all that has been said about the importance of
humility (and toleration as one of its constituent attitudes) in Augustine's work, the
debate assumes additional significance for this dissertation. While Niebuhr broadly
addresses this issue in his critique of Augustine's doctrine of the church and grace he
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offers no systematic analysis of the apparent paradox between Augustine's emphasis
on humility and his readiness to use coercion. In his 1997 essay "Augustine on
Justifying Coercion," John Bowlin does not address the motif of humility but does
offer perspectives that help clarify Augustine's treatment of the just and unjust uses
of coercion.105
Noting that most contemporary writers are uniformly critical of Augustine's use and
justification of coercion, Bowlin insists that a fuller understanding begins by placing
Augustine in context. There we find the use of coercion by magistrates and bishops a
fact of life, a "morally unproblematic" given in the proper ordering of all human
social relationships. "In business and in family life, and eventually in the relationship
between a bishop and his flock, coercion was an ordinary feature of the North
African moral landscape."106 Moreover, as Augustine's protracted and increasingly
desperate struggle with the Donatists attests, intolerance characterized nearly all
religious traditions in conflict. Indeed, in his dealings with the Donatists Augustine
demonstrates a growing intolerance for their dissenting views and disruptive
behaviour and willingness to use state coercion in their suppression.107 Bowlin finds
that Augustine's contemporaries would be less surprised by his actual use of state
power to suppress dissent than by his persistent attempts to justify it. For some of
Augustine's friendly critics among scholars today his use of coercion and the
justification he offers for its employment provoke their "modern indignation." Two
such scholars are Robert Markus and John Milbank.108
105 Annual of the Society ofChristian Ethics 17 (1997), 49-70.
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Ibid., 51.
107 As noted, Emilien Lamirande presents a more moderate view ofAugustine's toleration and use of
coercion, at least in his early years as bishop. "Church, State and Toleration: An Intriguing Change of
Mind in Augustine," 30-35. Bowlin does note that the young Bishop of Hippo called for "gentle"
means of suppression with "threats and severity" being the last resort. "Here is a refined intolerance if
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108 Bowlin's references to Markus are taken from his Saeculum: History andSociety in the Theology
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Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
35
Markus, while finding much to admire in Augustine's "liberal" understanding of a
secular, pluralist and autonomous politics of the state, is troubled by his unapologetic
use of state coercion to suppress religious dissent. Markus is troubled, Bowlin
observes, because Augustine's "theologically neutral account" of political life,
concerned only with the penultimate goods such as reasonable order and earthly
peace, should afford all persons who stand to benefit from these goods a voice in
politics. Given Markus' account of Augustine's understanding of politics, "no human
beings, no human communities, should be permitted to direct the apparatus of
political authority to the service of the goods they consider ultimate."109 For critics
such as Markus Augustine's desacralization of politics should have allowed a
plurality of opinion in the political view. That it did not creates a troublesome
inconsistency ("unresolved tension") in Augustine's mature social thought. Markus
struggles to explain how so "liberal" a view of the political role can be made
consistent with Augustine's "illiberal" use of state coercion against religious dissent.
Bowlin finds Markus' discovery of an Augustinian liberalism probably anachronistic
and perhaps false.110
When Augustine resists every effort to sacralize political life he is not
providing a prescriptive account of politics, liberal or otherwise. He is not
telling us what the limits of political community look like. He is not
telling us what the limits of political authority should be. Rather, his
intentions are strictly negative. God's salvific purposes do not depend
upon the fate of any earthly society, and therefore the goods that can be
achieved within any political association outside the city of God cannot
be regarded as ultimate. They cannot be regarded as ends in themselves,
at least not simply. Rather, the goods of political life and the mechanisms
of political authority are mixed goods, neither strictly final ends nor
merely instrumental means. They are proximate ends that are pursued
and achieved, at least in part, so that they might be put to use for the sake
of achieving to ends that are in fact regarded as final. Whether this or that
final end is pursued with the assistance of the mixed goods of this or that
political community largely depends upon the vicissitudes of political
fortune. Indeed, it is this initial neutrality with respect to final ends,
transformed as princes come and go, that is the consequence of





Thus the use of state coercion to suppress Donatist dissent is to transform
politics by directing it to ultimate ends. It is true that the early Church could
not avail itself of politics but when circumstances allowed it to do so its use of
state coercion was to use politics in the service of God, humanity's ultimate
end. In short, writes Bowlin, "Augustine resists secular limitations upon the
119 •
use of the temporal goods of political association." To infer, as Markus
apparently does, that Augustine's idea of political autonomy points to some
modern notion of liberal politics is to infer, falsely in Bowlin's view, that
politics are in fact ultimate in their own sphere. Such a view reflects the sort of
error into which Augustine believed the Donatists had fallen.
The Donatists infer an eschatological distinction from sociological
realities. Markus infers sociological distinctions from
eschatological realities. Both inferences assume a necessary
connection between sociological and eschatological treatments of
the two cities. Both should be resisted. If sociological treatments of
the two cities have no necessary eschatological significance, then
why should we think that eschatological distinctions yield
sociological prescriptions? In fact, contra Markus, it is the
inference to autonomy in politics that Augustine would find odd,
precisely because it implies that the ends of politics are in principle
ultimate in their own sphere.113
Augustine encourages prudence, leniency and mercy on the part of coercing
magistrates. Nevertheless he insists that if grace does not transform politics for good
"it will be transformed by vice." A city that fails to obey the commands of God can
"neither expect justice to obtain among its citizens nor enjoy those temporal
advantages that are the fruit of just political action."114 Just here it appears that
Bowlin finds Augustine's use of coercion justified by what the Bishop of Hippo







Milbank's critique of the justification of coercion follows from what he finds as
coercion's inconsistency with Augustine's supernaturalism. Milbank rejects Markus'
view that Augustine's social theology prescribes something like the political
autonomy of contemporary liberalism. To the contrary, Milbank takes the view that
Augustine's desacralization of politics affirms the autonomy of the church not the
state, and that the church may rightfully make use of proximate political goods.
Milbank's objection to Augustine's justification of coercion, rather, is that coercion
of religious dissent is "inconsistent with the ontological priority of peace over
conflict." that Augustine himself holds for both the church and Christian virtue.116
Thus for Milbank coercion by the Church is inconsistent with the supernaturalism
that characterizes all other facets of Augustine's social thought. Indeed, it is
Augustine's refusal to acknowledge that goods of the "natural sphere" are any more
than illusions that Milbank finds so appealing. The citizens of the heavenly city will
apply its standards to their sojourn through the city of the earth. In forgiveness, care
for others, the rejection of vengeance and in charity they act as the earthly city does
not even as they refuse to compromise with its notions of virtue and peace that are
enmeshed in "violence and conflict." Just here Milbank believes he discerns
Augustine's error:
In his willingness to use force against religious dissent and to justify
coercion, Augustine ignores the moral consequences of his own ontology.
When he recommends peace pursued through the subordination of rivals
and justice secured in a context of conflict, he forgoes his uniform
supernaturalism and finds real value in the peace and justice of the world.
Similarly, when he imagines God willing discipline and punishment for
the sake of the good, he gives worldly violence real presence among the
saints and angels in the heavenly city.117
Bowlin asserts that Milbank's conclusion regarding Augustine's inconsistency may
be "more apparent than real." Yet in this regard Bowlin's objection to Milbank's
assertions is no mere cavil: ifwe are to apply the heavenly standards to peace and
virtue, as Milbank does, then they must apply to all moral practices, including those
that distinguish the church. If it is true that coercion cannot be imagined as necessary
116 Milbank, 363, in Bowlin, 60.
117 Bowlin, 61-62.
38
in the heavenly kingdom then neither can it be imagined that forgiveness, restitution,
reconciliation-all marks or virtues of the church-will be found in the city ofGod.
If resort to coercion by the church must be refused precisely because the
conditions that make it imaginable in this life are absent in the house of
the blessed, then the forgiveness and refuge the church offers in this life
must also be refused, for they are equally unimaginable in that heavenly
form of life.118
Augustine's justification of coercion against religious dissent reflects regret over the
necessary use of force for relative justice in the earthly kingdom, not remorse for an
inability to meet the perfectionist standards of the heavenly kingdom. In this regard,
Bowlin rejects Milbank's assertion that Augustine's defense may be characterized as
a "lamentable kind of political consequentialism."119 We can conclude that
Augustine believes in the possibility of just coercion without finding that his
justification is in fact this sort of consequentialist calculation. Here, rather, Augustine
asserts that justice provides a standard in the use coercion against religious dissent
that must not be transgressed even as he knows that temporal justice remains an
"awful necessity." Through grace we do the best we can in this "wretched business,"
knowing that misery accompanies even success.120
Bowlin concludes that if there is room for the necessity of forgiveness in the church
there may also be a place for coercion. Nevertheless, while we cannot imagine the
church without forgiveness the case for coercion is certainly less clear, most
particularly as it touches upon the matter of human freedom. It is just here that many
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of Augustine's critics today believe that freedom trumps any justification that he
offers for the use of coercion. Yet it was in the context of the Donatist debate that
Augustine most explicitly addresses the issues of coercion and freedom.
Augustine concedes that coercion constrains liberum arbitrium, the
freedom to believe this or that, or to choose this or that course of action
(Ep.\13.3; Ep. 185.vi.22). He also insists that in certain instances
coercion's yield is "a somewhat freer sense of liberty" (£p.l85.vi. 17).
Here he has in mind what we would no doubt call positive freedom; the
liberty (libertas) to participate in this or that activity and secure the goods
that accompany participation (Ep. 173.3-4). Nevertheless, because he
believes that negative liberty is a genuine good he refuses to conclude
that every negative liberty lost can be justified by this or that positive
liberty gained. Instead he assumes a rough collection of criteria that must
be met for coercion to proceed justly and for negative liberty to be
• 121sacrificed for the sake of positive.
In this precis of Augustine's justification of coercion in letters to Boniface and
••• *122
Donatus, Bowlin discerns three criteria in determining just coercion.
First, just coercion must be confined within specific relationships. Parents, for
example, may properly restrain their own but not others' children. The physician
may rightfully discipline his assistant in the practice of medicine. But coercion
outside such relationships risks injustice because proper authority is lacking and
because a negative liberty has been endangered by arbitrary fore.
Second, coercion must follow truth and its means used to achieve goods compatible
with human flourishing. Such coercion aims at a rightly ordered love of desirable
good. While neither belief nor desire can be compelled through coercion, Augustine
argues that habits can be challenged and the mind disciplined to discern truth. Here
he reasons that when truth is known the will is properly ordered and the right action
freely embraced: "it is this hope and this choice that makes the loss of negative
121 Ibid., 66.
122 Ibid., 66 passim
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freedom bearable."123 Coercion that directs us to this right choice may be harmless,
even praiseworthy, because it leads us to a willing participation in true human goods.
Finally, Augustine relates coercion with Christian charity. Rightly intentioned
suppression of dissent must always have a care for those suppressed and, as above,
the good achieved must be for their benefit. This good must always be one that they
properly may come to love, a result that would not be possible without the rightly
intentioned use of coercion.
For Augustine participation in the earthly city ofGod is humankind's great good. Yet
sinful human nature inclines the will not toward this great and more difficult good
but to falsely pleasurable goods increasingly entrenched by habit. This being the case,
Augustine posits "fraternal coercion" as a duty of pastoral care. Yet Bowlin finds
Augustine's sentiments in distinguishing between just and unjust coercion quite
similar to ours today and that it is precisely these sentiments that are reflected in his
justification of coercion against what he considers the Donatists' confused theology.
Augustine is at pains to demonstrate Donatist error because it is the truth that must
distinguish between just coercion and unjust persecution.
This no doubt overstates the point. And yet, once we realize that coercion
deployed in order to secure participation in a false practice cannot
possibly be just, we can no longer conclude that Augustine's anxious
efforts to pointout [sic] Donatist confusions are the clever moves of a
cynical debater. Quite the contrary, they are signs ofmoral seriousness.124
Augustine insists that Christian magistrates, like parents, have a role-specific duty to
direct the conduct of those for whom they are responsible; absent this role-specific
duty, coercion would be unjust. Because coercion is part and parcel of the Christian
magistrate's duties, Augustine sees nothing extraordinary about their willingness to





magistrate is just because its objective is the good. Moreover, Augustine avers that
coercion may reflect the requirements of Christian love. When force may serve to
correct dangerous error or restrain disordered conduct it seeks to direct us to the great
goods of the heavenly kingdom. A failure to use just coercion in this regard is a
failure of Christian love. Conversely, it is a failure of charity to coerce those who
either cannot or should not participate in the goods or goods to be achieved. "Only
those who know and love the good should be encouraged to do so." These include
schismatics, e.g., the Donatists, but not pagans, who may be restrained from certain
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practices but not compelled to Christian faith.
As Bowlin demonstrates, both Markus and Milbank struggle to reconcile the great
truths they find in Augustine's public theology with what Markus, at least, considers
a "horrible doctrine" of church discipline. Yet it is precisely in their reluctance to
grant moral seriousness to Augustine's justification of state coercion against religious
dissent that Bowlin finds them falling into error. This justification is based upon what
Lamirande sees as Augustine's insistence upon the "irreplaceable character of
i or
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truth," and the responsibilities that follow from it. Here Bowlin finds little
inconsistency between Augustine's justification of coercion and his broader social
thought. Moreover, he finds the moral sentiments in Augustine's justification largely
mirrored in contemporary reflections upon the moral use of force. These sentiments
remain relevant to contemporary moral discourse despite the "twists and turns" of
history from which modern liberal societies have emerged.127
Despite his frequent criticism of liberal idealisms that failed to understand the
necessity of coercion in achieving relative justice, Niebuhr was unquestionably a
product of modern liberal social thought. His dissent from Augustine's justification
for state coercion in the matter of religion largely tracks those presented by Bowlin.
But Niebuhr was particularly critical of what he perceived as Augustine's claim of
the church to possess absolute truth, a claim that is so central to his moral





that any human being or institution can lay claim to absolute truth, always insisting
that our truth is not to be identified with God's truth. Clearly Niebuhr accepts the
essential place of truth in determining the just use of coercion. But he was ever
mindful that human fmitude delimits our idea of the truth and that sinful human
nature perverts our truth by lending is a finality that it cannot possess. It is just here
that we succumb to the destructive temptations of self-righteousness.
Conclusion
In Augustine's work Niebuhr encountered the theologian he considered the most
reliable of all Christian thinkers. In Augustine he discovered a towering Christian
theologian who was as well, in Niebuhr's estimate, the West's first great realist. As
he broke with the liberal Christian idealism of his youth and matured as a Christian
thinker Niebuhr found in Augustine an ancient Christian tradition that illumined a
faith relevant to 20th Century experience. For Niebuhr Augustine was the most
reliable of Christian thinkers because he discerned in the innermost recesses of faith
the spiritual resources essential to Christian life and social responsibility. It was
Augustine who first "emancipated" Niebuhr from his liberal Christian idealism and
then provided the foundation for his Christian realism.128
Augustine's influence on Christian realism is pervasive but nowhere more so than in
his insistence on the essential role of humility in Christian faith, life and
responsibility. Humility, in Augustine, is the beginning of faith. It is the gift of grace
that brings the sinful creature into conformity with the perfect Creator. Only the
divine grace of humility can overcome the sinful pride in human nature that impedes
the true relationship with God. Humility's work establishes and nurtures this
fundamental relationship and properly orders all human relationships. In this regard
humility is seen as the gift of grace that illumines Christian spiritual life and
Christian social responsibility. It is the wellspring of all Christian virtues. From his
faith perspective Augustine surveyed the world with a realist's eye and
128 Niebuhr, "Intellectual Autobiography," in Kegley and Bretall, 9.
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unsentimentally discerned that "The way is first humility, second humility, third
humility."129
If he found significant error in Augustine's belief that the grace of humility
overcomes human sin "in principle", Niebuhr's correction lends even greater
immediacy to the importance of humility and its attitudes in Christian responsibility.
Here he warns against the inevitable assertion of human pride that operates of "upon
1 TO • •
whatever new level grace has pitched the new life." That there is no escape in
history from the sinful assertion of pride, particularly as pride tempts all power and
power is driven by the fury of political and religious expressions of self-
righteousness. Through the gift of divine grace humbled man finds redemption but
remains a sinner. In no human being is the power of self-love and its potential for
injustice ever entirely eradicated. By "no discipline of reason or by any merit of
• 131
grace" does even the justified sinner conform to the perfect will of God. In short,
grace redeems and changes the Christian's spiritual orientation but pride remains at
the core of human nature. While following Augustine in embracing the essential role
of humility in Christian tradition and responsibility, Niebuhr found that the error in
Augustine's work, institutionalised and compounded by Church dogma, lay in claims
to possess and dispense absolute truth. Here Niebuhr's prickly brief was to extricate
the truths of faith illumined by Augustine from their "sinful and finite
corruptions."132
This brief is central to Niebuhr's Christian realism. In rejecting claims to religious
absolutes Niebuhr attacks the foundation of self-righteous fanaticism. In rejecting all
claims to hold absolute and universal religious truth, Niebuhr's Christian realism
129






Ibid., 95. In noting what he discerns as Niebuhr's particular animus toward Catholicism, Hauerwas
observes that "it is a mistake to think that Niebuhr is critical of Catholicism primarily because of its
alleged failure to understand that all human institutions including the church are sinful. No doubt he
assumed that that was the central issue, but more importantly, Niebuhr sensed that Catholicism rests on
the claim that our knowledge ofGod must be mediated." With the Grain ofthe Universe: Probing
Twentieth Century Theology and Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001), 136-137, note
57.
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necessarily rejects any effort to lend theological authority to any ideology's claims to
absolute truth. Every age has been marked by the consequences of self-righteous
fanaticism; Niebuhr's by totalitarian ideologies that sought either to incorporate
religious absolutes or to destroy religion absolutely. Thus his "correction" of
Augustine in this regard is not simply a fine theological point but one with vast
implications for Christians devoted to social responsibility that necessarily entails the
use of some form of power. Here Niebuhr's critique corrects, clarifies and intensifies
Augustine's insistence that humility must ever accompany power:
I know how great is the effort needed to convince the proud of the
power and excellence of humility, an excellence which makes it soar
above all the summits of this world, which sway in their temporal
instability, overtopping them all with an eminence not arrogated by
1 -J"7 ^
human pride, but granted by divine grace.
My experience in public service leads me to believe that the initial task here is not to
convince the proud of the power of humility but to convince the proud that they are,
in the Augustian and Niebuhrian sense, proud. The word "proud" may be the most
commonly used word in Congressional correspondence and in the daily train of Floor
speeches. Floods of Congressional press releases express pride in good works
achieved and good causes affirmed. As a nominal Christian embroiled in the daily
exigencies of political life on Capitol Hill perhaps I saw the use of this morally
suspect expression as simply one of Augustine's relatively harmless sins. Ironically
the word "proud" is so pervasive a clue that it obscured the basic disorder.134
Perhaps my basic disorder is a pride that imputes malevolence to the pride of others
but not to my own. To a degree I attribute this presumption to my earlier failure to
study critically the core doctrines of traditional Christian faith. The idea of original
sin certainly appeared in the vocabulary of my childhood faith but it seemed largely
irrelevant to my daily life. And despite the truths regarding sinful human nature
133
Augustine City ofGod, preface to Book I.
134 In fairness I must note that the last House Member for whom I served as chief of staff despised the
word "proud" and nearly always rejected its use in correspondence and press releases. She attributed
this aversion to her strict Presbyterian upbringing.
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discerned in formal studies, I was able to cling to a belief in the relative innocence of
my own pride. Here my experience reflects what Niebuhr and Augustine have to say
about the corruptive nature of power. It is ironically comforting to think of power and
corruption in their most spectacular culminations. Reflecting upon my time in public
service it is far more discomforting to contemplate the daily, seemingly insignificant
ways in which power persistently obscured both the corruption of my own prideful
nature and the requirements of Augustine's ideal of loving service.
In the increasingly fractious atmosphere of Congress personal humility may be
admired by colleagues but it is not an attitude indicative of either party in action. The
attitudes of humility may be given practical effect in the patience, toleration and
reconciliation that characterize the legislative process at it best. But in that arena of
national debate the political stakes are such that outcomes make or break careers,
profoundly affect significant populations and vital interests, and, it is no exaggeration
to say today, change the course of history. Promises on behalf of long-favoured
District projects or threats regarding coveted committee assignments are starkly
compelling. Personal attitudes of humility may be the battle's first casualties as they
are subsumed in the compelling partisan cause and swept along by perceived
necessity. Here in the embrace of power and pride we lose the God's eye perspective
that is ours through the grace of humility. The "fog of war" is not reserved to the
battlefield alone.
Militating against all human pride, including my own innocent pride, are the attitudes
of Christian humility discerned in Niebuhr's critical study of Augustine. While these
attitudes must shape all efforts at the truly Christian life, they hold particular truths
for Christian responsibility in the social task. For in this task, as Niebuhr knew, the
Christian is required to understand that justice requires the use of power that itself
tempts pride and always entails some injustice. In underscoring the relational
dimensions of humility he knew as well that there is no such thing as innocent pride;
certainly there is no innocent power. It is just here that Augustine the realist led
Niebuhr in discerning the essential relevance of the grace of humility to Christian
responsibility.
46
Like Niebuhr I am embarrassed by my late encounter with Augustine and, also like
Niebuhr, have found in the Bishop of Hippo an "answer to so many of my
unanswered questions." Nevertheless there remain essential elements in Niebuhr's
public theology that affirm the critical significance of humility within his Christian
realism. In the following chapter Niebuhr's understanding of humility and its




The Origins and Attitudes of Humility in Niebuhr's Prophetic Faith
Humility is not something we can wring from ourselves, that we
possess within ourselves, or that we can control. It is ever a gift of
grace, appropriated in faith and renewed in love and obedience.
Therefore when we speak of humility as one of the resources offaith
for the social task we speak not only ofsome virtue or other but rather
the social significance ofthe whole tonal quality ofthe life offaith.1
Gordon Harland
Introduction
We have seen that Niebuhr was profoundly influenced by Augustine's realist
perspective and emphasis on the attitudes of humility in Christian life and
responsibility. Niebuhr remained prophetically critical of Augustine, however,
finding error in his failure to see that redeemed and "blameless" souls remain sinners;
that sinful human nature continues to assert itself "upon whatever new level grace
has pitched the new life."2 Here Niebuhr's critique lends increased immediacy to the
essential role ofhumility in Christian responsibility and its attendent use of power.
While his critical study of Augustine provides a reliable foundation for assessing the
role of humility in Niebuhr's Christian realism, a deeper understanding of that role
emerges when additional elements in Niebuhr's theology are examined. In this
chapter I will consider several of those elements, beginning with a brief treatment of
certain motifs in Niebuhr's prophetic calling and his role as "prophet to America in
praxis."3 The heart ofNiebuhr's prophetic faith is revealed in his interpretation of the
1 The Thought ofReinholdNiebuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 133.
2
Destiny, 141.
J Martin Marty, "Reinhold Niebuhr: Public Theology and the American Experience," The Journal of
Religion 54 (October, 1974): 336.
"myth" of the Atonement that provides the lens through which he discerns Christian
truth. Therein we gain a fuller insight into the theological origins of grace, sin and
Christian humility in Niebuhr's prophetic faith. These discussions provide the
context in which I examine Niebuhr's understanding of pride in its various guises and
its antithesis in the attitudes of humility. Finally, I examine the attitudes of humility
for the social task as they are discerned in the heart ofNiebuhr's theology.
Niebuhr's Prophetic Faith
When The Irony of American History appeared in 1952, Niebuhr's had been a
familiar voice in American religious, intellectual and political circles for more than
two decades. During and after WWII his writing, preaching and participation in high
national councils made him a familiar figure to millions of main-street Americans.
For many Niebuhr was a theologian and public intellectual who seemed to know how
to make sense of their world. He was for several generations of Americans A
Prophetic Voice in Our Time4
He was regarded by many as a prophet, not in the sense of speaking
with canonical authority or of forecasting the future, but because, like
the Old Testament prophets from whose message he drew inspiration,
Niebuhr addressed his nation and its religious communities in times of
crisis and decision, and did so in accents challenging pride and
complacency in the name of a God who calls for justice within and
among nations.5
Niebuhr's life and work reflect an intentional assumption of the prophets' mantle.
Like Israel's prophets he often stood in that place outside "the church" where it met
4 ReinholdNiebuhr: A Prophetic Voice in Our Time, ed. Harold R. Landon. (Cambridge: Seabury
Press, 1961). The titles of a number ofworks on Niebuhr refer to his prophetic role. See Ronald
Stone's ReinholdNiebuhr: Prophet to Politicians (Washington: University Press ofAmerica, 1981)
and more recently Charles C. Brown's Niebuhr and His Age: ReinholdNiebuhr's Prophetic Role and
Legacy, new ed. (Harrisburgh, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002).
5
Brown, Niebuhr and His Age, 8.
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the world and his faith could address both.6 He appealed to the Hebrew prophets and,
frequently using synonymous terms, what he called "prophetic faith." In The
Children of Light and the Children of Darkness Niebuhr credits the prophetic
monotheism of Amos with the first "religious apprehension of a universal and
unlimited moral obligation." Here, Niebuhr believed, was a "conception of a
universal history, over which the God of Israel presided as sovereign but of which the
history of Israel was not the centre and end." Israel's God has universal designs for
which He might use or reject Israel according to His own purposes. The prophets of
this infinite God who stands within and above history were thereby set against any
m n
nationalistic or exclusive appropriation of faith for finite human purposes. In the
caustic anti-nationalistic oracles of Amos Israel's God is the Lord of all people and
His purposes will be achieved with or without the instrumentality of Israel or any
other nation or people.8
He probes beyond Amos' anti-nationalistic stance to identify what he describes as
prophetic faith's "more far-reaching criticism of all forms of optimistic Messianism";
a critical stance that makes "no concessions to the Messianic hope of the fulfilment
of history in either nationalistic or universal terms." Prophecy reflects God's
judgment in history: first upon Israel because it betrayed its chosen mission even as it
presumed upon the divine favour, and then upon all nations. Yet Niebuhr finds that
the signal contribution of Hebrew prophecy is not, as first it might appear, the
"triumph of universalism in the history of ethics," but rather "the beginning of
revelation in the history of religion."
It is the beginning of revelation because here, for the first time, in the
history of culture the eternal and divine is not regarded as the
extension and fulfilment of the highest human possibilities, whether
6 Hans Hoffman, The Theology ofReinhold Niebuhr, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1956), 245. While his chair at Union provided this place Niebuhr
nevertheless remained active in the pulpit and in church affairs. Following WWII he played a
prominent role in the formation of the World Council of Churches. See Heather Warren's Theologians
ofa New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). But his stance toward the church
was always prophetic, whether in criticism or in encouragment.




conceived in particularistic or universalistic terms. God's word is
spoken against both his favoured nation and against all nations. This
means that prophetism has the first understanding of the fact that the
real problem of history is not the finiteness of all human endeavours,
which must wait for their completion by divine power. The real
problem of history is the proud pretension of all human endeavours,
which seeks to obscure their finite and partial character and thereby
involves history in evil and sin.9
Here we see essential elements in Niebuhr's prophetic witness to America. He
appealed to the attitudes of humility that ameliorate national self-righteousness and
pride in times of crisis.10 Steeped in the Judeo-Christian tradition and taking
seriously its assumed historic particularity, America's pride and power obscured the
persistent message of Israel's prophets: the instruments of God's purposes are
exempt from neither the vicissitudes of history nor the divine judgment that sits upon
all human endeavours. But if Niebuhr inveighed against national pride and social
injustice, here as elsewhere in his life's work there is an accompanying note of
prophetic hope and encouragement. The humbling sting of God's judgment remains
always but in His laughter at human pretensions we also discern the patience,
forbearance and forgiveness of an ultimately loving creator. "The whole drama of
human history," Niebuhr wrote, "is under the scrutiny of a divine judge who laughs
at human pretension without being hostile to human aspirations."11
We discern by faith the ironical laughter of the divine source and end
of all things. "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh" (Psalm 2.4).
He laughs because "the people imagine a vain thing." The scripture
assures us that God's laughter is derisive, having the sting of judgment
upon our vanities in it. But if the laughter is truly ironic it must
symbolize mercy as well as judgment. For whenever judgment defines
the limits of human striving it creates the possibility of a humble
acceptance of those limits. Within that humility mercy and peace find
a lodging-place.12
9
Ibid., 25-26, (emphasis mine).




Through the lens of prophetic faith Niebuhr struggled to read the signs of the times
that might point America toward that lodging-place. If, as he forcefully preached,
power always tempts to prideful pretension and social injustice he understood as well
the mitigating, redemptive, and essential countervailing power of humility.
Certainly his understanding of the moral ambivalence of power is another defining
characteristic of Niebuhr's prophetic faith. Critics, friendly and otherwise, devote
considerable attention to Niebuhr's attempts to find some Christian perspective on the
use of political power; to find, as Lovin observed, an expression of Christian faith
"consistent with the way in which the world settles questions of truth."13 His fellow
liberal and younger contemporary Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. believed that Niebuhr's
acceptance of the inevitability of social conflict reflected the inevitability of power in
human collectives. Most significantly he discerned in Niebuhr's work the paradoxical
truth that power is both the cause and the antidote to social conflict.14 The mid-20th
century doyen of political realism Hans Morgenthau found Niebuhr's insights
regarding relationships between power and ideologies a marked contribution to
political thought.15 Other critics viewed Niebuhr's perceived preoccupation with
power and its uses in a far less positive light. Here we find Niebuhr characterized as
an "apologist of power"16 To this Stanley Hauerwas adds the somewhat ironical note
that Niebuhr's realism and its attendant focus on power too easily become
"justification for perpetuating dominant ideologies."17
Niebuhr's perceived pre-occupation with power reflects his Augustinian conviction
13 Robin Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 243.
14 "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role In American Political Thought and Life," in Kegley and Bretall, 145.
15 "The Influence ofReinhold Niebuhr in American Political Life and Thought," in Reinhold Niebuhr:
A Prophetic Voice in Our Time, ed. Harold R. Landon (Greenwich, CT: Seabury Press, 1962), 109.
16 Bill Kellerman, "Apologist of Power: The Long Shadow ofReinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism,"
in Sojourners 16 (March 1987): 15.
17
Stanley Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 50. Hauwerwas enlists Milbank's critique of the strongly Stoic
influence on Niebuhr's understanding of natural law and his realist ethics. "The Stoics are obviously
natural allies for those who think that 'social ethics' is the attempt to name the requirements necessary
to run an empire." See note 45, With the Grain ofthe Universe, 133-34.
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that pride resides at the core of human nature. His struggle to find Christian strategies
for the use of power are grounded in his prophetic belief that sinful human nature is
inevitably and variously expressed through power. Thus, as with Augustine, humility
as the antithesis of pride could not be simply a peripheral virtue or merely one among
other desirable Christian qualities. Humility is for him the gift of grace essential to
discerning sinful pride and addressing its social consequences. To say only that
Niebuhr is pre-occupied with power is to ignore the pervasive motif of humility and
its attitudes within prophetic faith. It is to ignore, as Harland observed, that humility
may been seen as a lens through which Niebuhr's prophetic faith is to be read: "No
theme courses through the whole of Niebuhr's writing with greater strength or
constancy than the theme of the social relevence of the humility born of faith's
encounter."18
This assertion is only partially confirmed by reflecting on Niebuhr's position within
the Augustinian tradition in Christian humility. The central importance of humility in
his work requires the further understanding of humility developed within his theology
and reflected in his incidental work. This is the understanding of humility discerned
through his interpretation of the Atonement which for him illumines the central truths
of prophetic faith. It is, in Niebuhr's view,
....the beginning of wisdom...it contains symbolically all that the
Christian faith maintains about what man ought to do and what he
cannot do, about his obligations and final incapacity to fulfil them,
about the importance of decisions and achievements in history and
about their final insignificance.19
If his critique ofAugustine lends additional immediacy to the importance of humility,
Niebuhr's understanding of the Atonement establishes the signficance ofhumility
within the heart of his theology.
18 Gordon Harland, The Thought ofReinhold Niebuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960),
132.
19
Destiny, 220. Kenneth Durkin asserts that the Atonement is key to intepreting The Nature and
Destiny ofMan and, indeed, Niebuhr's understanding of "nature, life, and history." Reinhold Niebuhr
(London: Cassell Publishers, 1989), 101.
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The Atonement and Christian Humility in Niebuhr's Prophetic Faith
The significance of Niebuhr's interpretation of the Atonement requires some
attention to the role of "myth" in his theology. My intent here is not to present a
comprehensive analysis of Niebuhr's interpretation of myth but to establish the
• • 20
fundamental significance of the Atonement within his prophetic faith. The
discussion ofmyth in The Nature and Destiny ofMan serves as primary source. This
approach appears justified for several reasons consistent with the purpose of this
dissertation. Although Niebuhr had examined the Hebrew/Christian cycle ofmyths in
earlier works, most explicitly in Beyond Tragedy, his "mature" interpretation of
myth, as reflected in his work during the 1940's and early 1950's, is presented in the
two volumes of The Nature and Destiny ofMan. There Niebuhr labours to show the
relevance of prophetic faith, of the "Biblical view", by "demonstrating how it is
capable of interpreting experience" while "refuting false interpretations of
experience." In this endeavour he appropriated and applied the truths he found in
Christian myth.21
Dennis McCann finds Niebuhr's understanding of myth central to the entire
theological enterprise of prophetic faith: "Niebuhr uses the term [prophetic faith] to
designate his understanding of the Christian cycle of myths, its continuity with a
• • • 99
biblical perspective, and its relevance for effective social action...." Thus Christian
myth provides the theological under-girding for both the personal expression of faith
20 In his essay "Reinhold Niebuhr as Apologist" Alan Richardson implies that Niebuhr holds views
on myth and miracles similar Bultmann's. See Kegley and Bretall, 215-228. Niebuhr replies that "1 do
not think that Bultmann makes a sufficient distinction between the prescientific myths and what I have
elsewhere defined as the myths ofpermanent validity, without which it is not possible to describe the
ultimate realities in conditions of the temporal world." "Intellectual Autobiography," in Kegley and
Bretall, 438. Durkin finds that for Niebuhr "religious myth points to the ultimate ground and the
ultimate fulfilment of existence, but because it has to express trans-historical truth in symbols and
events in history it invariably falsifies history, as seen by science, to state its truth. Niebuhr adopts the
Pauline expression 'As deceivers, yet true' (2 Cor. 6:8) to express this." Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr,
77.
21 Durkin, ReinholdNiebuhr, 100.
22 Dennis McCann, Christian Realism and Liberation Theology: Practical Theologies in Creative
Conflict (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981), 64.
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and its social implications. It is the basis for discerning Christian truth in human
experience and history. Here it is important to stipulate Niebuhr's insistence that
there be "constant commerce" between revelation in Christian myth and truths
discerned through knowledge. As Durkin observed of Niebuhr, biblical "myths are
tested by correlation with other knowledge...the truths of faith cannot be proved
empirically, but they can be empirically tested."23 This provides the point of
departure for our analysis ofNiebuhr's interpretation of Christian myth.
The one constant feature of Niebuhr's work is the theme that all
knowledge must be situated ultimately in an ultra-rational framework.
As his work developed he insisted that the primary myths of biblical
religion, Creation, Fall, Atonement, and Parousia provided the
substance for this ultra-rational framework ... the myths were products
of experience in community but they received their power then, and
continue to exercise their power now, because they relate to the
deepest experience of human nature. This illumination of the deepest
experience of human nature is called faith.24
While Niebuhr holds the Hebrew/Christian myths of Creation, Fall, Incarnation and
the Parousia in what Durkin describes as creative tension, the Atonement is always
central to Niebuhr's understanding of all Christian myth.25 For Niebuhr the
Atonement is central to understanding the myths because "it expresses the
paradoxical relationship between grace and sin, mercy and judgment ...[it] reveals the
pattern which is stamped on the historical process."26 Indeed, we may say that for
Niebuhr the Atonement provides the lens through which Christian myths are most
truly viewed and the pattern by which those truths are most faithfully expressed in
the lives of Christians. While The Nature and Destiny ofMan presents Niebuhr's
most sustained attempt at a systematic theology his interpretation of the Atonement
reflects his abiding concern for a relevant theology for Christian life and social
responsibility. Perhaps we may say that it is through the Atonement that Niebuhr
enlists the full panoply of Hebrew/Christian myth in meeting this responsibility. As






his interpretation in The Nature and Destiny ofMan reveals the Atonement is for him
the ground of Christian humility and the attitudes he associates with it.
Within the Atonement Niebuhr perceives history as the revelation of divine wrath
upon humanity's sinful pride and reflects upon attempts to resolve the problem of
how God is to overcome the tragedy of history, i.e. how He "can cure as well as
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punish the sinful pride in which man inevitably involves himself." God's wrath,
according to Niebuhr, is "the world in its essential structure reacting against the
sinful corruptions of that structure."28 While his characteristic avoidance of precise
definitions may create confusion at this point, the concept is important in his
understanding of the Atonement and merits clarification. Here Durkin offers this
clarifying insight:
"Wrath" is...the disintegrating process which is consequent upon the
corruption of the triple harmony of selfwith God, self, and neighbour.
The law of life of the essential structure is the law of love. Wrath is
the consequence of the defiance of the law of life as love. It is the
• 9Q
exercise of justice for the defiance of the law of life."
The resolution of this problem is found in the atoning work of Christ who reveals the
relation of God's judgment to His mercy, His wrath to His forgiveness. It is evident
here that for Niebuhr the historical and theological significance of the Cross event—
the "symbol of the redeeming power of God in Christ"~is most fully understood
through the lens of the Atonement.30
Christian faith sees in the Cross of Christ the assurance that judgment
is not the final word of God to man; but it does not regard the mercy
of God as a forgiveness which wipes out the distinctions of good and
evil in history and makes judgment meaningless. All the difficult





29 Durkin, ReinholdNiebuhr, 113.
30 Ibid., 99.
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to explicate the ultimate mystery of divine wrath and mercy in its
relation to man. The good news of the gospel is that God takes the
sinfulness of man into Himself, and overcomes in His own heart what
cannot be overcome in human life, since human life remains within
the vicious circle of sinful self-glorification on every level of moral
advance.31
Niebuhr believed that human nature attests a "general" revelation wherein human
beings may perceive God as creator and judge and long for divine forgiveness and
reconciliation. While these inchoate perceptions may be variously expressed, in
Biblical faith vague longings are clarified and find ultimate coherence. This
coherence is achieved through the "special revelation" perceived and interpreted
within the history of the Jewish people. In special revelation inchoate longings
become expressed in terms of gratitude, contrition, reverence, moral obligation and
the longing for forgiveness.32 For Niebuhr these are attitudes ofhumility.
But most important is Christ's "special and distinct" revelation of the true character
of God, Who by divine initiative and sacrifice "takes the consequences of His wrath
and judgment upon Himself and into Himself." The assurances of divine mercy
found in the Old Testament were tentative because the prophets were uncertain of
how the relationship between God's judgment and his mercy was to be resolved. A
profound consequence of this uncertainty, observed Niebuhr, was reflected in the
shaping of a Messianic hope in which the "righteous" believed that God's final
revelation "must consist of His vindication of the righteous rather than in His mercy
to sinners." Here is the reason that a messianic concept of the suffering servant, one
who would suffer for sinners, was so offensive to the good people of Jesus' time. But
in the suffering of Christ the Old Testament problem of the relationship between
God's judgment and His mercy is resolved as innocent and vicarious suffering are
revealed in "the very character of the divine." Here, for Christian faith is "the
31
Nature, 152-153 (Emphasis mine). For Niebuhr it follows that Christian responsibility also entails
making such distinctions.





In the Atonement the true nature of mankind is also revealed. Because humanity's
true nature is free and self-transcendent, nature and history cannot provide man's
ultimate good which can be found only in faith. In prophetic faith Christ reveals the
true character of God and, as the second Adam, the true character of mankind. The
nature of God is revealed as love which, Niebuhr observes, "is the ultimate reality
upon which the created world depends and by which it is judged...[God] is not an
'unmoved mover' or an undifferentiated eternity, but the vital and creative source of
life and of the harmony of life with life."35 In Christ love is also revealed as the true
nature of finite but free and self-transcendent humanity. Thus only the law of love
provides the ultimate norm in which "free personality is united in freedom with other
persons."
The coerced unities of nature and the highly relative forms of social
cohesion established by historic "laws" are inadequate as final norms
of human freedom. The only adequate norm is the historic incarnation
of a perfect love which actually transcends history, and can appear in it
■j/i
only to be crucified.
Thus for Niebuhr the true character of history is revealed in the Cross event as
• T7 •
interpreted through the Atonement. Here sin is revealed as so profoundly
disordering that it causes even God himself to suffer. Yet it is also the supreme act of
divine reconciliation in which judgment remains but "the final word is not one of
judgment but ofmercy and forgiveness."
34
Nature, 154. In his examination of the resources of faith for the social task Harland notes the
importance ofNiebuhr's Christology. See Harland, ix-x. As with Harland, an expansive treatment of
Niebuhr's Christology is beyond my purpose here, but such a treatment is provided in Paul Lehmann's









This doctrine of atonement and justification is the "stone which the
builders rejected" and which must be made "the head of the corner." It
is an absolutely essential pre-supposition for the understanding of
human nature and human history.
The Challenge of Prophetic Faith
Here sinful human nature is confirmed as the central problem of history. Humanity's
estrangement from God is not the result of its creaturely limitations but of its prideful
and abortive attempts to escape creaturely finitude.40 Human attempts to avoid or
compromise the Atonement's inescapable truths regarding the significance of sin
simply confirm Niebuhr's understanding of its persistent and pervasive place in
human nature. Mankind's rejection of this truth is yet another manifestation of sinful
pride. Humanity's prideful pretension issues in vain endeavours to overcome its
creaturely limitations and it is this pretension, not human finitude, that is the root of
sin.41 The great task of prophetic faith is to be an "affront" to all manifiestations of
human self-esteem and pride.
Human history stands in contradiction to the divine will on any level
of its moral and religious achievements in such a way that in any
"final" judgment the righteous are proved not to be righteous. The
final enigma of history is therefore not how the righteous will gain
victory over the unrighteous, but how the evil in every good and the
unrighteousness of the righteous is to be overcome.42
Only in Jesus' reinterpretation of prophetic faith is this enigma resolved.43 Niebuhr
finds this reinterpretation most perfectly explicated in the parable of the Last
Judgment wherein the sheep are sorted from the goats. While the received prophetic
39 Ibid. For a critique ofNiebuhr's interpretation ofhistory see Karl Lowith's "History and









motif of ultimate vindication of righteousness over evil is retained, Jesus adds an
astounding new dimension to prophetic faith: "The righteous are humble and do not
believe themselves to be righteous" (Mt.25: 37-39). Conversely the unrighteous do
not recognize their unrighteousness. Here Jesus distinguishes on the basis ofwho has
served their fellows and who has not. Those who have served most faithfully know
that even their best efforts fall short in God's judgment. Those oblivious to their
obligations to others are too self-centred to recognize their sin before God. In Jesus'
interpretation of the final judgment prophetic faith's distinction between good and
evil is nevetheless retained:
Yet it is asserted that in the final judgment there are no righteous, i.e.,
in their own eyes. Jesus' conflict with Pharisaic self-righteousness is
governed by the same conviction. It is the contrite publican who is
"justified" before the righteous Pharisee, for "whosoever shall exalt
himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be
exalted."44
This insight holds great significance for Niebuhr. It affirms that human responsiblity
entails relative judgments regarding good and evil in history while humankind's
relative judgments are ultimately judged by God beyond history. Further, it affirms
that the "righteous" are always under divine judgment, perhaps doubly so when they
act from the self-righteousness for which the prophets denounced ancient Israel. Thus
in prophetic faith "the good are added to the mighty, noble and wise as standing
particularly under the judgment of God."45 When the social implications of this
judgment are recognized we see that this insight resides at the heart of Niebuhr's
treatment and understanding of power.
A Paradox of Strength Perfected in Weakness
In Niebuhr's reference to abasement we discern the motif of the suffering servant and






reshaped prophetic tradition in ways that brought him into lethal conflict with the
religious righteous of his time. Here Niebuhr discerns the recurring motif in history
that finds "the truth of Christ contending constantly against the truth as men see it."46
These motifs appear early in Niebuhr's writing where the suffering of Jesus reveals an
essential characteristic of God's nature. This revelation illumines Niebuhr's
understanding of humility: in Jesus' suffering "God's strength is made perfect in
weakness."47
Yet he cautions lest this revelation be subject to errors of misinterpretation. In the
optimistic error, i.e., for Niebuhr the interpretation of "liberal" Christianity, Christ's
vicarious suffering reveals that love eventually overcomes evil; suffering love begins
with the tragedy of the Cross but ends in the triumph of good over evil in history. The
pessimistic error, on the other hand, is that suffering love points to ultimate victory
over evil yet is "defeated and tragic" in history. But if human experience refutes the
optimistic view that sin is gradually overcome in history, the tragic view leaves the
question of evil in history unresolved:
How is the evil of history overcome? Does the power of the guilty,
under which the guiltless suffer, go on indefinitely? Is history a
constant repetition of the triumph of evil on the plane of the obvious
and is the triumph of the good merely the inner triumph of its own
assurance of being right?48
Christ's revelation addresses these questions. He suffered in history but is more than
simply a character q/'history because his divine nature is above history. In Christ God
is revealed both in and above history as suffering for humanity's sin. For Niebuhr this
truth of faith refutes the optimistic error in which evil and its consequences are to be
gradually overcome in history. Rather, they are ultimately and finally overcome only
"on the level of the eternal and the divine." This does not abandon the field to the








destruction of all human history. In Jesus' Messianism, wherein the righteous are
seen as unrighteous in God's judgment and evil is overcome by His bearing of all
evil, God's infinite mercy is also revealed as embracing all human history:
Just as the idea that the distinction between the righteous and the
unrighteous disappears in the final judgment is implicit in the most
radical prophetic analyses of history, so also the idea that God suffers
in history is implicit in the whole Hebraic-prophetic idea that God is
engaged and involved in history, and is not some unmoved mover,
dwelling in eternal equanimity.49
For Niebuhr the more enduring pessimism emanates from the recurring refusal of the
"righteous" to accept Christ's radicalising of even this most radical of ideas: that both
the righteous and the unrighteous are sinful before God, and that this sin causes even
Him to suffer. Only until man comprehends the profound seriousness of sin, revealed
to him in history through the suffering atonement of Christ, can God's mercy be
effective. Only when the individual knows himself to be a sinner can the proper
divine-human relationship be restored.50
It is by that knowledge that man is brought to despair. Without this
despair there is no possibility of the contrition which appropriates the
divine forgiveness. It is in this contrition and in this appropriation of
divine mercy and forgiveness that the human situation is fully
understood and overcome. In this experience man understands himself
in his finiteness, realizes the guilt of his efforts to escape his
insufficiency and dependence and lays hold upon a power beyond
himself which both completes his incompleteness and purges him of





The Grace of Humility
Only through grace is the contrite and humbled person brought to newness of life.
This grace brings us to the new life and to the faith that God's mercy ultimately
overcomes sin. Grace sustains the new life through both power ("grace in judgment")
and wisdom ("knowledge into the nature of history and ethics"). It expresses the
freedom of divine power; as we observed in Niebuhr's critique of Augustine, the
grace through which His truth is revealed and sustained cannot be appropriated by
any human institution. Attempts to do so are simply another guise under which the
sinful pride of finite man seeks to insinuate itself into the eternal truth that only God
possesses. Yet from Niebuhr's perspective of the Atonement grace empowers the
contrite and humbled Christian whose newness of life embraces the ever-expanding
possibilities of human freedom and knowledge. As Durkin discerned, grace in
Niebuhr's thought provides wisdom to perceive both the possibilities and limitations
of human power for good. It is power "beyond human power and operative only
when human powers recognize their own limits."53 Such knowledge illumines the
"proximate" mysteries and complexities of human experience while always pointing
to "a mystery beyond itself." For Niebuhr this operation of grace places humility and
its attitudes at the heart of prophetic faith.
There is, therefore, no way of understanding the ultimate problem of
human existence if we are not diligent in the pursuit of proximate
answers and solutions. Nor is there any way of validating the ultimate
solution without constantly relating it to all proximate possibilities.54
Grace as both wisdom and power thus illumines the obligations of the new life while
recognizing the creaturely limits and incompleteness attendant upon all finite human
endeavours. This confirms, from Niebuhr's perspective of the Atonement, the
meaningful but fragmentary nature of human history that "points beyond itself to the





judgment and mercy of God for its fulfilment."
The Christian doctrine of the Atonement, with its paradoxical
conception of the relation of the divine mercy to the divine wrath is
therefore the final key to this historical interpretation. The wrath and
the judgment of God are symbolic of the seriousness of history. The
distinctions between good and evil are important and have ultimate
significance....On the other hand the mercy of God, which strangely
fulfils and yet contradicts the divine judgment, points to the
incompleteness of all historic good, the corruption of evil in all
historic achievements and the incompleteness of every historic system
of meaning without the eternal mercy which knows how to destroy
and transmute evil by taking it into itself.55
Niebuhr's interpretation of the Atonement is thus the touchstone of his prophetic faith
and the grounding of his understanding of Christian responsibility in history. It is, he
wrote,
The beginning of wisdom in the sense that it contains symbolically all
that the Christian faith maintains about what man ought to do and
what he cannot do, about his obligations and final incapacity to fulfil
them, about the importance of decisions and achievements in history
and about their final insignificance.56
Social Dimensions of the Atonement
Niebuhr's prophetic faith seeks to apply the truths of the Atonement to Christian
social responsibility. As this present work attempts to demonstrate, Niebuhr was
above all a practical theologian who believed that his theology must be a profound
resource in humanity's daily and enduring struggles for justice. This was the defining




While Niebuhr cautioned against its "sacramental" usurpation by the Roman Church
or any human construct, the Atonement illumines a bridge between the Christian's
•57
personal religious experience and the social relevance of that experience.
Articulating a faith perspective relevant to both personal and social ethics became a
persistent motif in Niebuhr's prophetic calling. In Moral Man and Immoral Society
his attempt to construct a theological bridge between personal and collective ethics
had produced a dualism that left a distinct taste of cynicism regarding the relevance
of faith to social ethics.58 Following Moral Man, however, Niebuhr continued to
build his bridge. He found its essential building materials in the "paradoxical' concept
of the freedom and finitude of human nature: man as both imago Dei and sinner.
Drawing upon history and experience Niebuhr believed that the paradox of human
nature comprehended in Christian myth could be discerned in human collectives.
Only prophetic religion, in which humanity comprehends its sinful state before God,
"can maintain the elements of decency, pity and forgiveness" necessary for social
justice. It is this spiritual perspective and the attitudes that flow from it that provide
ultimate political guidance for human collectives. All economic theories, political
strategies and social arrangements, at best only partially just, must be judged from the
spiritual perspective illumined by faith's ultimate truths.59 This insight, according to
McCann, "represents the closest thing to a religious conversion in Niebuhr's
experience."60
His rediscovery of an authentically Christian spirituality meant that the
abiding truth in myth provides guidance for public affairs as well as
personal meaning. Inspired by this rediscovery, The Nature and
Destiny ofMan is meant to show how finiteness and freedom, anxiety,
and sin and grace are key to understanding the moral and religious
situation of human societies. Just as individuals may interpret their
actions in terms of these categories, so patterns of social and
institutional behavior may similarly be illuminated. For in Niebuhr's
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view, the problem of anxiety is just as fundamental to the soul of
society as to an individual self.61
Because anxiety is a concomitant of human collectives as well as individuals, the
Atonement provides an analogous key to understanding "finiteness and freedom,
anxiety, and sin and grace" in their collective expressions. While cognizant of
historical varieties of human experience and cultural development, Niebuhr believes
that insights revealed through the Atonement provide the most comprehensive
understanding of human nature in its "total environment...which includes both
eternity and time."62 Using an analogical approach Niebuhr finds that the egotism of
human nature is expressed collectively as tyranny (wherein pride is variously
expressed through power) or anarchy (wherein pride takes the form of sensuality).
From the truths he believed were discerned through the Atonement Niebuhr observes
that "the divine power which bears history is clarified; and, with that clarification,
life and history are given their true meaning."63
As he surveyed history and examined the contemporary totalitarian alternatives of
fascism and communism, Niebuhr concluded that liberal democracy provided the
form of governance that most closely approached the truths revealed in prophetic
faith. The dialectic between prophetic faith and experience led Niebuhr to believe
that the "structural contrition" of the liberal democratic tradition "reflected the truths
revealed in the myth of the Atonement."64 Democracy's structural contrition is
achieved through an equilibrium of social, economic and political forces that allows
power sufficient to maintain a just order. Democracy's great achievement, he
observed, is its ability to "embody the principle of resistance to government within









All communities are more or less stable or precarious harmonies of
human vital capacities. They are governed by power. The power which
determines the quality of the order and harmony is not merely the
coercive and organizing power of government. That is only one of the
two aspects of social power. The other is the balance of vitalities and
forces in any given social situation. These two elements of communal
life—the central organizing principle and power, and the equilibrium of
power—are essential perennial aspects of community organization; and
no moral or social advance can redeem society from its dependence
upon these two principles.66
While Niebuhr defended democracy he rejected attempts to sanctify it. From the
perspective of prophetic faith all political arrangements nevertheless remain human
constructs subject to the inevitable distortions of sinful human pride: all forms of
government stand under God's judgment. Prophetic faith denies any human
collective's pretensions to perfect justice just as it condemns complacency in the face
of conflicts that threaten even limited achievements of justice. Thus Niebuhr's
prophetic faith requires the pursuit of "the higher possibilities of justice within every
historic situation." This commitment is discerned though the individual experience of
justification by faith:
Justification by faith in the realm of justice means that we will not
regard the pressures and counter pressures, the tensions, the overt and
the covert conflicts by which justice is achieved and maintained, as
normative in the absolute sense; but neither will we ease our
conscience by seeking to escape from involvement in them. We will
know that we cannot purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in which we
are involved by the moral ambiguities of politics without also
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disavowing responsibility for the creative possibilities ofjustice.
We see then that for Niebuhr the Atonement is the lens through which we discern the
central truths of Christ's revelation for both personal faith and social responsibility. It
reflects a humility that illumines the limits of human power yet is a power beyond
human power for good in Christian responsibility. It is this grace of humility that





relationships. While our profound experience ofGod is an intensely personal one our
new life reflects in attitudes and action the divine love at its center. This grace is at
once the ground of our most profound personal experience and knowledge of God
and the power that sustains and orients the redeemed life. Perhaps no writer has more
ably captured the essence of Niebuhr's understanding of the supreme importance of
humility in all of Christian life and responsibility than has Gordon Harland.
It is ever a gift of grace, appropriated in faith and renewed in love and
obedience. Therefore when we speak of humility as one of the
resources of faith for the social task, we speak not of some virtue or
other but rather the social significance of the whole tonal quality of the
life of faith.68
Pride Revisited: Niebuhr's Antithetical Approach to Understanding Christian
Humility
The significance of humility within Niebuhr's theology has been approached from
two perspectives. In the first we found his place broadly though not uncritically
within the Augustinian traditions in Christian humility. In the second we explored
Niebuhr's understanding of humility in light of his interpretation of the Atonement,
an interpretation that forms the core of his prophetic faith. In both discussions
Christian humility is seen as the gift of grace that establishes, illumines and sustains
the right ordering of all human relationships. Yet Niebuhr does not offer any precise
definition of humility. As with Augustine, Niebuhr typically uses an antithetical
approach in discussing the characteristics of humility and its attitudes. While the
attitudes of humility and their importance glint throughout The Nature and Destiny of
Man, for example, the word "humility" appears in the index of neither volume of
this, Niebuhr's most systematic work. "Pride," however, receives numerous entries
and is treated at length. If we are to fully grasp the significance and meaning of
humility in Niebuhr's incidental work we must treat with its antithesis, pride, in its
various guises.
68 Harland, Thought ofReinholdNiebuhr, 133.
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Origins of Pride in Human Nature
Reflecting his study of Augustine, Niebuhr's understanding of sin as pride is integral
to his assessment of human nature because it emanates from "the very centre of
human personality—in the will." Neither human freedom nor finitude is sinful. Rather
they characterise mankind's unique creatureliness within the creation that God
pronounced good. Man's sin, rather, lies in the refusal to accept his creatureliness, in
his pretension to be more than he is. Here Niebuhr encapsulates the ironical enigma
of human nature: "Man contradicts himself within the terms of his true essence. His
essence is free self-determination. His sin is the wrong use of his freedom and its
consequent destruction."69 While the essence of sin is the creature's rebellion against
God there is an additional dimension of enormous consequence. In the wrong use of
its freedom, humanity also rebels against its own nature. Though created individuals,
human beings are social creatures whose true nature, as revealed in Christ, is love.
This law of love in human nature seeks the harmony of life with life, the right
ordering of all relationships. In that it reflects God's own true nature the law of love
projects humanity in the image of God. But in the misuse of his freedom man
desecrates his created imago Dei and violates the law of love, the harmony of life
with life, by making himself the "center and source"of life. In the misuse of their
freedom human beings sin against both the Creator and his creation.
The freedom of his spirit enables him to use the forces and processes
of nature creatively; but his failure to observe the limits of his finite
existence causes him to deny the forms and restraints of both nature
and reason. Human self-consciousness is a high tower looking upon a
large and inclusive world. It vainly imagines that it is the large world
which it beholds and not a narrow tower insecurely erected amidst the
shifting sands of the world.70
From this paradox of freedom and finitude in human nature springs anxiety.
Although Niebuhr notes that anxiety may spur creativity it is also humankind's





creaturely vulnerability and claim for himself a permanence that his finite
creatureliness refutes. Here creative freedom is corrupted by the "ideological taint" of
71
the pretension that human knowledge somehow escapes human finitude. Here
creativity and the destructive taint of pretension become fused in anxiety. Man is
"anxious both to realize his unlimited possibilities and to overcome and hide the
dependent and contingent character of his existence."72 From its spiritual perch
above nature humanity may assess the vicissitudes of nature and society but cannot
alter its own ultimate contingency within nature and society. "The ideal possibility is
that faith in the ultimate security of God's love would overcome all immediate
insecurities", but Niebuhr recognises that few if any people possess the faith
necessary to overcome all human anxiety.73 Thus any realistic theory of human nature
must understand how human beings respond to their anxiety failing this complete
trust in God. Niebuhr believes that anxiety expressed through pride is humanity's
basic sin. In its spiritual dimension pride corrupts man's proper relationship with
God; in its moral dimension pride is the basis of social injustice.
Those who relieve the anxiety of their human condition by asserting
themselves in pride require an inordinate share of life's resources to
sustain their illusions of immortality and invulnerability. Their
demands deprive other persons of what they need...Indeed, the
demands of pride actually use persons themselves as resources,
reducing them merely to instruments of the plans of others.74
In religious terms pride is sin against God; in moral terms it is man's sin against
others. In the former, sinful pride is characterized by rebellion against God or as
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by social injustice.75 The ego which denies God's supreme place in and above the
universe "falsely makes itself the centre of existence" and "in its pride and
will-to-power inevitably subordinates other life to its will and thus does injustice to
other life."76 Here Niebuhr underscores the relational nature of sin as it impairs the
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proper relationship with God and consequently with other human beings.
Conversely it is through the grace of humility that we come to the profound
experience of God that illumines the destructiveness of prideful sin to all human
relationships.
The sinfulness of the self is magnified in collective behaviour while the pride of
collective pretension serves to quell individual moral qualms. Echoing a motif he
treated earlier in Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr marks the disparity
"between the canons of ordinary morality and the accepted habits of collective and
78 • •
political behavior." Collective behaviour exacerbates humanity's sinful
will-to-power while it obscures the "true man" revealed in Christ who seeks the
harmony of life with life. This is particularly manifest in the collective pride of the
nation state. Awed by the state's power and symbolic majesty individuals succumb to
its idolatrous pretensions to escape their own contingency. In the self-glorification of
the national state human pride and pretension "reach their ultimate form and seek to
break all bounds of finiteness. The nation pretends to be God."79 National idolatry is,
for Niebuhr, man's most pathetic and demonic attempt to escape his finitude: "The
very essence of human sin is in it."80
The tragedies of his own time confirmed history's continuing narrative of collective
relationships disordered by human pride. While the individual is brought to the
Christian life through the grace of humility Niebuhr's prophetic faith sought a









consequences of pride in its various guises. "What is distinctive about Niebuhr",
Harland observes, "is the power and insight with which humility is set in a wide
social context...[and] how pride insinuates itself into our very desires to be humble;
• 81
he also sees so clearly the significance of this for social relations."
Expressions of Pride in Niebuhr's Theology
As with Augustine, Niebuhr provides no precise definition of humility. For both
humility and its attitudes are antithetical to the sinful pride in human nature.
Niebuhr, however, devotes considerable attention in his formal writing, most
extensively in The Nature and Destiny of Man, to the various guises in which
prideful sin impedes the divine/human relationship and consequently blights all
human relationships. In considering Niebuhr's treatment of sin as pride we more fully
grasp his antithetical approach to understanding the essential role of humility within
his prophetic faith. That is the task to which we now turn.
In Nature Niebuhr distinguishes three expressions of pride and a fourth that is an
inclusive expression of pride in its most "quintessential form."82
Pride ofpower. Here the ego's willfulness seeks to make its finite power proof
against its contingent existence: the ego "assumes its self-sufficiency and
self-mastery and imagines itself secure against all vicissitudes."83 Anxious that its
power is insufficient to its pretensions the ego constantly seeks to enhance its security
and significance through accretions of power. The ego's will-to-power thus makes
pride its end. Whether expressed individually or collectively pride blinds the ego to
its own contingency and obscures the injustice it inflicts upon others. This is the
pride against which the Hebrew prophets so forcefully inveighed.84 Pride of power
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is also manifest by those all too aware of their limitations and insecurity. The egotism
of those who lack power and are less secure seek another expression of power to
overcome the weakness of which they are altogether too aware. This egotism seeks
its security through comfort and material accretion. Here Niebuhr suggests that
power is expressed as greed, the desire for over-abundance that attempts to mask the
inescapable insecurity of finite humanity. This greed, Niebuhr observed, is the
oc
"besetting sin of a bourgeois culture."
Because pride of power in each expression entails the submission of other wills, each
violates human freedom and "involves the ego in injustice." In human collectives
this injustice ironically engenders fear and animosity that increase the very insecurity
power seeks to ameliorate. Herein is the prideful ego's sisyphean struggle: "The more
man establishes himself in power and glory, the greater is the fear of tumbling from
his eminence or losing his treasure, or being discovered in his pretension."87
Intellectual pride. Intellectual pride, or pride of knowledge, is a second expression of
egotistic will-to-power. In intellectual pride we refuse to accept or attempt to obscure
the truth that all human knowledge like all human power is circumscribed by human
finitude. In this expression pride we refuse to understand that what we can know
cannot be separated from what we are, i.e., free but finite creatures. While humanity
possesses the freedom to contemplate itself and the cosmos our knowledge never
escapes the partiality of any human perspective. This "ideological" taint in human
intelligence is destructive of human relationships as it ignores or denies it limited
perspective. Human intelligence, Niebuhr observed, "pretends to be more than it is. It
is finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final
and ultimate knowledge."88 Intellectual pride thus attempts to mask its finite






capability. In denying or obscuring the temporal nature of all human endeavours
on
intellectual pride ultimately "imagines itself in complete transcendence of history."
If prideful sin resides at the core of human nature, it follows that some ideological
taint infects all human collectives. It is especially endemic to authoritarian and
moralistic societies wherein egotistic will-to-power coalesces with intellectual pride
so completely that the two create a particularly virulent expression of pride. Even as
Niebuhr delivered the Gifford lectures in 1939 he witnessed this coalescence in Nazi
Germany where the intellectual pretension of a learned culture was made to serve a
demonic will-to-power. Niebuhr nevertheless was quick to remind his
fellow-Americans and British colleagues that no culture escapes the ideological taint
of intellectual pride.90 It is this taint masks the degree to which competing cultures
and ideologies are involved in the same errors for which they so vehemently oppose
one another.
Moral Pride. The ideological taint of intellectual pride engenders moral pride that
strives to "establish my 'good' as unconditioned moral value." This is the
self-righteous attitude that attempts to lend its partial values the authority of universal
truth. Accordingly moral pride allows the self to judge itself and others by its own
standards. Invariably when a morally prideful society judges itself by its own
standards it declares itself good; when it judges others by these same standards it
declares them evil. In moral pride mankind's partial values become "the final
righteousness and his very relative moral standards are absolute."91 When cultural or
national values are identified with God's standards moral pretension fuels the self-
righteousness that condemns all non-conforming values and lends social approval
and theological sanction to injustice and cruelty.
It involves us in the greatest guilt. It is responsible for our most
serious cruelties, injustices and defamations of our fellowmen. The








a commentary on the objective wickedness and social misery that
• 92results from self-righteousness.
Spiritual Pride. Intellectual pride and moral pride coalesce in its quintessential form
as spiritual pride. Here Niebuhr finds that the ego commits the ultimate religious sin
QO f , #
of making "the self-deification implied in moral pride explicit." In spiritual pride
human beings claim divine sanction for their contingent and partial understanding of
themselves, their society and their universe. Of supreme significance here is that in
spiritual pride religion is itself perverted. It becomes the vehicle for self-glorification,
individually or collectively, rather than the means through which persons seek the
proper relationship with God. In the sin of spiritual pride religion ceases to express
man's search for God and becomes the "final battleground between God and man's
self-esteem." 94
Spiritual pride profoundly corrupts collective human relationships when God is made
"the exclusive ally of our contingent self."95 The more spiritual pride perverts
religion the more religion is made to embrace false absolutes from which the most
virulent expressions of self-righteousness and intolerance emerge. Even as he
inveighed against totalitarianism Niebuhr insisted that no form of government or
culture is immune to spiritual pride. America's sense of particularity, that it "was
called out by God to create a new humanity", made it especially susceptible. Its
particular temptation is a spiritual self-righteousness "which imagines that a man's
acceptance of ideals of justice and peace proves that it is someone else and not he
who is responsible for injustice and conflict."96 While Niebuhr believed democratic
rule was most conducive to social justice, his persistent prophetic warning to
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We see then that in whatever its guise pride is essentially self-glorification, an
idolatry of self and things of the self that radically rejects man's creaturely status
before God. Here pride expressed through power, knowledge, and moral self-
righteousness seen as attitudes through which we attempt to put our finite selves in
the place of the infinite Creator. Again we see that the religious consequence of pride
is alienation from God and that its social consequence is alienation among human
beings.
The profound irony is that the pride we vainly enlist in efforts to escape creaturely
finitude invariably compounds our insecurity. We reject true security grounded in the
right relationship with God. Yet even as we are mired in sinful pride we sense the
self-deception that the self-idolatry of a finite creature entails. Here the attitudes of
humility would direct us to the transcendent source of true security. But in pride we
enlist other human beings and human contructs to assuage our deep-seated doubts
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regarding our monstrous self-deception. And here, once more, the social
consequences of our pride are made manifest:
All efforts to impress our fellowmen—our vanity, our display of
power or of goodness—must, therefore be regarded as revelations of
the fact that sin increases the insecurity of the self by veiling its
weakness with veils which may be torn aside. The self is afraid of
being discovered in its nakedness behind these veils and of being
recognized as the author of the veiling deceptions. Thus sin
compounds the insecurity of nature with a fresh insecurity of spirit. 99
Attitudes of Humility for the Social Task
In seeking a Niebuhrian definition of humility for the social task we can confidently
discern what it is not. Any perception of humility as indicative of weakness or
passivity is inconsistent with Niebuhr's prophetic faith and the tradition of humility





that both Niebuhr and Augustine discerned in Christ who, along with Moses, is the
only biblical figure described as "meek."100 Following in Christ's pattern both
Niebuhr and Augustine view humility as essential to Christian life and, through
grace, a power in responsible action; its attitudes are always cast in a positive light.
Yet as Lord Longford found among his political colleagues perceptions of humility
are often decidedly negative. Particularly among the powerful the attitudes of
humility may be perceived as weakness and irresolution in action. As Lord Longford
notes some colleagues believed that humility indicates a lack self-confidence and
"weakens the defence of a righteous cause." In line with Augustine and Niebuhr
Longford himself rejects such negative notions of humility. A fervent but reflective
Christian Longford was a man of action for whom humility begins and ends with
Christ. No "restrictive or negative understanding of humility," he wrote, "possesses
the authority of the Gospel."101
It is evident that any perception of humility as indicative of weakness, passivity or
irresolution is inconsistent with Niebuhr's career, insistence on Christian
responsibility, and the frequently polemical tone of his writing. "If some men
conceive the resolute purpose to enslave us", Niebuhr wrote in 1942, "nothing avails
but an equally resolute purpose, armed with all available resources, to prevent the
enslaver from affecting his purpose."102
Nor for Niebuhr does humility entail an unappreciative estimate of one's capabilities
or an attitude of self-denigration, as one of Lord Longford's referees believed. Rather
humility concerning one's own perspective reflects the prophetic self-criticism that
encourages objective self-examination before God. The attitudes of humility
strengthen self-examination by allowing us to think beyond our narrow perspective;
perhaps more importantly, we become aware of and seek to correct our
subconsciously dishonest judgments.103 These perspectives are provided through the
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"gentle." We note particularly the linkeage between humility and submissiveness, a popular perception
that imputes largely negative qualities to humility.
101 Frank Packenham, Earl of Longford, Humility (London: Collins, 1969), 60.
102 "The Christian and the War," in Christian Century 59 (November 16, 1942): 6.
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continuous dialectic between experience and prayerful, revelatory insight. Here the
attitudes of humility approach a God's eye perspective without the pretense of being
God.
The vantage point provided by faith above the battle is precisely what
motivates us to engage in the battle, and to temper the spirit in which
we do our battling...it is exactly the joining of this humility and
resoluteness that is the distinguishing mark ofNiebuhr's thought.104
Conclusion
In this chapter I have undertaken to demonstrate that humility and its attitudes flow
from the theology that underpins Niebuhr's prophetic faith. At the heart ofNiebuhr's
theology is his interpretation of the Atonement, its significance for both the
individual experience of God and the attitudes that flow from that experience. For
Niebuhr the Atonement provides the lens through which he views all Christian truth
about the character of both God and sinful humankind. In Christ the true nature of
God and man is revealed as love. But humanity's true nature and its true relationship
with God is impeded by sin. In Christ the consquences of sin are revealed as so
profound that they cause even the infinite God to suffer. Yet in God's humble
assumption of human form in suffering the consequences of sin, the character of His
love is most fully revealed.
The perfect God's judgment upon imperfect humanity remains but "the final word is
not one of judgment but of mercy and forgiveness."105 This suffering love does not
eliminate His judgment of good and evil in history. But it is the source of divine
grace that brings humanity to the profound experience of God in which we recognize
ourselves as prideful violators of the law of love, as rebels against God and against
our own true nature. Only here can we know and confess the disordering power of
sin. And only here do we find the grace of humility that opens us to God's mercy and
104




forgiveness and to the newness of life. Thus we can now say with Harland that for
Niebuhr,
Humility is the pervasive quality of that relationship with God in
which we stand before Him in the unity of our being, know and accept
His judgment upon us, know and appropriate His forgiveness and seek
to live in the light of that grand fact.106
This definition of humility and our discussion of Niebuhr's place within the
Augustinian tradition provide the foundation for discerning the attitudes of humility
within Niebuhr's work. In the last chapter I characterized wisdom, self-knowledge,
patience, compassion, forgiveness and responsibility as attitudes of humility within
the Augustinian tradition. Toleration as an attitude of humility is included as it is
clarified in Niebuhr's critique of Augustine's doctrines of the Church and grace.
Here a succinct summary of the attitudes of humility we have discerned in Niebuhr's
work completes the task of this chapter and prepares for the next.
Self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is the first fruit of Niebuhr's humility. In a very
early work Niebuhr observed that "the truly religious man does know himself as no
one else does."107 Truly religious persons are those who have had the profound
experience of God, the gift of grace in which we see ourselves as God sees us. Here
we know ourselves to be sinners yet also the forgiven and beloved creatures of a
perfect Creator. This is a gift of grace that allows us to accept our finitude because
we know that we are loved and redeemed by an infinite God, One who is active on
our behalf in and beyond history. The humility of self-knowledge is essential to the
right relationship with God that rightly orders all human relationships. As Cardinal
Heenen observed to Lord Longford, "humility is essentially recognizing the truth
about yourself and living accordingly."108 Knowing the truth of one's self before
God and living accordingly rejects any idea of humility as self-abasement. True self-
106
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knowledge allows an appreciation of our gifts as further evidence of God's grace
toward us as his beloved and redeemed creatures.
Wisdom. Self-knowledge points us toward true knowledge which is the wisdom of
God. For Niebuhr, human wisdom is born of the profound experience of God
discerned through Christ's atoning work. The wisdom of God is a possibility for us
only when we humbly recognize the fmitude, limits, and tainted character of our own
knowledge. Through grace we access the wisdom that allows us a God's eye
perspective without pretending that we are God. As an attitude or fruit of humility
wisdom illumines righteousness while apprending the ever-present temptations of
self-righteousness. Once again the relational dimensions of humility are confirmed.
For Niebuhr the grace of humility points to the "wisdom by which we deal with our
fellow men, either as comrades or competitors."109
Patience. In confessing our sinful and creaturely condition we recognize our common
humanity before God. Patience with others who share our sinful nature is born of this
recognition and reflects the humble character of Christ who, though perfect, was
patient with others; a lack of patience indicates an absence of humility. Patience is an
attitude of humility that must colour all our relationships but is perhaps especially
required of those who possess power and exercise authority.110 It must be said that
while Niebuhr appeals to patience as an attitude of humility, it is not always reflected
in his own, more polemical writing. As we will see, amid wartime exigencies he was
often enough impatient with those reacting wrongly or too slowly to events. While at
times his impatience was vindicated and others not, the point is that patience as an
attitude of humility discerned in context. It cannot be used as a pious mask for
irresponsibility.
Toleration. Niebuhr's rejection of all human claims to absolute truth and of
Augustine's doctrine of the Church are perhaps his most important critiques of
Augustine. From his Reformed perspective Niebuhr rejected Augustine's belief that
109




the Church (or any human construct) possesses absolute truth or can mediate God's
grace. If in the context of his own time Augustine was relatively tolerant of opposing
views, Niebuhr saw in his doctrines the seeds of self-righteousness that infected both
the Catholic Church and later radical reformers. Though Niebuhr had many Roman
Catholic friends and colleagues whom he found personally humble and tolerant, he
described the Roman Catholic Church as "collectively and officially intolerant."111 In
Niebuhr humility expressed as toleration is an essential safeguard against religious
and moral self-righteousness. For him toleration is an essential attitude of humility
for free and democratic societies. Yet, like patience, toleration must not be allowed to
mask self-deceptive irresponsibility. All the attitudes of humility as gifts of grace
illumine the point at which the tolerable becomes intolerable and action is required.
Forgiveness. Niebuhr believed that forgiveness is the "crown of Christian ethics." If
God's forgiveness is at the heart Christ's atoning work it characterizes the
divine/human encounter and thus informs all human relationships. Forgiveness in the
humble and religious soul is the grace that militates against the fury of self-
righteousness. It reflects God's true character, his wisdom and mercy. The forgiving
attitude is inextricably related to each of the attitudes of humility and as it embraces
them forgiveness becomes an occasion of grace, a power beyond human power for
good. The forgiving spirit seeks the God's eye perspective that rejects the human
absolutes that lend demonic fury to social conflict. The forgiving spirit does not
pretend to be God but knows that there is a God's eye perspective in which "all our
righteousnesses are as filthy rags."112 Forgiveness characterizes the Christian spirit
in conflict.
Compassion and Responsibility. The relational dimensions of humility are discerned
in each of its attitudes. For Niebuhr the biblical understanding of God's compassion
and responsibility for human beings is revealed most fully in Christ's atoning work.
In Christ we see God's compassion for humanity's sinful state and for all human
suffering. In Christ's ministry and atoning work God's compassion is reasserted as
111
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he confirms His responsibility for the world and takes the consequences of sin upon
himself. This divine compassion and responsibility are asserted in the self-humbling
of Christ who reveals the law of love as the true nature of both God and Man. When
we respond in love to God's love we know that His compassion for all human beings
requires our responsibility to and for others. The grace of humility that brings us to
the new life is also the power beyond our power to meet the responsibilities it entails.
As these brief treatments of humility attest, it is difficult to find in Niebuhr any
characteristic of the Christian life that precludes humility. This is particularly true
when the dimensional nature of humility is understood in Niebuhr's work. He
discerned the signal importance of humility in his study of Augustine but in his
critique of Augustine he gave increased immediacy to its importance within the
complexities and relationships of contemporary social life. In proclaiming the truth of
Christ Niebuhr's prophetic witness echoes Augustine's call to "convince the proud of
the power and excellence of humility."
While prideful sin resides in human nature, both Niebuhr and Augustine understood
that power magnifies the temptations and social consequences of sin. Niebuhr is
particularly concerned with understanding the moral ambiguity of power and its use
in meeting Christian social responsibility. His emphasis on pride in its various guises
is particularly directed at those with power and political responsibility for social
justice. In underscoring the profoundly destructiveness of human pride upon all
human relationships Niebuhr proclaims the essential power of humility. In his
frequent polemic against the "righteous", however, Niebuhr understood that it was
first necessary to convince the proud that they are, in fact, proud. It is through the
lens of humility and its attitudes that Niebuhr finds "the truth of Christ contending
constantly against the truth as men see it."113
But the truth in Christ cannot be speculatively established. It is
established only as men encounter God, individually and collectively,
after the pattern of Christ's mediation. The creative consequences of




absence of pride and pretension, must be the proofs that there has been
an encounter with the only true God.114
114 "Intellectual Autobiography," in Kegley and Bretall, 20.
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Chapter Three
Humility and Niebuhr's Christian Realism
Humility he believed, must temper, not sever, the nerve ofaction.'
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
Introduction
In the preceding chapters I examined Augustine's significant influence upon Niebuhr's
understanding of humility and his "realist" perspective on society and human nature. In
the second chapter Niebuhr's understanding of the origins and significance of humility
were examined in the context of his prophetic faith. Particular attention was given to
Niebuhr's linkage of the individual's experience of the grace of humility and its attitudes
for the Christian's social task.
In this chapter I will examine the attitudes of humility and their operation in what came
to be called Niebuhr's Christian realism. Here Niebuhr is placed in the theological and
political context and his realism compared with several prominent political realists who
both influenced and were influenced by Niebuhr's work. Because Niebuhr's "mature"
Christian realism focused on American international responsibility the primary concern
is to illumine the attitudes of humility in meeting those responsibilities.
1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., forward to Charles C. Brown's Niebuhr and His Age: Reinhold Niebuhr's
Prophetic Role and Legacy, new ed. (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002,1, vii.
Significance of Humility in Christian Realism
Niebuhr's theology fundamentally shapes his understanding of Christian responsibility.
In his explication of humility bom of the self s profound encounter with God we
acknowledge responsibility for our sins and stand judged before the perfect Creator. Yet
in this encounter we experience the divine mercy and know ourselves to be his infinitely
loved and forgiven creatures. Thus humility and responsibility share their common
source in Niebuhr's theology and are concomitant characteristics of the Christian's
participation in God's redemptive work. This acknowledgment of responsibility for self
and for others discerned in the profound encounter with God is a tenet of faith that
undergirds Niebuhr's Christian realism.2
Essential to Christian responsibility is accepting the reality of sinful human nature and
recognizing it consequences in collective human behaviour. It is at the conjunction of
Christian responsibility and action that Harland observed, "no theme courses through the
whole of Niebuhr's writing with greater strength or constancy than the theme of the
social relevance ofhumility bom of faith's encounter."3
Niebuhr's insistence upon the relevance of humility to action is evident in his earliest
work. In his first published book, Does Civilization Need Religion? (1928), he wrote that
the "intricate social life" of human collectives can be achieved only through the humility
and love that persuades the religious person "to regard the values of his religion
critically."
2 Charles T. Mathewes, Evil and the Augustinian Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 147. Niebuhr's idea ofChristian social responsibility provides a rich vein mined by his critics,
including Stanley Hauerwas who objects to its "Constantinianism." Christians concerned with social
justice want "to play the game of responsibility" based upon Niebuhrian assumptions that Hauerwas cannot
accept. "Having bought the Niebuhrian assumption that one can live the kingdom ethic or promote justice
but not do both, Hauerwas concludes that justice 'is a bad idea for Christians.'" Gary Dorrien, Soul in
Society: The Making and Renewal ofSocial Christianity (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 358.
3
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Humility is therefore a spiritual grace which has value not only for its
own sake but for its influence upon social problems. Traditional
religions... easily fall into a pride of their own, the pride which comes
from identifying the absolute standards of their inspired source with their
partial achievements and inevitable compromises. But religion in its
purest and unspoiled form is always productive of a spirit of humility
which regards every moral achievement as but a vantage point from which
new ventures of faith and life are to be initiated toward the alluring
perfection which is in God.4
In The Contribution of Religion to Social Work (1932) Niebuhr observed that "true
religion prompts to both love and humility, and the humility preserves the unselfish man
from assuming he is unselfish." In the profound encounter with God, the religious person
knows how short he falls of God's holiness; and it is in this sense that the "truly religious
man does know himself as no one else does." The animosities of social conflict are
reduced through self-knowledge grounded in religious humility, Niebuhr wrote, because
it deprives "the privileged classes of the moral conceit which is one of their chief
weapons, as well as a principal cause of their political intransigence."5
The significance of humility in what would become Niebuhr's Christian realism
developed over the following decades as he studied and experienced the operation of
pride in human nature. This significance is reflected in what most likely is his ultimate
understanding of Christian realism. "Let's be clear that realism means particularly one
thing," Niebuhr observed late in 1969, "that you establish the common good not purely
by unselfishness but by the restraint of selfishness. That's realism."6
4
Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion? (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), 55.
5
Niebuhr, The Contribution ofReligion to Social Work (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932),
90-91
6 Ronald H. Stone, "An Interview with Reinhold Niebuhr," Christianity and Crisis 29 (March 17, 1969):
50, cited in Brown, Niebuhr and His Age, 238.
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Pride and the Inadequacy of Liberal Idealism
Just as Niebuhr's understanding of humility is shaped in part by its oppositional attitude,
pride, so too his understanding of realism is shaped by what he considered its opposite,
liberal idealism. During his youth, education and early ministry Niebuhr had himself
been immersed in an optimistic idealism formed in the synthesis of the Social Gospel
and 19th Century American liberal idealism. Walter Rauschenbusch's Social Gospel
envisaged the Kingdom of God not as a transcendent hope but as a historical possibility.
In its fusion of religious and liberal idealism, Schlesinger wrote, the Social Gospel
encouraged the belief that politics "could incarnate the absolute."
The laws of the Kingdom were identical with human nature and society;
the Christian ethic and the commandment of love were directly applicable
to social and political questions; and that Christian policies offered
practical alternatives to secular policies in specific situations. Charles M.
Sheldon's question, "What would Jesus do?" was considered the key
which would unlock social and political perplexity7
While the Social Gospel provided America's liberal idealism a religious sanction the
work of John Dewey shaped its "humanistic and secular rationale." Dewey believed
human progress would be achieved by the application of scientific method to the
political and economic aspects of society. Ignorance and prejudice were all that stood
between humanity and Utopia; education would remedy the former and scientific method
the latter. Through education and scientific method society would eventually achieve
7
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in American Political Thought and Life," in Kegley and
Bretall, 128. This appears to Robin Lovin an overly simplistic characterisation ofRauschenbusch's Social
Gospel: "Rauschenbusch's call for social reconstruction that would he both Christian and scientific was far
more attentive to the complexities of life in industrial society that some of his nineteenth-century
predecessors." ReinholdNiebuhr & Christian Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995J, 5.
Nor was Rauschenbusch as nai've as realists such as Schlesinger and Niebuhr characterised him: "We must
not blink from the fact that idealists alone have never carried through any great social change .... For a
definite historical victory a great truth must depend on the class which makes that truth its own and fights
for it." Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (New York: Macmillan, 19079, 420-421.
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8
"definitive solutions to the great political and economic issues." Schlesinger found that
the Social Gospel and Dewey's rationalism converged to "vindicate a common attitude
toward man and society—a radiant sense of optimism and hope, a conviction of the
manageability of human tensions and the plasticity of human nature."9
Writing in retrospect Niebuhr provided something of a caricature of the liberal idealism
that he himself had largely embraced in his early life and pastorates.10
a. Injustice is caused by ignorance and will yield to education and greater
intelligence.
b. Civilization is becoming gradually more moral and that it is a sin to
challenge the inevitability of the efficacy of gradualness.
c. The character of individuals rather than social systems and arrangements is
the guarantee ofjustice in society.
d. Appeals to love, justice and good-will and brotherhood are bound to be
efficacious in the end. If they have not been to date we must have more
appeals to love, justice, good-will and brotherhood.
e. Goodness makes for happiness and that the increasing knowledge of this
fact will overcome human selfishness and greed.
f. Wars are stupid and can therefore only be caused by people who are more
stupid than those who recognize the stupidity ofwars."
8
Schlesinger, "Niebuhr's Role," in Kegley and Bretall, 128.
9
Ibid., 127.
10 Kenneth Thompson, "The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," in Kegley and Bretall, 173. This
is a salient example ofwhat Thompson calls Niebuhr's "normative, polemical and vague" approach to
defining terms and concepts.
11 "The Blindness ofLiberalism," Radical Religion 1, no. 4 (Autumn 1936): 4.
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As the callow young minister in his first pastorate Niebuhr "found that the simple
idealism into which the classical faith had evaporated was as irrelevant to the crises of
•12 •
personal life as it was to the complex social issues of an industrial city." It would in
Niebuhr's view prove equally irrelevant as he began to focus on America's international
responsibilities. The chief flaw of liberal idealism was its unwillingness or inability to
recognize the fact of prideful human nature and its consequences for collective
behaviour.
At the time Niebuhr took up his ministry at the Bethel Evangelical Church in burgeoning
Detroit, the Great War that then embroiled Europe was a distant nightmare for America.
For the United States, 1915 fell within a era of technical advance and cultural optimism.
American technology had made possible the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914,
transcontinental telephone service had just been introduced, and the nation's industrial
output equalled that of Great Britain and Germany combined.13 There appeared to be
many sound reasons for America's optimistic idealism then, especially in Detroit where
the nascent auto industry employed thousands of workers under the reputedly paternal
eye of Flenry Ford. Yet beneath the city's vibrant veneer and Ford's vaunted $5 per day
wage, pastor Niebuhr discerned the drudgery and insecurity ofmost industrial workers in
America's largely unregulated economy.14
We see in his mid-1920s fight to expose Ford's pretensions several essential elements in
what came to be called Niebuhr's Christian realism. First, he recognized that the truth of
any situation always requires that pretensions and idealisms be unmasked to allow the
underlying reality to be examined as clearly as possible. For Niebuhr, Ford's pretension
12
Niebuhr, "Intellectual Autobiography," in Kegley and Bretall, 6.
13 Ronald H. Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1981), 24. Such was the spirit of American optimism, Brown notes, that WWI "hardly shook the
sunny temper of American culture or the optimistic theology and philosophy of the Yale faculty." Niebuhr
andHis Age, 18. Niebuhr had completed his MA at Yale in 1915.
14
Niebuhr, Leaves From the Notebook ofa Tamed Cynic (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox
Press, 1980), 65.
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was obscured by America's liberal idealism that in reality provided "cover for power."15
Second, Niebuhr witnessed first-hand the social and moral consequences of unbridled
economic power and unregulated industry; the injustices of Ford's industrial practices
occurred in large measure because there was no countervailing power in the hand of
labour. "Besides the brutal facts ofmodem industrial life," he wrote after a plant visit in
1925, "how futile are all our homiletical spoutings."16 As his understanding of pride and
will-to-power in human nature developed Niebuhr became convinced that some balance
of power rather than more futile pleas from the pulpit was essential to ameliorating the
excesses of power itself.
Niebuhr was nevertheless deeply influenced by the Great War, particularly its aftermath
of dissolution and cynicism. Despite some initial reluctance he had taken time from his
pastoral duties to visit military installations, to counsel youthful recruits and to support
President Wilson's wartime objective to make the world safe for democracy. In the
course of doing so, as reflected in Leaves and elsewhere in his writing, Niebuhr
pondered the incongruities ofwar and "how to reconcile its necessities with the Christian
ethic."17 But despite his revulsion at the violence concomitant with war he rejected
pacifism, seriously considered the chaplaincy himself, and was a patriotic proponent of
Allied victory against his father's native Germany. It is quite possible to detect during
this period an element of the stridency that prompted later critics of Niebuhr's Cold War
positions to characterise him as an "apologist of power."18 Reflecting later on the nature
of his early support of Wilson's idealistic war aims, Niebuhr himself later confessed that
"I was more than ordinarily patriotic during the war."19
15 Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985; Ithica, New York:




18 Bill Kellerman, "Apologist ofPower: The Long Shadow of Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism,"
Sojourners 16 (March, 1987): 14-20.
19
Brown, Niebuhr andHis Age, 22.
90
Reflecting on Niebuhr's views and work during WWI and after we discern a willingness
to acknowledge error in light of theological reflection and experience. As the spectacle
of Versailles unfolded in 1919, Niebuhr observed that Wilson's idealism won him the
worship of the crowd but rendered him impotent at the conference table: "They will let
Wilson label the transaction if the others can determine its true import. Thus realities are
exchanged for words," Niebuhr recorded in his diary.20 "Wilson at Paris trusted too
much in words while the "sly Clemenceau...helped by Mr. Lloyd George undermined his
aims by writing into the terms of peace large reparations demanded from Germany."21 In
1923 he toured the structural and financial wreckage of the Ruhr Valley which France
had occupied when Germany defaulted on the reparations. There he witnessed the
consequences of Wilson's political naivity and the arrogant vindictiveness of the Allies.
Niebuhr, whose German relatives were among the victims of this vindictiveness, was
outraged: "One would like to send every sentimental spellbinder of war days into the
Ruhr. This, then, is the glorious issue for which the war was fought! I didn't know
Europe in 1914, but I can't imagine that the hatred between peoples could have been
worse than it is now."22
These early experiences pre-date Niebuhr's encounter with Augustine and his analysis of
sin as pride in human nature. We nevertheless discern in his Detroit experiences and his
ruminations on WWI a deepening conviction that pride is somehow at the heart of all
human disorder. If he had not yet developed the systematic analysis of sin and pride
presented in The Nature and Destiny of Man, his early experiences were essential
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Pride and the Marxist Alternative: Having and Not Having the Truth
Niebuhr's dynamic ministry at Bethel, renowned attacks on Ford, leadership in
addressing Detroit's social problems, and insightful writing gained him a chair of
Christian Ethics at Union Seminary in 1928. His Detroit pastorate and committed
involvement with social and industrial conditions provided the foundation for his
life-long understanding of America "as a nation of behavers and experiencers and not
very often as theorists about their belief."23 At Union he made it his task to identify and
prophetically critique America's particular self-understanding and its social
consequences. If he had appropriate concern for his paucity of scholarly theological
training, his experience revealed the inadequacy of religious and secular idealisms for
the task. In retrospect Niebuhr discerns pride as central to this inadequacy.
I found each with a sense of superiority over the other because it
possessed, or had discarded, the Christian faith. But this contest was
ironic because the viewpoints of the two communities were strikingly
similar, both were obviously irrelevant to the ultimate realities, whether in
terms of mankind's collective behaviour or in terms of individual man's
ultimate problems.24
Within the context of the Great Depression Niebuhr looked increasingly at the Marxist
alternative. It appealed to Niebuhr for several reasons. For one, he found that it provided
a more realistic theory and analysis of capitalism and the causes of class conflict. For
another, the Marxist theory that capitalism would succumb to some great
"end-of-history" catastrophe was a sobering physic to liberalism's historically
insupportable view about human perfectibility and progress. Perhaps most important
Niebuhr found the Marxist understanding of the power of self-interest in collective
23 Martin E. Marty, "Reinhold Niebuhr: Public Theology and the American Experience," Journal of




human behaviour a far more more effective tool for social change than liberalism's
9S
appeals to "sentimental idealism."
Yet Niebuhr came to see that Marxism shared the basic flaw of secular and religious
liberal idealism. This flaw was another expression of human pride. If religious and
secular liberal idealisms preached humanity's eventual perfection in history, Marxism
proclaimed the Kingdom of God in history and saw in the Soviet Union "the incarnation
of the absolutes."26 Both liberal and Marxist idealisms, in Niebuhr's estimate, attempted
to transform contingent and finite systems of thought into universal and absolute truths.
Just as Christian moralists made the Sermon on the Mount absolute to social ethics,
Communists elevated Marxist theory to an equally absolute social ethic. "The pathos of
Marxian spirituality," Niebuhr wrote, "is that is sees the qualified and determined
character of all types of spirituality except its own."27
Niebuhr's critique of Marxism reflects his view that pride resides at the heart of human
nature and is magnified in collective behaviour. The Marxist view that human nature
"would be transfigured with the withering away of the state" was for Niebuhr "a pathetic
illusion." Schlesinger observed that for Niebuhr the reality of Soviet Communism
confirmed his view that no social system or idealism could essentially change the
prideful will-to-power of human nature.
If power remained the central fact of society, and the desire for power
man's ireradicable failing, then the destruction of economic privilege
25
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could hardly be expected to alter human nature to the degree that no one
thereafter would desire to make selfish use of power.29
Nevertheless in his retrospective 1939 essay "Ten Years that Shook My World," Niebuhr
confirmed his belief that Marxist analysis of the relationship of economics to politics
was "essentially correct" and he remained convinced that only socialism provided the
balances of economic and political power necessary to address the injustices of
American capitalism.30 Having rejected the Marxist alternative and dismissing
Roosevelt's New Deal as "whirligig reform," Niebuhr believed that only socialism could
address the nation's economic crisis and, as he reviewed the international scene, arrest
ii
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what he feared as a possible drift toward fascism. Only gradually did he began to
accept the creative possibilities ofNew Deal strategies wherein "social power could best
be distributed and balanced."32 Niebuhr's conversion from radical socialism was
reluctant and perhaps grudging but he eventually embraced, albeit critically, Roosevelt's
gradualism and pragmatic method of social change.33
Quandary of American Power and Responsibility
Niebuhr's wavering counsels in the 1930s regarding US international responsibility
reflected an abiding fear that its economic and military power would tempt America to
29
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address its problems through prideful "intransigence and defiance of world opinion." As
early as 1932 Niebuhr warned against American economic power that was not balanced
by experience and skill in international affairs. He saw American foreign policy as
driven by powerful commercial interests whose influence was so poorly perceived by an
uninformed electorate that there was little check upon business excesses. He feared a
prideful coalescence of American economic and military power devoid of any "critical
attitude towards national pretensions and ambitions."34
These factors led him to counsel American detachment from the turmoil and militaristic
ventures then plaguing the international landscape. He apparently hoped that European
collective security would avoid major armed conflict long enough to correct the unjust
social systems and economic rivalries leading to war.35 As the international crises of the
1930s multiplied Niebuhr typically "criticised the self-righteousness of the League, and
attacked moralistic illusions, but he did not emphasize American responsibility."36 As
late as 1938, when a European war appeared certain, Niebuhr wanted the United States
to stay clear of the conflict. Even Roosevelt's modest re-armament proposals drew his
near-hysterical ire.
Niebuhr never lost his suspicion of American power. Yet having concluded that social
justice requires a balance of power he rejected any moral absolute as an antidote to, or as
an escape from, the reality of power. Thus he rejected Christian non-resistence as a
moral absolute for public policy. The "moral achievement of goodwill is not a substitute
for the mechanisms of social control," he wrote. It may "perfect and purify" the
individual, "but it cannot create basic justice."38 In Moral Man and Immoral Society he
had likewise critiqued the non-violent ethic of liberal Christian theology and socialist
34
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pacifism as absolutes for public policy.39 He recognized the positive possibilities of
non-violent approaches such as Gandhi's; that non-violent means reduce animosity in
conflict and allow those involved "more objectivity in analysing the issues in dispute."40
It is nevertheless necessary to recogize that non-violent strategies may be as
indiscriminately destructive and unjust to the innocent as the use of coercive force. A
case in point was the pacifists' call for League of Nations' economic sanctions against
Japan following its 1931 attack on Manchuria. "If the League of Nations should use
economic sanctions against Japan, or any other nation," Niebuhr wrote, "workmen who
have the least to do with Japanese imperialism would be bound to suffer most."41
In Niebuhr's quandary over American power in the 1930s we perhaps discern his
struggle to find a responsible course between two expressions of pride. Certainly he
recognized the evil potential in American pride and power. Yet he recognized the
operation of pride in moral absolutes that appear to offer an escape from the ambiguity
and taint of power.42 Here Niebuhr confirms that the prideful-will-to-power residing at
the core of human nature can be ameliorated socially only by some form of
countervailing power. Those committed to relative justice must understand the reality of
power and the necessity of its balance in some form. "The task of securing justice is a
39 The book earned Niebuhr the enmity of pacifists of both persuasions. Norman Thomas, the 1932
Socialist presidential candidate, labelled Niebuhr's rejection of pacifism "defeatism," while the pacifist
Christian Century denounced its cynicism and "unrelieved pessimism." Heather A. Warren, Theologians
ofa New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 52.
40
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even economic strictures and that no country mired in the Great Depression would willingly and
unilaterally curtail trade with Japan; nor was any, including the US, willing or prepared to wage war over
the matter. This episode, writes Kissinger, was the first step in the League's unraveling.: "None of the
League members knew how to overcome these self-inflicted contradictions." Diplomacy (New York:
Simon & Shuster; Touchstone, 1995), 286.
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never-ending political task," Harland writes of Niebuhr. "It is therefore always involved
in a contest of power."43
With the Munich debacle, the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the Nazi-Soviet
non-agression pact of August, 1939 Niebuhr recognised that American power had a
necessary role in the struggle. While he discerned very early the threat of Nazism and
spoke often against the international barbarism of the 1930s, he had not "articulated a
coherent policy for the US prior to WWII," Stone observed. "His prescriptions for
foreign policy had been hesitant, and he had hope that the United States would remain
out of the military struggle."44 But along with other Christian realists Niebuhr came to
see that American neutrality, which he himself had appeared to advocate earlier, coupled
with a "confused pacifism," represented "the cardinal weakness of democracy in facing
the perils of tyranny."45 IfNiebuhr had discerned the evil potential of prideful US power
he saw less clearly that the failure to use power responsibly entailed still worse evil.
His prophetic faith sanctified no form of government but it did require choices between
lesser and greater evils. There is no perfectionist solution to the inevitable tensions
entailed in fashioning the requisite balances of power. Nor does faith remove the moral
ambiguity of power. But the Christian is not thereby excused from responsibility for
social justice within and among the nations. What profound faith does offer for the task
are the attitudes of humility that illumine decisions and open humankind to grace that is
power beyond human power for good.
43 Gordon Harland, TheThought ofReinhold Niebahr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 51.
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A Deficit of Clarity
Niebuhr's mature period, the era of the work and activism of Niebuhr the Christian
realist, has been described as those years just preceding WWII and through the early
Cold War to 1950.46 While his realism in this period was more immediately a
theological and political response to the world-wide cultural crisis of the War and its
aftermath, it was not formulated to provide a policy blue-print for that or any other era:
Niebuhr's Christian realism always entails a relevant faith attuned to specific context and
specific consequences. His purpose, rather, was to express "the Christian faith in terms
consistent with the way in which the world settles questions of truth."47 His Christian
realism attempted to provide a prophetic perspective from which America could
participate in addressing those questions.
Typically perhaps, Niebuhr's definition of realism lacks what Lovin decribes as
"definitional specificity."48 Niebuhr admits as much in observing that the "definitions of
'realist' and 'idealist' emphasise disposition rather than doctrines; and they are therefore
bound to be inexact."49 In Christian Realism and Political Problems Niebuhr struggles
46 Dennis McCann, "Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain on Marxism: A Comparison of Two
Traditional models of Practical Theology," Journal ofReligion 58 (January, 1978): 144-45. Warren has
done good service in reminding us of the "prophetic band" ofChristian realists who laboured along side
Niebuhr and were eclipsed by his prominence. These included Niebuhr's close Union Seminary colleagues
Henry Van Dusen and John Bennett with whom he established Christianity and Crisis in early 1941. Like
Niebuhr, these were not armchair activists. Warren cites Van Dusen's role in formulating Roosevelt's
Lend-lease program. Theologians, 3.
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with a definition of realism that convincingly confirms Lovin's criticism.
In political and moral theory "realism" denotes the disposition to take all
factors in a social and political situation, which offer resistance to
established norms, into account, particularly the factors of self interest and
power. In the words of a notorious "realist," Machiavelli, the purpose of the
realist is "to follow the truth of the matter rather than the imagination of it;
for many have pictures of republics and principalities which have never been
seen." This definition of realism implies that idealists are subject to illusions
about social realities, which indeed they are. "Idealism" is, in the esteem of
its proponents, characterized by loyalty to moral norms and ideals, rather
than to self-interest, whether individual or collective. It is, in the opinion of
its critics, characterized by a disposition to ignore or be indifferent to the
forces in human life which offer resistance to universally valid ideas and
norms. This disposition, to which Machiavelli refers, is general whenever
men are inclined to take the moral pretensions of themselves or their
fellowmen at face value; for the disposition to hide self- interest behind the
fafade of pretended devotion to values, transcending self-interest, is
well-nigh universal.50
Acutely aware of the lack of precision in Niebuhrian terminology, Lovin appeals to
Niebuhr's dialectical method for clarification. As has been noted, the approach here is to
develop concepts negatively by noting what they are not and to clarify positions by those
that they reject. The depth of meaning in Niebuhr's work is most fully mined when we
recognize that "his aims are synthetic, linking related ideas into a complex whole, rather




This is especially apparent in the terminology of Christian Realism itself.
Niebuhr's position emerges as a complex of theological conviction, moral
theory, and meditation on human nature in which the elements are mutually
reinforcing, rather than systematically related. The "logic" of the biblical
doctrine emerges as we carefully distinguish it from other views and come to
appreciate "the adequacy of its answer for human problems which other
views have obscured and confused." We understand what Christian Realism
is largely by identifying what it is not.31
We cannot escape the lack of clarity and consistency of definitions in Niebuhr's work.
Lovin is chiefly correct in his view that we understand what Niebuhr means by Christian
realism by antithetical analysis and by an examination of its constituent elements. Here
Robin Lovin's work is of signficant help.
Christian Realism's Constituent Realisms
Lovin's Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism provides a recent benchmark in
Niebuhrian criticism in which he analyses the constituent realisms that comprise
Niebuhr's Christian realism. Here the purpose is to discern what may be seen as
distinctly Christian about Niebuhr's Christian realism. Although Lovin cautions against
any strict delimitation of the constituent elements in Niebuhr's Christian realism, he
nevertheless finds analysis of its particular compound of realisms helpful to
understanding the depth and cohesion of Niebuhr's public theology. Niebuhr's
"distinctive insights come as these perspectives are drawn into a relationship in which no
one of their conclusions is definitive, but from which, likewise, none can be omitted."52
Lovin identifies these constituent elements as political, moral and theological realisms.
51
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Political Realism. Lovin sees Niebuhr's Christian realism as a form of political realism
that takes into account self-interest, power, fear, and all the factors that underlie political
decisions. Here Niebuhr's use of Marxist theory in analysing social conditions, most
evident in his earlier writing, was a precursor to the "hermeneutics of suspicion" that
became an essential analytical tool of liberationist theologians.53 Utilizing this approach
each factor is carefully weighed to determine its true impact on events rather than its
position within the dominant system of values and ideals. Put differently, Niebuhr's
realism entails the use of the social sciences; if Christians are to address the social and
economic ills of society, they must first identify and understand their root causes.
Following Marxist thought, Niebuhr believed that the realities of society, what was
really going on, were reflected in the realities of economic power.54 Because social
conditions are based on the reality of power political realism holds that we cannot "rely
on moral argument alone to decide on political action nor should we overestimate the
power ofmoral suasion to determine the course of events."55 Niebuhr's political realism,
then, cannot accept the ethics of Jesus as a "simple possibility." The history of human
conflict reveals the enormous void between "what the ethics of Jesus demands and any
possible social organization."
The ethic of Jesus does not deal at all with the immediate moral problems
of everyday human life—the problem of arranging some kind of armistice
between various contending factions and forces. It has nothing to say
about the relativities of politics and economics, nor of the necessary
balances of power which exist and must exist in even the most intimate
social relationships.56
53 The early liberationist theologian J. Secundo, developed a hermeneutic model which harnessed the
concept of suspicion with use of the social sciences. "Everything involving ideas, including theology, is
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Moral Realism. Nevertheless Lovin observes that Niebuhr's Christian realism reflects a
moral realism which accepts that moral ideas have power and therefore political
consequences because people believe in them. The perfectionism of Jesus may be called
unrealistic but its social impact is nevertheless real and enduring because millions of
people believe it—some may even try to live it. Analogically, while the Marxist ideals of
the withering away of the state and of the classless society may have proven unrealistic
Marxism was a potent 20th Century force because it embraced the hopes of the masses.57
Thus moral idealisms may be unrealistic but nevertheless have real and profound social
impact. But moral realism looks beyond the real effects of the ideal which flow from the
strength of its believers. For an ideal to be realistic in Niebuhr's moral realism it must
also be true irrespective of whether it is supported by the force of its believers. Thus the
moral realist holds "that whether a moral statement is true or false depends on a state of
affairs that exists independently of the ideas that the speaker or the speaker's community
holds."
A moral claim might be true, even if nobody believes it. If, for example,
the truth or falsity of a moral claim depends on what God has
commanded, and God has commanded that no person be held in slavery,
then slavery is wrong, even if everyone in a slave-holding society,
including the slaves themselves, believes it is morally right.58
While political realism per se is concerned for the tangible social effects of belief
systems, the moral realist believes "that moral statements are true of the world, and not
just true of our beliefs about morality.59 Lovin readily points out, however, that there are
varieties of moral realists and locates Niebuhr among those who largely embrace an
ethical naturalism. Moral realists of this sort discern moral terms on the basis of the
"natural properties of 'good' or 'bad' persons, situations, and actions." To be
57
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distinguished from ethical naturalism is reductive naturalism "which holds that the
moral term means nothing but the natural properties."60 Thus while Niebuhr's moral
realism may hold that moral truths can stand independent of our particular beliefs, it
does not follow that such truths have natural properties in a universe "in which there
were no human beings to know and respond to them."61
Typically, Niebuhr characterised his moral realism by distinguishing it from others and
focused his attention primarily on Catholic natural law tradition. As was evident in his
treatment of Augustine's theology, Niebuhr's analysis of this tradition is decidedly
informed by his Reformed perspective regarding human freedom. As a result, Lovin
observes, perhaps Niebuhr did not recognize the degree to which his Christian realism
shared in the chief premises of the natural law tradition: that right action conforms to
human nature; that the action of the good person encourages rather than defeats human
capacities; and that the good person strives to maximise human potential while
maintaining realistic expectations regarding its possible achievement. But while
recognising here that individual morality must conform to human nature, Niebuhr's
primary brief was to demonstrate that conformity to human nature informs social
morality as well. Societies are morally imperiled when they ignore the requirements of
human nature because "their moral systems and political institutions do not truthfully
represent the possibilities and limitations of human life."62
[A] free society prospers best in a cultural, religious and moral
atmosphere which encourages neither a too pessimistic nor too optimistic
view of human nature. Both moral sentimentality in politics and moral
pessimism encourage totalitarian regimes, the one because it encourages








the second because it believes that only absolute political authority can
restrain the anarchy, created by conflicting and competitive interests.63
Yet Niebuhr stressed that the good in conformity with human nature does not follow the
determinative cause/effect characteristics of the natural order. To be sure human beings
are creatures of nature but in their spiritual freedom they transcend nature. Man shares
nature's finitude and contingency, but his "essential nature also includes the freedom of
his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally his self-transcendence."64
Human freedom inserts a troublesome wrench into the works of those who would
"formulate the requirements of human nature into a determinate set of rules, goals, or
virtues."65 For Niebuhr the truly moral human existence, both personal and collective, it
entails the full use of uniquely human qualities: imagination yoked with reason that
reveals both life's realities and its full potential.
Theological Realism. That human beings are by their nature imaginative creatures who
can envision life differently from that which they experience indicates that idealism is an
inevitable element in personal and social morality. Yet Niebuhr rejected the sentimental
idealism of the sort he believed characterised much of the Social Gospel movement
because it proved ineffectual in addressing social realities. Following his early
experiences in Detroit, moreover, his hermeneutics of suspicion was always operative
regarding the liberal idealisms that mask the realities behind self-serving and self-
righteous morality. Nevertheless he recognised that idealism has its origin in imaginative
human nature and must therefore have an appropriate place in individual and collective
moral life. Demonstrating the "the relevance of an impossible ethical ideal" was the task
to which Niebuhr the moral realist turned in An Interpretation of Christian Ethics,66
Here, Lovin observes, we encounter Niebuhr's theological realism.
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The dimension of depth in the consciousness of religion creates the
tension between what is and what ought to be. It bends the bow from
which every arrow of moral action flies. Every truly moral act seeks to
establish what ought to be because the agent feels obligated to the ideal,
though historically unrealised, as being the order of life in its more
essential reality. Thus the Christian believes that the ideal of love is real
in the will and nature ofGod, even though he knows of no place in history
where the ideal has been realized in its pure form. And it is because it has
this reality that he feels the pull of obligation.67
Niebuhr's theological realism posits God's infinite love as the ultimate source of unity in
which human communities flourish but it does not assert that we know the specifics of
what God's law of love requires. Thus to claim that the God whose law is love is real
does not sanction any particular pretension to a "God's-eye point of view" of morality.
Rather, for Niebuhr, "the religious conviction that such a perspective belongs to God
alone may be the best way to insure that no person or group can lay a claim to it."68 It
was for this reason that Niebuhr frequently inveighed against religious
self-righteousness. And it was for this reason Niebuhr insisted that the obligations of
love, and the inevitable conflict among perspectives for meeting those obligations, must
be discerned through the lens of Christian humility; "a humility born of the recognition
that since one of us, at least, must be wrong, it may be me."69
If in Lovin's analysis the role of humility in Niebuhr's Christian realism is implicit it is
more explicit in Harland's The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, a book which won
Niebuhr's rare approbation.70 From his analysis of Niebuhr's theology and his
antithetical treatment of pride Harland developed our most succinct statement of the
67
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operation of humility and its attitudes in Niebuhr's work. Harland does not solve our
definitional defict problem but his observation indicates the character and task of
Christian realism.
Niebuhr is a realist, but he is also a Christian realist, that is he seeks to
inquire into the political behavior of the realist who knows that he still
lives and acts under a norm that transcends the realities with which he
must responsibly deal. To locate and describe the character of this
boundary line, against those who would completely separate the realms of
politics and religion or those who would too simply identify them, has
constituted a large portion of his task. But he has sought to do more: he
has endeavoured to show wherein the vantage point of Christian faith
illuminates the task of the political realist.71
Stance of Niebuhr's Christian Realism
In his essay "The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," Kenneth Thompson
discerned five characteristic stances in Niebuhr's Christian realism.72 A brief review of
these elements provides a helpful introduction to our current task.
First, from the history of his own times Niebuhr concluded that moral absolutes such a
pacifism are to be avoided in the conduct of foreign policy. Along with political realists
such as Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, Niebuhr rejected idealistic
tendencies to apply some philosopher's stone to the resolution of international conflict.
Like them Niebuhr rejected the meretricious appeal of moral absolutes such as pacifism
and neutrality that obscure the reality of power in international politics.73 To embrace
moral absolutes, Niebuhr concluded, may be both futile and in the event irresponsible or
71
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irrelevant; those who seek to avoid the guilt incurred by action incur the guilt of inaction.
Idealistic absolutes, he observed, "measure realities, not in terms of possible historical
alternatives but by comparison with purely ideal possibilities."74
Second, though he had in the 1930s counseled US "aloofness" from Europe's struggles,
Niebuhr came to reject the notion that America could avoid exercising political power in
the international sphere. Morgenthau, whose concept of human nature was significantly
shaped by Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society, affirmed that the exercise of
power was essential to any ordered social existence. Both accepted power politics as
integral to international affairs; their political realism aimed not at eliminating power
politics but at reducing its destructiveness. As Schlesinger observed, Niebuhr's
experience and analysis of human nature led him to accept conflict as both "the
consequence of power" and the "antidote to it."76
Third, Niebuhr is disdainful of idealisms based upon some belief in human perfectibility
and moral progress. Here as well Niebuhr shared Morgenthau's realism that rejects the
notion that basic human nature may be perfected by education and "moral exhortation."
Wilson's substitution of a liberal ideal, i.e., the League of Nations, for the reality of
power politics following WWI led to the next generation's agony because it failed to
acknowledge "the actual conditions of human action."77 Niebuhr found in
such false idealisms not merely harmless illusions which should be
avoided if one is not to be disappointed, but in some cases an escape from
urgent responsibilities and in other cases the source of the most
destructive forms of idolatry and of cruel fanaticism.78
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Those who espouse idealisms that assume some perfectibility of humankind will
encounter either of two results. The more benign result is that those devoted exclusively
to "morally right" social strategies such as pacifism render themselves irrelevant in the
event. The more malignant result is that the moral absolute holds sway as political
strategy and "proves horribly destructive, abolishing the necessary balances of power and
unleashing potent fanaticism." In Niebuhr's realism, the key to resolving conflict in any
given situation lies in recognising and understanding the particular factions and forces in
play.79 Idealisms and moral absolutes as the basis for action skew analysis,
understanding and expectations.
Fourth, Niebuhr's realism requires the study and interpretation of history. If he lacked
the skill and precision of a trained historian, he more than most social critics and
philosophers reflected a critical historical awareness.80 This characteristic appears
essential to Niebuhr's ability to read the signs of his own times.
Fifth, as expressed in The Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr is convinced that
understanding the prideful core of human nature is essential to any realistic
understanding of collective behaviour. His critique of liberal idealisms, Marxism,
pacifism, and world-government idealism all reflect his Christian understanding of sinful
human pride.81 Prideful human nature is the "rock-bottom problem" that Christian
realism addresses and is the test ofChristian realism's adequacy as a public theology.
While Thompson does not probe Niebuhr's understanding of humility he obliquely
recognizes its role in the application ofNiebuhr's realism to international relations.
79
Lovin, Christian Realism, 6.
80
Stone, Prophet to Politicians, 138.
81
Bennett, "Social Ethics," in Kegley and Bretall, 49.
108
We have a right to ask of our national leaders a kind of cosmic humility
regarding the moral actions of states. If realism strives to guard against
over-rating the influence of moral principles upon politics, it does so
because this humility is so frequently the missing factor.82
It is the missing factor of humility that Niebuhr's Christian realism always brings to the
table of political decision-making. Regarding international relations Niebuhr's realism
assumes a bottom-line of national self-interest and looks beyond whatever ideologies
may mask self-interest: "No nation," he wrote, "is good enough to do what is right,
• • • 83
unless its sense of duty is compounded with its sense of survival.
Niebuhr's writing, perhaps most notably his Moral Man and Immoral Society,
significantly influenced the realist school of American politics that included Hans J.
Morgenthau and George F. Kennan.84 The German emigre Morgenthau, whose 1947
book Scientific Man vs. Power Politics bore Niebuhr's imprint, became the doyen of
American political realists.85 In 1949 the two men served on the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff then led by Kennan. A distinguished diplomat, Kennan's political
realism significantly shaped the US policy of Containment in the early years of the Cold
War. His February 22, 1946 Long Telegram from Moscow and his subsequent
anonymous article in Foreign Affairs, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," are benchmarks
• OA
in 20th Century US diplomacy. A brief analysis of Kennan's and Morgenthau's
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understanding of political realism in the context of international relations illumines
Niebuhr's place among the leading realists of his day. It illumines as well the distinctions
between them and Niebuhr's Christian realism.
Principles of Political Realism in International Affairs
In Politics Among Nations Morgenthau suggests two opposed theories regarding human
nature and its political implications.87 One believes that a rational and moral order can be
achieved by the application of universally valid principles. Here it is assumed that
human nature is essentially good, infinitely malleable and perfectable through education
and social reform; that, in short, society can change human nature. The second theory
holds that the imperfections of society result from inherent forces within unchanging
human nature. To improve a world characterized by conflict it is necessary to understand
how the inherent forces within human nature may be used to balance and check
competing interests. Looking at history the realist sees no perfection of human nature or
• • • 88
society but "aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good."
In the realists' theory of human nature Morgenthau discerns six principles for
OQ
international affairs.
1. Through understanding the objective laws rooted in human nature, political realism
posits a theory of political behaviour that reflects these laws. Because no theory escapes
human imperfection and bias realism is tested by experience and reason. Thus realist
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political theory demands that the facts be known and their meaning understood through
rational analysis. In international relations, realism assumes that the true character of
foreign policy is understood through the interpretation of concrete political action and
consequences. Beyond an examination of what statesmen do, realism requires an
analysis ofwhy they acted as they did.
We put ourselves in the position of statesmen who must meet a certain
problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances and we ask
ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which the statesman may
choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances
(presuming always that he acts in a rational manner)...It is the testing of
this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences
that gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics.90
2. In international relations realism defines the national interest in terms of power. This,
we may say, provides the hermeneutical stance from which political realism interprets
the facts of international affairs at any given moment. Here national interest defined in
terms of power is seen as autonomous sphere of action apart from economic, moral, and
religious interests. While the political realist is certainly not indifferent to other spheres
of interest, nor indeed to the stateman's imputed motives, all interests are evaluated
through their relationship to national power.
We asssume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as
power, and the evidence of history bears this assumption out....Thinking
in terms of interest defined as power, we think as [the statesman] does,
and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions
perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.91
3. While the concept of national interest defined in terms of power is universally valid,
the realist does not see "interests" as permanently fixed. Concrete action is dominated
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by material and ideal interests, not ideas of how things might be different. But as Max
Weber wrote, "these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on
which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving."92 Thus the power that drives
national interest may adapt to the political and cultural environment in which it is
expressed. If national interests are the product of history the realist recognizes that they
will change. Indeed, the realist accepts that developing technology and moral
requirements may replace a world order of nation states with "larger units of a quite
different character." What the realist rejects is the notion that the transformation of the
international order can be effected by idealisms that ignore political realities that reflect
the prideful will-to-power in human nature.93
4. Prudence is the political virtue that relates political action and moral principle. The
realist knows that poltical action has moral implications and, indeed, insists that tension
between moral command and successful political action be fully recognized. Failure to
do so obscures the revelvant moral and political issues by making it appear that the
"stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral
law less demanding than it actually is." Unlike individuals, states cannot abandon
responsibility for national interests and those in its care on the basis of abstract moral
principles. To be applied to political action realism requires that moral principles be
"filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place." Prudence, the realist
holds, provides this filter.
There can be no political morality without prudence: that is, without
consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action.
Realism, then, considers prudence—weighing of the consequences of
alternative political actions--to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in
the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political
ethic judges action by it political consequences.94
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5. Realism rejects the identification of national moral aspirations and universal moral
principles. The realist may accept that all nations are subject to moral law. But the realist
knows the fundamental difference between "the belief that all nations stand under the
judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that
God is always on one's side." Here, Morgenthau notes, is precisely the sin of pride
against which the Biblical prophets enveighed. The realist's concept of interest in terms
of power militates against moral self-righteousness because it allows us to see our own
and others' interests.
We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having
judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that
respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting our
own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation ofmoral
judgment.95
6. The political realist insists on the autonomy of the political sphere. Just as the
economist analyzes action in terms of wealth, the lawyer in terms of the law, and the
moralist in terms ofmoral principle, the political realist anaylizes action for its effect on
the nation's power. Realism is aware of these perspectives and their relevance but will
not subordinate the autonomy of politics to them. The realist always sees the national
interest in terms of power and "parts company with other schools when they impose
standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere." Error
follows when political action is not based upon national interest in terms of power and is
unrelated to rationally anticipated consequences. For Morgenthau, the "legalistic-
moralistic approach" to international affairs subordinates the true national interest to
legal and moral requirments with often disasterous results.96
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This claim to autonomy is critical to Morgenthau's political realism, particularly in his
insistence that "the autonomy of the political sphere must be protected against the
encroachment of the military." 97 Realism discerns that pride in its sundry guises skews
objectivity and the ability to interpret the facts rationally. The moral limitation upon
understanding is human pride: "pride in his intellect, pride in his goodness, pride in the
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collectivity with which he identifies himself as against other collectivities." Intellectual
pride retards our ability to learn from past mistakes and enfeebles creative thinking on
immediate problems. Self-righteous pride impedes objectivity in thinking and action
regarding the situation at hand and mistakes a patina of abstract moralistic principles for
substantive analysis. Moreover, the embrace of idealistic principles may tempt flight
from responsibilities that a realistic assessment would impose. The resultant policies
may have serious and potentially catastrophic consequences.99
Political Realism in Practice
George F. Kennan's political realism provided the foundation for the West's post- WWII
policy of Containment. Unlike Morgenthau and Niebuhr, Kennan was by profession a
diplomat whose famous "Long Telegram" from Moscow of February 22, 1946100 and his
subsequent anonymous article in Foreign Affairs, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," are
benchmarks in 20th century US diplomatic history.101 Kennan's political realism, as with
Morgenthau's, is articulated within the context of international relations and politics.
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In formulating his political realism Kennan like Morgenthau and Niebuhr rejects
moralistic idealisms as the basis of national policy. For Kennan the idealist seeks
aloofness from the the exigencies of political reality while favouring policies derived
from some transcendent set of values. All three thinkers see two types of idealists. The
"pretentious" idealist fails to see the hypocrisy such moral claims entail and, more
seriously, the self-righteousness they often engender. The "perfectionist" idealist, finding
hypocrisy in the state's claim to act in accordance with universal moral values,
withdraws from, or becomes irrelevant to, political realities. In Niebuhr's fight with
Henry Ford and his later split with pacifism we find his critique of both types, while
Kennan and Morgenthau focus their critiques upon pretentious idealism.102
Kennan, like Niebuhr, was a keen detector of irony in human behaviour and saw in
pretentious idealism the crowning irony in the legalistic-moralistic approach to
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international problems.
Whoever says there is a law must of course be indignant against the
lawbreaker and feel a moral superiority to him. And when such
indignation spills over into military contest, it knows no bounds short of
the reduction of the lawbreaker to the point of complete
submissiveness...It is a curious thing, but it is true, that the legalistic
approach to world affairs, rooted as it unquestionably is in a desire to do
away with war and violence, makes violence more enduring, more
terrible, and more destructive of political stability than did the older
motives of national interest.104
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Kennan found with Niebuhr that human freedom thwarts those who seek to make history
conform to their particular ideals. Befogged by their pretensions such idealists do not
understand that "the greatest law of human history is its unpredictability."105 This was
true of Marxist idealism as well as the liberal democratic idealisms arrayed against it in
the Cold War. Such idealisms, thought Kennan, succumbed to the colossal pretension
that international life could be moulded in their own image.106 The statesman has the
responsibility of distinguishing less and more harmful idealisms, but any realistic
assessment of fact always requires that they be unmasked and not allowed to drive
foreign policy. Policies based upon moral absolutes complicate immeasurably the
resolution of international conflicts and promote self-righteousness that embitters
relations while impeding possibilities for mutual understanding. Idealist-driven policies
make it immensely difficult, if not impossible, to discern justice among competing
claims. "Where is the right or the wrong of the Kashmir dispute," Kennan asked. "And
how about the conflict between the Israeli and the Arabs?"107
While our conduct must conform to our own moral ideals we fall into error ifwe expect
or oblige others to share them.108 In counselling realistic policies Kennan strikes
something of an Augustinian note: we must assume an attitude of the detached, non-
judgemental physician in discerning the national interest:
We will have the modesty to admit that our own national interest is all
that we are really capable of knowing and understanding—and the
courage to recognize that if our own purposes and undertaking here at
home are decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other
people or delusions of superiority, then the pursuit of our national interest
can never fail to be conducive to a better world. This concept is less
ambitious and less inviting in its immediate prospects than those to which
we have so often inclined and less pleasing to our image ofourselves. To
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many it will seem to smack ofcynicism and reaction. I cannot share these
doubts. Whatever is realistic in concept and founded in an endeavor to
see both ourselves and others as we really are, cannot be illiberal.109
Both Kennan and Morgenthau believe that acting upon the national interest has a
particular "moral dignity" of its own: "The national community is the only source of
order and the only protector ofminimal moral values in a world lacking order and moral
consensus beyond the bounds of the national state."110 Here acting upon the national
interest is seen as meeting the demands of both morality and political realism.
Thus for all their insistence on a realism determined by the national interest neither
Kennan nor Morgenthau are without a moral compass. Good senses in Kennan's writing
"a humility and a breadth characteristic of profound faith," a recognition of the
imperfections and creativity of human nature that is coupled with historical
responsibility.111 "In the fabric of human events," Kennan observed, "one thing leads to
another. Every mistake is in a sense the product of the mistakes that have gone before
it." Here, he thought, was the locus of a "cosmic forgiveness" for those who must
assume historical responsibility. Yet in the sense that each generation's mistakes
determine those of the future, there is also a cosmic "unforgiveableness."112 Kennan's
prescription for the role of moral principle in pursuing the national interest accordingly
reflects his aversion to moral absolutes in judging the moral standing of others. "No
people can be the judge of another's domestic institutions and requirements, and we have
no need to be apologetic to anyone, unless it be ourselves, for the things we do and the
arrangements we enforce within our own country."113
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Given his aversion to moral absolutes in the conduct of international affairs Kennan,
according to Good, has chosen "to occupy the less difficult and less dangerous position
of moral relativity."114 Yet we can see that Kennan's position partially reflects the
attitudes ofhumility discerned in Niebuhr's prophetic faith.
To the extent that we are able to develop a social purpose in our own
society, our life and our experiences will become interesting and
meaningful to peoples in other parts of the world. We must remember that
we are practically the only country that has been able to afford for any
length of time the luxury of this experimentation with the un-inhibited
flow of self-interest. Almost everywhere else, men are convinced that the
answers to their problems are to be found in the acceptance of a high
degree of collective responsibility and discipline. To many of them, the
sight of an America in which there is visible no higher social goal than the
self-enrichment of the individual, and where that self-enrichment takes
place primarily in material goods and gadgets that are of doubtful utility
in the achievement of the deeper satisfactions of life-this sight fails to
inspire either confidence or enthusiasm. The world knows we can make
automobiles and television sets and that we can distribute them, but it is
looking to us for other things as well, things more relevant to the deeper
needs ofmen everywhere.115
Morgenthau more explicitly than Kennan asserts that there are transcendent norms that
delimit policies driven by the national interest. Such moral rules, Morgenthau wrote,
"do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the point of view of
expediency. There are moral absolutes "which must be obeyed regardless of
considerations of national advantage."116 While he discerns what Good describes as the
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irremedial gap between moral ideals and the reality upon which political decisions are
made, Morgenthau particularly warns the realist against the "sin of the Fascist mind,"
i.e., attaching moral superiority to political and military success.117
What Morgenthau calls transcendent norms such as liberty serve an essential function to
the realist: "the norm is not only a judgment against, but the goal of, political life—a
constant, relevant, directive force." Morgenthau attends more to norms as judgment upon
rather than the goals of political action; their insights serve to promote what he calls a
"cosmic humility" in accessing the morality of action.118 Even so, the essential
cautionary note remains. "To know that states are subject to the moral law is one thing;
to pretend to know what is morally required of states in a particular situation is quite
another."119 Flere Morgenthau's idea of the role transcendent norms in international
affairs appears to reflect Niebuhr's view that faith perspectives "illuminate but do not
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prescribe what ought to be done."
Niebuhr's Critique of a Political Realism of the National Interest
Like the two political realists, Niebuhr accepts the national self-interest as a fact of
international life. He knows the perils of ignoring the national interest. Yet he sees as
well the moral hazards of a too selfish devotion to the national interest and he rejects the
national interest as a primary norm121
proposal at Yalta to execute 50,000 German officers describes a "preventative" war action. The
distinctions are discussed in Chapter Ten.
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There are modern realists...who, in their reaction to abstract and vague
forms of international idealism, counsel the nation to consult only its own
interests. In a sense collective self-interest is so consistent that it is
superfluous to advise it. But a consistent self-interest on the part of a
nation will work against its interests because it will fail to do justice to the
broader and longer interests of other nations. A narrow national loyalty
on our part, for instance, will obscure our long range interests where they
are involved with those of a whole alliance of free nations.122
Neither Kennan nor Morgenthau, in Niebuhr's estimate, satisfactorily discern the moral
limits inherent in any policy of the national interest. Morgenthau, Niebuhr believed, was
right in seeing the necessary hypocrisy of masking national interest by appeals to moral
idealism; a bald appeal to national interest skirts sheer cynicism. But any nation's moral
legitimacy based upon the national interest is made ambiguous "given the fact that the
same power which assures order within the national community appears to guarantee
disorder beyond the national community."123 Here, in short, any morality of the national
interest is judged in its own courts. Niebuhr only partially accepts the importance that
Morgenthau attaches to political prudence. He agrees that finding concurrence between
self-interest and the general interest is the object of statecraft. But prudence does not
itself produce this result, Niebuhr believes, because prudence in essence applies "merely
a precedural standard" to expressions of self-interest.124 In short, prudent statesmen
following their particular national interest are inclined to define the general interest too
narrowly. Niebuhr insists that spiritual resources beyond political prudence are required
for the highest achievements of statecraft: "The sense of justice must prevent prudence
from becoming too prudential in defining interest."125
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Kennan's call for modesty in discerning the national interest is in Niebuhr's view valid
"as far as it goes." But for Niebuhr the national interest remains an expression of innate
human egotism that is inevitably magnified in collective behaviour. Human reason may
serve to delimit the national interest but it cannot escape the egotism of all human
nature. Modesty is after all a self-defined product of human egotism.
Egotism is not the proper cure for an abstract and pretentious
idealism...The cure for a pretentious idealism, which claims to know more
about the future and about other men than is given mortal man to know, is
not egotism. It is a concern for both the self and the other in which the
self, whether individual or collective, preserves a "decent respect for the
opinions of mankind," derived from a modest awareness of the limits of
1
its own knowledge and power
Niebuhr's frame of reference is American national self-interest filtered through its own
sense of historical particularity and wedded to unprecedented wealth and international
power. While finding wisdom in Kennan's appeal to modesty Niebuhr believes a
morality based upon the national interest is a thin and unavailing reed against pretension
and prideful power.
Does not a nation concerned too much with its own interests define those
interests so narrowly and so immediately...that the interests and securities
which depend upon common devotion to principles of justice and upon
established mutualities in a community of nations, are sacrificed?.../?
would be fatal for the security of the nation if some loyalties beyond its
interests were not operative in its moral life to prevent the national
interestfrom being conceived in too narrow and self-defeating terms.127
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For Niebuhr the national interest must be illumined beyond the light shed by
Morgenthau's autonomous political realism and Kennan's appeal to modesty. It is here
that Niebuhr brings Christian realism's insights to bear upon determinations of the
national interest. These moral and spiritual insights serve to discern a national interest
that recognizes the partiality of all human perspectives and insists that the truths of faith
transcend all other Christian loyalties. These are truths most fully illumined through the
lens of Christian humility.
The truths percieved through the grace of humility both negate and serve the national
interest. They negate the idea that the national interest represents any more than the
finite, fallible, and partial perspective of all human effort. Here is the God's eye view in
which "the nations are as a drop in the bucket and are counted as small dust in the
balances." Only this perspective fully illumines any true national interest. It is a
perspective gained through the grace of humility and applied to all human relationships.
Humility allows us to transcend the insights of autonomous political realism and self-
defined moderation, i.e. to see that my moderation may be your undoing.128 Rather, the
attitudes of humility illumine the possibilities of the true security that is the ultimate
objective of the national interest. This true security always lies in ever greater
achievements of human understanding and community. However idealistic this appears,
Niebuhr the realist found that various liberal idealisms proved incapable of its
achievement because they failed to understand prideful human nature. Niebuhr the
Christian realist knows that political realism rightfully rejects illusions about human
nature but does not escape it. If Christian realism knows there is no prescription for
perfection in history it also knows that the grace of humility at once illumines and
critiques responsibile action.
128 Good , "The National interest," 615.
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Attitudes of Humility and the National Interest
While humility is essential to all Christian action certain of its attitudes are emphasised
in Niebuhr's critique of political realism in international relations. In this context
humility expressed as toleration is given significant importance in the building of
community, the core requirement of true security that is the goal of the national interest.
As an attitude of humility toleration is not simply accepting that others have a right to
their own views. The paradoxical grace of humility is the ground of our truth and our
source of confidence in it; but humility always requires that we acknowledge our finite
grasp of the truth. Here humility expressed as toleration reflects the profoundly relational
character of the attitudes of humility. Toleration is thus essential to inhibiting national
self-righteousness and moral crusading in the conduct of international relations.
This reflects the first of two tests that Niebuhr poses for Christian toleration: the
"willingness to entertain views which oppose our own without rancour and without the
effort to suppress them." If he believed that modem culture has met this first test to a
reasonable degree it has been less successful in meeting the second: "The ability to
remain true to and to act upon our best convictions."129 This latter test is the more
stringent because it relates not to peripheral ideas but to our understanding of truths
central to Christian responsibility and action. Rather the second test requires a critical
and difficult balance between recognizing our fragmentary grasp of truth while avoiding
complacency and irresponsibility. An absence of this balance leads to self-righteousness
or perfectionism on the one hand and to complacency on the other. Christian toleration
can never mask "irresponsibility and indifference towards the problem of political
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justice." As he surveyed the domestic and global crises of his day Niebuhr came to
believe that American religious and secular liberalism failed this test, often disastrously,






Thus toleration is essential to maintaining the precarious balance of power and interests
necessary for relative justice within and among nations. It is reflected in the ideal of
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diplomacy that Morgenthau commends to us, and in this regard has its proper place in
political realism's pursuit of the national interest. Christian humility regarding the
partiality of our own truths does not obviate the necessity of judging among greater and
lesser social evils. Nor does it obviate responsibility for acting in defence of our own
truths and values. But in making and acting upon inescapable judgments, Christian
humility always requires that we acknowledge the partiality of our perspectives and the
potential for evil in even our own "good" action.132 Here, as Harland wrote, we
recognise that "the righteousness of our cause, though real, is not absolute."133
Niebuhr closely associates toleration with the profound importance of forgiveness in
Christian responsibility.
Our toleration of truths opposed to those which we confess is an
expression of the spirit of forgiveness in the realm of culture. Like all
forgiveness, it is possible only if we are not too sure of our own virtue.
Loyalty to the truth requires confidence in the possibility of its attainment;
toleration of others requires broken confidence in the finality of our own
truth.134
Here we recognize the sinful state of all humanity, first and foremost our own. In light of
our complicity in sin toleration born of humility fosters the forgiving spirit in conflict:
"Mercy to the foe is possible," Niebuhr observed in this regard, "only to those who know
themselves to be sinners."135 The grace of humility expressed in Christian forgiveness
reflects God's true character, wisdom and mercy. This spirit of forgiveness is thus the
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crown of Christian ethics because it is essential to all individual and social relationships.
When we recognize that the root of social evil lies in the broken relationship with God
and that forgiveness restores this fiindmental relationship, we discern the restorative
power of forgiveness in human collectives. "The root of forgiveness toward the foe lies
not in the supposition that he did right in his own eyes," Niebuhr observes, "but rather in
the recognition of the mutuality of guilt which finally produced the explicit evil against
which our anger is aroused."136 Here is the God's eye perspective that transcends
political realism's appeal to prudence.
Forgiveness is a moral achievement which is possible only when morality
is transcended in religion. No pure morality can bridge the gap which
divides men according to their conflicting interests and their natural,
racial and geographic backgrounds, because their moral idealism is
1 T7
conditioned by these very factors.
For Niebuhr, then, toleration is expressed theologically as a spiritual fruit of Christian
humility and socially as an essential and practical tool in the pursuit of relative justice. In
international relations it ameliorates narrow and rigid national self-interest and enables
us to see, as Lovin observes, "that all people have some claims that deserve to be
recognised."138
Pride and America's Sense of National Particularity
While rejecting the sanctification of any political system Niebuhr believes that
democracy establishes the balance between human freedom and selfishness necessary for
relative social justice. This equilibrium of power within democracy avoids the extremes
of tyranny and anarchy, the "Scylla and Charybdis between which the frail bark of social
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justice must sail."139 As he observed in his wartime defense of democracy the
democratic process "seeks unity within the conditions of freedom; and maintains
freedom within the framework of order."140
Although Niebuhr's prophetic faith validates democracy against alternative political
systems, its grounding in humility militates against the pretension that democracy
embodies absolute truth. This is evident in the process through which democracy reaches
its particular understanding of the truth. The democratic process approaches relative
social justice through balancing not destroying competing powers and interests. The
equilibrium of power necessary for relative social justice in democracy is thus tenuous
and requiring constant care. Democracy checks but does not destroy the political and
economic forces that compete for dominance.141 Likewise, truths regarding social ideals
such as justice are verified, affirmed and broadened through the balancing of competing
truth claims. Democractic truths, though measured against universal or transcendent
truths, nevertheless remain partial and finite truths.142 Christian realism requires
democracy to humbly acknowledge that it produces neither absolute truth nor perfect
societies. It requires, Niebuhr wrote, "a patriotic devotion which preserves a critical
attitude toward national pretensions and ambitions."143
Niebuhr recognized that American power and sense of particularity combined to
engender unconditioned loyalty to its democratic ideal. He found Americans too readily
tempted make their democratic ideal a universal norm and to lend it the ultimate ends of
religion. This prideful confusion diminishes the self-critical attitudes essential to any












short the sanctification of our democratic ideal is an expression of pride that imperils the
system to which we are so profoundly attached.
Even if our democracy were more perfect than it is, and if our current
notions of it were not so obviously drawn from the peculiar conditions of
the world's wealthiest nation, devotion to democracy would still be false
as a religion. It tempts us to identify the final meaning of life with a virtue
which we possess, and thus to give a false and idolatrous religious note to
the conflict between democracy and communism for instance.144
Without the grace of humility we risk the partial goods of democracy and commit the sin
of idolatry by substituting them for the ultimate good that is God alone. Yet there are
points at which responsibility born of this same Christian humility may require us to
defend partial goods, even to Lincoln's "last full measure of devotion." As we do so the
grace of humility requires that we avoid the illusion that our cause embodies absolute
truth. Only through the grace of humility do we discern a common humanity in the midst
of terrible conflict and "call upon the mercy of God to redeem us not from the
predicament of democracy but from the human predicament."145
Conclusion
It was during WWII and the early Cold War that Niebuhr sought the relevance of faith to
the responsibilities entailed by America's power and wealth. Although he entered this
era with his theology of Christian realism largely in place, it never ceased to be refined
and tested by the dialectic of experience and faith. As America's wealth and military
power became determinant facts of global life, Niebuhr's Christian realism and prophetic
vocation sought to make the truths of faith relevant to the realities of American power. In
the crucible of WWII and the Cold War that followed relevance required that these truths
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of faith illumine the struggle to "construct the delicate balance of forces under which
human survival and even human flourishing might be possible."146
It is difficult to find a more discerning summary of the purposes that Niebuhr would
have his Christian realism serve. Illumined by faith it attends to the practical realities of
the human situation while it knows that perfection lies only with God. Niebuhr's
Christian realism seeks strategies to make our imperfection and finitude serve God's
perfect and eternal purposes. Only through the perspective of humility is this possible.
For Niebuhr the grace of humility is first the foundation of our proper relationship with
God. It is through this grace that our lives are redeemed and reoriented. Our profound
relationship with God, in turn, illumines and properly orders all other relationships. Thus
in Niebuhr's Christian realism humility is central to ordering both the spiritual and social
dimensions of life. In this light, humility provides the pattern through which the
requirements of Christian realism are discerned and the attitude that must always
characterise its action.
Herein the sensitive compassion of the profoundly religious spirit is
joined with the resolute action of the political realist and the
discriminating judgements of the morally serious person. The foe remains
a real foe; he must be resolutely opposed. But the temper of the struggle
will be mitigated by the knowledge that the righteousness of our cause,
though real, is not absolute.147
146
Lovin, Christian Realism, 236.
147 Harland, Thought ofReinhold Niebuhr, 134.
128
Part II
Case Studies in Humility: Niebuhr's Incidental Writing,
1941-1952
The Christian faith believes that God is the sovereign of history, and
that all the tortuous historical processes are finally, though not
simply, meaningful. It understands, as it were, the meaning of chaos.
Thus it relates the objective judgments of history to the internal
judgments ofGod. The chaos is meaningful because it represents the
judgment ofGod upon all human pride, individual and collective, and
proves the futility of all efforts to organize life with the self as the
center of it, whether that self be an individual self, or the German or
the Russian, or the British or the American collective self. Thus the
God who visits the soul in the secret recesses of its uneasy conscience
is identified by Christian faith as the same God who presides over the
processes of history, before whom the nations are as a drop in the
bucket and the judges of the earth are vanity.1
Reinhold Niebuhr
' "The Christian Perspective on the World Crisis," Christianity and Crisis 4, no. 7 (May 1, 1944): 4.
Chapter Four
Introducing the Case Studies on Humility in Niebuhr's
Incidental Writings, 1941-1952
To love our enemies cannot mean that we must connive with their
injustice. It does mean that beyond all moral distinctions in history
we must know ourselves one with our enemies not only in the bonds of
a common humanity but also in the bonds ofa common guilt by which
that humanity has been corrupted. The Christian faith must persuade
us to be humble rather than self-righteous in carrying out our historic
tasks. It is the humility which is the source ofpity andforgiveness.1
Reinhold Niebuhr
Introduction
At the heart of this dissertation is the thesis that Christian humility, as Niebuhr
understood it, provides a lens through which his Christian realism should be read.
Because Niebuhr believed that relevance to the human condition is the great test of
his own or any theology or ethical system,2 this claim necessarily asserts the political
and social relevance of humility and the attitudes Niebuhr associates with it. While I
have drawn principally upon Niebuhr's formal work and related secondary material
to discern his understanding of Christian humility, the practical relevance of humility
is most obviously found in his massive body of incidental work that addressed the
issues of his day. With a few notable exceptions I have chosen incidental pieces
from the decade 1942-1952 to demonstrate Niebuhr's practical, if often enough
oblique, appeal to humility as that "grace" most essential to US power and
responsibility during the 20th Century's most tumultuous decade.
1 "Our Responsibilities in 1942," Christianity and Crisis 1, no. 24 (January 12, 1942): 1-2.
2
Stone, Prophet to Politicians, 230.
It was during this decade that historical developments forced America to forsake
decades of isolationism and to assume international responsibilities commensurate
with its wealth and power. Today most Americans do not know of a world in which
their nation did not play such a role. For them the debate is not whether the US has
international responsibilities but where and how these responsibilities are to be met.
But for Niebuhr and the Americans of his generation neither of these questions had
been settled. For them WWII and the protracted Cold War forced the nation to accept
international responsibilities. Niebuhr understood that this acceptance did not itself
confer wisdom commensurate with American responsibility. He believed that the
grace of humility born of faith is a source of such wisdom; indeed, that the attitudes
ofhumility are essential to the responsible use of all power.
This chapter provides the context in which Niebuhr's understanding of humility and
Christian responsibility is developed in his incidental work. Most of the incidental
work examined is taken from the decade 1941-1952. The purpose here is not to
present a substantive analysis of those events but to demonstrate the dialectic
between experience and faith that marks Niebuhr's public theology. Just here we
discern Niebuhr's understanding of the practical implications of humility to political
power and responsibility. The case Studies are presented in the following four
chapters.
Humility and International Responsibility; The Conduct of the War
Humility and International Responsibility: The US and the United
Nations
Humility and International Responsibility: The Marshall Plan
Humility and International Responsibility: Democratic Self-Criticism
Pride and Irresponsible Power
"It is the illusion of strong men and nations," Niebuhr wrote in 1932, "that power is
the basis of security." Though as a realist he saw the necessity of force in
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maintaining relative social justice he was equally clear that history rebukes those
who equate spiralling accretions of power with increased security. He understood
that the egotism of human nature meant that power is inevitably self-serving. Power
corrupted by egotism increasingly clouds political judgment and perverts the balance
of social forces required for justice. It thereby becomes the irresponsible and unjust
power rebuked by the prophetic faith whose God "knows how to 'put down the
• *3
mighty from their seats.'"
During much of the 1930s Niebuhr feared the real and potential perils of America's
international position. Its chief peril lay in a disproportionate economic power
largely uninformed by a concomitant political wisdom. A radical socialist, he
believed that the American economy was dominated by businessmen and engineers
whose technical competence amassed great wealth but whose pride blinded them to
the social injustice entailed in the creation of that wealth.4 Internationally, American
commercial interests disdained the patient give and take of diplomacy and sought
what they perceived to be the disinterested and technical problem-solving practices
they followed in the business world. Many decades before debates would rage over
economic globalisation, Niebuhr perceived that political leaders and ordinary
Americans too readily accepted the illusion that business efficiency "created some
kind of magic solution for the perennial problem of the protection of the weak
against the exactions of the strong."5 Thus Niebuhr believed that American
economic power, insufficiently illumined by political wisdom and abetted by the
complacency of the American people, imperilled justice both at home and in the
international community. Though attitudes of humility are implied here in non-
theological language, Niebuhr's words echo the message of the Biblical prophets,
"challenging pride and complacency in the name of a God who calls for justice
within and among nations."6
3
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What Niebuhr saw as the irresponsibility of American power was not due entirely to
the prideful limitations and influence he associated with the business mind. Only
with the advent of WWI, he thought, did America seek an international political
presence commensurate with its power and thus was bound "to betray a novice's lack
of skill."7 Living in a vast continent, unlike their British cousins, many Americans
had little interest in or access to information that might help them see their country as
viewed by the international community. In 1932 Niebuhr perceived that many
Americans had little understanding of international economic interdependencies;
almost certainly they would have been surprised to know that they were living in the
economic empire Niebuhr described. While perhaps proud of their nation's positive
role in international affairs most Americans had little understanding of how
American power operated at the international level and of its impact on other
peoples. Nor were most politicians, sharing the general view that America's interests
generally followed commercial interests, able or courageous enough to educate their
constituents on the international impact of US economic policies. "Thus," Niebuhr
wrote, "the phenomenal power of the American empire is scarcely under conscious
control."8 This is to say that, in Niebuhr's view, public complacency and the prideful
power of uncontested self-interest faced no countervailing power to hold economic
power accountable to wider community interests, i.e., more equal social justice.
These are familiar themes in his work dating from his Detroit attacks on Henry Ford,
whom Niebuhr credited for educating him in "the abuses of laissez-faire
capitalism."9
If the average American was aware of the hostility his nation's commercial policies
created abroad Niebuhr found little support in middle America to oppose that
hostility with military power. Most Americans, in Niebuhr's estimate, were not
particularly interested in impressing the world with military might. His hope in 1932
was that America would avoid the coalescence of economic and military power then
enveloping Japan and Germany. By avoiding that prideful snare Niebuhr believed the
7
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US might over time develop a political awareness commensurate with its economic
power and find its responsible place in the international community. An essential
component of this political sophistication entailed the responsibility to see ourselves
as others see us. Reflecting his fear of an American drift toward fascism,10 Niebuhr
presciently warned that, "the more our economic power is supported by military
strength, the more we shall be inclined to solve our problems by intransigence and
defiance of world opinion, and the more we shall multiply animosities against us in
the world community." 11
A prescription for avoiding this peril included the development of a strong US labour
movement that, unlike America's complicit or complacent middle classes, Niebuhr
believed would provide the critical detachment required to puncture imperial
pretensions. He saw the lack of intelligent labour leadership as more culpable than
other American social classes in the failure to check the injustice of US economic
power. This failure underscored the necessity of a "not too unqualified" national
loyalty and a patriotism that "preserves a critical attitude toward national pretensions
and ambitions." Niebuhr continues:
Without this element of criticism in the life of the nation, the national
pride of the man in the street is compounded with the ulterior purposes
of the privileged groups which gain special advantages from their
nation's dominance in world affairs, and the resultant mixture is a
national will to power which imperils the peace of the national
community and destroys the security of the wilful nation by the very
actions which are meant to guarantee it.12
Thus democratic self-criticism is for Niebuhr a social expression of the humility
essential to check prideful power; without the force of critical opinion and
countervailing power, unaccountable power becomes irresponsible power. Without
these attitudes even the most determined programs of national security become vain
and self-defeating.
10




Yet there is a certain irony in Niebuhr's call for national humility in 1932. Doubtless
most Americans felt themselves deeply humbled by the great depression and
believed that their government's countervailing policies were weak and ineffectual.
In the November elections they demanded a federal government willing to use its
power to combat their misery. But although they demanded change they largely
rejected Niebuhr's radical socialist prescriptions. Niebuhr was soundly defeated as a
New York Socialist Party candidate for Congress; apparently what he called the
"inert" electorate was not confined to middle America.13 Nevertheless if Niebuhr
was peevish about his defeat it was due to more than any sense of personal rejection.
As he surveyed the misery of his depression-ridden country he believed that only
socialism offered any hope of addressing the nation's economic chaos while resisting
a fascist alternative. He made no attempt to conceal his contempt for the laissez-faire
libertarianism that characterized the American economy. Moreover he believed that
US foreign policies were so driven by narrow economic interests that they
endangered efforts to build international community.14 Long after America's
economic recovery and emergence from isolationism Niebuhr would continue to rail
against what he considered the baleful influence of US business interests on US
international policy.
Another irony is that while Niebuhr feared the perils of American international
power the US entered a period of isolationism. As the New Deal focused on domestic
problems there was little enthusiasm for international military or economic
intervention or, for that matter, cooperation. At the July, 1933 World Economic
Council meeting in London President Roosevelt withdrew America from efforts to
stabilize international currencies, favouring instead his own national priorities. That
this action essentially crippled international efforts to fight the depression confirmed
Niebuhr's estimate of American economic power. Nor is it difficult to imagine that
the President was unaware of the international impact of this decision. At the same
time Roosevelt slashed his military budgets and reduced further the already shrunken






Niebuhr most dreaded.15 These signals regarding US economic non-cooperation and
its intentionally enfeebled military capacity were lost on neither Nazi Germany nor
Japan. Doubtless the Nazis remembered America's irresponsible retreat from its post-
WWI promises to guarantee French security, and Japan the recent US failure to
support international economic sanctions following the brutal occupation of
Manchuria.16
A significant milepost of Niebuhrian prophecy, his 1932 essay, "The Perils of
American Power," provides a succinctly critical analysis of irresponsible American
power. He discerned America's innocence regarding the reach of its great economic
power and its lack of understanding of the impact of that power upon other peoples.
If the nation could bridle self-righteously at the idea of being an empire, all the more
important that it should develop the political and the spiritual insights of humility
required to use its economic power responsibly. If over time America could achieve
that, its security would rest on a strong foundation that would make its military
power of secondary importance. Niebuhr's chief fear in 1932 was that his nation
might lack the patience for this strategy and, like Germany and Japan, seek a
totalitarian solution to its economic problems.
An unmistakably prophetic note is repeatedly struck against national pride. This
basic sin of human nature magnified by collective egotism fuels each of the perils
Niebuhr identified with American power. He insisted that Americans disenthrall
themselves of the prideful view that the US could draw wealth from the world yet
remain detached from its problems. Pride, he reminded his fellow citizens, feeds "the
illusion of strong men and nations that power is the basis of security." Whereas
selfish egotism foolishly seeks to secure freedom and wealth through ever increasing
power, humility wisely counsels that true security rests in seeking a more just
distribution of freedom and wealth at home and within the community of nations.17
15
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Prologue to Tragedy: The Chaos of Irresponsible Power
Events of the 1930s dealt Niebuhr's prophetic analysis something of a paradoxical
hand. As Roosevelt demonstrated at the World Economic Council in 1933, the
depression prompted an American isolationism in which it focused on its own
national economic interests. Initially, at least, American economic power would not
be in the service of the world community.18 On the other hand the severe depression
and related New Deal priorities required a significant reduction in military
expenditures, thus reducing the immediate likelihood that there would be some
coalescence ofAmerican economic and military power.19
This peril of American power at least temporarily abated, Niebuhr devoted much of
the remainder of the decade to advocating domestic and international economic
justice. He embraced radical socialism and feverishly supported national labour
9ft « • • •• •• •••
movements. A significant connection between his radical socialism and unionism is
evident in "Perils." In 1932 he believed the depression to be the death knell of
capitalism and saw socialism as the only hope for a more just international economic
system; for Niebuhr the question of socialism was not whether but when and how.21
Intelligent labour union leadership, he had observed in "Perils", is indispensable to
the balance of political power necessary to achieve social justice. Thus he believed
that America, and indeed all the western liberal democracies, had to achieve
economic democracy if they were to maintain their political democracy against the
• 99 •
chaos enveloping the world. Niebuhr accordingly regarded socialism and politically
18
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19 Ibid., 388.
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liberal Protestant opinion, Charles C. Morrison's, Christian Century. See Brown, 25. Later the two
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intelligent unionism as essential to transcending the narrow national economic
interests that threaten international cooperation and mutual security.
Though Roosevelt's New Deal strongly supported organized labour and undertook
reforms to promote economic justice, Niebuhr criticised its gradualism as
"whirligig" reform. As late as 1939 he continued to claim that economic justice
could be achieved only at the cost of "the socialisation of property." A keen
observer of the international scene and frequent world traveller, Niebuhr's
impatience over the pace of US economic reform was fuelled by global events. He
hoped that economic reforms would strengthen the international community and
promote a sense of mutual security sufficient to prevent war. Otherwise, another
world war seemed certain, even if its timing was not.24 Yet even as his hopes were
overtaken by events, Niebuhr's fears regarding US military power continued to the
end of the decade. In 1938, when German and Japanese aggression prompted
Roosevelt to propose a modest increase in US defence spending, Niebuhr reacted
with near hysteria: "The billion dollar defense budget of the Roosevelt
administration cries to heaven as the worst piece ofmilitarism in modem history."25
It is difficult not to conclude with Stone that Niebuhr had failed to articulate "a
coherent policy for the United States prior to World War II"; certainly we can agree
that Niebuhr's "prescriptions for foreign policy had been hesitant."26 For Niebuhr
America's primary responsibility in the 1930s was to justly order its own economic
house. This entailed curbing the prideful egotism he attributed to the business
interests he believed drove the American foreign policies that created the injustice
23 Ibid.
24
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and animosities recounted in "The Perils of American Power." Thus meeting its
responsibility for domestic economic democracy was requisite to finding America's
proper place within the international community. Unless this was accomplished the
pride of unjust economic power would be increased by coalescence with military
power. The result would be American irresponsibility within the community of
nations.
Nevertheless international events eventually forced Niebuhr to confess that
Roosevelt had more accurately assessed the immediate evils that threatened the
97 • •
world community. While Niebuhr had inveighed against the more subtle evils
inherent in uncontrolled US economic power, more overt and vicious evils appeared
in the form of Nazi and Japanese militarism. To be sure he had no illusions
regarding the military exploits of Japan in Manchuria, Italy in Ethiopia and Nazi
Germany in the heart of Europe. He had nonetheless opposed any unilateral US
intervention and thought it too late for an American entry into the League ofNations
to make any significant difference.28
The Munich fiasco of 1938 proved a dramatic conversion experience for Niebuhr.
There France and Great Britain sought to appease Nazi Germany by stripping
Czechoslovakia of the Sudetenland and its only credible defences. Ironically, Hitler
had based his claim to the Sudetenland on the principles of self-determination
proclaimed but often ignored at Versailles. This cynical act, Niebuhr observed, was
the tragic end of liberal culture. It was the culmination of the "stupidity of Europe's
statesmen of that period," personified by Chamberlain's well-intentioned grovelling
before the Nazi dictator.29 At Versailles, in Niebuhr's view, the prideful democratic
victors shattered liberal illusions that education and science had overcome human
27
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vindictiveness; and at Munich sentimental and irresolute liberalism imagined that the
• TO
vindictive injustice of Versailles "could be expiated by a peace of capitulation."
Both the vindictive "peace of Versailles" and the craven "peace of Munich" led to
great disaster because, in Niebuhr's view, they reflected liberal idealism's failure to
understand the egotism and pride of human nature. "I conclude that the whole of
contemporary history proves that liberal culture has not seen the problem of mankind
in sufficient depth to understand its own history," he observed. "Its too simple
• 31moralism has confused issues at almost every turn."
If Munich was seen as an immediate failure of liberal European responsibility,
isolationist America was not off Niebuhr's hook. Because the idealistic Wilson was
politically ineffectual at Versailles the US was complicit in the vindictive provisions
that ripened Germany for Nazism. Niebuhr shared the view that the peace of Munich
• T9
would have been unlikely had there not first been the peace of Versailles.
Moreover the US, whose influence had been decisive in creating Czechoslovakia,
distanced itself from the negotiations with Hitler that would decide the little nation's
fate. "The government of the United States," President Roosevelt announced, "will
assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations."33 When
Chamberlain returned from Munich in meretricious triumph a note from the White
House awaited him: "Good man," wrote the President of the United States.34
Nevertheless only four weeks after the Munich pact Roosevelt asked Congress to
strengthen America's armed forces and undertook secret plans to evade US neutrality
laws in order to assist Britain and France.35
The Munich disaster notwithstanding, it took the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of
August, 1939 to confirm Niebuhr's acceptance that the US could no longer remain
30 "Ten Years That Shook My World," 542-543.
31 Ibid., 542.
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aloof if the Western democracies were to survive. With the signing of this agreement,
reached only days before the German attack on Poland, "the death watch for Europe
began."36 The pact was the proximate cause of Niebuhr's final break with Christian
pacifism and his resignation from the Socialist party because of its pro-Soviet line.
He finally rejected pacifism as a moral absolute because it thwarted the balance of
• •• •• 3*7
power essential for social justice and therefore entailed irresponsibility. Likewise,
he wrote, enshrining neutrality as a political or Christian absolute offered a too "easy
• 38
and vapid escape" from reality and responsibility.
Perhaps greater humility on his own part might have enabled Niebuhr to see more
clearly that Roosevelt's pragmatic New Deal was producing the balance of political
power required for a more just and democratic economy.39 As it was, he was late to
support the New Deal, and did so initially because he had come to respect FDR's
prescience in foreign affairs.40 In the end, however, Niebuhr humbly acknowledged
that events had vindicated Roosevelt's modest rearmament program and wrote
contritely that the pragmatic president had "anticipated the perils in which we now
stand more clearly than anyone else."41 His conversion nearly complete, Niebuhr
began his active support for US military assistance to the beleaguered European
democracies. In late 1940 he launched Christianity and Crisis to promote non-
pacifist Christian opinion and helped found the Union for Democratic Action, a
liberal anti-communist group united in its opposition to US isolationism. 42
What became of Niebuhr's great fear of a coalescence of American economic and
military power? The more obvious response is that he came to recognize that US
36
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power was essential to the survival of the western democracies. Nothing less was at
stake. That evil attends all human use of power remained true, but Christians could
not escape responsibility for choosing between the lesser and greater evils by
claiming some moral equivalency between them. Niebuhr's acceptance that US
military power was the lesser of the evil choices in this context never abated his view
that American power, like all power, entailed evil consequences; mankind, he wrote,
cannot "escape from the guilt of history, nor yet call the evil, which taints all their
achievement, good."43
Less obvious answers to the question are also anticipated in "Perils." The egotism
that disrupts all human relationships, most basically the profound relationship with
God, is the same pride that corrupts all human use of power. In 1932 Niebuhr's chief
concern was for the consequences of egotistic economic power to social justice and
world community. In religious terms the attitudes of Christian humility provided the
insights necessary to check the pride that perverted power. In secular terms he called
for power to balance power, with humility expressed as critical opinion and, where
necessary, through countervailing force. Without the attitudes of humility that
suppress egotism power is inevitably irresponsible power in which social injustice
impedes true community. If America's true security rested upon its proper place
within the world community, as Niebuhr insisted, it could not be achieved by
destroying American economic power.44 Rather, America had to embrace a
community of interests wider than its own economic and national concerns. This, for
Niebuhr, entailed international responsibilities illumined by the spirit and attitudes of
humility regarding America's place in the world.
That America discerned this place by being forced into a war for which it was
desperately unprepared was itself a cause of national humility if not humiliation.
"There can be no justice in the world if we resent only the injustice which is done to
us," Niebuhr observed. Despite all the signs pointing to disaster an irresponsible






Niebuhr wrote shortly after Pearl Harbor, "and no evasion of our duty toward our
neighbors in the community of nations."45 The war forced the nation to see that its
true security lay in assuming its place within a community of mutual responsibility.
Equally important for Niebuhr, America's assumption of wartime responsibilities
would assure a commensurate role in the post-war peace. And, he hoped, a
"continuing loyalty to a community of free nations, faced with years of strife and
decades of striving toward the goal of an ordered and just world."46
If Niebuhr tardily accepted that American international responsibility required the
use of military power he remained suspicious of it. Power, even in the service of
good, never escapes the taint of egotistic human nature. Without the attitudes of
humility, power, especially great power, becomes irresponsible power. In the midst
of national catastrophe Niebuhr reminded Americans of Lincoln's sublime words
calling them to the responsibility of humility.
With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the
right as God gives us to see the right; let us strive to finish the work we
are in...to all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace
among ourselves and with all nations.47
Humility and Responsible Power
"Our Responsibilities in 1942," an essay written shortly after the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, reflects many of the major issues that would occupy Niebuhr's
incidental writing for the next decade.48 Most are related to Niebuhr's belief that
American power entailed international responsibilities and that these must in turn
shape both its self-identity and its national interests. This essay is also important in
45 "We Are at War," Christianity and Crisis 1, no. 23 (December 29, 1941): 2.
46 Ibid., 3.
47 Ibid.
48 "Our Responsibilities in 1942," 1-2.
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reflecting the varying approaches Niebuhr employs in alluding to the role of humility
and attitudes associated with it in the incidental work.
As Niebuhr had come to understand, American isolationism offered no escape from
the international responsibilities that its wealth and power entailed. Now, as with the
other world powers that had failed to transcend their own interests to create a
community of common cause, the US was thrown with them into a "community of
common sorrow."49 Niebuhr here confirms a prophetic faith that requires an
acceptance of responsibility for justice in the world and rejects perfectionist
interpretations of faith that encourage escape from responsibility. But if Christian
faith did not allow the war to be prosecuted with an easy conscience neither did it
foster the delusion that a purer Christian conscience could be had at the price of
irresponsibility. Just as prophetic faith entails Christian responsibility it also offers
insights and spiritual resources to illumine our decisions and bear those
responsibilities with courage and patience. Contemplating the daunting challenges of
war when prospects were most bleak, Niebuhr's thoughts reflected the spirit of
Lincoln's determined humility: America's wartime responsibilities must be met
without the hatred and self-righteousness that perpetuates the vicious cycle of
injustice, conflict and violence.
To love our enemies cannot mean that we must connive with their
injustice. It does mean that beyond all moral distinctions of history
we must know ourselves one with our enemies not only in the bonds
of a common humanity but also in the bonds of a common guilt by
which that humanity has become corrupted. The Christian faith must
persuade us to be humble rather than self-righteous in carrying out our
historic tasks. It is the humility which is the source of pity and
forgiveness.50
That Christian responsibility and Christian humility are inextricably linked became a
recurring and pervasive theme in the incidental work of this period. If Niebuhr's






insisted that power entailed responsibility. Christian humility must ever illumine
Christian responsibility because power is invariably corrupted by human pride and
self-righteousness. Without the grace of humility there is no Christian approach to
the use of power and therefore no truly Christian expression of responsibility.
In the realist's approach of his incidental work Niebuhr is nevertheless concerned
with the practical import of humility in the exercise of Christian responsibility. This
does not imply that the incidental work provides a systematic blueprint for humility's
role in the exercise of power; by practical is meant the application of the attitudes of
humility as they illumine responsibilities and requirements of faith in any given
situation. As in "Our Responsibilities in 1942," Niebuhr may refer directly to
particular attitudes of humility such as forgiveness and the avoidance of self-
righteousness in conflict. He may also allude to what he considers false attitudes of
humility that, though perhaps well-intentioned, promote irresponsibility and terrible
consequences. Moral absolutes such as pacifism, Niebuhr had concluded, often prove
to be both futile and in the event irresponsible; those who seek to avoid the guilt
incurred by action incur the guilt of inaction.51 In January, 1942 as he surveyed the
grim responsibilities ahead Niebuhr was moved to remind Christian and socialist
pacifists that hatred is not avoided nor forgiveness achieved by capitulation to evil:
"To love our enemies does not mean that we must connive with their injustice."52
This is a false humility. Though the conscience may be soothed by sentimental
expressions of faith, the failure to use available power against injustice done to
others until we ourselves suffer injustice is, in Niebuhr's view, an "egoistic
corruption" of responsibility.53
That "Our Responsibilities in 1942" lacks the critical stridency that marks much of
his incidental work over the next decade perhaps indicates contrition on Niebuhr's
own part. Doubtless he recalled his enthusiastic support for US involvement in WWI
and his subsequent disillusionment when Wilson failed to prevent the victorious
allies, particularly France, from imposing the vindictive Treaty of Versailles on
51
Nature, 290n.
52 "Our Responsibilities in 1942," 1.
53 Ibid., 2.
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Germany. He had recognized that its unjust provisions engendered the hatred and
resentment that create new conflict. Certainly he had seen very early the dangers
posed by Nazism and Japanese militarism. Yet his radical socialist's suspicions of
American economic power coupled with his low assessment of America's political
acumen—a fault accentuated by US power—bred wavering counsels regarding
American international responsibility. He had warned a decade earlier in "The Perils
of American Power" of the animosities being created by the nation's economic
power and what he saw as naively uncritical attitudes toward "national pretensions
and ambitions."54 The contrite note struck in "Our Responsibilities in 1942" appears
to reflect his own late recognition that while all power entailed some injustice,
America's failure to use power responsibly made it complicit in the greater evils that
engulfed the world. Aloofness from events provided no escape from the nation's
complicity in and responsibility for the world's evil:
The fact that we could not decide whether we had any responsibilities
for the preservation of civilization and that our indecision was
overruled by historical events ought to fill us with a sense of grateful
reverence for the fact that God knows how to make the wrath of man
to praise him.55
The responsibilities of 1942 unquestionably embraced the immediate duties of
waging war to America's full capacity. In this respect, Niebuhr wrote, Christian
duties "are no less compatible with our faith and our loyalty to God than many other
duties and responsibilities which Christians face even when the world is not at
war."56 These wartime responsibilities, like all Christian duties, must be met with
resolute humility and without hatred and bitterness. In wartime the Church is called
to present the truth and comfort of the Gospel to those afflicted by strife. A
"community of grace and not of blood or nation," the Church in wartime must
transcend conflict to be a resource for post-war reconciliation and reconstruction:
54 "The Perils of American Power," 96.
55 "Our Responsibilities in 1942," 1.
56 Ibid.
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"For as men know themselves to be united in Christ, they realize that momentary
57
historical divisions and conflicts, however important for the moment, are not final."
Thus Niebuhr insisted that planning for the post-war peace, even in the midst of the
desperate and uncertain situation of 1942, was an essential and immediate wartime
responsibility. Doubtless he recalled the post-war diplomatic chaos that produced the
Treaty of Versailles, a vindictive precursor to the present conflict. Wilson's inability
to transform his ideals of freedom and self-determination into a realistic political
blueprint for post-war order, Niebuhr believed, had been a massive failure of
American responsibility. However essential its role in defeating the Axis powers,
America had a concomitant responsibility in formulating politically realistic plans for
the post-war order. If this responsibility were not met, he wrote, "We shall have
CO
fought the war in vain."
Among the most important issues to be addressed would be the relationship between
America's sense of national sovereignty and its international responsibilities. If the
prospect of alignment with the hapless League of Nations had raised isolationist
hackles in libertarian America, Niebuhr the realist saw the idealistic futility of simply
declaring national sovereignty incompatible with Christian ethics. Yet he insisted
that some abridgement of national sovereignty would be required of all the world
powers if a peaceful and reasonably just post-war order were to be achieved. He
hoped that America's wartime cooperation with the Allied powers would promote the
trust essential to building the post-war community of nations. Where idealistic
appeals for the abridgement of national sovereignty in the interests of international
community failed, Niebuhr implies here, experience might suffice. A decade earlier
he had urged Americans to find their true security through a responsible relationship
within the world community. He believed in 1942 that events had shown the
indispensability of mutual security. But ever the realist Niebuhr acknowledged that
notions of international responsibility will always reflect national self-interest: "No
57
Ibid., 2. Niebuhr was a moving force among the largely Protestant theologians who established the
World Council of Churches. See Warren, Theologians ofa New World Order, 116-131.
58 Ibid.
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nation is good enough to do what is right," he wrote, "unless its sense of duty is
compounded with its sense of survival."5
That post-war planning was not given the priority Niebuhr called for is a recurring
motif in his wartime writing. Reading through that work we find Niebuhr
denouncing idealistic calls for world government and the Allies' wartime failures to
make progress towards a realistic post-war settlement.60 He is frequently so
impatient on the issue of post-war planning that he appears oblivious to the desperate
struggle to wage the war. One need not have been present in wartime Washington to
know that it was engulfed by the exigencies of waging a two-front war for which an
irresponsibly na'ive America was unprepared. Forces had to be recruited and trained,
industry retooled, rationing imposed, domestic security issues faced. War theatres
had to be prioritised, command and supply arrangements sorted out with allies.
During the early years of the war these frantic tasks were undertaken as Nazi and
Japanese forces moved from strength to strength.
Niebuhr clearly understood the desperate situation facing the western democracies.
Yet he insisted that even while under the chastisement of war we must hear God's
simultaneous call to repentance and see "the opportunities to bring forth fruits mete
for repentance. Days of catastrophe are days of the Lord," he wrote.61
Preoccupation with the immediate issues and urgencies among both
statesmen and people, occasioned by the war, seems to render us
incapable of lifting our eyes to the wider and more ultimate issues.
But we must not succumb to this peril. Physical weariness could cost
us the victory, but spiritual weariness or complacency could rob our
victory of its virtue.62
59 Ibid., 1.
60 Niebuhr's proposals for post-war organization and his writing on US responsibility vis a vis the
United Nations are discussed in Chapter Six.
61 "The Unity of History," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 7 (May 4, 1942): 2.
62
"Airplanes Are Not Enough," Christianity and Crisis 4, no. 1 (February 7, 1944): 1-2, reprinted in
Love and Justice, 189.
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That he persevered on the issue of post-war planning reflected the opportunities he
discerned through the attitudes of humility: wartime exigencies and decisions must
promote the trust and mutual security essential to achieving a more just and lasting
post-war agreement.63 Unless America assumed a responsibility for the peace
commensurate with its responsibility for waging the war, it would be tempted anew
to the egotistic irresponsibility of isolationism. True post-war security would rest
upon the mutual security arrangements of the international community shaped by the
post-war peace. "The peace after the war must be informed by both moral purpose
and political astuteness. We must not allow the cynics to make the peace. But they
will dictate the peace if the idealists offer only Utopian panaceas." 64 These were the
lessons ofVersailles for those who would have the humility to learn them.
Although the signs of the times were grimly uncertain Niebuhr concluded his
January, 1942 assessment on a humble note of prophetic encouragement:
In this, as in every great crisis in the life of men and nations, we must
work out our salvation in fear and trembling and yet be grateful for the
assurance that "it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do
His good pleasure."65
Humility and Case Studies in the Incidental Work
Niebuhr's understanding of the relationship between Christian humility and Christian
responsibility developed over the two darkest decades of the 20th Century. If the
theological grounding of this understanding is to be found chiefly in his formal
works, the practical relevance of humility to responsibility glints throughout his
prolific incidental work. Here the material requirements of Christian responsibility
are discerned through a humble reading of the signs of the times. The times in 1932
were characterized by economic disaster and social injustice. In "The Perils of
63 Niebuhr saw as well the wartime potential for greater racial justice for African-Americans.
64 "Our Responsibilities in 1942," 2.
65 Ibid.
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American Power" Niebuhr pronounced prophetic judgment upon the prideful and
egotistic irresponsibility that had issued in the nation's economic misery, both at
home and abroad. In 1932 his Christian responsibility entailed a struggle against the
prideful self-interest that engendered this misery and a duty to prevent irresponsible
power being exacerbated by the inevitable temptations of military power. Yet a
decade later Niebuhr wrote that "Our Responsibilities in 1942" required every
resource, including American military power, to be marshalled in the cause of
justice. We briefly noted events that prompted this significant change in what
Niebuhr believed Christian responsibility entailed. Clearly, for Niebuhr, Christian
responsibility must reflect the requirements mete for social justice within its given
context. What does not change is a prophetic insistence that we must "be humble
rather than self-righteous in carrying out our historic tasks." 66
Thus Christians had particular responsibilities for critiquing both the methods and the
spirit in which the war was to be waged. However desperate the struggle, the war
had to be conducted with a view toward the post-war order, toward the rebuilding of
an international community more just and secure than the old. American
responsibility entailed waging war with all its material and spiritual resources. But a
failure to maintain a prophetic perspective that envisioned a more just international
community beyond the war itself could doom the world to additional decades of
chaos. The signs of the times, then, pointed not simply to American responsibility for
the obvious exigencies ofwartime but to its continuing responsibilities in shaping the
nature of the peace to follow. Indeed, Niebuhr saw in these signs a "fateful
significance."
America's coming of age coincides with that period of world history
when the paramount problem is the creation of some kind of world
community. The world must find a way of avoiding complete anarchy
in its international life; and America must find a way of using its great
power responsibly. These two needs are organically related; for the
world problem cannot be solved if America does not accept its full
share of responsibility in solving it."67
66 "Our Responsibilities in 1942," 2.
67 "American Power and World Responsibility," 200.
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Ironically, the economic and military power that engendered American responsibility
posed the greatest impediment to meeting its responsibility in building world
community. Pride in its national particularity and great power distorted America's
understanding of "all problems of human togetherness," Niebuhr wrote in 1943.
That his incidental writing seldom strays far from the topic of power reflects
Christian realism's insistence upon the organic relationship between power and
responsibility. For Niebuhr humility is the resource of faith that brings power into an
organic relationship with Christian responsibility.
In approaching the case studies there can be no claim that humility born of faith
provides a precise blueprint for Christian responsibility. Christian realism insists that
the exact requirements of Christian responsibility must reflect the particular case.
Rather, we seek to discern the operation of humility in illuminating these
requirements in light of the overriding Christian responsibility for establishing
greater justice within and among human communities. More specifically, within
these case studies in Niebuhr's incidental work we examine the insights that






Humility and International Responsibility: The Conduct of War
To be in a battle means to defend a cause against its peril, to protect a
nation against its enemies, to strive for truth against error, to defend
justice against injustice...To be above the battle must also mean some
reverent andpitying comprehension of the vastness of the catastrophe
which has engulfed us all, friend and foe, and some sense ofpity for
the victims ofthe struggle, whether ally or enemy.1
Reinhold Niebuhr
Introduction
IfNiebuhr's prophetic vocation in wartime seldom strayed far from matters related to
building the post-war world, neither did he question that an Allied victory was the
condition precedent to a more just international community. If he did not appeal
directly to the ius in bello of classical just war theory, Niebuhr insisted that the
attitudes of humility be reflected in America's conduct of the war. Although he
recognized that victory would require the Allies' most vital material and spiritual
resources, Christian responsibility required protection of the innocent, compassion
for the enemy, and the avoidance of unnecessary and indiscriminate killing and
destruction. Though he does not appeal to just war theory, it is apparent that, for
Niebuhr, the attitudes of humility must precede and under-gird the essential ius in
bello criteria of "proportionality" and "discrimination."2 To be sure reason has an
1 "In the Battle and Above It," Christianity andSociety 7, no. 4 (Autumn 1942): 3.
2 Niebuhr viewed traditional interpretations ofjust war theory as "rigid, artificial and unhelpful."
According to Colm McKeogh he "rejects any just war approach which offers straightforward rules
and promises that, if they are followed, then moral standards can be upheld in international relations.
Niebuhr's own approach does not attempt to set out rules and restrictions on actions, rules which, if
followed, allow the actor to avoid guilt... His normative theory of international politics centres on a
pragmatic ethic, which focuses on ends and which is flexible, though morally aware, as regards
means. As such, it is a means of moral reasoning more common than one based on absolute rules and
prohibitions." McKeogh nevertheless places Niebuhr within the pragmatic wing ofjust war tradition
that "stressed the role of conscience and the avoidance of elaborate formulae." The Political Realism
ofReinhold Niebuhr: A Pragmatic Approach to Just War (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 148-149.
essential role in any Christian conduct of war. But Niebuhr insisted that humility
must inform reason because reason is always shaped by human partiality and
finitude; in short, human reason may easily become the servant of human egotism,
the "vehicle of the sinful self by which it seeks to give the sanctity of a false
universality to its particular needs."3 Humility thus illumines proportionality and
discrimination in wartime. Because it requires less certainty about the justice of our
means and more contrition regarding those decisions we nevertheless must make,
humility mitigates against the self-righteousness that engenders bloodlust in wartime
and precludes justice in victory.
Niebuhr persistently reminded Americans of the inextricable relationship between
how the war was fought and the possibilities of the ensuing peace. His belief that
neither side in the conflict was blameless did not alter his conviction that an Allied
victory served the cause ofmore equal justice. He chastised those who refused to join
the struggle but nevertheless expected to frame the peace: "the 'good' people will
presume to have the right, the duty, and the virtue to make the peace; while the 'bad'
people fight the war to the kind of conclusion without which these peace plans are
vanity." But if those who take up the sword do not "preserve in battle the
profoundest resources of the Christian faith, we might well create a situation in
which no real reconstruction is possible."4 Niebuhr thus underscored the inescapable
tension between the exigencies of warfare and the spiritual and political requirements
for rebuilding the post-war world. The policies and strategies employed in war had
themselves to be as just as possible if victory was to serve the cause of a more just
post-war world.
No blueprint on waging a "just" total war emerges from Niebuhr' incidental work
during WWII. But from his numerous essays it is possible to discern the attitudes that
serve the cause of justice in wartime and thereby serve the cause of a more just post¬
war community. These, for Niebuhr, are the attitudes of humility that in faith may
For Yoder, Niebuhr is not a just war thinker but simply a realist. "Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian
Pacifism," Mennonite Quarterly Review 29, no. 2 (1956): 101-17, cited in McKeogh, 173.
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Niebuhr, Destiny, 301.
4 "Amidst Encircling Gloom," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 3 (March 9, 1942): 1-2.
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illumine all human striving. Here, even in the conduct of a desperate conflict, we
may admit before God the imperfect and finite nature of the justice we seek to
defend. Accepting this and knowing that we stand ever under God's judgment,
however righteous we perceive our cause, serves to preserve the spirit of justice both
in the battle and beyond it.
Taint of Racial Pride
Though institutional racism against its Black citizens had been a continuing source of
Niebuhrian reproach upon American democracy, in early 1942 he underscored the
injustice and irony of racism in the conduct of total war against two explicitly racist
regimes. In the hysterical aftermath of the disastrous Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor thousands of Japanese American citizens were uprooted from their homes
and communities and placed in internment camps. The shocking destruction ofmuch
of America's Pacific fleet (but, significantly, none of its aircraft carriers) seemed
another of the inexorable Japanese triumphs that threatened to crush American power
and influence in the Pacific. Rumours and unsubstantiated allegations of espionage
were accepted as fact, particularly on the West Coast where most Japanese-
Americans made their homes and which was thought most vulnerable to imminent
attack.5
As a second generation German-American who had experienced America's anti-
German sentiment in WWI, Niebuhr anticipated the disaster that in fact overtook
many Americans of Japanese ancestry. In February of 1942 he recalled the earlier
war-time hysteria and insisted that American Christians bore heavy responsibility for
preserving civil liberties in wartime. If wartime conditions required that some
freedoms had to be curtailed, Niebuhr warned that hysteria must not cause
Americans to forget that "the thing which counts in making a free world is the
freedom of the few, not of the many."6 Anti-Japanese hysteria nevertheless reached
fever pitch with a greater breach of civil liberties than even Niebuhr had anticipated.
3 See Kennedy, Freedomfrom Fear, 748-760.
6 "Civil Liberties in Wartime," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 2 (February 23, 1942): 1.
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The indiscriminate internment of Japanese-Americans was attacked by Christianity
and Crisis in its April 20, 1942 lead editorial, "A Blot on Our Record." 7 It decried
the "Nuremberg-law" mentality fuelled by hysteria and race hatred that had shorn an
entire class of persons of their essential rights as American citizens. While allowing
that the internments were considered wartime measures as opposed to the Nuremberg
laws drawn during peacetime, the editorial noted the "uncomfortable parallel"
between Japanese-American citizens being made "scapegoats much as were the Jews
in Germany under Hitler."8 It was hoped that the churches of America would not be
as quiescent in face of Japanese-American internment as the churches of Germany
had been ofNazi persecution of the Jews.
Niebuhr himself responded to the barrage of negative mail that "Blot" predictably
fomented. He used the occasion to refute those who thought that criticism of
government in wartime gave comfort to the enemy. Hitler, he observed, could make
much more of American racial hypocrisy than of legitimate criticism of it; indeed,
the idea that government should be immune from criticism in wartime is "dangerous
to the spirit of democracy." Those Christians who urged the resolute prosecution of
the war had to distinguish continuously between responsible and irresponsible
criticism of the conduct of the war. Here Niebuhr reminded his fellow citizens that
the exigencies of war militate against the self-criticism that enabled them to see that
"there is no evil which Hitler represents in an extravagant form which is not present
in democratic society in some potential or inchoate form."9 The injustice being
inflicted upon Japanese-Americans reflected the racial pride that was the root cause
of the systematic injustice so pervasively inflicted on black Americans. Racism, not
7 Vol. 2, no. 6. Although this editorial was written by Henry Smith Leiper, a member of the journal's
editorial staff, Niebuhr was Christianity and Crisis' senior editor. Following an inundation of
criticism from irate readers Niebuhr vigorously defended the positions taken in Leiper's editorial. See
"The Evacuation of Japanese Citizens," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 8 (May 18, 1942): 2-5.
8
Ibid., 1. It is an irony of American history that the future Chief Justice of the United States, Earl
Warren, was at the time Attorney General ofCalifornia. The editorial implies that Warren saw his
promotion of the internment program as beneficial to his gubernatorial ambitions. He was in fact
elected governor ofCalifornia and later named U.S. Chief Justice by President Dwight Eisenhower in
October of 1953. Warren would lead the court in a number of landmark civil rights decisions,
including Brown v. Board ofEducation (1954) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
9
"Evacuation," 3. America's greatest racial problem was and remains injustice toward its black
citizens.
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simply the exigencies of total war, accounted for the internment scheme.10 The
wartime hysteria that predisposed Americans to believe that all American-born
Japanese were disloyal had the same obvious and dangerous racial implications.
The cleansing of racism from America's household held implications for how the
war would be fought as well as for the peace to follow. "In a war fought for political
principles transcending the boundaries of race, color and nation," Niebuhr cautioned,
"it is important to resist the natural but dangerous tendency to reduce the struggle to
national or racial proportions."11 This tendency hazards the great enterprise because
racial pride obscures the depth of our culpability for the injustices we inflict on those
ofdifferent races. Thus the racial pride blatantly evidenced in the wartime internment
of Japanese-Americans was not only a moral blot on American democracy. If racial
pride tainted the prosecution of the war, it would taint and endanger the peace to
follow. While racial pride is not exclusive with any race, the combination of racial
pride and technical power made white racism a particularly virulent hazard to world
• 12
community. Even under the chastisement of wartime exigencies American power
had always to reflect its responsibilities to the wider community of nations. Whatever
peoples its particular target, racism would be both a spiritual and political
impediment to that responsibility.
The Humble Spirit in Waging War
If Niebuhr acknowledged that Christians could not support war with an easy
conscience he realised that the brutality of warfare might batter any tender
conscience to the point of despair.13 Yet if Christian responsibility offered no easy
escape from the realities of modern warfare it nevertheless required every effort to
minimize human suffering, destruction and further injustice. Christianity and Crisis
subscribers read that faith may not say precisely how the battle is to be waged but it
10 "The Race Problem," Christianity and Society 7, no. 3 (Summer 1943): 4.
11
Ibid., 4.
12 Niebuhr, "The Intelligent Man's Burden," Nation 156, no. 1 (January 2, 1943): 26.
13 "Our Responsibilities in 1942," 1.
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does prescribe the spirit in which it is waged. A contrite and humble spirit fosters a
sense of common humanity that raises us above the battle even as we wage it. To be
above the battle, Niebuhr wrote, "means some reverent and pitying comprehension
of the vastness of the catastrophe which has engulfed us all, friend and foe, and some
sense of pity for the victims of the struggle, whether ally or enemy."14 This God's
eye view of conflict characterises Christian responsibility in wartime and delimits
any Christian understanding of "total war." From this perspective we discern our
complicity in the evil that foments war, its tragic necessities, and our responsibilities
beyond the conflict.15 Only through the grace of humility is it possible to discern the
spirit in which war is to be prosecuted and to gain some vision of the creative
possibilities that may emerge from it.
Niebuhr's support for the war entailed at least the tacit endorsement of the use of
hellish weapons against the enemy. Certainly bombs were one such weapon. The
advent of atomic weapons may today obscure the fact that the opposing camps in
WWII possessed weapons quite capable of mass destruction, i.e. weapons that
inflicted or could be reasonably expected to cause death and destruction on a large
and indiscriminate scale. Nazi attacks on Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry and
other cities caused massive loss of innocent life and prompted a gradual retreat from
the earlier official allied policy of "precision bombing" of military or strategic
targets. The combined American and British air attack on Dresden resulted in a
firestorm that killed 35,000 people; a one-night attack on Berlin, 25,000 deaths. On
March 3, 1945 American B-29s dropped bombs and incendiary weapons on Tokyo,
leaving one million people homeless and 90,000 dead.16
In the face of these terrible realities of technical warfare what did it mean to be both
in and above the battle? Can we disavow the use of bombs against an enemy who
will prevail against us because he is willing to use them? Niebuhr provides no facile
answer. It is not possible, he wrote, "to move in history without being tainted with
14 "In the Battle and Above It," 3.
15 "The End of Total War," Christianity and Society 9, no. 4 (Fall, 1944): 4.
16
Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 744; 847.
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guilt." There is on the one hand no "moral freedom to escape from these hard and
cruel necessities of history." On the other, we do have the moral freedom to meet the
necessities of war "without rancor or self-righteousness." Upon learning that certain
Allied pilots had refused the Sacrament before their bombing raids Niebuhr reminded
Christians that,
The Lord's supper is not a sacrament for the righteous but for
sinners....The Kingdom of God, of which the Sacrament is the
symbol, is on the one hand the peace which comes to the soul when it
turns from sin to righteousness. It is on the other hand the peace of
divine forgiveness, mediated to the contrite sinner who knows that it is
not in his power to live a sinless life on earth.17
When Allied strategy shifted from precision bombing to the carpet-bombing of
primarily civilian population centres, Niebuhr demanded to know the reasons. "It is
very confusing to find our authorities priding themselves in one moment on the
accuracy of their 'precision' bombing and in the next moment promising the
complete obliteration of all the great German cities."18 He nevertheless rejected
what he thought was the simplistic pacifist contrast between human values and
military necessity. After all, he argued, a quicker victory over Nazi tyranny and the
misery and death it was inflicting could be seen as "human value."19 Yet the
adoption of carpet-bombing could not be justified as a reprisal against Nazi attacks
on Allied civilian populations. Nor could he accept that the destruction of German
workers' homes justified targeting cities rather than military installations even,
apparently, if doing so might produce a quicker victory. The life and death struggles
of total war obscured them, "but there are limits even in total war, and the systematic
destruction of whole cities would certainly seem to exceed those limits."20 Niebuhr
insisted that the peoples of the western democracies had a right to know the military
17 "The Bombing ofGermany," Christianity and Society 8, no. 3 (Summer 1943): 3.
18 "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis 4, no. 4 (March 20, 1944): 2
19 "Is the Bombing Necessary?" Christianity and Crisis 4, no.5 (April 3, 1944): 1.
20 "Editorial Notes," (March 20, 1944): 2.
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justification for the change in strategy; the conduct of total war had to remain under
•21democratic scrutiny.
Later Niebuhr saw the development and use of atomic weapons as an element in the
"historical logic" of total war conducted between technically advanced nations. Their
use, he observed, "proved that 'total war' is not a Nazi invention," and he noted that
the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan was justified by the same logic the
Nazis used in bombing Warsaw and Rotterdam; i.e., that the war would be shortened.
Yet Niebuhr rejected any simplistic or blanket condemnation of the decision to make
and use the bomb. He alluded to the great fear that the Nazis were developing such a
weapon and that there was little question that once perfected they would use it.
Could the Allied leaders, once in possession of such a weapon, withhold its use
against Japan if doing so hastened the war's end? Even so, Niebuhr was profoundly
shaken by the indiscriminate atomic destruction of the two Japanese cities. The
failure of the US to first demonstrate the power of the bomb before using it, he
wrote, was a failure of moral authority. The world could hardly expect repentance on
the part of the Japanese when they felt they were "defeated by the use of an
illegitimate form of destruction."22 Considering his earlier observations regarding
American attitudes toward the Japanese, the inescapable conclusion is that Niebuhr
saw the taint of racism in the decision to use atomic weapons on Japan.23 It is also
inescapable to conclude that the obscene brutality of the 1931 Manchurian invasion,
Japanese diplomatic duplicity on the eve of the war, the nature of the attack on Pearl
21 See Kennedy, Freedomfrom Fear, 742-45. Kennedy summarizes the military debate surrounding
the shift of strategy in which the Allies "slid" across a moral threshold. He notes studies that
indicated carpet-bombing was a significant but not a decisive factor in the German defeat.
22 "The Atomic Bomb," Christianity and Society 10, no. 4 (Fall 1945): 3-5. While any full discussion
of the issues surrounding the decision to use the bomb against Japan is beyond the scope of this paper
some context is helpful. Brief consideration was given to a demonstration such as Niebuhr suggests
but rejected for various reasons. Conventional bombing had caused 900,000 deaths across Japan
before the nuclear strikes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki; it was questioned whether that the bomb
would cause loss of life on any greater scale. Meanwhile, Japanese troops refused to surrender; on
Okinawa only 7,000 of the original force of 77,000 survived while 100,000 civilians were killed in the
fighting. Extrapolating the casualty rate to US troops on Okinawa, the human cost of the planned
invasion of Japan itselfwas estimated at 268,000 US casualties. Kennedy, Freedomfrom Fear, 834-
35.
23 See "The Race Problem," Christianity andSociety 7, no. 3 (Summer 1942): 3-5; "The Evacuation
of Japanese Citizens," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 8 (May 18, 1942): 2-5; and "Christian Faith and
the Race Problem," Christianity andSociety 9, no. 3 (Summer 1944): 21-24.
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Harbour, the particularly harsh treatment meted out to Allied prisoners of war, the
use of suicide pilots against Allied warships, and the fanatical refusal to surrender all
fuelled the racial hatred of those targeted by Japanese power.
Niebuhr nevertheless saw no purely "Christian answer" to the problem of the
bomb.24 If Christian pacifism offered a clearer Christian witness in this matter, there
is as well the Christian witness of those who assume responsibility for social justice
and the security of their civilization. What future responsibilities might require could
not be known but the atomic genie was out of the bottle. Any unilateral renunciation
of its use might serve to encourage rather than discourage war. He thought that
making absolute moral distinctions between atomic and other destructive weapons
was not particularly fruitful; the moral issue was to avoid the use of any weapon for
the purposes of indiscriminate mass destruction. The ironic challenge in the nascent
atomic age was that the strategies designed to contain communism while preventing
war entailed the unavoidable risk of atomic war.
If Christian responsibility entailed the risk of nuclear war Niebuhr appealed to the
lessons of the Greek tragedies wherein "men may fall into evil by the very
desperation of their effort to avoid it." He was particularly concerned lest any
doctrine that accepted the inevitability of war metamorphose into a doctrine of
preventative war. In the atomic age Christian responsibility must avoid the
temptation to seek primarily military solutions to the problems of international
security. The chief hope of avoiding war, he wrote, lies in promoting the economic
and moral health of the world community. This is the positive strategy necessary for
avoiding war; a strategy in which, because of its wealth and power, the US must take
a disciplined lead.
24 "Which Question Comes First for the Church?", Christianity and Crisis 5, no. 19 (November 12,
1945): 1.
25 "The Christian Conscience and Atomic War," Christianity and Crisis 10, no. 21 (December 11,
1950): 161. In this essay Niebuhr summarised the Federal Council ofChurches' report, Christian
Conscience and Weapons ofMass Destruction. Niebuhr was a signatory to the document, an edited
copy ofwhich was reprinted in pages 162-68.
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Humility and Discerning a Victor's Justice
We have described humility as the attitude for all seasons of Christian responsibility,
especially those in which decisions imperil lives and community. Such decisions
always occasion contrition. It may be questioned, of course, as to whether victims of
war are much comforted by the fact that those who have inflicted their suffering
might themselves suffer from guilt. However that question might be answered,
Christian responsibility in waging war means remembering the common humanity of
all peoples and avoiding the hatred and self-righteousness that inevitably increase
innocent suffering. For Niebuhr these are attitudes of humility that always point to a
future beyond conflict, to the possibilities of forgiveness, reconciliation and
community.
In the aftermath of total war the fruits of humility assume the practical character of
feeding, housing and protecting all its victims.26 Perhaps it is only as we assume
these concomitant responsibilities in wartime that the enemy and innocent victims
alike can begin to believe that we have inflicted their suffering with a troubled
conscience. In these practical fruits of humility, our common humanity is affirmed
and the hope for restored community is established. The attitudes ofhumility are thus
all the more important for the victors because they bear the greater responsibility for
shaping the character of the community that emerges from conflict. Thus Niebuhr's
understanding of Christian responsibility in the conduct of the war precluded racial
hatred, the indiscriminate infliction of suffering, while requiring care for all its
victims.
Another wartime phenomenon that threatened the building of peacetime community
is the imposition of a victor's justice upon the defeated enemy. We have seen that, in
Niebuhr's view, the vindictiveness and self-righteousness of the western democracies
towards Germany following WWI reaped the much greater whirlwind of WWII.
26 Niebuhr wrote often, and often impatiently, of the Allies' responsibility for the civilian victims of
war. See "Soberness in Victory," Christianity and Crisis 5, no. 9 (May 28, 1945): 1-2; "If Thine
Enemy Hunger Feed Him," Christianity and Crisis 5, no. 22 (December 24, 1945): 2; "1 Was An
Hungered and Ye Gave Me No Meat," Christianity and Crisis 5, no. 23 (January 7, 1947): 5-6.
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Even as the Allies struggled to win the present war Niebuhr was anxious that they
apply the lessons of the earlier war, lessons most truly learned only in humility. No
human situation, he wrote concerning the prospects of victory, "offers greater
temptations to pride and vainglory."
Do the victors understand that they are under judgment as well as the
vanquished? If they do not they try invariably to falsify history and
make it appear that the vanquished were solely responsible for the evil
which befell all the nations. Invariably they also corrupt the execution
of judgment with vindictive self-glorification. That is why victory in
one war so frequently sows the seeds of another war... If we forget the
mutual guilt in which we were all involved and if we imagine that we
have banished evil from international relations by the defeat of our
foes, we will fail in the task of organizing the international
community.27
The appalling scope of Nazi war crimes prompted universal revulsion and righteous
anger. Knowing human nature, Niebuhr feared that the victorious Allies' righteous
anger would lapse into a self-righteousness whose objective was not justice but
vengeance. Therein the tragic pattern ofWWI would be repeated and the victors of
WWII would create conditions resulting in WWIII. Niebuhr's counsel in seeking to
impose justice upon those responsible for terrible crimes was "to be angry but sin
not."
If ever there was a "just" war in the minds of the American people, it was the
• • TO
struggle against Nazi Germany and Militarist Japan. It was easy to demonise these
regimes and thereby fuel the hatred and vindictiveness that Niebuhr knew would
imperil the future peace. Nevertheless, atrocities such as those committed by
Japanese troops against American, British and Filipino prisoners during the Bataan
Death March, could not be denied simply because they might create racial hatred
among many people. But what is historically true, Niebuhr wrote, must not lead us
to commit the "spiritual atrocity" of demonising an entire people: "We must be
27 "The Perils of Being the Judge," Christianity and Society 9, no. 1 (Winter 1943): 10-11.
28 James Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996; Oxford University Press paperback, 1997), 8.
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resolute in escaping the vicious circle in which cruelty begets cruelty and men create
what they claim to abhor."29 While a particularly cruel adversary evokes what is
worst in our human nature, in Christian humility we find the resources to recognise
that to some extent the enemy reflects the sin and guilt of all humanity, including our
own. Just as Christian responsibility may entail our having to make judgments
regarding the guilt of others, the attitudes of humility illumine the egotism and
vindictiveness that taint that judgment. "The more we recognize that we will not be
perfectly just, "Niebuhr wrote, "the better chance we have of attaining some measure
• • TO • • • •
of justice." Again Niebuhr insisted upon the organic relationship between the
conduct of the war, of which justice for the enemy is an integral part, and the peace
to follow.
While knowing well that not all Germans were Nazis, Niebuhr believed that the
German people, through their "political ineptitude" and "more positive political
vices," were implicated in a collective guilt for Nazi evil. If destroying Germany
would atone for the millions of Nazi victims or assure the future peace of the world,
he wrote, doing so might be justified. But such a morality of pure "justice" would
neither restore life to Nazi victims nor guarantee the world a more peaceful future.
Cultures and nations have developed systems of justice dealing with their criminals,
but there is no such system to deal with criminal nations. Moreover, simply
punishing individual war criminals does not of itself remove the underlying causes of
collective guilt.31 Only through the humility of faith are we able to recognize that.
There are crimes too terrible to be punished by the hand of man; and
there are punishments in history more terrible than any crime
deserves, so the God of history is both more terrible and more
merciful than any of our nicely calculated schemes of punishment and
justice.32
29 "The Japanese Atrocities," Christianity and Crisis 4, no. 2 (February 21, 1944): 1; "Factors of
Cohesion," Spectator 170, no. 5999 (June 18, 1943): 562-63.
30 "A Just World Power," Current Religious Thought 3, no. 8 (October, 1943): 13.
31 "Democratic Goals and World Order," New Leader 27, no. 29 (September 23, 1944): 5.
32 "Justice for the Enemy," Christianity andSociety 9, no. 4 (Fall 1944): 6.
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Humility thus illumines the possibilities ofjustice for even the most hateful enemy. It
enables the God's eye view that all human efforts towards justice are finite and
partial, and tainted by self-interest. The attitudes of humility point beyond the
requirements of justice to the enemy, which can be met imperfectly at best, to the
requirements of mercy and forgiveness that are also essential to the restoration of
community. When Christian responsibility requires that we struggle to deal justly
with so-called criminal nations, humility teaches that ruthlessness alone "solves no
essential problem of world order"; we must "either cure the criminal or perish with
him." 33
Here is yet another juncture in which the attitudes of humility issue in political
prudence. Humility does not simply illumine the limited possibilities of any justice
that we can devise for the foe who has committed terrible crimes. It illumines as well
the national self-interest in recognizing such limits. It requires accepting the
inescapable ambiguity of justice in relations between nations, particularly between
victor and vanquished, and thus the limited purposes served by any punishment.
Political prudence "adjusts itself to the complicated realities of the human
community," Niebuhr wrote, just "as Christian forgiveness grows out of
understanding the dimensions of good and evil, ofmercy and wrath, which transcend
the realities of history."34 In the case of the people ofNazi Germany, prudence asks
what punishment could be worse than that inflicted by the war itselfwherein millions
died, hundreds of cities were destroyed, and an economy that would be in ruins for
years to come.
But if Niebuhr believed that there were more Nazis deserving of death than any
civilized conscience could possibly allow he nevertheless was adamant that those
most responsible for wartime atrocities "ought to be destroyed." Indeed, he seems to
hold that summary or vigilante justice for war criminals, best served up by those on
whom the criminals inflicted such evil, would serve a more wholesome purpose than
trials conducted under the pretension of victors' impartiality. "Terrible as the
""Editorial Notes, " (March 20, 1944): 2.
34 "Justice for the Enemy," 6.
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consequences of such 'lynchings' may be, terrible that is in the inexactness of
punishment, it must nevertheless be hoped that most of the individual criminals will
be punished in that way." Niebuhr, accordingly, believed that wartime criminals
deserved to be punished. But he also believed that extensive war trials with tens of
thousands of accused would detract from what he saw as the more important tasks in
achieving greater social justice: the reconciliation and rebuilding of the international
community.35
Thus if Niebuhr's Christian responsibility always entails the pursuit of justice it also
knows that social justice is inextricably contextual even when attempted on an
international scale. It knows that there is no complete escape from the self-interested
and partial perspective attendant upon all human attempts at justice. These
impediments persist in peace as in war, but they are exacerbated by the exigencies
and fury of armed conflict. The victors posit their triumphs as proof of their virtue
and thereby obscure their share of culpability for the conflict. Here self-righteous
pride may so taint "justice" for the fallen enemy that judgment becomes revenge.
Just here the attitudes of humility militate against the fury and error of self-
righteousness. And just as they engender a God's eye view of responsibility in
conflict, so they illumine the possibilities of a greater justice beyond conflict.
Humility allows us to see that the power by which we triumph in a just cause also
imperils the justice of our cause. In Christian responsibility there is no escape from
making fateful choices between lesser and greater forms of justice, yet we cannot
escape judgment by avoiding those choices.
In times of victory, when the so-called righteous nations have
prevailed, we had better not forget the words of our Lord: "Judge not
that ye be not judged," and the words of St. Paul, written in the same
spirit: "Who art thou that judgest thy brother; for we must all be made
manifest before the judgement seat of Christ." These words are
spoken out of the ultimate insights of New Testament faith. They are
35 "Justice and Forgiveness," Christianity and Society 9, no. 3 (Summer 1944): 9. Possibly Niebuhr
was here contemplating Mussolini's gruesome but alarmingly satisfying end in Milan.
furthermore remarkable sources of insight into our contemporary
experience.36
Conclusion
Niebuhr's prophetic faith did not offer escape from sinful human nature nor any
guarantee that Christians can avoid all evil in meeting historic responsibilities.
Christians, he wrote, cannot act in history without the taint of guilt nor can they
escape guilt by inaction. But in conflict the spirit of humility illumines the common
humanity shared by all people and affirms the truth of faith that all people and
nations stand under God's perfect judgement. Niebuhr's prophetic warning to his
fellow Americans was that this judgment falls most heavily upon the "good" people
and nations who lay claim to some divine instrumentality.
Niebuhr insisted that the spirit in which the war was conducted would impact the
possibilities for a more just post-war community. In advocating American
responsibility to wage war he rejected perfectionisms that found moral equivalence
between the evils of the democracies and the totalitarianisms against which they
struggled for survival. But his stinging reminders that America's own moral failures
shared in creating these evils called for a spirit of humility to guide the struggle. It is
this humility about the moral purity of our own cause that mitigates self-righteous
fury in waging war. It is this same spirit that points beyond the struggle toward the
possibilities of a more just peace. For Niebuhr American power made its racial
attitudes as relevant to the international community as its military strategies. Nor
could the righteous wartime anger kindled against Nazi Germany and militarist Japan
be allowed to degenerate into vengeance. Any pretence of a totally disinterested
justice for the foe would further embitter relations between victor and vanquished
and impede the rebuilding of a more just international community.
36 "The Conflict Between Nations and Nations and Between Nations, and God," Christianity and
Crisis 6, no. 14 (August 5, 1946): 2.
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A more just world was the objective that Niebuhr persistently held to be America's
greatest responsibility and one that must govern the spirit in which any war is waged.
This spirit is a possibility only through the grace of humility and the attitudes it
engenders for responsible action.
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Chapter Six
Humility and International Responsibility: The US and the
United Nations
The Christian ought to know that the creation ofsome form ofworld
community, compatible with the necessities of a technical age, is the
most compelling command ofour day.1
Reinhold Niebuhr
Introduction
In writing "Our Responsibilities in 1942," Niebuhr had called for the girding of
Christian loins at a time when the Allies were in desperate peril. In his prophetic role
he did not shrink from assigning proportionate responsibility for the situation in
which America and the western democracies found themselves. At the same time he
offered prophetic encouragement and affirmed the resources of faith in the struggle
ahead. Moreover Niebuhr's insistence that planning for the post-war world was a
concomitant responsibility ofwaging war, just when victory seemed so uncertain and
distant, lends the essay an unmistakable aura ofprophetic audacity.
But if Niebuhr's call in early 1942 for post war planning was audacious it was not
inconsistent. He had persistently framed American power in terms of its
international responsibilities and he believed the war was in part due to America's
earlier failure to meet those responsibilities. In this respect the war should occasion
contrite responsibility for setting right the underlying economic and social injustices
that stoke overt armed conflict. The new chapter in history to be written after the
war, he insisted, cannot be written without reference to the old: "The two chapters
will be intimately related to each other."2 Niebuhr's own approach to writing the new
1 "Plans for World Reorganization," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 17 (October 19, 1942): 6.
2 "The Unity of History," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 7 (May 4, 1942): 1.
chapter reflects the style and many of the recurring motifs of his mature thought. His
approach is perhaps best captured in his 1942 essay, "Plans for World
Reorganization."3
Approaches to Post-war World Organization
Niebuhr discerned two general approaches to post-war planning and reconstruction.
The first he defined as the historical and realistic approach to politics, an approach
which rests on understanding human nature and the limits of human possibilities
discernable in history. The second approach is that of the rationalists and idealists
whose focus is on the goal of new possibilities, not the underlying problems of
human nature and the limitations they place on all human possibilities. For
Niebuhr's realist there is little new in history; the perennial problems of human
history may appear in new guises but they remain in essence the same.4 The
idealists, focused as they are on new possibilities, tend to hope that the perennial
problems of history and human nature will be eradicated by education and scientific
advancement. In Niebuhr's estimate, the idealists are overly inclined to believe that
injustice will recede before the moral demands of justice.
"In the present situation the idealists rightly insist that the economic
interdependence of the world demands new international political
organization. They believe in the necessity of some kind of world
government, which will make our economic interdependence
sufferable and which will organize the potential world community and
make it actual."5
Niebuhr's realists deny neither new necessities nor new possibilities. But they insist
that prescriptions for action be based upon understanding human nature and be
consistent with the lessons of history. The realist thus must ask how possible is
3 "Plans for World Organization," 3-6.
4 This is somewhat analogous to Niebuhr's view that pride pitches itself at whatever new level of
humility we may achieve through grace. Destiny, 141.
5 "Plans for World Organization," 3.
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world government, whatever its necessity in the face of economic interdependence?
Considering "that national pride and parochial self-sufficiency are something more
than the mere fruit of ignorance but recurring forces in all efforts at social
cohesion,"6 the realist asks how nations are to be coaxed into voluntarily
relinquishing their national sovereignty and prerogatives.
Distinctions between these two approaches to building world community rest upon
their understanding of the problems of political power. Niebuhr's realists do not
reject rational processes but neither do they believe reason to be the over-arching
factor in motivating collective human behaviour. Dominant power in some form,
these realists believe, is the cohesive element in all human collectives. Relative
justice within collectives is possible only when this dominant power is balanced by
countervailing power; without this equilibrium of power, reason and moral appeals
will not produce social justice. Idealists, on the other hand, want to see history
shaped less by power than by the "moral and social imperatives which a rational
analysis of the situation generates."
They look at the world and decide that its social and economic
problems demand and require a "federation of the world." They think
of such a federation not primarily in terms of the complex economic
and social interests and vitalities, which must be brought into and held
in a tolerable equilibrium. Least of all do they think of the necessity of
some dominant force or power as the organising center of the
equilibrium. They are on the whole content to state the ideal
requirements of the situation in as rigorous terms as possible.7
Here, of course, Niebuhr resorts to the generalisations and polemical style that
o
earned him the criticism of both friendly and unfriendly scholars. Yet if he
acknowledges that he has constructed something of straw man idealist it is because
so much is at stake in getting it right this time. Perhaps Niebuhr's polemics are best
understood in the tragic and ironic context of his own times. The ideal of the League
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 See Thompson, "Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," in Kegley and Bretall, 173; Rhoades,
"Prophetic Insights," 4.
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ofNations had failed in practice because the hegemonic nations were content with its
powerlessness. Indeed, had the League included effective enforcement provisions it
might not have ever been formed. Weak as the League was, the United States Senate
rejected American membership. In the event, the League failed because it could not
muster some countervailing military and economic force of the world community
against Nazi, Japanese and Italian aggression. It will be recalled that each of these
nations was an original signatory to the tragicomic Kellogg-Briand Pact in which
nearly all members of the international community denounced war as an instrument
of international policy.9 We need remember, too, the formative influence that the
Munich agreement and the German-Soviet pact had had on Niebuhr's thinking about
the relationship between idealism and power in the international community.
Niebuhr nevertheless recognized that the idealists can render an important service
and that the realists do not possess a franchise on strategies to build a more just and
peaceful world. Without the creative insights of the idealists, he observes, realists'
tend toward complacency and cynicism regarding the role of political power. Realists
too easily see power simply as physical force, whether economic or military: "They
do not fully appreciate that a proper regard for moral aspirations is a source of
political prestige; and that this prestige is itself an indispensable source of power."10
This is entirely consistent with Niebuhr's understanding that imagination is integral
to human nature and is expressed in idealism. Thus for all the scorn heaped upon
idealist straw men idealism has important and constructive purposes. Himself a
realist, Niebuhr discerns the creative and positive possibilities in the tension between
the two approaches. Reflected here as well is Niebuhr's belief in the creativity and
flexibility ofhumility shaping and evaluating our strategies and actions. It is just here
that the self-knowledge of humility requires that the criticism and correction offered
by others be considered.
9 The officially named Pact of Paris of 1928 was originally negotiated between the US and France. It
was expanded at the suggestion of US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg to include all willing
signers, thereby making it "as irresistible as it was meaningless." It was signed originally by fifteen
nations, including Germany, Japan and Italy, and eventually enjoyed nearly universal endorsement.
Kissinger, Diplomacy, 280-81.
10 "Plans for World Organization," 4.
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But while he finds both the idealist and realist approaches to world order flawed, his
greater loyalty lies with the realists. As we have seen, he saw no chance of building an
effective international organisation of nations without their sacrificing some degree of
national sovereignty. In this regard some idealists dismiss national sovereignty as
simply a legal impediment to world community. They would obviate this impediment
by superimposing international laws that deny any nation absolute sovereignty.
Herein, he insisted, idealists show themselves ignorant of the intricate cultural and
national complexities that underlie any nation's history and self-identity. More
troublesome still, in his view, these idealists seemingly ignore the basic reality of
international order that only power counters power. And yet other idealists, who
seemingly understand the necessity of power in building an effective international
organization, appear to equate the word with the deed. "They think it possible to create
such a new international authority and then make a moral demand upon the nations to
submit themselves to it."11 This species of idealists, like Shakespeare's Glendower,
obscure the vast distinction between the evocation of power and its actualisation.
The realists' approach to forming the post-war community, in Niebuhr's view, was
superior because it was based upon wartime cooperation and mutual commitments.
Sharing the prospect of defeat at the hands of an implacable foe, the Allies would
sacrifice some degree of national sovereignty because it is in their national interest to
do so. In short, Niebuhr believed that wartime necessities would compel a
coalescence ofmutuality and self-interest to a degree unachievable in peacetime. His
great concern was that the necessities of peacetime would be less compelling and that
the mutuality achieved in war would dissipate in the post-war world. Should this
occur, as Niebuhr feared, the tragic cycle of history would continue:
This logic is irrefutable because an economically interdependent
world must in some sense become a politically integrated world





Yet he found that if realists see this logic and recognize that old problems reappear in
new situations, they often fail to see that new situations also admit of new
possibilities.
Here Niebuhr's analysis of post-war world organisation requirements takes an
unexpected turn. Concerning the deployment of power in the new world order,
Niebuhr espies two schools within realist thinking. One school would forsake any
formal international political organisation and simply reconstruct a new balance of
power among the nations. The other school espouses something of an imperial
organisation of the world, "with some small group of dominant nations furnishing
the imperial power." Regarding the balance of power school Niebuhr acknowledges
the continuing necessity for recognizing the economic, political and geographical
elements essential to achieving some international equilibrium of power. The new
element this school did not appear to recognize is the destabilizing nature of rapidly
developed technological warfare. His case in point was Nazi air power had, in his
estimate, dramatically and quickly altered the balance of power in Europe. His point
was that the balance of power necessary for international equilibrium, always subject
to the vicissitudes of national politics and unforeseen events, was now subject to
such rapid change that it could no longer prevent international anarchy. The rapid
development and interdependence that characterize the technical age, in Niebuhr's
view, rendered the old balance of power formula a less certain guarantor of world
n
peace and stability.
Niebuhr thought that the "imperial" realists had a more hopeful design for post-war
world organisation. Niebuhr nowhere in this essay defines what he means by
imperialism, leaving us to discern its meaning from his own description of its
purpose. The imperialistic realists envisioned a world balance of power with what he
calls an "organizing" power at its center. This organizing center would possess the
instruments of power sufficient to manipulate "the social forces" of the world
community and avert international anarchy. The composition of this organizing
power would emerge from the conduct of the war itself. Realists variously saw
13 "Pillars of Peace," Spectator 171, no. 6017 (October 22, 1943): 379.
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America, or the Anglo-Saxon powers, or the so-called four great powers of Russia,
China, Britain and the US, as providing the organizing power within the new world
order. Niebuhr himself believed that the power center, if it were to be truly a world
organizing power, had to include the Soviet Union and China. He hoped that wartime
cooperation and "the practical steps of statesmanship" among the Allied powers
would make the arrangement workable in peacetime.14
That Niebuhr ventured into the fractious atmosphere created by the favourable
contemplation of imperial power is initially puzzling. His strategy appears to be pre¬
emptive. In his view any realistic proposal to deal with organizing the post-war
world would have to deal with the necessity of power at its center. It is best to
anticipate that "there is no possibility of organizing the world at all, which will not
be exposed to the charge of 'imperialism' by the idealists who do not take the
problem of power seriously."15 Yet he understood that the realists' espousal of an
imperial power center cannot be defended simply by attacking the idealists' naivety
about any use of power. If the idealists are naive about the problem of power the
realists are too often complacent about the problem ofjustice. However more just an
Anglo-Saxon imperialism might be compared with Nazi imperialism, it would not be
sufficiently just, in Niebuhr's view, to insure a more just world peace. The inclusion
of Russia in any post war imperial power center, as difficult as it might prove to be,
would be "a great gain." If the power center he envisioned was to achieve order and
justice it must itself achieve a "tolerable equilibrium" of power reflecting national
interests and cultural perspectives.
What of the place of the smaller powers in a new world order dominated by an
imperial power centre? How are their voices to be heard? Most important, how can
their power be accommodated to provide some balance or check against the
dominant powers? These are questions endemic to any discussion of imperialism,
and Niebuhr's struggle to answer them seems to reflect his inner doubts regarding
14 "The United Nations and World Organization," Christianity and Crisis 2, no. 24 (January 25,
1943): 2; "National Power and the Organization of Peace," The American Teacher 27, no. 7 (April
1943): 26.
15 "Plans for World Organization," 5.
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any realistic formula. The wartime cooperation he hoped would provide the
foundation for the new organising power was fragile enough among the US, Britain
and Russia; the smaller powers enrolled in the Allied cause appeared to have little
voice in matters. That "the policies of the United Nations are not being
democratically conducted," he complained, presented a serious impediment to justice
in the post-war world.16 Yet he recognized that unless the responsibility of member
nations was commensurate with their actual power the new world organization would
go the way of the League ofNations:
Constitutional arrangements which allowed smaller nations to
determine policies, which they lacked the power to implement, could
become as fruitful a source of new anarchy as unchecked dominant
power could become a new source of tyranny.17
Niebuhr finds himself unable to provide satisfactory answers to all the questions
regarding the just participation of the smaller nations; for the moment it will have to
do that the questions have been acknowledged. For in any case, he would write a few
months latter, "the trouble with less dangerous schemes than the coagulation of
dominant power at the center of world order is that the peril of a new anarchy is
1 R
greater, in them, than the peril of injustice in a United Nation's plan."
He cautioned that frustration in anticipating these and other problems must not
foment irresponsible escapism. It may be true, for example, that a world comprised
of model democracies, whose inner systems of checks and balances might moderate
their international relations, would make for a more just world. Clearly such an ideal
world did not exist; it is fatuous and dangerous to demand that the center of power
necessary for a stable post-war organization meet some perfectionist ideal. "If a
stable peace depended altogether on the achievement of an ideal democracy in the
constituent nations," Niebuhr wrote, "we would have to resign ourselves to decades
16 Ibid. Here Niebuhr uses the term United Nations to designate the Allied powers.
17 "Factors ofCohesion," Spectator 170, no. 5999 (June 18, 1943): 562-3.
l8"Review of Henry B. Park's The WorldAfter the War," Nation 156, no. 10 (March 6, 1943): 354.
Again, the reference here is to the Allied powers.
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of further purgatory."19 The purpose of constructing a tolerably just post-world
order was best served by humbly acknowledging the imperfections that inevitably
attend all human endeavours.
The Requirements of World Organization
Considering his realist's protestations against perfectionism and idealist escapism,
what then did Niebuhr's vision of the post-war organization look like? In offering
four principles of organization Niebuhr attempted a creative admixture of idealist and
realist approaches to post-war possibilities.
1. A constitutional arrangement that would provide some equilibrium of
power within the organizational structure itself. This "politically
implemented" arrangement would be designed to accommodate the
interests of the smaller powers as well as powerless nations.
2. An "organizing center" comprised of the great powers; they would
provide what Niebuhr rather oddly describes as "the coagulation of
dominant power at the center of world order." But perhaps given that
Niebuhr is attempting to prescribe a necessary cure for world disorder a
medical expression just here is quite appropriate.
3. This "imperial" power center would be balanced by checks "to prevent
its power from becoming vexatious."
4. An accommodation of what Niebuhr termed "regional arrangements."
Niebuhr here concedes that spheres of influence will remain a part of the
19 "Plans for World Organization," 5. Niebuhr observed in his review of Parkes' book that it was
vexatious problems such as protecting weaker nations that "drive so many good democrats to consider
Utopias rather than historical solutions of world problems."
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international landscape whatever the organization of the new world order.
But such regional arrangements, he insisted, "must not run counter to the
basic fact that the economic and political life of the nations is integrated in
20
world, rather than regional, terms."
In offering these organizing principles for the United Nations Niebuhr acknowledged
the importance of flexibility without compromising the requirements of basic justice.
He also reminded Christians of the resources of faith in meeting their responsibilities
in establishing the new world order:
A profound Christian faith knows something of the recalcitrance of sin
on every level of moral and social achievement, and is, therefore, not
involved in the alternate moods of illusion or disillusionment which
harass the world of idealists and secularists. It knows something of the
similarity between our own sin and the guilt of others; and will
therefore not be pitiless if ideal possibilities are frustrated by the
selfishness of others. But it also hears the divine command in every
new historical situation. The Christian ought to know that the creation
of some form of world community, compatible with the necessities of
a technical age, is the most compelling command of our day.21
It is easier to concur with Niebuhr's estimate of the resources of faith for building a
post-war community than with the plausibility of his particular outline to achieve it.
Despite his insightful if overly general dissection of the respective approaches of
idealists and realists, and his rather jolting endorsement of an imperial center of
power, there is an unmistakably wistful air to his proposals. Perhaps this wistfulness
simply reflects Niebuhr's reticence in undertaking a venture so haunted by the
carcases of idealistic and Utopian failures. He nevertheless embraced what he saw as
the idealists' creative contribution to addressing the problems of international
community. At the same time he feared that the political realists would simply revert
to some international balance of power scheme that he believed, in light of the
technical nature of modern warfare, could no longer maintain a reasonably just




impediments that would have to be overcome were a plan such as his ever to reach
fruition.
The cornerstone upon which so much depended and one in which the attitudes of
humility were so directly relevant is American responsibility for building community
among the great powers. Yet if American power and wealth are essential to creating
such community among the great nations such power also promotes the national
pride and selfishness that imperils international community. Only if its tasks are
illumined through the attitudes of humility could America meet its essential
responsibilities in building a more just and stable post-war order. Only from this
perspective can Niebuhr's plan be seen as achieving the multi-national concentration
of power he saw as essential to maintaining world order while promoting a more just
international community.
All, he believed at the time, depended upon the great powers finding some point at
which their national and mutual interests would converge. The trust and mutuality
essential to this convergence would have to be built upon their shared wartime
experience and agreements regarding post-war aspirations. Doubtless the wistful tone
that emerges from Niebuhr's outline in "Plans" reflects his realist's understanding of
how difficult reaching such agreements would be. The temptation of the victorious
powers to resort to security arrangements based principally upon spheres of influence
would be immense and, he thought, gravely dangerous to any post-war peace. It, in
fact, would mirror the European situation following WWI. 22
A more permanent peace lay with some "working accord" in which the victorious
powers would assure mutual security while avoiding spheres of influence. The
victorious Allies would have both the power and the responsibility for reaching such
an agreement. The question was whether they had the will.23 Because of its
22 "Russia and the Peace," Christianity and Society 7, no.. 2 (Spring 1942): 8.
23 "The German Problem," Christianity and Crisis 3, no. 23 (January 10, 1944): 4. That the Russians
saw territorial buffers as essential to their national security was an historical truism. Catherine the
Great had joined with Prussia and Austria in a partition of Poland in 1772; the 1939 German-Soviet
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predominant power and wealth, the US would have the greatest responsibility. In
reflecting upon likely post-war Soviet territorial claims Niebuhr saw a major
indicator of whether the US would meet its international responsibilities. The US, he
wrote, "cannot resist such demands without being willing to enter into a system of
collective security which makes this kind of security by territorial expansion
unnecessary." After WWI, Niebuhr observed, America had faced this same question.
Then it took the moral high ground against spheres of influence but refused to take
its share of responsibility for alternative means of mutual security among the nations
of Europe.24
Little wonder, then, that there is more than a note of wistful urgency in Niebuhr's
writing on post-war world organization. If he believed that the nature of wartime
cooperation offered the best hope for formulating the post-war peace he also knew
there were no guarantees that it would do so. He knew as well that the Allies'
wartime focus on defeating a common foe would not itself eradicate their significant
cultural and political differences regarding the organization of the post-war world.
Indeed, as the war drew on it became increasingly clear to Niebuhr that the US and
the Soviet Union would emerge as the two dominant world powers. That they were
so dissimilar in their economic, political and cultural perspectives struck at the heart
of Niebuhr's hopes; that each tended toward moral self-righteousness exaggerated
these differences and mutual suspicions. Niebuhr, moreover, was clearly aware of
Russia's historical determination to seek security through territorial buffers, a
tendency only exacerbated by Stalin's paranoia regarding the motives of the western
democracies.
Because the requisites of trust and commonality among the great powers did not
materialize in wartime Niebuhr's vision of a post-war world organization failed to
non-aggression pact ceded Polish territories that, ironically, Stalin saw as a buffer against a Nazi
attack. See Kissinger, Diplomacy, 338-349.
24 "Russia and the Peace," 8. Niebuhr believed reaching agreement regarding the post-war world
would entail meeting some Russian territorial demands in Poland, Finland and the Baltic States.
Though no agreement could justify meeting all Russian demands, Niebuhr thought some appeared
"plausible enough" in light of the mutual mistrust and ideological conflict between Russia and the
West. "Russia and the Christian World," The Christian News-Letter, supplement no. 189 (August 25,
1943): 1-2.
178
become a reality. True enough, the United Nation's charter ratified in October, 1945
by the five permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, USSR, UK
and the US—reflected each of the elements Niebuhr saw as indispensable to any plan
for world reorganization. The problem was that neither wartime experience nor
peacetime imperatives succeeded in building a community of trust among the great
powers, most critically between the US and the Soviet Union, essential to making
Niebuhr's vision work. As he repeatedly observed, only communities comprised of
"organically" related elements can forge practically effective constitutions and legal
systems. Where such elements as common culture, language and mutual interests are
25
lacking no constitution will create community out ofwhole cloth.
The American constitutional experience was not the clear exception to this rule that
some idealists claimed, he had warned in 1942. The colonies that became the United
States had shared the exigencies of a long and often desperate war; these States
recognized the need for a stronger central government only after their failed
experience under the Articles of Confederation. Many Americans even then opposed
or reluctantly embraced the federal Constitution that imposed a strong central
government. Niebuhr reminded the world constitutionalists, that the issue of Federal
versus State sovereignty was resolved finally only after a civil war that devastated
the American south and claimed 500,000 lives.26 He thus had few illusions about the
immense difficulty of establishing an international community in which powerful
nations would relinquish sufficient sovereignty to make his plan to maintain a just
peace workable.
He called for wartime "agreements" on Allied war aims, i.e., agreements among the
Allies regarding the geographical and political shape of the post-war world. These
agreements would provide the foundation of peace negotiations with the defeated
25
"Plans," 4.
"6 Ibid. See also Niebuhr's "The Illusion ofWorld Government," Foreign Affairs 27, no. 3 (April
1949): 381. Serving in Paris during the Constitutional Convention Thomas Jefferson, principal author
of the Declaration of Independence, Governor ofVirginia, and eventually third President of the US,
wrote that provisions in the new Constitution "stagger all my dispositions to subscribe to it." One such
provision was the creation of the office of the President that struck him as "a bad edition of a Polish
King." John Adams, David McCullough (London: The Free Press, 2002), 379-380.
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enemy and the incentive for the victorious powers to accept responsibility for
enforcing the terms imposed. A failure to reach such a wartime agreement, or "an
agreement to disagree" among the allied powers, would mean the division of Europe
27into spheres of influence, as in the event happened. In the shorter term it would
render any eventual peace negotiations with Germany chaotic, short-sighted and
vindictive.
Opposed to the Allies' demand for unconditional surrender, Niebuhr believed that the
total destruction and humiliation of the defeated foe would simply continue the cycle
of hatred that inevitably presaged new conflict.28 A policy of unconditional
surrender, he wrote, "means that the victors make their will and self restraint the only
basis for justice." Nor, he thought, did this policy serve the Allies' best interests in
the field. In the midst of the fierce fighting of January 1945, he asked if the Germans
would be fighting so desperately "had we stated conditions of peace which would
have held out some hope of health and security to them."29 Thus Niebuhr's insistent
and often strident demand for wartime agreement among the Allies, and his
formulation of an international body capable of enforcing those agreements, sought
to ameliorate the pride of the victorious powers. These steps would reduce national
self-righteous and ultimately self-destructive vindictiveness against a fallen foe.
They would serve as well the essential function of "exploiting the concurrence
between self-interest and our sense of obligation to the total community."3
27 "World War 111 Ahead?" Nation 158, no. 13 (March 25, 1944): 356.
28 Niebuhr thought that the allied policy of unconditional surrender, promulgated by Roosevelt and
Churchill at Casablanca in January, 1943, "stupidly" deprived anti-Nazi Germans of any incentive to
overthrow the Nazi regime. "We are in Peril," Christianity and Crisis 3, no 17 (October 18, 1943): 2.
Kissinger asserts that this policy was due in part to Roosevelt's fear that peace negotiations with
Germany would be divisive. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 405. This policy in fact did not preclude the June,
1944 assassination attempt on Hitler led by Count Stauffenberg and in which Bonhoeffer was
implicated with tragic consequences.
29 "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis 5, no.2 (February 19, 1945): 2. "As a general rule,"
observed Kissinger, "countries striving for stability and equilibrium should do everything within their
power to achieve their basic peace terms while still at war. As long as the enemy is in the field, his
strength indirectly enhances that of the more peaceful side." Diplomacy, 405.
30 "From Victory to Peace," Christianity and Society 9, no. 1 (Winter 1943): 36.
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Recognizing "The Limits Set by Man's Recalcitrance"
"We can have nothing that we need," Niebuhr wrote in early 1945, "if the core of the
31
world community is not established in the mutual trust of the great powers." Yet
the trust between the West and Stalin's Soviet Union essential to Niebuhr's vision
became a more distant possibility even as victory approached. He had never been
naive regarding the possibilities of agreement between the two colossal powers
emerging from the war. In addition to the flaws he discerned in communism itself, he
was a formidable critic of Stalinist paranoia and well aware of Russia's historic quest
to expand or buffer its European borders. He knew, too, that the communist parties
32
operating within the western democracies were tools of the Soviet state.
Yet his prophetic voice was raised more often against the economic injustice of
America's libertarian capitalism at home and abroad, its propensity for self-
righteousness, and its history of isolationist irresponsibility. While urging vigorous
prosecution of the war he constantly reminded his fellow Americans of their shared
responsibility for the injustices at the core of international conflict. In meeting its
responsibilities within the world community America would have to resist its
enduring temptation to isolationist escapism, on the one hand, and on the other the
"impulse to dominate the world" prompted by its great power.
To be sure our power is not great enough to give us security, even as
our isolation is not complete enough to guarantee it. But our
temptation lies in the fact that we have just enough power to make the
policy of seeking security by an unmutual [s/c] expression of power
seem plausible.3
For Niebuhr the attitudes of humility are essential to overcoming these conflicting
temptations. Christian humility requires that America meet the responsibilities
31 "Russia and the Peace," Social Progress 35, no. 5 (January 1945): 23.
32 "Russia and the West, Part II," Nation 156, no. 4 (January 23, 1943): 125.
" "American Power and World Responsibility," Christianity and Crisis 3, no. 5 (April 5, 1943),
reprinted in Love and Justice, 203.
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commensurate with its power and wealth; there could be no retreat into egotistical
and irresponsible isolationism. But humility also requires an acknowledgment of the
limits to power and the ability to control events. When both responsibility and limits
are acknowledged the nation more clearly discerns its own interests and, through
patience and toleration, the interests of other nations.
Greater humility about their lack of experience on the world stage would also allow
Americans to see what Niebuhr believed was Great Britain's essential role in
building trust among the Allies. The British were uniquely positioned to play this
role because of their long experience on the world stage and an economic system
Niebuhr saw as midway between libertarian capitalism and socialism. The realism
and moral understanding the British brought to the table would have a salutary effect
on both the "adolescent" great powers.34 Moreover, Niebuhr hinted, Great Britain's
historical attachment to realism in international affairs created a certain kinship with
Russian Realpolitik; indeed, the British might see Russian power as a necessary
counterweight to American power; even the imperial power center Niebuhr
envisioned within the new world order required some internal balance of opposing
forces.35
We have touched upon several of the reasons the wartime agreements that Niebuhr
had insisted upon as essential to the new world order failed to materialize. At heart
was the failure of the great powers to reach agreement on the political and economic
organization of the post-war world, and on arrangements necessary to enforce that
agreement. "Order will have to be maintained for some time to come by the
organization of preponderant power," he wrote in 1943. "There is no other way of
overcoming the anarchy of rival national sovereignties."36 While certain wartime
agreements regarding the post-war world were reached there was no agreement
34 "Great Britain's Post-War Role," Nation 157, no. 2 (July 10, 1943): 39.
5 "Russia and the West, Part II," Nation 156, no. 4 (January 16, 1943): 125. It is clear that Niebuhr
underestimated the degree to which the war had left Britain too physically and fiscally exhausted to
play so dominant a role between the two great powers.
36 "The Possibilities of a Durable Peace," Christianity andSociety 8, no. 3 (Summer 1943): 9-12,
reprinted in Love and Justice, 196.
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regarding the core problem of overcoming what Niebuhr called rival national
sovereignties. Kissinger offers his view of what was and was not accomplished by
these agreements and why.
"Roosevelt's refusal to discuss the shape of the post-war world while
the war was in progress threw America's vast influence behind an
outcome which lacked such crucial elements as a balance of power or
any criteria for political solutions. In all matters to which the
Wilsonian assumptions of an underlying harmony were relevant,
Roosevelt played the major role in shaping the post-war world. Under
his aegis, a series of international conferences elaborated blueprints
for the cooperative components of the post-war world; for what
became the United Nations (at Dumbarton Oaks), for world finance
(at Bretton Woods), for food and agriculture (at Hot Springs) for relief
and rehabilitation (in Washington), and for civil aviation (in Chicago).
But he was adamant in his refusal to discuss war aims, or to risk
disagreement with the Soviets on that subject."
Here irony abounds. Niebuhr had criticised Roosevelt as too narrowly realistic and as
too inclined to assert American power unilaterally without much regard for the
interests of other nations.38 But Roosevelt had used his power to establish the
"cooperative components of the post-war world order" and affirm new US
commitments to the international community, including a commitment to what
would become the United Nations. Indeed, the UN Charter ratified in October, 1945
reflected the major elements Niebuhr had written in his "Plans for World
j7
Kissinger, Diplomacy, 405. The British, at least, realized that Stalin was the chief beneficiary of
this refusal. "We are going into a decisive conference," Anthony Eden complained to Harry Hopkins
at Malta, "and had so far neither agreed what we would discuss nor how to handle matters with a Bear
who would certainly know his own mind." The Reckoning: The Memoirs ofAnthony Eden (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 592. Roosevelt may have been counting on his ability to charm Stalin into
satisfactory agreements after the war but Schlesinger insists that the President had an alternative plan
for "a great army, a network of overseas bases, plans for peacetime universal military training and the
Anglo-American monopoly of the atomic bomb," should things go wrong in US/Soviet relations.
"Roosevelt and U.S. Foreign Policy,"an unpublished speech before the Society ofHistorians of
American Foreign Relations, Vassar College, June 18, 1992, 18.
38 "From Wilson to Roosevelt," Christianity and Crisis 8, no. 4 (Fall 1943): 3.
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Organization."39 It created a General Assembly in which all member nations could
participate and a Security Council, comprised of five permanent members, along the
lines of Niebuhr's center of power in which power and responsibility were to be
commensurate. Ten non-permanent members appointed by the General Assembly
could participate and vote in Security Council matters but any permanent member
had an absolute veto over certain matters considered binding upon UN members.
These latter matters, under Chapter Seven of the Charter, include the power to
impose sanctions or take armed action against "threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, or acts of aggression."
Thus the UN became a component of the post-war order along the organizational
lines Niebuhr had outlined. But there had been no essential agreement among the
victorious powers regarding the political and geographic nature of the new world
order. It seems likely that, even with the kind of agreements Niebuhr had envisioned,
the UK, the US and the Soviet Union each would have demanded some kind of veto
power in the Security Council. Given the preponderance of western powers on the
Security Council the Russians would not have acceded to the UN charter without the
veto. And despite a newly developed sense of international responsibility, as
reflected in Roosevelt's commitments to a UN, etc., it is highly improbable that the
US would have been willing to sign the charter without a Council veto power. The
point underscored here is that the UN that emerged from the wartime experience may
have reflected the organizational form Niebuhr had envisioned for it, but it lacked the
imperial power center he believed necessary for a more just post-war order.
In his essay "Plans for World Reorganization" Niebuhr had struggled to find the
coalescence of political realism and creative idealism he believed necessary for a
39
Exactly how much Niebuhr's ideas influenced the formation of the United Nations is beyond the
scope of this paper. But given the internationalist inclination of his intellectual circle it is scarcely
surprising that his organizational ideals are consistent with those that eventually found their way into
the UN Charter. It will be remembered that Niebuhr's acquaintances included John Foster Dulles
whose brother Allen was a central figure in WWII intelligence circles; Allen nominated Niebuhr to
membership on the Council on Foreign Relations in 1948. We know, too, ofNiebuhr's close
relationship with Arthur Schiesinger, Jr., a "New Dealer" who dedicated the first volume of his work
The Age ofRoosevelt to Niebuhr. Schiesinger noted that Niebuhr was drawn earlier to Roosevelt's
foreign policy than he was to New Deal economic principles. See "Niebuhr's Role," in Kegley and
Bretall, 146.
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lasting peace and a more just international order. He hoped that wartime exigencies
would create a sense of community among the Allied powers upon which the post¬
war world order would be based. This community of trust among the great powers
was the prefatory condition of the organization Niebuhr had envisioned. Without it
there could be no real agreement on any effectively cooperative use of power
necessary to maintain a more just world order against recalcitrant forces. Essentially,
what Niebuhr's vision required was that each of the great powers relinquish
sufficient national sovereignty and short-term self-interest to create a truly
international power center; indeed, that the great powers would perceive that their
own long term interests would be served by doing so. That this "realistic" ideal did
not prove possible for a variety of reasons, some of which Niebuhr had foreseen and
some not, was for him a great disappointment. Once again the egotistic flaw in
human nature had been magnified by collective pride and an historic opportunity for
enlarging the community of mankind was tragically lost. Yet, he insisted, Christians
must "in all humility, deal with the realities of human nature, as well as the ideal
possibilities." Their humble responsibility is "to establish a tolerable community
within the limits set by man's recalcitrance."40
Although the global organization he had envisioned eluded the ideologically
bifurcated world of 1945, Niebuhr nevertheless believed that the UN served
important purposes within the international community. It could, in fact, provide a
forum in which all nations could be heard and the world's troubles discussed. It could
bring international resources to bear upon the health, educational and development
needs of poor nations. And as the Cold War divided the victorious allies, the UN
could serve as a political bridge between two increasingly implacable camps.
Although the UN lacked the power to maintain world order, "some frictions between
the powers will be mitigated here which might otherwise produce intolerable
tensions."41 These functions, Niebuhr believed, are in themselves important and
encourage the patience and foster the tolerance upon which world community might
be built42 Yet he insisted that the UN could best serve its important purposes if its
40 "World Community and World Government," Christianity and Crisis 6, no. 3 (March 4, 1946): 5.
41 "The United Nations," Christianity and Society 12, no.l (Winter 1946): 3
42 In September, 1949 Niebuhr served as a member of the US delegation to the Fourth Conference of
UNESCO in Paris. While he believed that UNESCO was attempting too much and made unrealistic
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limitations were acknowledged. It was essential that UN deficiencies not occasion
escape into idealistic schemes for world government while reality demands
responsibility for a suffering and starving world. Those who would have better
solutions to world problems than the UN offered must work to create the conditions
upon which such solutions rest, i.e., building trust and community among the great
powers. That the UN lacked the kind of power center Niebuhr had envisioned
heightened US responsibilities within the international community. He called upon
America to meet those responsibilities with creativity and imagination, a task
requiring patience, toleration and a continuous acknowledgement that,
The peace of the international community is not secured by the logic
of constitutional authority, even as no logic of law can maintain the
peace of a national community, if more potent factors make for
conflict. If we understand this we may give ourselves to our daily
responsibilities with the greater devotion. 4
Reflected here is Niebuhr's fear that frustration with the UN might occasion yet
another case of American "schizophrenia." If America's daily responsibilities for
international community are more burdensome than the modest results sometimes
appear to justify, America's idealists may be tempted to "dream up pure answers for
difficult problems." One such scheme was to abolish the veto in the UN Security
Council, ignoring the reality that neither the US nor the Soviet Union would agree to
such a measure. American cynics frustrated by the veto, on the other hand, "may
make our name odious by the irresponsible exercise of our power." The
schizophrenia Niebuhr feared could best be avoided by creative and practical
measures to relate US wealth and power, i.e., its national interests, to the needs and
wider interests of the international community. If we fail in this responsibility, he
wrote, "we shall have proved that we know how to resent, but not to allay, the
world's fear of our power."44 American support for and use of the UN presented
claims regarding its immediate and direct relevance to world peace, he wrote that its program in
general could be of "tremendous significance" in integrating the world community. "The Theory and
Practice ofUNESCO," World Organization 4, no. 1 (February 1950): 3.
4> "World Community and World Government," 6.
44 "The Myth ofWorld Government," Nation 162, no. 11 (March 16, 1946): 314. At this time the US
was debating loans to the impoverished British government and considering ways to somehow
"internationalise" its then-monopoly on atomic secrets. The former was achieved, the latter not.
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significant opportunities, in Niebuhr's view, to relate US interests to the international
community and to allay its concerns for America's great power.
UN and the Cold War: Old Realities and New Responsibilities
Though Niebuhr's incidental writing over the decade 1942-1952 reflected the daily
events of this most tumultuous era of the 20th century, certain essays are prophetic
milestones in this body of his work. In analysing Niebuhr's thinking on the postwar
world his 1942 "Plans for World Reorganization" is one such milestone. There, as
we have seen, Niebuhr prescribed the political considerations and resources of faith
necessary to meeting what he perceived to be "the most compelling command of our
day." Yet in the event the trust and political agreement among the great powers
essential to his vision of the UN did not materialize. Neither wartime experience nor
the fear of another even more destructive conflict had built community between the
two great powers; indeed, their deep ideological differences, distrust and insecurity
divided the world into two hostile camps. The victorious powers had cobbled a UN
but it was not the world organization he envisioned when the US entered the war in
1942.
Niebuhr's prescription for a more just and peaceful international community had
been refused. The pathology he had diagnosed was prideful and self-interested
irresponsibility among the nations; his prescriptive cure was humility and its
attitudes, given practical effect in the willingness of nations to relinquish some
degree of national sovereignty in the interests of building international community.
That this remedy was refused to a significant degree by all his patients did not alter
his view that it remained the right and most hopeful prescription for building a more
just world community. Yet for Niebuhr the attitudes of humility are always resources
of faith that sustain hope and discern new possibilities amid missed opportunity,
tragedy and disappointment.
Written a decade after "Plans," and in the early years of a quite different kind ofwar,
Niebuhr's "Moral Implications of Loyalty to the United Nations" is another of his
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prophetic milestones. 45 Here Niebuhr provides something of a bookend for his
views on the UN and American responsibility to the world community. If it treats
with substantially the same problems raised in 1942, its perspective is very much
grounded in the international realities of 1952. It provides a sober, almost steely
assessment of these realities so tragically different than those he had envisioned a
decade earlier. In this essay there is little of the wistfulness that seemed to lurk just
beneath the surface of "Plans," wherein so many incalculable ifs had to accumulate.
Here, rather, is a renewed call for American responsibility in light of the new
realities. There is here an air of disappointment but not despair, of irony but not
cynicism, of hope but not escapism.
America's commitment to the UN had been something of a dramatic conversion from
the illusion that isolationism preserved its national innocence and from an "ignoble
irresponsibility" within the world community. The fervour of this conversion,
Niebuhr believed, lent a distinctly spiritual dimension to America's moral
commitment to the UN. Indeed, this resolute commitment met the first of William
James' two basic tenets for any great moral undertaking; the second being what
Niebuhr described as "a whole series of specific acts of loyalty to give historical
body to the commitment."46 Yet the spiritual nature of the commitment tended to
distort realities regarding the UN and the international community. Some idealists
were inclined to pretend that the UN was in fact the kind of global system that
Niebuhr had envisioned in 1942. Others, though rightly recognizing that it was not,
thought it possible to give the UN a more constitutional order by removing the great
power veto in the Security Council. These latter idealists erred in not recognizing
that the UN as structured was the best that could have been achieved at the time. In
this light it could be said that the UN had exceeded realistic expectations.
It was a system of cooperation among the nations designed not for
ideal possibilities but for the actualities of the present situation.
Therefore, it could not only help us to take a resolute first step [James'
first requirement for any great moral undertaking] in the direction of
45 "Moral Implications of Loyalty to the United Nations," Motive 16, no. 1 (October, 1955): 17-20.




world order, but it could also be the vehicle for all those acts of
fidelity in an ongoing relation, which give body to the initial
resolution [James' second requirement].47
As in the marital relationship, Niebuhr offered, America's initial resolute
commitment to the UN must be sustained by "daily acts of fidelity and forbearance."
Niebuhr believed these acts assumed greater significance in light of the abstract
nature of America's idealism and the fact that the UN had become a central device
through which it was seeking to organize the non-communist world.
American commitment to the UN had to take realistic account of the schism between
the communist and non-communist powers following the ratification of the UN
charter in 1945. If wartime exigencies had failed to achieve community between two
ideological worldviews, Niebuhr cautioned against overly investing in hopes that
UNESCO cultural exchanges or grand summits would resolve those differences. The
two sides may use the same words but they express different ideas; communist
ideology, he thought, was so dogmatic that it had no way of truly engaging with
other systems of thought. "It is dogmatic without qualification. It may ultimately
yield to the pressure of world history but it is not likely to be beguiled by any
4o
international conference." But just here America's resolute commitment to the UN
served to preserve it by helping adapt its organization to the tragic realities of the
bifurcated world. Through the Security Council the UN provided at least a minimal
bridge between the two great power centers while the General Assembly served to
integrate the nations of the free world.
These, it must be said, are modest achievements in world community compared to
those he might have expected had the organization he envisioned in 1942 reached
fruition. But events foreseen and unforeseen required him to affirm his own
understanding regarding sinful human nature and the unpredictability of human
freedom. The creative freedom to build world community that he had urged upon the





mutual suspicion. Speaking perhaps as much to himself as to his readers, Niebuhr
obliquely appeals here to the humility that enables us to see new possibilities and
new realities amid the wreckage of our hopes; humility that helps us accept the
possible rather than selfishly insisting on our own ideal; humility that frees us from
the prideful all or nothing mentality that denigrates those daily, patient, and perhaps
humble acts of fidelity required to sustain our spiritual commitment to any moral
striving.
These attitudes of humility underscored the significance of the UN to America's
responsibility for avoiding war while opposing the spread of communism. The US
commitment to the UN demonstrates that, while difficult, the duties to avoid war and
prevent communist expansion were not incompatible. For Niebuhr, the UN provided
a bridge between the two camps and offered an international forum before which
they could make their respective cases. It provided an opportunity for America to
allay suspicions and refute misrepresentations regarding its commitment to avoid
war. Indeed, it offered the opportunity to patiently perform those daily acts of fidelity
that affirm commitment to building international community. As the Cold War set
in, Niebuhr saw that programs such as UNESCO built community within the free
world and strengthened it against communist encroachment in non-military ways.
Conversely, if the veto power restricted the Security Council's actions against overt
aggression, the US appeal to the UN following North Korea's invasion of South
Korea demonstrated America's commitment to at least the non-communist camp of
the international community.49 Appeal to the UN was, in Niebuhr's view, an
important way of showing US patience and lack of hysteria in fulfilling its
responsibilities for avoiding war while opposing communist expansion.50 A fruit of
humility, patience served to illumine the practical necessities in meeting those
responsibilities.
49
At the time of the North Korean invasion the Soviet representatives were boycotting the Security
Council, while the European nations dominating the General Assembly were anxious to support US
resolve against Soviet encroachment on the Continent. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 249.
50 "Moral Implications of Loyalty to the United Nations," 19.
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If Niebuhr insisted that US power was essential to preserving what was then called
the free world, he clearly believed that it was in America's interest to work through
the UN to relate US power and wealth to an impoverished world. He feared that the
disparity of wealth inevitably would create hostility between the US and the rest of
the free world. He fretted that many Americans had little idea of the reach of their
nation's power and wealth, particularly its economic power. "Power and weakness,"
he observed, "do not march easily in the same harness. It tempts the holders of power
to pride and it tempts the weak to envy and resentment."51 In the course of fulfilling
its international responsibilities the US inevitably would make the mistakes and
misjudgements attendant upon all human endeavours. But because its power
"impinges everywhere in the world, far beyond our conscious striving" its mistakes
and misjudgements would be writ large internationally.
In many parts of the world, moreover, the US had inherited resentments created by
centuries of Western exploitation and domination. In this respect the US should
accept the UN as a constructive though not absolute check upon the use of its power
and as a mechanism to align its national interests more justly with those of the
broader world community. For Niebuhr, the attitudes of humility should enable
Americans to discern between just and unjust resentment of US power, and to bear
envy with patience and forbearance. Commitment to the UN gives practical
expression of these and others of the attitudes of humility essential to the responsible
use ofAmerican power.
From such loyalty will spring policies, which we must refrain from
calling generous because they will be in our own long-term interest;
but they will be wise in the sense that they will help to cement the
unity of the free world.32
For Niebuhr, US loyalty to the UN was integral to meeting its international
responsibilities. The failure of wartime exigencies to create the international




made seemingly impossible so long as the world community was divided into two
opposed ideological camps. But the UN could provide a bridge between the two
camps and, just as important, underscore US commitment to building community at
least within the non-communist world. Such a community, Niebuhr wrote, "must
gradually grow through acts of mutual loyalty" and the UN provided a great
o
international stage upon which such acts could be performed. In this regard
commitment to the UN and, perhaps as importantly, policies in such areas as tariffs,
trade, immigration and economic development assistance form "a whole series of
specific acts of loyalty to give historical body" to US responsibility within the
international community.
Conclusion
Niebuhr nevertheless insisted that the imperfections and weaknesses apparent in the
UN had always to be recognized. Even these, he thought, held lessons in humility for
those willing to learn them. Most importantly America, so quickly thrust into world
leadership, had much to learn in it new role. Its ascendance to world leadership,
compared to that of past global powers, occurred in what he described as "quick and
easy strides." The US was unused to the "frustrations of history" through which past
hegemonic powers had matured. In its infancy and youth America was inclined to
solve its problems by increasing its strength. Unprepared by its own experience,
America as leader of the free world faced elements "beyond the control of any single
agency or power." America, Niebuhr insisted, had to learn that its relationship with
the world is not a matter resolved simply by power and that, conversely, not
everything that goes wrong is its fault. Each of these attitudes is a manifestation of an
egotism that obscures self-understanding and delimits new possibilities for
community. The attitudes of humility teach that there are circumstances that we
cannot control.
We can deflect, harness and beguile the historical forces of our age
but we cannot ignore, defy or annul them. Perhaps no lesson is more
53 Ibid., 20.
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important for a nation as powerful as we, than the truth that even
powerful nations cannot master their own destiny: for they are in a
web of history in which many desires, hopes, wills and ambitions,
other than their own, are operative.54
Thus the attitudes of patience, forbearance, and acknowledgement of the limits of
power illumine the important place of the UN in US international responsibility. For
Niebuhr, the attitudes of humility had always to illumine the reality from which
responsibility was to be discerned.
Yet it cannot be said that Niebuhr identified US international responsibility with
loyalty to the UN. He was wary lest idealists invest the UN with an authority and
power it did not possess, thereby jeopardising world order and tempting America to
escape the responsibilities of its power. The reality of the post-war international
community was that power was not concentrated in the single, preponderant center
he had envisioned as essential to a more just world order. The United Nations that
emerged from the war could not provide such a power center. Rather, the post-war
world was characterized by concentrations of power within two ideologically hostile
camps, each with its own vision of how the world ought to be organized. The UN
could serve as a bridge between these camps but it could not resolve their ideological
and political differences. It could serve to build community among the nations of the
free world but it could not provide the power essential to deflecting communist
encroachment and aggression; for this, the US and not the UN would have to bear
primary responsibility.53 In 1952 Niebuhr believed the US must be committed to a
cooperative world community but that its commitment had to be less concerned with
loyalty to the UN "in the abstract" and more concerned with dealing realistically
with the concrete issues of the day. But, he cautioned, "In some of these issues a
powerful nation will be inclined to disregard the wishes of weaker allies. In some of








For Niebuhr it is precisely here, where weakness tempts power, that the attitudes of
humility illumine and circumscribe US responsibilities for justice within the




Humility and International Economic Responsibility:
The Marshall Plan
A little more justice now would obviate the necessity ofcharity later}
Reinhold Niebuhr
Introduction
This case study does not attempt an exhaustive history of the Marshall Plan. Rather,
it offers an analysis of developments within Niebuhr's experience and public
theology that convinced him such a program was essential to US post-war
responsibilities. This task follows the contextual approach integral to his Christian
realism that always discerned Christian responsibility through the attitudes of
Christian humility. He insisted that America's post-WWI errors offered essential
lessons for meeting its post-WWII responsibilities. These lessons included the long-
term consequences of ignoring the economic despair and physical suffering that
always follows in the wake of armed conflict. For Niebuhr the vindictive pride
evident in the Treaty of Versailles had obscured such lessons to political realists who
too narrowly defined their long-term national interests. Niebuhr wanted Americans to
understand that military success alone could not produce the more just international
community necessary for US security.
Although the US emerged from the war the world's dominant economic and military
power Niebuhr believed that the responsible use of economic power was the key to
meeting the nation's post-war international responsibilities. While he supported a
policy of US firmness he viewed military force alone as a negative and ultimately
unavailing program against Soviet intentions in Western Europe. What was required.
1 "The Fight for Germany," Life 21, no. 17 (October 21, 1946): 67.
he told his Christianity and Crisis readers, was a "positive economic and political"
program to mobilize American wealth to address the economic vacuum that made
Western Europe politically vulnerable to Soviet encroachment. Niebuhr believed
that some convergence of humility and self-interest would be required for the kind of
positive defence he thought essential. On a political level, it would require
Americans to recognize their self-interest in such a program. On a spiritual level, it
would require sufficient humility to recognize their privileged place in, and
responsibility for, an impoverished world. Following true self-interest informed by
the attitudes of humility America could assume its economic responsibilities within
the world community. For Americans such a program would be integral to what
George Kennan described as "the responsibilities of moral and political leadership
that history plainly intended them to bear."
Post-WWI Lessons in Economic Irresponsibility
The youthful Niebuhr grew bitterly contrite over his support for war in 1918 because
of injustices subsequently inflicted upon Germany by the victorious democracies at
Versailles. A 1923 visit to the Ruhr had convinced him further of the economic
injustice of the Treaty of Paris in which, he later wrote, "one nation was asked to
enslave itself to the Western world for several generations."4 Under the terms of the
treaty Germany was required to indemnify British and French civilians for all
wartime damages and to pay pensions to war victims and compensation to their
families. These were open-ended debts that future generations of Germans were
obligated to pay. At the same time Germany was assessed an immediate payment in
cash or in kind of $5 billion and its foreign assets of about $7 billion were seized. As
compensation for its naval losses to German submarine warfare, Britain received a
significant share of the German merchant fleet. Germany's major waterways were
internationalised and its powers to raise tariffs curtailed. Finally, German patents
2 "Positive Defense," Christianity and Crisis 6, no. 7 (April 29, 1946): 2.
J
George F. Kennan ("X"), Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July, 1947): 578.
4 "Perils of American Power," 91. At Versailles France originally demanded the dismemberment of
Germany, specifically the separation of the Rhineland, the nation's industrial heart. The economic
penalties imposed were, in part, compensation for being denied this demand.
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were seized, an action that continues to have economic consequences: "Thanks to the
Versailles Treaty," Kissinger notes, "Bayer Aspirin is an American, not a German
product."5 To the German people, whose pre-war industrial production and exports
had led both Britain and France, these draconian provisions of the treaty were
politically motivated:
They inflamed German nationalistic passions: Germans felt that their
country had not only been crippled and humiliated but had been made
the victim of economic enslavement and spoliation.6
Niebuhr rebuked himself and other moral idealists like Wilson who supported the
war while failing to prevent the vindictiveness that drove the "peace" of Versailles.
"Of course," he wrote, "we really couldn't know everything we know now. But now
we know. The times ofman's ignorance God may wink at, but now he calls us all to
repent."7 That there was much cause for repentance among the western democracies
would become increasingly clear. The economic and political frailty of Weimar
Germany was a proximate cause of the rise of Nazism and another war that would
destroy much of Europe. As the scholar of Nazi history Detlev Peukert observed,
"The German crisis had become the German catastrophe; its ultimate result was to be
o
the devastation ofEurope."
When Germany failed to meet its reparation payments in 1922 French forces
occupied the Ruhr. On the heels of this occupation and Germany's impending
financial collapse, American banker Charles G. Dawes headed the Reparations
Commission whose brief was to design a workable repayment plan and to provide
Germany with American credit essential to meeting the rescheduled payments. The
5
Kissinger, Diplomacy, 240.
6 Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, trans. Richard Deveson, (London: Penguin Books,
1993), 267.
7
Leaves From the Notebook ofa Tamed Cynic, 42.
8 Peukert believes that though the economic crisis destabilized the Republic it was not alone sufficient
to destroy it. (267) He writes that the political and psychological effects of reparations were more
onerous than their economic effects. (197) The Republic failed because of the world depression of
1929 and because it had lost support ofmoderate political parties while under constant pressure from
anti-republican and authoritarian elites who lent their support to Hitler in the electoral crises of 1932.
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Dawes plan was accepted by the German government in 1924 and was renewed in
1929 with some alterations by the so-called Young plan. The immediate effect of the
Dawes plan was to remove the French pretext for occupying the Ruhr and to lift a
significant burden from the German economy. "The Dawes Plan," Peukert wrote,
"was a victory for financial realism."9
But in 1931 Niebuhr had a decidedly different perspective regarding this
demonstration of American international financial responsibility. In the Dawes and
Young plans he espied the pride and presumption that he associated with American
capitalism. "Their supposition was that a politics-ridden Europe was unable to find a
solution for this vexing problem until unbiased American businessmen essayed the
task."10 Flere Niebuhr appears to ignore the fact that Britain saw the need to assist
Germany and that the Dawes Commission had been proposed by the German
government and accepted by the French. Fresh from his battles with Henry Ford and
embarking upon a decade of radical socialism, Niebuhr may have interpreted the
facts to suit his own ideological prejudices and to sooth his own guilty conscience
regarding his support for the war.
Niebuhr's polemics do not diminish the clarity with which he saw the ominous
political reality being masked by efforts to lessen the burden of German war debts.
The reparations were themselves unjust in Niebuhr's view; that the 1929 Young Plan
extended reparation payments well into the 1980s would poison generations of
Germans with that injustice. Here Niebuhr reflected upon what he considered the
peculiar tendency of American businessmen to disregard "the human factor" in
international affairs. A greater awareness of this factor might have illumined the
more critical problem underlying the payment of reparations, i.e., that the reparations
were themselves unjust, "ft was the obsession of Americans with business codes," he
wrote in 1931, "which prevented a real solution of the reparations problem."11
Moreover, he saw that behind the issue of reparations was the issue of war debts
9 Peukert, Weimar Republic, 195.
10 "Perils of American Power," 91.
11 Ibid.
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owed by France to US lenders; that the unjust reparations were a vehicle for the
repayment of French war debts. By 1931 both the political and economic
consequences were evident. The extension of reparations payments had proven
particularly odious to the political right in Germany and prompted such slogans as
"Three generations of forced labour!" On the economic front,
A vicious circle developed, as American credits were followed by
German reparations payments, which led to French credit repayments,
primarily to the Americans, which in turn were followed by new
American credits. In late 1929 this whole overblown system
collapsed, and the countries involved were sucked into the world¬
wide recession.12
Niebuhr saw America's inability or unwillingness to discern the organic relationship
between its political and economic responsibilities as a political failure in meeting its
international responsibilities. "But the real difficulty lay not with our leaders," he
wrote, "but with the rank and file of American citizens, who insisted on a simple
formula for a complex situation."13 It was essential that the average citizen, upon
whom international policies ultimately rests, understand the effects of their nation's
great power and wealth upon the rest of the world. Americans, he believed, tended to
measure their nation's power in military and political terms; they did not seem to
understand its power in terms of wealth. They would need to disenthrall themselves
from their libertarian ideal of laissez-faire economics if they were to understand the
global impact of American wealth. In short, they would have to learn what Niebuhr
thought in 1939 was a clear lesson of the Great Depression: that economic
democracy is essential to maintaining political democracy.14
Responsibility and Impatient Humility
Though for Niebuhr patience was one of the attitudes of humility that usually
12
Peukert, Weimar Republic, 196.
13 "Perils of American Power," 91-92.
14 "Ten Years That Shook My World," 545.
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characterized responsible action it had always to be applied in a particular context.
Complacency and delay in the face of imminent disaster and human suffering must
not be masked by pious appeals to patience. In this regard Niebuhr in his prophetic
mode was seldom patient.
The chaos and injustice of Versailles led to Niebuhr's insistence that the Allies of
WWII reach wartime agreements regarding the post-war world prior to any peace
conference. There were highly touted meetings between Allied leaders but there was
never a true meeting of their minds of the kind that Niebuhr believed essential to
provide a stable and reasonably just peace.15 Even when Roosevelt and Stalin used
similar words in the agreements that were reached— e.g., "free elections"—each had a
distinctly different understanding of what those words meant. In the end, the political
geography of Europe was decided far more by occupying armies than by any
political agreement among the victorious powers.
Niebuhr personally witnessed German misery after WWI that he believed
engendered the hatred and Nazi madness leading to WWII. Avoidance of similar
mistakes after victory over Nazi Germany was crucial to ending the circle of hatred
that fed European conflict. Given the desperation and incalculable suffering of the
struggle this would be a daunting undertaking that would require the discernments of
faith and the attitudes of humility. Contemplating the Allied victory over Germany in
May, 1945 Niebuhr wrote:
It is well that we should be shocked into sobriety by the magnitude of
historical events and should be prompted by humility and piety by a
contemplation of the tasks which still confront us. All of them are
really beyond our best wisdom.16
15 "The Basis ofWorld Order," Nation 159, no. 17 (October21, 1944): 489. The need for such an
agreement was a mantra ofNiebuhr's during the war. This article, written after the Dumbarton Oakes
conference in 1944, reflects his growing pessimism regarding an overall agreement despite the
progress toward a UN-style organization.
16 "Soberness in Victory," Christianity and Crisis 5, no. 9 (May 28, 1945): 1. In recounting the cost of
the war, however, Niebuhr also reminded his readers what had been at stake in the conflict. "As the
victorious armies liberated one concentration camp after another and unearthed the hideous cruelties
which were practiced in them, they gave us some hint of what the dimensions of total slavery are like,
lfom which we escaped by a total war."
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In May 1945, amidst national elation over victory in Europe, Niebuhr called for
American "Soberness in Victory." As he had counselled humility in the responsible
conduct of the war he now counselled it in the responsible conduct of the peace.
While confirming the necessity of waging the war, he noted the Carthaginian nature
of Germany's defeat and the responsibility that it cast upon the victorious powers.
Certainly humble self-criticism would illumine the errors of vengeful self-
righteousness. It would help America to perceive its self-interest in ameliorating the
cycle of hatred that perpetuates international conflict. He reminded his Christianity
and Crisis readers that humility teaches that the victors' pride easily becomes the
chief impediment to the foes' repentance.17 Here again we discern the organic
relationship Niebuhr posits between the attitudes of humility and identifying the
responsibilities concomitant with true self-interest.
An immediate and inescapable responsibility in this regard was to prevent starvation
in war ravaged Europe. Shortly after the German surrender Niebuhr observed that,
"Whether this wealthy nation will have the grace to reduce its dietary standards for
the sake of feeding a starving Europe will be one of the great moral and political
issues of the coming months."18 The necessity of meeting this immediate
responsibility was a matter to which Niebuhr often turned, and often critically.
Initially welcoming the US Army's commitment to provide a daily ration of 1500
calories in its occupation zone, he subsequently discovered that this represented a
starvation diet on which no one could sustain physical labour. He noted the resultant
low birth weight and high death rate of German children.19 He asked Americans to
consider their average daily diet of 3300 calories and to compare it with the self-
sacrifices of the British people who continued on food rationing while helping feed





19 "I Was An Hungered and Ye Gave Me No Meat," Christianity and Crisis 5, no. 23 (January 7,
1946): 5
20 Niebuhr consistently saw the British government and people as more compassionate about
starvation in Europe than their American counterparts. He noted that the British, still under stringent
wartime rationing, were sending private food parcels to Germany. "Editorial Notes," Christianity and
Crisis 7, no. 1 (February 3, 1947): 2.
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German children over the 1945 Christmas season were quashed by the commanding
general, Niebuhr ironically found his outrage best expressed by the militantly
isolationist Chicago Tribune:
There is no lack of hate in the world today and no lack of men so
stupid as to believe that peace can be born of hate. That we knew, but
we were not prepared to hear that the blood feud was to be pursued in
all its vindictiveness against little children by order of an American
General. We did not expect that Christmas in the American Zone of
occupation was to be devoted to teaching American boys that
everything they learned in their homes and churches was a lie and to
teaching German children that everything the Nazis told them about
Americans was gospel truth. 1
As he had after WWI, Niebuhr travelled to Germany in the fall of 1946 and reported
back to his readers.22 Surveying the wreckage of war and the chaotic nature of the
occupation Niebuhr wrote that, "the contrast of power and weakness is as fruitful of
arrogance as the contrast of poverty and wealth is of self-indulgence." Noting that
some occupation officials believed the American public favoured a hard peace for
Germany, perhaps he shared with them the Tribune editorial. We don't know that he
did but he wrote confidently that were the American people aware of the suffering of
the German people "they would arise to the challenge."
Niebuhr's impatience with American relief efforts appears at times to ignore the
complexity of the immediate post war situation in Europe. His May 28, 1945 call for
soberness was certainly an appeal for the attitudes of humility to illumine the victors'
21 "I Was An Hungered," 6. "We do not often quote the Chicago Tribune to praise its sentiments!
Even that low type ofjournal finds the prospects of this policy in Germany so bad that its editorial
about General McNarney [Eisenhower's successor] is entitled: 'Another Beast in Germany.' "
Otherwise, Niebuhr appeared to despise the Tribune.
21 Professor John Baillie, who had invited Niebuhr to deliver the 1939-40 Gifford Lectures at the
University of Edinburgh, visited Germany the summer of 1946. Although Baillie's initial observations
regarding the food situation there are not as stark as Niebuhr's, his diary of the visit confirms
Niebuhr's fears that the victorious powers were making the same mistakes as after WWI. "Report on
Germany: Excerpts from a Personal Diary—June-July 1946," Christianity and Crisis 6, no. 16
(September 30, 1946): 3-7.
23 Untitled notes on the relief situation in Germany, Christianity and Crisis 6, no. 17 (October 14,
1946): 1.
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policies. But reality was that Japan remained unconquered and estimates on the time
and casualties required to do so were themselves sobering. While Niebuhr was
impatient with American efforts to feed and house hungry Germans the Army was
attempting to organize an occupational government in fractious coordination with its
wartime allies.24 Moreover, many of the troops who had participated in the liberation
of Europe were preparing to ship out to Asia for a final push against Japan. If it is
true that the nascent Truman Administration had been "reluctant to recognize our full
responsibilities" it is also true that those full responsibilities may have required more
25than even American power and wealth could deliver at that time. In Niebuhr's
understanding of the relationship between Christian humility and responsibility there
is no place for complacency. So much is true. But there will always be competing
demands and moral requirements in any given situation. Seldom are there resources
sufficient to meet every demand. Those entrusted with responsibilities in such
situations may not always reach the decisions we think right; but it does not
necessarily follow that they are either callous or stupid, as Niebuhr at times implies.
A Prophetic Prologue
Niebuhr's approach to responsible action emerges from the dialectic of prophetic
faith and experience. And, as always in his work, the attitudes of humility illumine
the proper course of action while pride, in its many guises, imperils true
responsibility. Christian humility does not eliminate distinctions between greater and
lesser evils in history: it did not require Americans to deny the relative justice of their
cause against the Nazis. What humility does require is a God's eye view of all human
conflict and a profoundly prophetic understanding of the God in "whose sight no
man living is justified." Here, Niebuhr believed, is the great lesson for America in
24 "The Conflict Between Nations and Nations and Between Nations and God," Christianity and
Crisis 6, no. 14 (August 5, 1946): 2-4.
25 "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis 6, no.3 (March 4, 1946): 2.
26 Ibid. In early 1946 Niebuhr noted that President Truman's decision to conserve American wheat to
boost efforts to feed Europe was "long overdue" and was concerned that mail service had not been
restored in Germany. In January, 1946 Niebuhr had complained that the lack ofmail service from
outside Germany was preventing the receipt of urgently needed food parcels from abroad. "I was An
Hungered and Ye Gave Me No Meat," 6.
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Hebrew prophetic tradition: nations who serve as instruments of God's justice are not
exempt from God's judgement. "Jesus," Niebuhr wrote, "was later to justify the
seeming perversity of the severer judgment upon the righteous with the words, 'To
27
whom much hath been given, of him much shall be required.' " Pride blinds power
to this Biblical truth and to the injustice that inevitably results from the disparity
between abject weakness and great power.
In his caustic August, 1946 essay "The Conflict Between Nations and Nations and
Between Nations and God," Niebuhr surveyed the wreckage of Europe and feared
that American power and ideological pride would issue in irresponsibility. The work
of statesmen in meeting America's seemingly overwhelming responsibilities, he
believed, would have to be characterized by the attitudes of humility. Here the
witness of the Christian church was essential in reminding the nation that "the
primary engine of injustice in victory is still the pride of victors who have no idea of
28the fact that the judgment of God is upon them as well as upon their foes." Here,
too, the Christian witness ofhumility perceives the practical nature of responsibilities
drawn from this truth. For Niebuhr this required America to recognize that the kind
of democracy and economic organization possible in an impoverished world might
be quite different from the type of democracy "that only a wealthy nation can
afford."
Niebuhr's impatience with US efforts to feed and house the German people sprung
from both his great compassion and his understanding of human nature. He had
observed first-hand the suffering following WWI and knew that the war just ended
had inflicted far heavier destruction on the German people. An essential lesson to be
learned from the earlier war was that in human suffering the seeds of new conflict are
nurtured. For Niebuhr the care and feeding of ravaged Germany would be an early
test of US post-war responsibility. Indeed, it would be a test of Allied propaganda
regarding the provision of food and security for post-war Germany. This task was in
fact prefatory to what Niebuhr saw as an enlarged and continuing American
2' "The Conflict Between Nations in Love and Justice, 161-162.
28 Ibid., 163.
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responsibility for world stability. Such a responsibility had been implied by the
August, 1941 Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August, 1941,
even before the US had officially entered the war. Niebuhr was disillusioned by
what he saw as a failure to meet these promised or implied obligations. "Our leaders
wrote in the Atlantic Charter assurances which pledged us to actions which a
horrified Europe now sees are not forthcoming."29 Thus while Niebuhr was impatient
with US efforts to care for the surviving victims of the war, his broader concern
anticipates the massive US commitment required to salvage future generations of
Germans and thereby the future of Western Europe. The political and economic
turmoil of post-war Europe, meanwhile, was exacerbated by growing tensions
between a frustrated West and an increasingly intransigent Soviet Union.
Yet amid this uncertainty Niebuhr found hope in the renewal of Germany's spiritual
life. While recognizing the historic failures of both Protestant and Catholic traditions
in the rise of Nazism, Niebuhr saw contrition and repentance in the churches'
assumption of responsibility for the victims of the war. He saw hope in the increased
cooperation between Protestants and Catholics on the political scene, particularly in
their awareness of the dangers of religiously sanctified political parties. Believing
socialism to be the best form of economic organization in recovering Europe,
Niebuhr saw this as a particularly promising development. In this resurgent spiritual
life Niebuhr thought he saw the truth and power of the gospel in action. In the one
remaining intact church of ruined Stuttgart Niebuhr was stunned by the powerful
preaching of the young Helmut Thielicke:
The gospel was given the most precise and helpful relevance to the
daily life a harassed and sorely tried people. If the world would give
Germany half a chance (which it may not either out of stupidity or
malice) much grace will flow to all of us from this new life.30
29 "I Was An Hungered ," 5. The Atlantic Charter enlarged upon Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" of
speech, worship, hunger and fear. The joint statement of the two leaders, notes Kissinger, "reflected not
a statement of traditional war aims but the design of a totally new world bearing America's
imprimatur." Kissinger, Diplomacy, 390-391.
30
"Report on Germany," Christianity andCrisis 6, no. 17 (October 14, 1946): 6. Though he had
commended Karl Barth's warning against religiously sanctified political parties, Niebuhr could not
resist a swipe at Barth whom he suspected as being naive regarding communist intentions. "In a now
famous address in Stuttgart, he [Barth] declared: 'The Christian faith can be maintained even in a well
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In the humility of the powerless Niebuhr encountered the contrition and repentance
in which hope illumined by faith created new possibilities for community. He saw
these fragile possibilities being thwarted by the pride and complacency of US power.
Of all the great powers engaged in WWII, only America escaped devastation in its
homeland. It emerged from the war with the greatest industrial and economic
capacity the world had yet seen. Though its sacrifice in human life and suffering was
great, its civilian and military casualties did not approach the appalling percentages
of Europe. Niebuhr's prophetic voice refused to let the powerful forget Christ's
judgment that "to whom much is given, of him much shall be required."
Discerning a Positive Defense
Niebuhr's incidental work nearly always addressed the contemporary situation.
Certainly his insistence upon post-war American economic responsibility reflected the
political and economic framework of prostrate post-war Europe. The often fractious
relationship between the western democracies and the Soviet Union had essentially
disintegrated. Europe was being divided into two camps, with the struggling western
democracies under the umbrella of America power facing Soviet encroachment from
without and communist agitation from within. Though he counselled firm resistance to
Soviet power, Niebuhr believed that the dismal economic situation presented the
greatest threat to the European democracies. In April, 1946, as much of Europe sank
further into chaos, Niebuhr wrote in Christianity and Crisis of what he called a
"Positive Defense."31 While proposing no detailed plan Niebuhr called for a "positive
and affirmative program for possessing the field." The greatest threat to Western
Europe was the vacuum created by its ruined economies and it was into this vacuum
that Russian power would inevitably flow. What was required was a new and positive
political strategy that recognized this reality. "Unless we support our political policy
with an adequate economic policy," Niebuhr wrote a few moths later, "Soviet
regulated band of robbers.' To which one of the leaders of the struggle against Nazism replied: 'Such a
judgment is more easily made by one who has little direct experience of the robber band from which we
have been liberated.' " "Report on Germany," 7.
31 "Positive Defense," Christianity and Crisis 6, no. 7 (April 29, 1946): 1
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ideology will cross our strategic barrier."32 On the part of the victorious powers such
a political policy would require sufficient humility to acknowledge their self-interest in
an economically viable Germany.
It is not possible to spell out every detail of a positive economic and
political policy for western Europe. But only such a policy can prevent
the spread of communism upon the continent. It would not obviate the
necessity of standing firmly against Russia on certain issues. But such
firmness would not consist merely in threatening the weight of our
military power. We would not try by our might to keep Russia out of a
chaos and a vacuum. Rather we would make western Europe healthy
enough to resist the totalitarian alternative to its ills.33
Niebuhr continued this line in his essay "The Fight For Germany" appearing in the
October 21, 1946 edition of America's popular Life magazine.34 He outlined the
bleak situation in Germany and its relationship to the struggle against Soviet power
in Europe. He supported the Truman administration's policy of firmness with the
Soviets and its commitment to continued responsibility in European affairs and
rejected the view of some American liberals that such a policy was provocative.
"Russian truculence," he wrote, "cannot be mitigated by further concessions." His
recent travels convinced him that the Russians were "seeking to extend their system
over the whole of Europe." There must be no illusions about those ambitions nor
amnesia regarding the policies of appeasement that had failed to stop Nazi
aggression. It was right to contain Russian power to prevent its reaching the point
that it believed it could dominate Europe. Should that point be reached, Niebuhr
32 "Will Germany Go Communist?" Nation 163, no. 14 (October 15, 1946): 372.
33 "Positive Defense," 1.
34 "The Fight For Germany," Life 21, no. 17 (October 21, 1946): 65-72.
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Ibid., 65. In September, 1946 American Secretary of State James Byrnes had assured anxious
Europeans that US troops would remain in Germany to deter further Soviet encroachment. Niebuhr
was present for Byrnes' Stuttgart speech and wrote that it was supported by "everyone except the
Communists." Days later at a New York City rally the radical liberal Henry Wallace, Truman's
Secretary ofCommerce who had served as vice president in Roosevelt's third term, minimised the
Soviet threat in Europe and criticised the Byrnes speech as provocative. See Brown, Niebuhr and His
Age, 127-8. Truman fired Wallace. In his 1948 presidential campaign Wallace was supported by the
US Communist party, ofwhich Niebuhr was a leading liberal critic. He believed that Wallace's
Communist support was aimed at electing a conservative Republican thereby providing grist for the
Soviet propaganda mills in Europe. "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis 7, no. 24 (January 19,
1948): 2.
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averred, the West's survival instinct would make war inevitable, as had happened
• 36
with Nazi Germany. "The way to avoid war is not to allow this expansion."
Although Niebuhr supported Truman's firmness he nevertheless was critical of
American policies in Europe. His criticism went beyond the oft-voiced bitterness at
what he saw as inadequate US relief efforts.37 "In addition to political firmness we
need an economic strategy." This was particularly true in Germany where the Soviets
had insisted upon four occupation zones while thwarting efforts to unify the German
economy. Indeed, German economic disunity and its resultant misery were precisely
suited to the Soviet strategy for subduing Germany ideologically. While Soviet terror
tactics had discredited Communism in much of Germany and Europe, the West's
failure to acknowledge the critical role of economic assistance, in Niebuhr's view,
was an increasing source of disillusionment among anti-Communist and pro-
o o
democratic forces across the continent.
Because German socialist parties were in the forefront of anti-Communist
opposition, Niebuhr was particularly incensed by American hostility to what was
viewed as "undemocratic" socialist planning. "Amidst the shambles of the German
cities," Niebuhr fumed, "such notions of 'free enterprise' are as irrelevant as
• . TQ * • •
Communism is noxious." In his view America's economic libertarianism was a
prideful impediment to political groups, especially the German socialists, who knew
that Soviet strategy played upon economic misery. This was true of the desperate
situation across Europe, Niebuhr observed. "There is no possibility of saving
freedom in Europe except by the support of political forces that stand to the left of
36 "The Fight For Germany," 67.
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American liberal thought."40
American firmness, if expressed in military presence alone, was insufficient to save
Europe. The American people had to understand that a clear policy of economic
reconstruction was required if Europe was to resist further Communist
encroachment. German and European industry needed to be rebuilt even as
humanitarian efforts were increased. "A little more justice now," Niebuhr wrote in
the autumn of 1946," would obviate the necessity of charity later."41 A humble
understanding of the limits of American political and military power would illumine
the practical requirements of the justice that the new situation required. Humility
would help Americans accept the limited relevance of their economic and democratic
ideologies to a prostrate Europe. Even as America affirmed its "outer defences" the
attitudes of humility would help "make our political and economic life more worthy
of our faith and therefore more impregnable."42
It would be error, of course, to think that Niebuhr alone perceived American self-
interest being served by economic aid to Europe. Even as he was laying before his
readers the desperate situation in Europe, US officials were digesting George F.
Kennan's "Long Telegram" of February of 1946. This document was the basis of his
equally famous essay, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in the July, 1947
issue of Foreign Affairs 43 Kennan did not here provide an economic analysis of the
needs of Europe nor detail US responsibility for meeting those needs. But in calling
for a US policy of containment he underscored the economic fragility of the Soviet
Union, a fragility masked by the "primitive political vitality" of Communist
ideology. Soviet Communism, Kennan wrote, could export "its enthusiasms...[but
was] unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material
power and prosperity." Countering and moderating Soviet behaviour would be a
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observed. The security of the American people would depend upon "their pulling
themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political
leadership that history plainly intended them to bear." 44
The Limits of a Military Solution
Meanwhile events on the edge of Europe were forcing the issue of US financial
responsibility. In the winter of 1946-47 Great Britain's economic straits rendered
impossible its continued military support for the beleaguered governments of Turkey
and Greece. In early 1947 President Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall,
and his deputy Dean Acheson met with Congressional leaders to make the case for
US assistance to the two nations. Both Marshall and Acheson outlined the nations'
relevance to US national interests but, according to Kissinger, it was the usually
urbane Acheson's apocalyptic rhetoric that carried the day.45 "We are met at
Armageddon," he began:
Like Apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of
Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry
infection to spread through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe
through Italy and France...The Soviet Union was playing one of the
greatest gambles in history at minimal cost...We and we alone were in
a position to break up this play.46
The immediate result of this seminal meeting was the so-called Truman Doctrine,
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1 believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free people to
work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help
should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is
essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.47
In addition to these sweeping statements of principle, Truman asked Congress for
$400 million in military aid for Greece and Turkey. Despite criticism that the plan was
imperialistic, was ambiguous,48 that it bypassed the UN and that its cost represented 1
percent of the $40 billion Federal budget, it easily passed both houses of Congress
some months later. Among the groups supporting the plan was the recently formed
Americans for Democratic Action, a liberal anti-communist organization of which
Niebuhr was a founding member and moving force. Like Truman, Niebuhr urged a
political "middle ground" between conservative and radical anti-interventionists and
supported "the development of a healthy democratic program, embracing both foreign
and domestic policy and both economic and political problems."49 Nevertheless, while
Truman confirmed an ongoing US international commitment to the kind of patient
firmness that Niebuhr supported, the immediate purpose of the plan was to provide
military assistance to Greece and Turkey. The urgent economic requirements of
Western Europe upon which its long-term recovery depended, as Niebuhr and others
knew, could not be met by military assistance alone.
If the Truman plan was a right decision, in Niebuhr's view, it was but a "token" of
the commitment required for European recovery. His June 9, 1947 essay, "American
Power and European Health," doubtless written before Marshall's June 5 speech at
Harvard University, supported Acheson's earlier call for a $5 billion annual
47
Harry S Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, Years ofTrial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y: 1956), 129-130;
cited in Patterson, 128.
48
Kissinger concurs with those critics who made the point at the time: "It was an ambiguity that
refused to go away, generating debates about American purposes in nearly every crisis that have not
ended to this day. Ever since, American foreign policy has been obliged to navigate between those
who assail it for being amoral and those who criticise it for going beyond the national interest through
crusading moralism." Diplomacy, 453.
49
Niebuhr, "The Organization of the Liberal Movement," Christianity and Society 12, no. 2 (Spring
1947): 10.
211
peacetime lend-lease program and interest free loans for Europe. Such a national
commitment would not be a matter of pure generosity.
Nations as nations are incapable of such generosity. We could rise to
such a policy only if we were wise enough to understand that
generous, interest-free loans would not merely save the economy of
western Europe but would also insure our own economic health.50
Recognizing that such a program would be a matter of responsibility and self-
interest was important as a practical matter. For Niebuhr it was essential that this
be clearly understood. Otherwise what would begin as responsible action—the
action discerned through the attitudes of humility—could become a vehicle of
self-congratulatory pride falsely affirming the national virtue. As a practical
matter, in Niebuhr's view, such pride would impede European recovery by
insisting that economic aid be tied to America's particular notions of free
enterprise and libertarian democracy. "If we insist upon them Europe may be
wrecked even though we meet all other tests."51
A Nation "Conscious of Our Responsibilities": The Marshall Plan
Even as Niebuhr's June 9, 1947 essay was reaching its Christianity and Crisis
readers, Secretary of State General George C. Marshall used the occasion of
Harvard University's June 5 commencement to announce the plan that would
bear his name. Given the proposal's sweeping international context Marshall was
an inspired choice to announce it. Famously non-political and the highest-
50
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ranking American general ofWWII, his prestige far exceeded Truman's. Indeed,
for Truman, Marshall was "the greatest living American, and for Churchill, "the
greatest Roman of them all." Though not an historian, Marshall had fought in
WWI and had been a thoughtful observer of US policy failures following that
conflict. In October, 1945 he warned against America returning to a "state of
disinterested weakness" and failing to meet its international economic and
political responsibilities. As both soldier and diplomat he was determined that
these mistakes should not be repeated. Public opinion, however, seemed inclined
toward a new isolationism. In the Fall of 1946, the Republican party, calling for
tax cuts, economic nationalism, and downsized government, had captured
majorities in both Houses of Congress. In February, 1947, as the situation in
Europe continued to deteriorate, Marshall appeared at Princeton University and
reminded the American people of their responsibilities as citizens of a world
53
power. Meanwhile, Marshall's staff was preparing a new initiative for the
massive aid that those responsibilities would entail.
In his brief June 5 speech at Harvard Marshall did not present a master plan for the
massive US aid he said would be required if Europe were to be restored to economic
and political health. One wonders whether Acheson's "We are met at Armageddon"
approach might have best served the occasion, but hyperbole was not Marshall's
style. He first outlined the need in his typically dispassionate manner.
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe the
physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines,
and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious
during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less
serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy.
For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal
....Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete...Long¬
standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance
companies and shipping companies disappeared, through the loss of
capital, absorption through nationalization or by simple
destruction...The breakdown of the business structure of Europe was
52
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complete...the rehabilitation of Europe quite evidently will require a
much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.54
Meanwhile, he reminded Americans, what few resources remaining to the
governments of Europe were required to feed and clothe desperate and displaced
populations. While Marshall couched his appeal in humanitarian language, he
wanted Americans to understand that far more than humanitarian assistance was
necessary to salvage Europe.
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next 3 or
4 years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from
America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she
must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social and
political deterioration of a very grave character...The remedy lies in
breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the
European people in the economic future of their own countries and of
Europe as a whole.55
If Marshall believed that Americans were peculiarly drawn to altruistic appeals he
also knew, like Niebuhr and other realists, that any sustained recovery program
required an essential element of US national self-interest. As Niebuhr had observed
in his June 9 essay, no program capable of salvaging the European economy could be
"a matter of pure generosity." Nations, he wrote, are not capable of such generosity.
Only if Americans have the wisdom to see that an economically healthy Europe
insures their own economic health, "could we rise to such a policy."56 It was only
after cataloguing Europe's economic ills and couching his appeal in humanitarian
terms that Marshall made this essential point to his Harvard University audience.
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the
possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the
people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United
States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States
should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal
54 Ibid., 7.
55 Ibid.
56 "American Power and European Health," 1.
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economic health in the world, without which there can be no political
stability and no assured peace.57
Ironically, for all of Niebuhr's railing against the moral blindness of US
businessmen, the intellectual father of the Marshall Plan was the wealthy
commodities trader, William Clayton. Clayton, serving as Undersecretary of State for
Economic Affairs, saw Europe not as an admixture of national interests but as a huge
market. It was Clayton who saw that Europe's economies could be restarted only if
its industries were rebuilt. This, Clayton argued, would require US dollars to
purchase American retooling exports and technical assistance to modernize both
industry and agriculture. It was Clayton, moreover, who insisted that the program
ro
should be administered by Europeans."
Though Clayton appears to be precisely the type of business figure he often
demonised, Niebuhr recognized the significant political strength that Clayton's
approach lent to the entire enterprise, "ft is highly significant," Niebuhr wrote in the
Fall of 1947, "that motives of self-interest thus come to the support of a policy which
generosity alone might well prompt." In the heat of the Congressional fight for the
plan's enabling legislation, Niebuhr observed that, "it is because motives of national
self-interest converge upon motives of generosity, that we have a right to hope that
the Marshall Plan will be accepted, no matter how the isolationists may rage."5
In concluding his brief address Marshall underscored that the purpose of his proposal
was to "provide a cure rather than a mere palliative" for Europe's economic crisis.
The program would be open to all the nations of Europe, including the Soviet Union
and the Eastern European nations that were increasingly under its political control.
57 "Marshall Plan," 7-8.
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At the same time Marshall warned that nations, political parties, and other groups
that seek to undermine economic recovery "will encounter the opposition of the
United States."60 He called for those governments that wished to participate in the
plan to outline their needs and agree upon an organization to administer whatever
program Congress might eventually approve.
Reflecting the desperate situation reaction to Marshall's speech in Europe was
favourable and immediate. Most European nations, including the Soviet Union,
appeared at a June 17 conference in Paris to prepare the outline of need and
administrative organization that Marshall requested. The Soviet delegation, however,
was quickly recalled by Moscow and left the conference inveighing against
American economic imperialism. Neither the Soviet Union nor its satellite nations
would participate in the Marshall Plan. Clearly Stalin would not have seen a
resurgent Western Europe as furthering Soviet interests. Perhaps, too, he was not
prepared to share the revealing financial and economic data that would be required to
participate in the program. Indeed, some who are sceptical regarding the intent of the
Marshall Plan believe this requirement was written to discourage Soviet
participation. But as a practical matter, the Soviet withdrawal from the Paris
conference and its increasing truculence in Europe was a political plus: in the eyes of
the American people and their Congress, the plan was more attractive without Soviet
participation.61
For Niebuhr the Soviet walkout at the Paris conference had significance beyond
participation in the Marshall plan. What was increasingly apparent had become real.
The Soviet decision not to participate in the plan, in his view, signalled the "final
division" of Europe into opposing ideological and political camps. Even so, if the
plan would be unable to rebuild all of Europe it nevertheless did what the Truman
60 Marshall here refers to both the Soviet Union and to the apparent reactivation of the Comintern that
had been dismantled during the war as a concession to the Allies. The new organization of worldwide
communist parties, called the Cominform, was announced in September, 1947. Kissinger,
Diplomacy., 443.
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plan could not do: it offered Western Europe new hope for economic recovery,
"without which military resistance (as envisioned by the Truman plan) is in vain."
Moreover, the departure of the Soviets enabled Britain and France to design the
cooperative European program requested by Marshall. Although Niebuhr saw that
the "final division" meant a divided Germany for the foreseeable future, the Marshall
plan offered the opportunity to rebuild the economy of the western sector of
• 62 • •
Germany, a step Niebuhr thought essential to a stable Europe. Thus, as with his
hopes for the UN, Niebuhr's hopes for the Marshall plan had to adjust to the realities
of a politically bifurcated Europe.
After the Soviet walk-out at Paris the western European nations lead by Britain and
France moved with celerity to submit the proposal requested by Marshall. Their
initial proposal of a four-year, $29 billion program reached Washington in late
August 1947. This figure was not politically feasible and was eventually reduced to
$17.8 billion over four years. Although there was political opposition in the
Republican-controlled Congress, some conservative Republicans supported the plan
and some liberal Democrats, following Henry Wallace, opposed it on various
grounds, including the fact that it bypassed the United Nations. In retrospect,
however, the national debate fell short of Niebuhr's glum prediction that it would
"undoubtedly plumb some sodden depths of American stupidity."63 Moreover,
events favoured passage. Members of Congress who visited Europe confirmed its
dire conditions. Most Americans were optimistic about their own future and thought
the nation could afford to help. And, like Truman, the American people had come to
distrust the man they had called Uncle Joe Stalin during the war. As Congress was
considering the plan's enabling legislation, rigged elections in 1947 installed a pro-
Soviet government in Hungary and in early 1948 there was a communist coup in
62 "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis 7, no. 13 (July 21, 1947): 2. Niebuhr recognized that
while the Marshall plan aimed at rebuilding the economies ofWestern Europe, it would also
encourage East-West trade and thereby provide another of his "bridges" between the two camps. "The
Federation ofWestern Europe," Christianity and Crisis 8, no. 3 (March 1, 1948): 17.
63 "American Wealth and the World's Poverty," Christianity and Society 12, no. 4 (Autumn 1947): 3.
At times it is difficult to distinguish between Niebuhr's prophetic anger and his partisan political
leanings. But in this case those occupying the "sodden depths" included the Republican controlled
Congress which he saw as isolationist and anti-New Deal, as well as Wallace and his left-wing
Democrat following who opposed what they mocked as the "Martial Plan." See Patterson, Grand
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Czechoslovakia. This coalescence of events spurred Congressional action. The
enabling legislation authorizing $14 billion for four years was passed in March 1948.
In April Congress appropriated £6.8 billion for the first fifteen months of the
Marshall Plan, with $5.3 being spent in the first year.64
Though Niebuhr had expended considerable energy in urging the kind of massive
European aid program embodied in the Marshall Plan, its passage and subsequent
implementation are not prominent in his incidental work. Initially this appears odd
in light of his commitment to a program he considered essential and that, even before
its passage, he had called a "turning point in postwar history."65 Certainly he would
later acknowledge that the economic assistance provided by the plan was critical to
Western Europe.66 But beyond that the Marshall plan, for Niebuhr, signalled
America's acceptance of its significant international responsibilities. "There is,"
• i •• .... • z 7
Niebuhr wrote, "a genuine impulse of responsibility in our gesture of aid." By
such guarded praise he wanted to discourage the idea that the plan was simply an
extraordinary act of national generosity and to preclude any self-congratulatory
arrogance for doing only what the responsibilities of American power and wealth
required. In this regard it was essential to recognize that the Marshall Plan served
America's long-term self-interests. Moreover, as passage of the plan became more
likely Niebuhr renewed his prophetic criticism of what he considered an idolatrous
attachment to the "American way of life," i.e., for Niebuhr, the identification of
democracy and freedom with libertarian economic policies and the idolatrous belief
that America's wealth is a proof of its virtue.
Conclusion
If the Marshall Plan signalled American acceptance of responsibility, Niebuhr would
64
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iterate that true responsibility always entailed the attitudes of humility. He wanted his
nation to comprehend the great disparity between its wealth and the poverty of the
world; to understand that while America emerged from the war a far wealthier
nation, its Allies had been impoverished by it. Americans needed to perceive the
desperate situation through the lens of humility.
Europe as a whole, though grateful for the provisions of the European
recovery program, cannot view our generosity with quite the same
enthusiasm as we are inclined to regard it. Its provisions are still in
the category of crumbs which fall from Dives' table.68
If Americans had expected of their allies an "equality of sacrifice" during the war it
was now clear that some had sacrificed far more. In this regard, even generous
wartime lend-lease arrangements and Marshall Plan assistance left America "far
short of the goal of equality of sacrifice." Humbly accepting this reality should
prompt generosity in meeting American responsibilities for helping rebuild Europe.
Humility, in illumining what equality of sacrifice requires, should as well reduce our
expectation of gratitude from the nations assisted. These nations, Niebuhr reminded
Americans, are poor not because they don't work hard or because they don't
understand competitive capitalism. They are poor, rather, "partly because they
sacrificed more in a common struggle than we; and partly because they have not
been favored by nature as much as we."69
Although Niebuhr saw the Marshall Plan as America's most creative venture in
international affairs, his praise was sparing.70 For him the attitudes of humility would
help Americans put the Marshall plan into perspective. If they could accept
Churchill's assessment that it was the most unsordid act in history humility would
remind them of their self-interest in performing that unsordid act. If the Marshall
Plan did great good, as it clearly did, humility cautioned against exaggerating its
impact while diminishing the remarkable role the recipients themselves played in
68 "The Morality ofNations," Christianity andSociety 13, no. 2 (Spring 1948): 8.
69 Ibid.
70 "Ten Fateful Years," Christianity and Crisis 11, no. 1 (February 5, 1951): 2.
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their own recovery. Niebuhr would likely agree with the late 20th Century American
historian who wrote that compared to the "selfish reaction of the United States to the
plight of Europe after World War I, the Marshall Plan represented a remarkably
enlightened effort."71 But that seems as far as Niebuhr's understanding of true
responsibility would allow him to go in praise of the Marshall Plan. "If we waste
very much time in self-congratulation," Niebuhr observed in the Fall of 1950, " we
••••• 79
will not be prepared for the continuing responsibilities which we must bear."
Niebuhr recognized the meretricious appeal to Americans of once-and-for-all
solutions to incalculably complicated problems. In his caution against self-
congratulatory satisfaction regarding the Marshall Plan Niebuhr addresses a basic
concern regarding America's ongoing responsibilities within the international
community. His wartime insistence on post-war planning and agreements reflected
his rejection of the popular idea that military victory marked, as it largely had in
WWI, the limits of American responsibility. He strongly encouraged commitment to
the UN because it could illumine American responsibilities in building world
community. At the same time he rejected the notion that commitment to the UN was
absolute and marked the limits of American responsibility for a more just world.
Likewise, while Niebuhr welcomed the economic commitment the Marshall Plan
represented he knew that undue pride in its achievements would obscure America's
ongoing responsibilities. He knew enough of human nature to know the temptations
of self-righteousness and pride, particularly when we believe we are doing "good."
71
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Chapter Eight
Humility and International Responsibility:
Democratic Self-Criticism
The best chance of our own powerful nation meeting the great
responsibilities ofwhich history has given us too briefa preparation,
lies in abjuring every temptation to regard our power and our
favoured position among the nations as proofofour superior virtue;
and in listening patiently to the mounting criticism of our life (even
though envy may partly prompt it) in the hope that it may make us




In an early work Niebuhr wrote that "the truly religious man does know himself as
no one else does." Grounded in the acceptance of our finite and sinful condition
before an infinite and perfect God, self-knowledge is the first fruit of Christian
humility. Gained in the profound experience of God, humble self-knowledge
comprehends the great impediment that pride, in its various guises, poses to the
relationship with God that properly orders all human relationships. Only through the
self-knowledge of humility do we apprehend and accept the finitude of the creaturely
existence we share with all human beings. Through humble self-knowledge we
apprehend the chimerical nature of the security we seek through false self-esteem
and pride, and contritely perceive the danger egotism poses to our relationship with
God and with others. Thus Niebuhr could write that humble self-knowledge is the
"wisdom by which we deal with our fellow men, either as comrades or
competitors."3
1 "America's Precarious Eminence," The Virginia Quarterly Review 23, no. 4 (Autumn 1947): 490.
2 The Contribution ofReligion to Social Work (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 90.
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Niebuhr believed that its power, wealth and sense of national particularity made the
US especially prone to the pride that impedes responsibility. A contrite and humble
recognition of our limitations, our nation's natural blessings and our self-interest
issues in the democratic self-criticism essential to national responsibility. The
attitudes of humility open us to the criticism and claims of others who must look to
us for justice. Just here the humble spirit of democratic self-criticism militates
against confusing American power with moral authority and right action.
This case study is more broadly contextual than the previous three. It entails an
examination of democratic self-criticism as it emerges from Niebuhr's understanding
of Christian humility reflected in his incidental work. To discern the importance
Niebuhr assigns to American self-criticism it is necessary to describe, briefly,
America's historic self-image. Within this context Niebuhr's prophetic role comes
into sharper focus and illumines the true nature of Christian patriotism. The study
then examines the relationship between democratic self-criticism, Christian love and
the requirements of social justice. Finally, the study examines the role of self-
criticism in discerning the moral authority upon which responsible power must rest.
A Prophetic Vocation and the New Jerusalem
Niebuhr unquestionably loved America yet was one of its harshest, if insightful,
critics. This critical stance formed the core of a prophetic vocation that he
consciously patterned after the implacable Hebrew prophet, Amos. In Amos Niebuhr
found "a conception of a universal history, over which the God of Israel presided as
sovereign but of which the history of Israel was not the centre and end."4 Amos'
transcendent God had universal designs in which He might use or reject Israel,
according to His own purposes. The prophets of an infinite God who stood both
within and above history were thereby set against any nationalistic or exclusive
appropriation of their God for finite human purposes. Amos' God is the Lord of all
4
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peoples; His purposes will be accomplished with or without the instrumentality of
Israel or any other nation or people. In the caustic anti-nationalistic oracles of Amos,
Niebuhr observed, "history is seen not from the perspective of a nation but as a
universal whole."5 Niebuhr's prophetic vocation attempts a God's eye view of
America's place in this universal history.
He was called to this vocation within a nation shaped by a sense of its own
particularity, "called out by God to create a new humanity."6 The young nation,
blessed by immense natural resources, was formed just as technological innovation
facilitated their development. Although it could not escape entirely the social
upheavals of Europe, America's geography insulated it from the political turmoil of
the Continent while it developed its self-understanding as a uniquely libertarian
democratic society. Following Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of
Independence, Americans developed a sense of Tightness and innocency regarding
their national destiny. And, like Jefferson, many Americans came to believe that they
had shed the prejudices and vices of the Old World to offer mankind a new
beginning. When a late 18th Century American divine preached of the United States
as "God's American Israel" he voiced the sentiments of many of his countrymen.7
The Jeffersonian poet Freneau gave popular expression to America's sense of
national particularity.
Here independent power shall hold sway
And public virtue warm the patriot's breast.
No traces shall remain of tyranny
And laws and patterns for the world beside
Be here enacted first.
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Shall grace our happy earth.
In The Irony of American History Niebuhr identified a "deep layer of Messianic
consciousness" among Americans regarding the "allegedly universal values which
we hold in trust for mankind." 9 This Messianic self-consciousness as the "darling of
divine providence" also sanctified the secular Jeffersonian ideal of American
political innocency. This sense of innocency became a filter through which
Americans viewed their national power. America's purposes would be achieved
principally through example and the mysterious workings of divine providence. This
did not preclude, of course, a role for human action in furthering the national destiny.
Yet most Americans saw themselves not as masters of the world but as "tutors of
mankind in its pilgrimage to perfection."10 Here Niebuhr found that America's sense
of particularity produced not a lust for power but rather a sense of naive innocency
among ordinary citizens regarding their nation's use of power. This innocency
coupled with the moral pride that tempts all notions of particularity, Niebuhr warned,
are ironical hazards to achieving America's "new Jerusalem."
Our moral perils are not those of conscious malice or the explicit lust
for power. They are the perils which can be understood only if we
realize the ironic tendency of virtues to turn to vices when too
complacently relied upon; and of power to become vexatious if the
wisdom which directs it is trusted too confidently. The ironic elements
in American history can be overcome, in short, only if American
idealism comes to terms with the limits of all human striving, the
fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all
historic configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in
all human virtue.11
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of course, shared this popular and sentimental view of national destiny and innocency. John Adams,
an intellectual and moral force among America's founding fathers, and the nation's second president,
reminded Jefferson of the underlying reality of human nature and the corruption of power. "Power
always thinks it has a great soul and vast views beyond the comprehension of the weak; and that it is






Niebuhr calls for the degree of national self-examination possible only through the
lens of humility. This requires that a rich and powerful nation possessed of a
profound sense of its particularly not be the ultimate judge of its own case; that it
measure its merit as the "tutor of mankind" not against the failures of other systems
but against the failures of its own. For Niebuhr the attitudes of humility enable a self-
criticism essential to true self-understanding. Because it opens us to the critical views
of others humility enables us see ourselves as others see us. But most fundamentally,
the attitudes of humility acknowledge the ultimate judgment of God upon all human
endeavours and pretensions. If Americans believe that God has called their nation to
special responsibility humility requires that they seek a God's eye perspective of
their virtues and achievements. Americans, Niebuhr insisted, must remember that the
same divine will from which they discern their nation's particularity also judges their
historical stewardship of the gifts bestowed. From the perspective of prophetic faith a
nation that fashions itself as the New Jerusalem must always remember the lessons of
ancient Israel: that those charged with a divinely ordained mission remain under
divine judgment. This essential lesson could be discerned only through "humility
born of faith"12
Certainly Niebuhr believed that America, as a nation blessed among nations, was
called to responsibility commensurate with its power and wealth. Its particularity, for
Niebuhr, entailed the use of its great resources in the pursuit of more equal social
justice both at home and abroad. His prophetic judgment followed when, in his
view, America's divinely bestowed blessings were used selfishly and unjustly; when
his nation presumed that its power and wealth were "the fruit and proof' of its virtue;
when, like ancient Israel, the nation presumed that divine favour exempted it from
divine judgment.13 Because pride in its various guises was the great hazard to
America's special responsibility he insisted that the attitudes of humility had always
to be concomitants of US power. In the context of liberal democratic tradition
12 Harland, Thought ofReinholdNiebuhr, 136.
13
Irony, 46. "Ifwe are to have prophetic criticism of the statesmen, " Niebuhr had written in An
Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, "may they be prophets who know what kind ofworld we are living
in and learn how to place every type of statesmanship under the divine condemnation." 121.
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Niebuhr believed that a balance of social forces and democratic self-criticism formed
the "structural contrition" mete for collective humility. 14
A contrite recognition of our own sins destroys the illusion of
eminence through virtue and lays the foundation for the apprehension
of "grace" in our national life. We know that we have the position we
have in the world today, partly by reason of factors and forces in the
complex pattern of history which we did not create and from which
we do not deserve to benefit. If we apprehend this religiously, the
sense of destiny ceases to be a vehicle pf pride and becomes the
occasion for a new sense of responsibility.15
This reflects the essence of Niebuhr's prophetic vocation. Behind the often biting
criticism of the pretensions of a nation he loved was his profound belief that without
the grace of humility there could be no responsible use of power; that, indeed, his
nation could lay no claim upon a Christian's patriotism. If in his incidental work he
occasionally offered words of encouragement and solace, he more often spoke in the
mode of the implacable Amos. Speaking with prophetic authority he could challenge,
shame, condemn and offend. Though his personal humility was seldom questioned,
Niebuhr speaks in a prophetic voice that is often angrily audacious. If his
understanding of Christian humility entailed the attitudes of patience and toleration
he could appear unreasonably impatient and his tendency to generalise opposing
views in pejorative language can ring a decidedly intolerant note. Yet at the heart of
his prophetic oracles against what he saw as American pride and irresponsibility is a
calling to help shape a nation worthy of its God-given gifts and mission, a nation
worthy of a Christian's love and devotion.
There could be no question, of course, of where a Christian's ultimate love and
obedience lie. A persistent criticism within Niebuhr's work is the tendency of people
and nations to confuse finite and partial values with God's ultimate and universal
truths. This confusion reaches demonic proportions when religion lends divine
sanction to the state's partial and limited goods. Thus prophetic judgment at times
14
Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr, 124.
15
"Anglo-Saxon Destiny and Responsibility," Christianity and Crisis 3, no. 16 (January 30, 1943): 3.
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must critique religion to deny the state's claim to absolute truth or to the Christian's
ultimate loyalty. But while Niebuhr understands that Christian patriotism can be
problematic he also posits a Christian responsibility to participate in the shaping of a
national life whose finite goods make it worthy of Christian love. Nevertheless, by
its very nature Christian loyalty is shaped first and foremost by the love of God. All
human loves and loyalties, including those owed one's country, must be ordered by
the love of God and through faithful obedience to Him.
For Niebuhr, the aura of innocency derived from America's sense of a divinely
ordained mission always tempts national self-righteousness and pride that he
believed are the very essence of sin. Compounded by national wealth and power, this
sin always issues in national irresponsibility. His prophetic vocation was a
continuous call to account for American stewardship of its natural blessings and the
divinely ordained mission it claimed for itself. This calling to account is critical and
often devoid of the language of love. But its inspiration is always the divine love that
orders all loves including the love of one's country. Like Jeremiah, he condemned as
false the prophets who assured his fellow countrymen, "who walketh after the
imagination of their own heart, No evil shall come upon you."16 Indeed, in Moral
Man and Immoral Society Niebuhr observed that patriotism is a piety born of limited
imagination that "may be expressed by savants as well as saints."17 For Niebuhr, any
understanding of patriotism and of the claims it may make upon the Christian can be
discerned rightly only through the self-critical lens of Christian humility.
The best chance of our own powerful nation meeting the great
responsibilities of which history has given us too brief a preparation,
lies in abjuring every temptation to regard our power and our favoured
position among the nations as proof of our superior virtue; and in
listening patiently to the mounting criticism of our life (even though
envy may partly prompt it) in the hope that it may make us wiser in
the exercise of our power and more prudent in the discharge of our
responsibilities.18
16 Jeremiah 23:17, quoted in "The Validation of the Christian View of Life and History," Theology
Today 6, no.l (April, 1949): 43.
17 Moral Man and Immoral Society, 66.
18 "America's Precarious Eminence," 490.
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Humility and Discerning the Requirements of Justice
Although patience and toleration are fruits of humility essential for any democratic
society, Niebuhr called his fellow citizens to their responsibility to make difficult,
even tragic, choices among conflicting claims.19 Patience and toleration cease to be
fruits of Christian humility if they mask irresolution and complacency; humility does
not license retreat from responsibility by apportioning moral equivalency among
competing claims. Such feigned humility, Niebuhr observed, obscures the essential
••• • •• •• 20 * * n *
issue of justice involved in all political decisions. At what point in collective
behaviour the distinction might become clear cannot be calculated with precision.
But for Niebuhr the requirements ofmore equal justice in any given situation provide
the most important markers in democratic decision-making. That these requirements
are themselves often difficult to discern ironically reflect the attitudes of humility. In
some circumstances justice unquestionably requires compassion, patience and
toleration while in others justice and compassion are served through criticism and
resolute action.
* *21Niebuhr consistently affirmed the law of love as the ultimate law of Christian faith.
But he as consistently criticised what he saw as liberal Christianity's tendency to be
irrelevant to the daily and practical requirements of justice because it presented "the
law of love as a simple solution for every communal problem." He rejected the
sentimental assumption that the law of love that in personal relations issues in
sacrificial self-giving operates similarly in collective relationships. "Nations, classes,
19 "Justice and Love," Christianity and Society 15, no. 4 (Fall 1950), reprinted in Love and Justice, 27.
20 "Christian Faith and Political Controversy," Christianity and Crisis 12, no. 13 (July 21, 1952): 98.
21 "Hazards and Resources," The Virginia Quarterly Review 25, no. 2 (Spring 1949): 200. "All law,
whether historical, positive, scriptural, or rational, is more tentative and less independent in its
authority than orthodox Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, supposes, even as it is more
necessary than liberal Protestantism assumes. The final dyke against relativism is to be found, not in
these alleged fixities, but in the law of love itself. This is the only final law, and every other law is an
expression of the law of love in minimal or in proximate terms or in terms appropriate to given
historical occasions." "Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism," The Journal ofReligious
Thought 9, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 1952): 95-111; reprinted in Christian Realism and Political
Problems, 173.
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and races do not love one another. They may have a high sense of obligation to one
another," but "they must express this sense of obligation in the desire to give each
one his due." In collective relationships the law of love critiques and illumines the
requirements of justice but it does not abrogate the "specific and detailed definitions
of rights and duties" essential for more equal social justice.22 For Niebuhr enforced
rights and duties are essential in collective relationships because sentimentalised
notions of Christian love seldom recognize the persistent power of self-interest.
It is because self-interest is not easily overcome in even the life of the
"redeemed" that most of the harmonies of life are not the perfect
harmonies of fully co-ordinated wills but the tolerable harmonies of
balanced interests and mutually recognized claims.23
Thus America's sense of a divinely gifted particularity ironically obscures the
essentiality of these practical requirements for social justice. In its innocency
regarding the goodness of its own purposes America is too easily beguiled by
sentimental notions of the law of love to critically assess the potential injustice that
individual and collective self-interest entails. The law of love that always demands of
the Christian more than justice requires is subverted when the self-knowledge gained
in humility is impaired by egotism. Philanthropic love demonstrates this point. In
philanthropy, Niebuhr observed, love is expressed toward those who "make no
claims against us, who do not challenge our goodness or disinterestedness." Self-
interested philanthropy accordingly may serve to confirm the power we hold within
the social structures that sustain social injustice. "An act of justice on the other
hand," Niebuhr wrote, "requires the humble recognition that the claim that another
makes against us may be legitimate." 24
The egotism of human nature may so sentimentalise the law of love that it becomes
irrelevant to social justice. Love's requirements are expressed in such transcendent





ideals that it assumes an ethereal quality too easily susceptible to our self-interest.
Here the law of Christian love may be set in opposition to the mundane laws of
social justice that entail both rights and duties. In the sentimental, self-serving
expression of love corrupted by egotism only un-coerced goodness is seen as real
goodness; that which we do in accordance with the coercing laws of justice assumes
the quality of "second-rate" goodness. Such a perfectionist view of Christian love,
Niebuhr insisted, obscures the fact that justice and social harmony require a great
deal of the "second-rate goodness" required of us by law.
We have to have a taxation system that demands more of us than we
are inclined to give voluntarily; and we may maintain a social security
system that holds us responsible for the security of other families than
our own beyond our natural inclination. We cannot preserve the health
of the free world without American aid to other nations that must go
25far beyond the utmost limits of voluntary philanthropy.
In his 1950 essay "Justice and Love" Niebuhr identified two errors in the efforts of
what he called moralistic Christianity to address the problems of justice in the
context of the early Cold War.26 The first error, he wrote, is the perfectionist view
that complete and consistent selflessness is a simple possibility. This error follows
from the finite and partial perspective of human nature. Even the least self-interested
persons assay the common interest from a limited perspective that can never be
entirely free of ambition and self-interest. The self-criticism required of Christian
humility illumines the nature and degree of self-interest in the choices before us. But
the notion that individuals, much less human collectives, are capable of achieving
perfect self-interestedness is a delusion. "If complete selflessness were a simple
possibility," he wrote, "political justice could be quickly transmuted into perfect
love; and all the frictions, tensions, partial co-operations, and overt and covert
conflicts could be eliminated."27 The requirements of love always stand in judgment
of our efforts to achieve justice, but human nature and history militate against the
25 Ibid.




idea that love, particularly in human collectives, may simply substitute itself for the
laws of justice.
Moralistic Christianity's second error, according to Niebuhr, is to set self-interest in
simple opposition to common interest. This error ultimately becomes one of
omission because it leads us to ignore the great majority of society's ethical issues.
Such issues, he observed, "are concerned not so much with the problem of the self
against the whole as with problems of the self in its relation to various types of
'general welfare.'" Is self-interest set against that of family, community or nation?
Which of these collective goods should have the greatest claim upon the Christian's
conscience? If the choice is between family and nation, for example, must the choice
be for the larger community? If the choice is between my nation and another, "must
preference always be for the other nation on the ground that concern for my own
nation represents collective self-interest?" Here moralistic insistence that Christians
always place the collective interest of another community or nation above that of
their own may resolve conflict but not serve the cause of justice. Niebuhr's case in
point was Christian pacifists who argued that it was principally the "selfish concern
for our own civilization" that fomented Cold War tensions between the West and the
Soviet Union. "Thus," he wrote, "disloyalty and irresponsibility toward the
treasures of an historic civilization becomes equated with Christian love."29
Here we encounter something of a paradox in discerning Christian responsibility for
social justice. Christian responsibility entails a critical recognition of self-interest in
judging others' claims for social justice, indeed in all the moral choices before us.
But the critical analysis of self-interest entails as well the consideration of our own
claims for justice. If the disavowal of our own claim to social justice is made a
moral absolute of love, Niebuhr insists, there is no true justice. As Lovin observed,
the moral legitimacy of any political arrangement reflects the recognition that
28 Ibid. The arguments here reflect those Niebuhr had used in his break with Christian and Socialist
pacifists over the course ofthe 1930s and particularly with the onset ofWWII. See Why the Christian
Church is not Pacifist (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1940), reprinted in Christianity
and Power Politics, 1-32.
29 "Ten Fateful Years," Christianity and Crisis 11, no.l (February 5, 1951): 1.
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"everyone has some claims that deserve to be honoured by any community."
Resistance to Nazi and Communist aggression by the Western democracies was an
assertion of such claims and was undoubtedly self-interested. There may be what
Niebuhr calls an "ecstatic" form of agape that makes one capable of selflessness to
the point of martyrdom. But this ideal as an absolute social norm does not define the
... 3i
requirements of the daily struggles for social justice and harmony. But while the
love commandment cannot produce perfect justice among human collectives, as an
"impossible possibility" it stands in ultimate judgment upon all human attempts at
T9
justice. In the daily exigencies of social life love and justice cannot be equated but
they are inextricably related in prophetic faith. "In so far as justice admits the claims
of the self, it is something less than love. Yet it cannot live without love and remain
justice. For without the 'grace' of love, justice always degenerates into something
less than justice."
Thus if justice allows that our own claims be entertained it also requires that the
seductive power of self-interest always be resisted. Christian responsibility for social
justice never escapes this tension because the egotism of human nature stands
opposed to the demands of love: "There is a law in my members which wars against
the law that is in my mind," Niebuhr reminds us from St. Paul.34 It is the grace of
love, rather, that enables us to distinguish between self-interest and the cause ofmore
equal justice. But because of the law in our members that follows human nature,
Niebuhr nevertheless insists, any realistic system of social justice does not assume
the power of love but rather the power of self-interest. It must further assume that,
30
Lovin, Christian Realism, 245.
31 This discussion has its antecedents in "The Ethic of Jesus," a chapter in Niebuhr's An Interpretation
ofChristian Ethics. "The ethic of Jesus does not deal at all with the immediate moral problem of
every human life-the problem of arranging some kind of armistice between various contending
factions and forces. It has nothing to say about the relativities of politics and economics, nor of the
necessary balances of power which exist and must exist in even the most intimate social
relationships." An Interpretation. 23.
,2 An Interpretation, 71.
33 "Justice and Love," 28.
34An Interpretation, 71.
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This power will express itself illegitimately as well as legitimately. It
must therefore be prepared to resist illegitimate self-interest, even
among the best men and the most just nations. A simple Christian
moralism counsels men to be unselfish. A profounder faith must
encourage men to create systems of justice which will save society
and themselves from their own selfishness.35
Because of its sense of particularity and divine mission Niebuhr's America was
inclined to count itself among these most just nations. Its sense of innocency
regarding the use of its power and wealth abroad was heightened by victories over
manifestly evil regimes in WWII and by its subsequent Cold War leadership of the
West against yet another tyrannical power. "What could be simpler," Niebuhr
asked," than to play the role ofmoral hero when the villains, who act as a foil for our
virtue, are so obviously evil?" The nature of the evils against which US power was
arrayed, coupled with America's tendency to view itself as the democratic ideal,
served to instil a sense of virtue regarding the use of its power. These factors
combine to discourage the self-critical attitudes that serve to make American power
more just, an essential element in sustaining its moral authority. America's self-
image as God's favoured nation militates against the attitudes of humility reflected in
the political self-criticism that retards self-righteousness. The frequent result,
Niebuhr observed, is an inflexible self-righteousness that impedes harmonious
relations with other nations.37 "Powerful men and nations are in greater peril from
their own illusions than from their neighbors' hostile designs," he wrote in 1947.
While power may protect the privileges and possessions of nations, "it does not
protect them from their own follies, which are indeed aggravated by the privileges of
38
power.
Genuine self-criticism is a fruit of humility that deflects self-destructive pride and
safeguards others against our self-righteousness. It illumines the point at which self-
interest and the requirements of justice for others converge; it thereby opens us to the
35 "Justice and Love," 28.
36 "American Pride and Power," The American Scholar 17, no. 4 (Autumn 1948): 394.
37 "The Conditions ofOur Survival," The Virginian Quarterly Review 26, no. 4 (Autumn 1950): 482-
3.
j8 "American Pride and Power," 393.
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creation of ever-enlarging communities within the human family. While all human
efforts at social justice stand under the judgment of God's perfect love, Niebuhr's
Christian realism knows that social justice always requires the use, or threatened use,
of power. At the same time Christian realism recognizes that all power entails evil
consequences even when employed by "good" people for "good" purposes. For this
reason prophetic faith always critiques power, most especially power employed in
the name ofjustice.
It reminded the rulers and princes, the powerful and influential, that
they were never as just as they deemed themselves to be, but
encouraged them nevertheless to exercise their power contritely and
with "firmness in the right," as God gave them to see the right."
Self-Criticism and Discerning the Moral Authority of American Power
Niebuhr cast a critical eye upon his own nation because he sought a God's eye view
of the great responsibilities attached to its power and wealth. In doing so, he rejected
expressions of the Christian faith and political idealism that seek God "too simply as
the truth which supplements historic truth but does not stand in contradiction to it;
which completes human virtue but does not judge it."40 From this perspective,
Niebuhr reminded his fellow citizens, the most powerful of nations are as "drop in
the bucket and are counted as small dust in the balances."41 The God's eye
perspective illumines the essential relationship between the contrite self-criticism of
humility and the moral authority of American power. Only those persons and nations
who recognize the finitude and limits of their power may claim any divine
instrumentality for good. But such a claim always remains tenuous and subject to the
prophetic criticism that the God's eye view belongs to God alone.42 The limited and
partial perspective of all human understanding means there can be no Christian use




42 Lovin, Christian Realism, 22.
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of great power with an easy conscience.43 An ever-present hazard to true Christian
responsibility, from the perspective of prophetic faith is the self-righteousness that
egotistically equates our cause and our imperfect use of power with the perfect love
and will of God.
The love of Christ thus always stands in a double relation to the
strivings and achievements, the virtues and wisdoms of history.
Insofar as they represent developments of the goodness of creation it
is their fulfilment. Insofar as they represent false completions which
embody the pride and the power of individuals and nations, of
civilizations and cultures, it is their contradiction.44
If Niebuhr's prophetic criticism was ranged against false completions of Christian
responsibility his purpose was to illumine the impossible possibilities of love amid
the mundane struggles for social justice. He believed democracy to be the form of
government most capable of the balance of conflicting demands of freedom and
order out of which more equal justice may emerge. Where democracy seeks ever
increasing degrees of social justice it is worthy of Christian devotion and loyalty. But
this loyalty always remains conditional and under the ultimate judgment of God.
Niebuhr's vocation was to speak this judgment to a powerful nation prone to confuse
its form of democracy with God's perfect will.45 To make a political absolute of our
particular democratic ideal is an idolatry that he attacks with prophetic vitriol. His
frequently caustic pronouncements could offend Americans of all political
persuasions. Quite likely, for example, Niebuhr was among those intellectual elites
that Richard Nixon would brand the "Blame America First Crowd."46 To the extent
that Niebuhr's prophetic vocation set him in opposition to the injustices of power
masked by both liberal and conservative ideologies, this accusation has a decidedly
ironical ring to it. Where American power and self-righteousness converge there is a
43 "Hazards and Resources," 201.
44 "The Validation of the Christian View of Life and History," Theology Today 6, no.l (April 1949):
31.
45
"Democracy as a Religion," Christianity and Crisis 7, no. 14 (August 4, 1947): 1.
46 Nixon was "the bete noir ofmost Democrats and ADA liberals like Niebuhr, whose leaders he had
long accused of being soft on Communism." Brown, Niebuhr and His Age, 212. That Niebuhr and
Schlesinger, both founding members of the ADA, were staunchly anti-communist did not make them
immune from the charge.
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prophetic obligation to denounce the false completion of national responsibility. It is
through the humble acceptance of prophetic criticism that the nation discerns the
truer completion of its responsibilities.
For Niebuhr the truer completion of American responsibility entailed the use of its
power and wealth to participate in creating a more just world community. Because
power also imperils responsibility its use must be illumined by a humility that
transcends our perceptions of national self-interest. Prophetic faith recognizes that
self-interest may lay moral claims, but those claims are always subject to the
requirements a divine justice discerned through the requirements of love. Just here
Niebuhr's critical stance seeks to illumine the relationship between America's true
self-interest and its responsibilities for building the more just international order
upon which its greater national security ultimately rests.
Thus the moral authority of American power requires some convergence of self-
interest and the interests of the wider community of nations. That America's power
rests upon a democratic form of government does not lend it a de facto moral
authority that its sense of national particularity too readily assumes. This ideal,
Niebuhr observed, encourages uncritical assumptions regarding the moral authority
of American power. Such assumptions reflect an arrogance that undermines
American power in building world community. While responsibility rejects the
escapism of attributing moral equivalence to lesser and greater injustice the fact of
power does not make the moral case for assuming responsibility. Indeed, Niebuhr
repeatedly warned that power engenders a prideful spirit that militates against a true
assessment ofmoral authority. Just here, he believed, Americans are prone to endow
their ideal of democracy and economic life with the ultimate values of life.47
Consequently our claims to moral authority become confused by power, wealth and a
prideful presumption of national particularity.
On a political level humility discerns moral authority through democratic self-
criticism, toleration, patience and responsibility for social justice. Here the attitudes
47
"Democracy as a Religion," 1.
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of humility allow "the constant interpenetration of ideas and ideals" that discern
"mutually supplementary moral values" among competing claims. The attitudes of
humility serve as midwife to the inclusive moral values "requisite for the spiritual
and moral integration of civilization."48 In the context of US international
responsibility Niebuhr thus relates moral authority and political influence. Absent the
attitudes of humility pride, most particularly national pride, militates against the
moral authority that is an essential concomitant of responsible political power.
Pretension to universal truth in political organization and action thus masks the moral
ambiguities reflected in all social structures and all use of all power. The result is the
diminished moral authority that issues in diminished political influence without
which power alone cannot maintain order and justice.
The more we indulge in an uncritical reverence for the supposed
wisdom of our American way of life, the more odious we make it in
the eyes of the world, and the more we destroy our moral authority,
without which our economic and military power will become
impotent. Thus we are undermining the reality of our power by our
uncritical pride in it.49
Conclusion
This case study reflecting on humility and moral authority in Niebuhr's incidental
work, unlike the earlier studies on the conduct of war, the United Nations and the
Marshall Pan, is less contextual and more broadly cast. If each of the previous case
studies affirms the essential role of humility for Christian responsibility in particular
contexts, this study seeks to affirm humility as the lens through which Niebuhr is
most meaningfully read in any context. Humility is affirmed as indispensable to all
Christian responsibility and use of power. The moral authority of responsibility rests
on discerning the truth that prophetic faith always speaks to power.
48 "Hazards and Resources," 201.
49 "American Pride and Power," 394.
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Both as prophet and Christian realist Niebuhr urged the powerful to gauge the limits
as well as the possibilities of power. As a practical matter this responsibility requires
that all factors in a given situation be given due consideration. An essential factor is
the moral authority claimed by those who possess power. True moral authority
cannot rest upon self-serving claims to ultimate truth that simply mask power. It
rests, rather, upon the humble and self-critical recognition that there is an ultimate
truth beyond the truth that we ourselves may claim; that we must critically weigh our
truth claims against the claims of others; and that we are responsible to our fellows
and ultimately answerable to God in light of His ultimate truth. "This," Niebuhr
wrote, "is why every historic judgment must be charitably and humbly subjected to
the 'last judgment' which is not ours."50
The ultimate truth of this last judgment humbles the powerful and empowers the
powerless. Grounded in the profound experience of God, this truth is the source of
the grace that continuously shapes our relationship with Him and with others. This is
the grace of humility that is power beyond human power and "operative only when
human powers recognize their own limits."51 Thus discerning moral authority
essential to responsible power requires searching self-criticism before God and the
humble acceptance of the criticism of our fellows. Niebuhr's prophetic eye
accordingly was cast most often on what he saw as the pretension, hypocrisy and
injustice of his own nation. He insisted that the moral authority of American power
requires ever-greater achievement of the ideals of justice, equality and freedom that
underpin its sense of particularity.
If we succumb to the temptation of hypocrisy and claim too pure a
virtue for our international politics, we shall merely invite the world's
derision and contempt. This derision will be forthcoming the more
readily because powerful nations are not generally popular.
Moreover, we shall also relax our own moral restraints too much by
such procedure. Power ought always to be exercised with a certain
uneasiness of conscience. When the conscience becomes easy, self-
50 "Ten Fateful Years," 4.
51
Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr, 118-19.
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righteousness aggravates the moral weakness of the wielder of
power.52
52 "Hazards and Resources," 203.
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Part III
Reading Niebuhr for Today
Look with mercy upon the peoples of the world, so full both ofpride
and confusion, so sure of their righteousness and so deeply involved in
unrighteousness, so confident of their power and so imprisoned by
their fears ofeach other. Have mercy upon our nation, called to such
high responsibilities in the affairs of mankind. Purge us of the
vainglory which confuses our counsels, and give our leaders and our
people the wisdom of humility and charity. Help us to recognize our
own affinity with whatever truculence or malice confronting us that
we may not add to the world's woe by the fury of our own
resentments)
Reinhold Niebuhr
' A prayer for nation and community in Justice and Mercy, ed. Ursula M. Niebuhr (New York: Harper
<& Row, 1974), 97.
Chapter Nine
American Power and Iraq: A Retrospective
The paradox ofAmerican power is that world politics is changing in a
way that makes it impossible for the strongest world power since Rome
to achieve some of its most crucial international goals alone.'
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Introduction
The degree to which the attacks of September 11, 2001 affected the Bush
Administration's understanding of American power and its role in the international
community was reflected in its October 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). As
the strategy was being analysed by the international community the Administration
launched a diplomatic campaign to disarm Iraq of suspected weapons of mass
destruction. Concomitant with these efforts was a build-up of US forces in the Gulf
region. Not unexpectedly much of the international community viewed Iraq as the
first major test of the new US security strategy.
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief history of the relationship between
American power and Iraq since the first GulfWar in 1990-91. This material provides
the immediate historical context in which Iraq became a focal point of the G.W.
Bush Administration's response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. With this material in
mind I turn to Chapter Ten and a Christian realist's analysis of key elements in the
National Security Strategy.
1
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The First Gulf War
The new world order heralded by President George H.W. Bush in 1989 appeared to
promise a more hopeful era characterized by the peaceful building of international
community. Discouraging US and Western triumphalism over the Soviet collapse the
President envisioned a new world order that "would feature increased US-Soviet
cooperation, a more effective United Nations and multilateral responses to threats of
that order."2
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future
generations a new world order, a world order where the rule of law, not
the law of the jungle governs the conduct of nations.. .an order in which a
credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfil the promise
and vision of the UN's founders.
Such hopeful declarations gained credence with the serial eradication of thoroughly
nasty East European despots. If the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of neighbouring
Kuwait revealed the ephemeral nature of hopes for the new world order it also
affirmed America's commitment to multilateral strategies. Saddam's forces had
barely crossed Kuwait's borders before the President initiated the first of the eighteen
resolutions that circumscribed and in the view of many nations, legitimised those
strategies.4 Some observers believed that Bush had encouraged the UN to function
as it was designed to function in building international consensus. Others such as
Arthur Schlesinger wrote that Bush had forcefully engineered a "multilateral fa?ade
2
Stanley R. Sloan, "The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Away from
Self-Deterrence?" A Congressional Research Report for Congress (January 6, 1997): 6.
3 President G.H.W Bush, "The Liberation ofKuwait Has Begun." Speech of January 16, 1991, in The
GulfWar Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, ed. Micah L. Siffy and Christopher Cerf (New
York: Random House, 1991), 349-50.
4 See "U.N. Resolutions: The Complete Texts" in The GulfWar Reader, 137-156. Within days these
resolutions imposed on Iraq the most rigidly enforced sanctions in history; with some adjustments
over the years these sanctions, which had always excepted food and medical supplies, remained in
place until lifted following the destruction of Saddam's regime. See Kimberly Elliot et al., "Sanctions
Work: The Historical Record," in The GulfWar Reader, 256.
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for a unilateral U.S. war."5 And while some observers believed that the first
President Bush had established a multilateral paradigm for US leadership in the post-
Soviet era others, among them Henry Kissinger, believed that circumstances
admitting the high degree of international cooperation in the Kuwait crisis were too
unique to serve as that paradigm.6
Hindsight confirms this view. The coalition arrayed against Saddam in late 1990
succeeded, with broad international cooperation coalescing around US/UK arms, in
ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. But, as Johns Hopkins' Fouad Ajami observed, "it
was idle to think that the broad coalition cobbled together during an unusually
perilous moment in 1990-91 would stand as a permanent arrangement."7 Indeed,
Saddam confirmed his grasp on power even as his forces were routed from Kuwait
whose oilfields were left aflame. Quickly withdrawing his most loyal and best-
equipped Republican Guard divisions to pockets of opposition within Iraq, Saddam
left poorly trained and vulnerable conscripts to their fate on "the highway of death."
The rout was an international debacle for Iraq but it "relieved Saddam of the most
o
troublesome part of his army and preserved the most loyal divisions." Within
weeks he was ruthlessly destroying internal opposition, most viciously the Kurdish
5
Schlesinger, "White Slaves in the Persian Gulf," in The GulfWar Reader, 267. This response was
puzzling on several levels. Doubtless the President did engage in political arm-twisting at the UN. Yet
observers of the UN far less experienced in its ways than Schlesinger recognize that the organization
of the Security Council favours inertia. His ire at Bush's approach to the UN reflected Schlesinger's
belief that Iraq's occupation of Kuwait threatened only US financial interests. Britain, France and
other allied nations who had clear security and financial interests at stake would be puzzled to learn
they were fighting a "unilateral U.S. war." For Schlesinger, at least, this was not a case in which UN
imprimatur bestowed moral authority on multinational military action.
6
Kissinger, "How to Cut Iraq Down to Size," in The GulfWar Reader, 462.
7 "The Sentry's Solitude," Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6 (November/December, 2001): 10.
8 Faleh A. Jabar, "Why the Uprisings Failed" in The Iraq War Reader, ed. Micah L. Silffey and
Christopher Cerf (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 112. Iraq's estimated 50,000-100,000 losses
in the 1991 Gulf War would have been substantially greater had President George H.W. Bush not
halted the aerial destruction of those fleeing, largely conscript forces. "We would have been
castigated for slaughtering fleeing soldiers after our own mission was successfully completed."
George [H.W.] Bush and Brent Scowcroft, The Iraq War Reader, 101. Kenneth Pollack, a former
CIA analyst and member of the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration,
observed that initial intelligence reports of slaughter along the Highway of Death were greatly
exaggerated: "The vast majority of the Iraqis fled their vehicles when the first aircraft appeared, and
only a few dozen bodies were found among the hundreds ofwrecked vehicles." Moreover, many of
the 800 Iraqi tanks that survived Desert Storm were being used by elements of the Republican Guard
against Saddam's internal opposition. "How Saddam Misread the United States," The Iraq War
Reader, 84-5.
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people of Iraqi Kurdistan.9 These actions prompted UN resolution 688 that
condemned Saddam's brutal repression and, for the first time, asserted a right of
interference within the internal affairs of a member state.10 Subsequently a Kurdish
safe-haven was established and secured by US/UK/French air forces; a second no-fly
zone was established to protect the Shiite majority in the south of Iraq. Neither of
these zones maintained by US, UK and French forces had specific UN
authorization.11
Desert Storm re-established a precarious balance of power in the Middle East and,
consistent with its UN mandate, restored an independent Kuwait. But the Kurdish
and Shiite safe-havens were preserved only by US/UK air forces deployed without
any specific UN mandate.12 That this force was used for a demonstrably moral good
appears to militate against arguments that only UN approval bestows moral authority
on the use of force. This is not to argue that the UN should not be a sources of moral
authority in international opinion. But experience reflects the truth that the
organizational structure of the UN and the interests of Security Council nations lend
it, like all human constructs, a moral ambiguity.
The Gulf War gained broad international legitimacy under the aegis of the United
Nations but behind Bush's clear commitment to a multilateral approach was the near
certainty of a unilateral alternative. As admirers and critics agree US diplomatic and
military leadership was essential to the undertaking. Without cynically dismissing
White House rhetoric of regarding the rule of law and the right of self-
determination,13 American and Western interests in the Gulf rendered it
9 The gassing of thousands of Kurdish people rightfully shocked the world. Lesser outrages, such as
the 1992 hanging of 42 of Baghdad's leading businessmen accused of "profiteering," also deserve
remembering. See Kanan Makiya, "How Saddam Held on to Power" in The Iraq War Reader, 119.
10
Ibid., 124.
11 Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensing, "A Backgrounder on Inspections and Sanctions" in The
Iraq War Reader, 167. France withdrew from participation in the no-fly zone protecting Iraqi Kurds in
1996 and from the southern zone in 1998 in protest over President Clinton's Desert Fox initiative.
Graham-Brown and Toensing observe that the U.S and Britain "regularly resorted to military action to
enforce Security Council resolutions on Iraq without express U.N. approval."
l2Fouad Ajami, "Iraq and the Arabs' Future," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (January/February 2003): 8.
lj
Populist right-wing columnist Patrick Buchanan, who later challenged Bush in the 1992 presidential
primaries, labelled the President's international vision as "Wilsonian gobbledygook." "Have the
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inconceivable that any US President would allow Saddam to control most of the
world's proven oil reserves. Many nations, including Arab states, acknowledged the
liberation of Kuwait as a significant good that served their interests and those of the
broader international community. In maintaining continuity with America's post-
WWII multilateral strategies the first Bush successfully cobbled a community of
common interest that could coalesce around US power.
Service as America's ambassador to China and to the UN provided Bush a
diplomatic experience and familiarity with world leaders unmatched by any 20th
Century US president. Firmly rooted in the post-WWII internationalist wing of the
Republican party Bush could appeal to many Democrats for whom UN approval is
the sine qua non of moral authority in the use of US military force. Bush
nevertheless was made answerable to criticism that past US involvement with the
Saddam regime morally disqualified America from ousting him from Kuwait. While
US policy was directed at securing significant US interests in the Middle East in no
immediate sense did it ameliorate the historical grievances that date (at least) from
the region's colonial heritage. In the end US attempts to moderate Saddam, in Bush's
own words, "didn't work."14 In the words of Christopher Hitchens, it was "a game
gone tilt."15
The Gulf War was a success in the immediate sense that Saddam was ousted from
Kuwait. But the first major military crisis of the New World Order teems with the
ironies of good intentions gone awry. Even as Saddam suffered a humiliating defeat
he destroyed internal opposition and further entrenched his regime. Economic
sanctions, initially imposed as a "peaceful" alternative to military action but which
remained in place to thwart re-armament, predictably hit the most vulnerable Iraqis
Neocons Thought This Through?" in The GulfWar Reader, 213-215. New York Senator Daniel P.
Moynihan believed that Bush's use ofUS military power on behalf of a "nasty little country invaded
by a littler but just as nasty country," rendered him "a menace to his own people." "A Return to Cold
War Thinking," in The GulfWar Reader, 284-286.
14 See "The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador," in The GulfWar Reader, 122
passim.
15
Christopher Hitchens, "Realpolitik in the Gulf: A Game Gone Tilt," in The GulfWar Reader, 107-
118.
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hardest. Thus hatred that rightly might have been directed at Saddam was directed
instead at the US and the West.16 The US troops stationed in Saudi Arabia remained
to insure against recalcitrance and to encourage cooperation with UN-imposed
disarmament inspections. It was the "haughty and arrogant" presence of these troops
on soil sacred to Islam that so enraged Osama Bin Laden who has directed serial
attacks on US and Western interests, most disastrously to date those of September
11, 2001.17
With the Soviet collapse much of the world's preponderant power devolved, at least
temporarily, upon the United States. Bush sought multilateral strategies to make the
preponderant power necessary for world order the collective power necessary for a
more just world peace.
The Post-Gulf War "Peace"
President Clinton faced an array of humanitarian crises in Haiti, Africa, and the
Balkans. The Serb attacks on Bosnian Muslims, mostly non-combatant civilians,
would have appeared an urgent matter for European and UN humanitarian
intervention. But just as France (e.g., Iraq) and the US (e.g., Israel) routinely
protected friendly countries from Security Council action, Russia's patronage of
Serbia precluded the authorization of UN-sanctioned forces sufficient to prevent
16 A Harvard University study reported that in the first year of the sanctions infant deaths in Iraq
increased more than 350 percent and of all children under age five, more than one million were
malnourished. See The Nineteen-Ninety One Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991), 454. Sanctions may cause innocent suffering at least as
indiscriminately as military action. Noting the possibility of economic sanctions against Japan in 1932
Niebuhr observed that "workmen who have the least to do with Japanese imperialism would be bound
to suffer most from such a discipline." Moral Man and Immoral Society, 241. Stanley A. Renshon
notes that dictators, unlikely themselves to suffer from sanctions, need not fear being voted out of
office. They may indeed strengthen their regimes by controlling the distribution of food and medicines
while blaming the shortages on those imposing the sanctions. "The GulfWar Revisited:
Consequences, Controversies, and Interpretations," in The Political Psychology ofthe GulfWar, ed.
Stanley A. Renshon (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 337.
17
"Haughty and arrogant" are Bin Laden's words to describe what he saw as American triumphalism
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. See Walter LaFeber's "The Post September 11 Debate
Over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation," September 11, Terrorist Attacks and U.S. Foreign
Policy, ed. Demetrios J. Caraley (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 202), 20.
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atrocities against the Muslim populations of Bosnia and Kosovo. The insertion of a
few ill-equipped Dutch troops to police UN "safe zones" may have eased the
international conscience but it failed to prevent the massacre of 7000 men and boys
in Srebrenica.18 Despite the presence of UN troops, Sarajevo was bombarded into
near-oblivion by Serb forces.
UN peacekeepers were not mandated to break the siege of Sarajevo,
stop the bombardment of civilians or prevent ethnic cleansing. The
UN troops were only allowed to protect humanitarians seeking to
distribute relief to endangered populations. This style of humanitarian
intervention met its Waterloo at Srebrenica....1
The Serbian pogrom was curtailed only when a reluctant Clinton Administration led
hesitant European allies to put NATO combat forces into the field and air. No
20
Security Council resolution authorized the use of these arms against Serb forces.
That the UN was meanwhile able to create an ad hoc tribunal in the Hague to
prosecute suspected war crimes struck an ironically perverse note with some
observers: "The world would not stop war crimes while they were actually
happening, but it would prosecute them afterward."21
Iraq-related problems early plagued the Clinton presidency. Allegations of an Iraqi
plot to assassinate former President Bush in the Spring of 1993 festered until on June
18 Adam Lebor, "Clark Links Milosevic to Srebrenica," The Times (December 19, 2003): 15. This
"safe area" was under the protection of 110 "lightly armed Dutch peacekeepers who offered no
resistance when the Bosnian Serbs stormed in. Requests for air-strikes were somehow lost or delayed
by bureaucracy. The failure of the international community to come to the rescue of Srebrenica is one
of the darkest stains on the history of late 20th century Europe."
19 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Light: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosova andAfghanistan (London:
Vintage, 2003), 58.
20 Michael Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (May/June 2003):
24. Clinton may have been hesitant to act but his role was a decisive factor nevertheless.
Essayist/journalist/polemicist Christopher Hitchens, avowed nemesis of Henry Kissinger and all his
works, observed that without this exercise of American power and will, "the European provinces of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo would now be howling wildernesses...." Regime Change, 32.
21
Gary J. Bass, "Milosevic in The Hague," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (May/June 2003): 84. For an
intriguing analysis of the tragedy in Bosnia, see "The Kitty Genovese Incident and the War in
Bosnia," in Phillip Bobbin's ambitious historical survey ofwarfare, The Shield ofAchilles (Penguin:
London, 2002), 411-467.
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26th Clinton launched 23 Tomahawk missiles against Iraqi intelligence agencies in
Baghdad. The New York Times'1 Seymour Hersh noted that Clinton's Desert Fox
strike was defended as consistent with provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter
that recognize any nation's right of self-defence against armed attack. Hersh claimed
that the Clinton Administration failed to acknowledge, "that most legal authorities
note that the threat must be instant and overwhelming and leave no moment for
deliberation."22 Nevertheless, in a speech that evening Clinton told the nation that the
attack was directed against a regime that "had repeatedly violated the will and
conscience of the international community." The plot against former President Bush,
he said, "was an attack against our country and against all Americans." The
following day President Clinton told reporters gathered outside the Foundry
Methodist Church that, "I feel quite good about what transpired. I think the
American people should feel good."
In 1998 Saddam ejected UN inspectors from Iraq. In May, Clinton signed into law
PL 105-174, authorizing $5,000,000 to fund an "Iraqi democratic opposition" and to
compile information in anticipation of war crime prosecutions. In August 1998
Clinton signed PL 105-338 declaring the Government of Iraq to be "in material and
unacceptable breach of its international obligations." It urged the President to "take
appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the
United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with those obligations."24 On October
31, 1998 Clinton signed The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, sponsored by Democratic
Senators Lieberman (the party's Vice Presidential nominee in 2000) and Kerrey (of
Nebraska), passed without a dissenting vote. This Act expressed the sense of the
Congress that,
It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to
remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and
22
Seymour M. Hersh, "Did Iraq Try to Assassinate Ex-President Bush in 1993? A Case Not Closed,"
New Yorker (November 1, 1993), reprinted in The Iraq War Reader, 146-147.
23 Ibid.
24 See PL 105-338, Section 2 (11) and (12).
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to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that
25
regime.
This policy appeared to elicit little international anxiety regarding potential
American unilateralist action even though Clinton had neither sought nor received
explicit UN sanction for the use of US armed forces deployed against Somalia,
Afghanistan, Serbia and Iraq. Clinton's 1995 declaration that US security and world
peace was best secured by the advance of human rights and "democracy elsewhere,"
articulated ideals nestled firmly in the 2002 National Security Strategy. His appeals
to human rights were characterized by some as arrogant interference in the internal
affairs of sovereign nations. When one offended prime minister complained of
Clinton that, "no one confirmed this right on this crusading President," he was
articulating the views of US friends as well as foes. As one Washington observer
noted, "Wilsonian Presidents drive them crazy-and have done ever since the days of
Woodrow Wilson."27
On December 16, 1998 after Saddam failed to comply with UN inspection
resolutions, Clinton launched "Desert Fox", a series of joint US/UK air strikes
against military targets in Iraq. The President defended his actions in a nationally
televised address that evening.
If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far
greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors;
25
Ibid., Section 3, "Sense of the Congress Regarding United States Policy Toward Iraq." The act
authorized up to nearly $100 million in military and other assistance to democratic opposition groups
and urged the President to provide humanitarian aid (under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) to
Iraqis living within areas controlled by such organizations. But Section 8 reads: "Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces (except as
provided in section 4 (a)(2) in carrying out this Act." If some observers saw this as a significant
indication of a toughening stance toward Saddam others, such as Christopher Hitchens, thought the
Act provided US policy makers the opportunity to blow diplomatic smoke without inhaling the
political carcinogens of direct US military action. As Hitchens observed, the Iraq Liberation Act
"committed the United States to support the removal of Saddam Hussein by the exercise of any force
but its own." Regime Change (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 46.
26 British political scientist Christopher Coker characterized Clinton's foreign policy as "multilateral if
possible, unilateral if necessary." Cited in Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," 72.
27
Nye, The Paradox ofAmerican Power:Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 147.
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he will make war on his own people. And mark my words, he will
develop weapons ofmass destruction. He will deploy them and he will
use them. Because we are acting today, it is less likely that we will
28face these dangers in the future.
The connection of Iraq to global terrorism was assumed but not certain. A1 Qaeda
had made its first attack upon the World Trade Center, participated in the killing of
18 US troops in Somalia in 1993 and in 1998 bombed two US embassies in Africa.
In response Clinton launched missile attacks against suspected al Qaeda positions in
Afghanistan and Sudan that proved ineffective and, in the case of Sudan, mistakenly
destroyed a pharmaceutical plant. Although unable to find and eradicate bin Laden
Clinton, like his successor, believed it necessary to suppress regimes "suspected of
9Q
supporting and supplying the al Qaeda network—above all, Iraq." This conviction,
not simply the need to enforce UN resolutions, was almost certainly a factor in
Clinton's 1998 missile attacks on suspected weapons of mass destruction
installations in Iraq. Subsequent investigations indicate that the intelligence relied
upon in this regard was largely wrong. At the time, however, it was widely believed
by US/UK agencies, most international intelligence agencies and the UN that Iraq
possessed or had the ability to produce such weapons.
America and Iraq Post-9/11
The issues of terrorism and Saddam hovered over the White House as Governor
George W. Bush of Texas took up his controversy-ridden residence in January 2001.
Though possessing the educational credentials of his Eastern establishment family
(Yale Skull and Bones, Harvard MBA) Bush led a desultory if not profligate lifestyle
in Texas that apparently ended with a dramatic religious conversion. Following
some success in the oil industry and as owner of a major league baseball franchise,
28 President Bill Clinton, "The Costs ofAction Must Be Weighed Against the Price of Inaction," a
televised address to the nation, December 16, 1998. As noted above, operation Desert Fox occasioned
withdrawal of French forces from the Southern no-fly zone essential to protecting the majority Shiites
Saddam had viciously suppressed after the GulfWar.
29 LaFeber, 21. LaFeber is apparently among the foreign policy analysts who believed US and
Western intelligence sources regarding Iraq's WMD programs and its role in supplying international
terrorism.
249
he entered politics and was twice elected governor of Texas. A popular governor,
Bush was devoid of foreign policy experience. His presidential campaign indicated
an Administration more narrowly directed at US national interests and less oriented
to the human rights activism that characterized the previous White House. Some
Republicans, such as myself, believed that Governor Bush would reflect some of the
diplomatic skill and internationalist traditions of his father. In this regard, during the
presidential campaign Governor Bush's call for a "humble" projection of US power
appeared to reflect his father's anti-triumphalist stance following the Soviet collapse.
Bush's major appointments were largely from the so-called neo-conservative wing of
his party. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
had each served as secretaries of defence in earlier Republican administrations,
Cheney notably during the 1990-91 GulfWar. Rumsfeld, his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz
and Richard Perle, Chairman of the Department's key Defense Policy Board, were
among the conservative activists and intellectuals associated with the Project for the
New American Century, an organization devoted to the promotion of "American
global leadership." They had signed a well-publicized Project letter to President
Clinton in January, 1998 calling for regime change in Iraq. The current policy of
containment and diplomacy regarding Iraq "is clearly failing," they wrote; "a
willingness to undertake military action" was essential. The removal of Saddam
"now needs to become the aim ofAmerican foreign policy."
Although we are fully aware of the dangers and difficulties in
implementing this policy we believe the dangers of failing to do so are
far greater. We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing U.N.
resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to
protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy
cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity
in the U.N. Security Council.30
30 "Remove Saddam from Power," an open letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998. Reprinted in
The Iraq War Reader, 200. As noted above, Congress passed and Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation
Act in October, 1998. Also among the signatories of this letter was historian Francis Fukuyama. He
recently said that "When the letter talked about regime change, what it was supporting was the INC
[Iraqi National Congress] and exiles and possibly destabilising the regime, all of which the Clinton
Administration ultimately signed on to do." "Why I won't Vote for George Bush," Andrew Billen
interview with Francis Fukuyama, Times (London), July 12, 2004, 12-13. This post-invasion
perspective is difficult to square with the actual wording of the letter which urges upon Clinton "a
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Eleven of the eighteen signers of this January 28, 1998 letter to President Clinton
became senior members of the George W. Bush Administration. Bush's image
abroad as an inarticulate and somewhat dim "cowboy" of questionable presidential
legitimacy strengthened the perception that he was captive to the "regime change"
unilateralists who dominated his administration's foreign policy establishment. This
perception was not dispelled by the appointment of Colin Powell as Secretary of
State. Powell, a soldier-diplomat rapidly promoted during the Reagan and George
H.W. Bush administrations, fell well within the conservative multilateral tradition of
post-WWII American foreign policy. Foreign as well as domestic observers
committed to America's multilateral traditions hoped that Powell would bring some
balance to Administration foreign policy. Early Administration forays into foreign
policy and salient international issues, however, projected a decidedly unilateralist
stance.31
Despite candidate Bush's call for the humble projection of US power the initial
attitudes of his Administration impressed many in the international community,
including allies, as "arrogantly unilateral."32 The new administration moved with
celerity to confirm suspicions regarding a distinctly unilateralist makeover of
America's traditionally multilateral foreign policy strategies:
willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing." "Remove Saddam from
Power," The Iraq War Reader, 200.
jl
Joseph S. Nye describes the "neo-conservatives" surrounding Bush as divided into "Wilsonians of
the right" and "Jacksonian unilateralists." The former, according to Nye, emphasize the use of
American power on behalfof democracy and human rights and, though they obscure Wilson's belief
in the role of international institutions, see these desirable objectives as assuring international support
for the use of force. The Jacksonian unilateralists, Nye holds, focus too narrowly upon military power
to achieve the spectrum of desired American foreign policy and security objectives. While military
power is unquestionably crucial in this regard and "pure multilateralism" impossible, Nye believes
that the unilateralists err in under-estimating the multi-polar distribution ofglobal economic power
and in failing to appreciate the chaotic distribution of power among the state and non-state players that
impact US policy objectives. Nye sees both the Wilsonians and Jacksonians as "pitted against the
more multilateral and cautious traditional realists...such as Brent Scowcroft and James Baker," the
former G.H.W. Bush's National Security Advisor and the latter his Secretary of State, both of whom
worked closely with Colin Powell. "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4.
(July/August 2003): 63-64. Colin Powell was seen to fit comfortably within this multilateral cadre of
"cautious traditional realists."
32
Nye, The Paradox ofAmerican Power, 156.
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Among the multilateral treaties and agreements that the administration
opposed in its first six months were the International Criminal Court,
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the ABM Treaty, the Kyoto
Protocol, a small arms control pact, a biological weapons protocol,
and an OECD measure to control tax havens.
Whatever substantive and national-interest concerns it might have raised against
these and other international agreements, the Administration unnecessarily invited
hostile world opinion. That the Senate had unanimously rejected the proposed Kyoto
Protocol during the Clinton Presidency rendered the Bush Administration's
repudiation gratuitous; similarly, its declaration as "null and void" President
Clinton's signature to the International Criminal Court Treaty which Congress had
never ratified. The Administration's insistence that all European Union members sign
a waiver exempting US citizens and soldiers from the Court's jurisdiction was, in
James Rubin's view, political overkill: "The idea that the ICC would ever have
forced a European country to imprison an American citizen over the objections of the
U.S. government is not only hypothetical in the extreme, but also politically
unthinkable."34 While some of these examples are reminders that Congress, not the
President, has final approval of binding US international agreements, these actions
focused negative international attention upon a President already suspect in world
opinion. For some it was as though President Bush had "contrived to prove his own
theory that arrogance provokes resentment for a country that, long before his arrival,
was already the world's most conspicuous and convenient target."35
The unilateralist tone of the nascent G.W. Bush administration served to obscure
decidedly unilateral actions of the Clinton administration. Christopher Hitchens notes
that Clinton had bombed targets in Sudan and Baghdad "without demanding
inspections, without resorting to the United Nations, without consulting
33 Ibid., 205. Former Clinton administration State Department official James Rubin, somewhat
hyperbolically, charged that "early in its term, the Bush administration declared war on all outstanding
international treaties." "Stumbling into War," Foreign Affairs 82, no 5 (September/October 2003): 58.
34
Rubin, "Stumbling into War," 58.
°
Roger Cohen, "Arrogant or Humble? Bush Encounters Europeans' Hostility," International Herald
Tribune, May 8, 2001, 1.
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Congress...."36 If Clinton did not fully inhale unilateralist toxicants his air strikes
nevertheless produced clouds of unilateralist smoke. Apparently eager to dismiss
Clinton and all his works, Bush failed to recognize that his strategies regarding
terrorism and Iraq might have gained broader support by emphasising their
continuity with the Clinton administration. But as John Waterbury observed, the
unilateral tenor of the pre-9/11 White House appeared a sharp departure from
America's post-WWII multilateral approach to international leadership. This
approach affirmed the international community's increasing wariness of US hyper-
power.
While a self-professed Christian presidential candidate had spoken of the need for
humble leadership, the early attitudes and actions of his Administration did not
reflect the attitudes of Christian humility discerned in Niebuhr's incidental work. Nor
did the Administration reflect the political realism of Hans Morgenthau and George
Kerrnan who had urged "modesty" and the guidance of a "cosmic humility" in
asserting American interests and power. Rather, so-called hyper-power appeared to
obscure the vision of imputed political realists to the limits of all human power, to
the humble self-knowledge that allows us to see ourselves as others see us, and the
reality that US security ultimately rests on building an international community of
shared interests. From the perspective of a relevant Christian realism candidate Bush
rightly acknowledged the necessity of humble American leadership. Yet the actions
of his Administration even before 9/11 reflect a realism of national interest and a
worldview distorted by prideful power. In this regard a relevant Christian realism for
today will echo the voice that spoke relevant truth to American power decades ago.
The more our economic power is supported by military strength, the
more we shall be inclined to solve our problems by intransigence and
36
Hitchens, Regime Change, 35. In 1998, President Clinton announced his Desert Fox attacks on
Baghdad in his speech, "The Costs of Action Must be Weighed against the Price of Inaction." In
August, 2002 Vice President Cheney told the Veterans ofForeign Wars that "The Risks of Inaction
are Far Greater than the Risk of Action." See The Iraq War Reader, 205-209; 298-300.
j7 John Waterbury, "Hate Your Policies, Love Your Institutions," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1.
(January/February 2003): 58.
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defiance of world opinion, and the more we shall multiply animosities
• 38
against us in the world community.
Prelude to War
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks the US enjoyed the support
of most long-time allies. "We are all Americans now," announced a leading French
newspaper on September 12. Remembering America's fifty-year commitment to
safeguarding Germany the German government quickly rallied round. India, China
and Russia each of which faced terrorists insurgencies expressed solidarity. For the
first time in its history NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter that declared that an
39armed attack on any member "shall be considered an attack on them all." Two UN
resolutions approved the use of force against al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan as
consistent with a "campaign of self-defense against armed attack."40
America's initial attack against al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan garnered the
overt or covert support of 70 countries worldwide.41 Broad international support for
US action in Afghanistan did not signal support for an increasingly clear US
intention to oust Saddam. Some nations which at least tacitly supported the US led
campaign against al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts found the Afghan campaign
consistent with, or at least not inimical to, their own interests. According to Fouad
Ajami the Taliban, being distant from the Gulf and other Middle East flashpoints,
were "the Khmer Rouge of this era and thus easy to deal with." Moreover while
military force in Afghanistan might eradicate a parasitic host it would not ameliorate
anti-American resentment among the Muslim populations that looked with
satisfaction upon the "soot and ruin in New York's streets."42
38 Niebuhr, "Perils of American Power," 95.
39 Rebecca Johnson and Micah Zenko, "All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be
on the Front Lines in the War on Terror," Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly (Winter
2002-03): 49.
40 UNSC Res. 1368, September 12, 2001; UNSC Res. 1373, September 28, 2001. See Ruth
Wedgwood, "Al Qaeda and American Self-Defense" in Caraley, 166.
41
Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism, The White House, September, 2003, 5.
42 Fouad Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude," 15.
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As the Taliban was being dislodged other issues troubled some long-time American
allies. Generally alarming to them was the unilateralist tenor of the Bush
Administration. Another was its increasingly militant intentions toward Iraq. Yet
another was the treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters captured in Afghanistan
and interned at Guantanamo Bay. These issues were shaping the international
community's assessment of America as hyper-power even as the Bush
Administration announced its September, 2002 National Security Strategy.
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Chapter Ten
The National Security Strategy and Iraq: Reflecting on the
Relevance of Humility to American Responsibility in Context
To be sure our power is not great enough to give us security, even as
our isolation is not complete enough to guarantee it. But our
temptation lies in the fact that we have just enough power to make the




As a presidential candidate in 2000 George W. Bush articulated a prescient
understanding of the necessity of humility in illuminating the uses American power.
Our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power.
And that's why we've got to be humble and yet project strength in a
way that protects freedom....Ifwe are an arrogant nation, they'll view
us that way, but ifwe're a humble nation, they'll respect us.2
How the "humble nation" envisioned by candidate Bush has come to be regarded by
so many as an "arrogant nation" under President Bush is the underlying question
examined in this chapter. The focus here is upon the National Security Strategy
(NSS) promulgated by the Bush Administration in September 2002. Five elements of
the NSS are analysed through the lens of humility: the nature of the peace the NSS
envisions; America's relationship with the UN; the concept of "pre-emptive" war in
1 "American Power and World Responsibility," in Love and Justice, 203.
2 "2nd Presidential Debate Between Gov. Bush and Vice President Gore," New York Times, October
12, 2000, A20, cited in Joseph Nye, The Paradox ofAmerican Power: Why the World's Superpower
Can't Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Oxford University Press paperback, 2003),
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pursuit of US national security interests;3 the role of intelligence; and the
significance of human dignity in the projection of American power. Of concern are
the NSS's implications for America's post-WWII multilateral traditions. Where do
the multinational organizations America nurtured assiduously during the Cold War
and the 1991 Gulf War fit into the NSS response to a new kind of global threat?4 If
the Iraq war exemplifies US action pursuant to the NSS what do related events reveal
regarding the moral authority of US power as it is projected in Iraq? In this regard,
does US strategy serve to build the inclusive community of interest that Christian
realism finds essential to a more just and secure world? Conversely, as Niebuhr
asked in his own day, are traditional American ideals being subverted to provide "a
screen or rationalization for our interests?"5 Most essentially, have US actions
pursuant to the NSS reflected the humility ofChristian realism without which there is
no Christian responsibility?
Overview of the National Security Strategy
The National Security Strategy was announced by the White House in September
2002 as the world was assessing America's response to the terrorist attacks of the
previous year. This assessment was being formulated even as the international
community contemplated the emerging realities of history's first hyper-power. That
the Bush Administration produced a national security document is unremarkable
inasmuch as an annual national security report has been required since passage of the
Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of1986. Successive presidents since have
produced such reports largely intended to provide internal policy guidance for
defense and intelligence agencies. But the September 2002 document was not
primarily a security blueprint for US military and intelligence agencies. Rather, as
viewed through the lens of 9/11, the document was received as a "comprehensive
3 The NSS uses the word "pre-emptive" but as will be discussed it has conflated this doctrine with
preventative war doctrine.
4 As Robert Kagan observed, questions regarding the roles of international law and institutions predate
the second Bush presidency, but its unilateral tone and the Iraq war "deepened and hardened the
transatlantic drift." "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004):
66.
5
Niebuhr, "Hazards and Resources," The Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1949): 199.
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statement of the Administration's view of the world and the American role in it."6
Appearing on the cusp of America's year-old war on terrorism and with the
Administration's increasingly hard line on Iraq, the National Security Strategy was
clearly intended for the broadest possible international audience.
The NSS proposes policies the Bush Administration believes necessary to address
the threat to international order posed by "catastrophic technologies in the hands of
the embittered few." In this new reality policies designed to address relations
between states are seen as inadequate to deal with organizations that have access to
weapons formerly available only to states. Thus traditional deterrent policies that
assume states have a "return address" at which security threats can be answered may
no longer apply. Where "rogue" states are seen as aiding and abetting terrorism by
providing sanctuary and weapons, deterrence may not work either. This is
particularly true where rogue states possess or intend to possess weapons of mass
destruction potentially available to terrorists. Because such states are typically in the
grip of tyrannical regimes resistant to internal democratic opposition or international
economic pressure, US policies must include the option of pre-emptive/preventative
force to effect regime change. America will lead with economic and political policies
that address the underlying causes of terrorism and will seek international support in
its pursuit of these objectives. But it is prepared to use its "unprecedented" power to
act unilaterally when it believes US interests require. That their objective is to
promote human dignity by replacing terrorist-friendly rogue states with democratic
regimes provides the underlying moral authority ofUS policies.
Why then was a document that commends "a spirit of humility" widely viewed an
arrogant proclamation of American hegemony, if not empire?7 The initial
6Ivo H. Daalder, "Brookings Scholars Evaluate and Analyze President's National Security Strategy
Paper," Brookings Institution (Washington: October 4, 2002): 1. National specialist Edward Bruner
describes President Clinton's December, 1999 National Security Strategy of a New Century as a
"policy agenda guide to U.S. officials. Bush, on the other hand, seems to be addressing an audience of
American and world citizens in plain English and sharply expressed themes." "Comparison of
National Security Strategies Published by Presidents Bush and Clinton," a Congressional Research
Service Memorandum (September 24, 2003): 1.
NSS, 25. If the NSS is not a proclamation of empire Robert Jervis believes it "calls for something
very much like an empire." "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 118, no.
3 (Fall 2003): 365.
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explanation is in the language of the document: America today "possesses
unprecedented—and unequalled—strength and influence in the world." Its military
power will remain beyond challenge: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or
equalling, the power of the United States."8 In its focus on contemporary challenges
to America power the Administration appears to have ignored relevant lessons
offered by past realities. One such lesson, as Niebuhr often noted, is that American
power like all great power inevitably creates suspicion, jealousy and resentment. As
Robert Jervis affirmed shortly after the 9/11 attacks, "Powerful states are always
hated, even if they exercise their power relatively benignly."
That America's emergence as global superpower would attract such resentment,
fairly or unfairly, appears an historical certainty. It is true that the US had been a
global military power for six decades. But during most of that time the opposing
threat of powerful totalitarian states served to obscure the resentments inevitably
generated by US power. The first President Bush recognized this hazard when he
called on the nation to reject triumphalist attitudes following the Soviet collapse. It is
puzzling then that even prior to 9/11 an Administration governed by political realists
would take unnecessarily provocative stands on issues certain to grate on
international nerves. Its pronouncements on the Kyoto accords and the International
Criminal Court, issues of particular interest to Europe, are salient examples. That
both issues had been rejected during the previous Administration made further action
gratuitous and appeared to reflect an underlying change in American attitudes toward
international opinion. One need not agree with the substantive content of Kyoto or
the efficacy of the ICC to interpret the Administration's attitudes as an arrogance of
hyper-power.
Whether the Administration reflected America's traditional sense of innocency
regarding its power, its apparent failure to recognize or to ignore predictable
responses to great power tainted the atmosphere in which the NSS was received. It
8 Ibid., 30.
9 Robert Jervis, "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?"
September 11, Terrorist Attacks, and U.S. Foreign Policy, in Caraley, 186.
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appears unlikely that the humility Candidate Bush urged in October 2000 would have
prevented the devastation of September 2001. But had the Administration of
President Bush reflected the attitudes of humility, the necessary assertion of
American power following 9/11 might have strengthened rather than diminished
international support for NSS policies.
The Assertion of American Power: Commensurate Responsibility or
Hegemony?
The National Security Strategy asserts the unprecedented~"and unequaled"— nature
of American power and the Administration's intention to maintain and extend it. But
it recognizes that with this unique position of power comes "unparalleled
responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity" to "promote a balance of power that
favors freedom." It suggests that a time characterized by international terrorism is
also a time of opportunity for America to "translate this moment of influence into
decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty" for itself and the world. The sweeping
character of this decidedly audacious document proclaims a "distinctly American
internationalism" whose aim is "to help make the world not just safer but better."
Pursuant to this objective, the US will undertake to:
—Champion aspirations for human dignity
—Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against
us and our friends.
—Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
—Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons
ofmass destruction.
—Ignite a new era of economic growth through free markets and free trade.
—Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the
infrastructure of democracy.
—Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of power-
Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and
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opportunities of the twenty-first century.10
Brookings Institution Fellow Ivo Daalder finds the 31-page document best
summarized in the President's cover letter. Here the overarching assumption of the
NSS is that "the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and
great economic and political influence." While the document proclaims America's
strategic objective to be a "safer and better" world and elaborates the eight
constituent goals, Daalder along with John Gaddis suggests that these eight goals
cluster around three comprehensive responsibilities or tasks that flow from American
power. These are identified as defending the peace, preserving the peace, and
extending the peace.11 Given the essential relationship between humility and
responsibility in Christian realism the NSS invites examination through an analysis
of these three responsibilities that flow from American power.
Defending the Peace. America will "defend the peace by fighting terrorists and
tyrants." According to the NSS the salient threat to American security, and by
extension the security of "freedom loving people across the globe," is posed not by
national powers such as Russia and China but by a nicely alliterative three "T"s:
terrorists (evil people and evil organisations opposed to freedom and universal
human values), tyrants (rogue states) and technology (weapons ofmass destruction).
Defending the peace will require prevention (diplomacy, arms and export controls,
and dealing with failed states), pre-emption (the use of force to thwart "imminent"
threats, which include the acquisition of weapons ofmass destruction by terrorists or
rogue states) and defence (entailing a missile defence system and the development of
civil defence systems able to manage and mitigate the impact of catastrophic terrorist
attacks).
Preserving the Peace. The NSS calls on America to "preserve the peace by building
10
NSS, 1.
" President's cover letter to The National Security Strategy (The White House, September 17, 2002).
This discussion closely follows Daalder's summary in the Brookings Analysis, 1-3. See John Gaddis,
"A Grand Strategy of Transformation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (November 1,
2002): 3.
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good relations among the great powers." The assumption here is that terrorism and
the possession of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states or terrorists create a
commonality of interests among the major powers. This appears analogous to
Niebuhr's hope that a common cause in WWII would unite the allied powers in a
post-war peace. The NSS expresses the belief that the common threat of terrorism
will forge an international community in which "great powers compete in peace
instead of continually prepare for war." Better US relations with Russia and China
form the cornerstone of the cooperative international community that can be forged
in their common cause against terrorism. In the case of each power, the document
• • • 12
assumes that open markets will inevitably produce political liberalisation.
Extending the Peace. America will "extend the peace by encouraging free and open
societies on every continent." As was shown in the case of Afghanistan failed and
militarily weak states can threaten the security of the world's most powerful nation.
Because such states create conditions in which terrorist and fanatical ideologies can
take root dealing with them is a strategic US requirement; and because human rights
abuses and suffering fester in such states, America has as well a moral responsibility
to act.
A world where some live in comfort and plenty while half the human
race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including all
the world's poor in an expanding circle of development—and
opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities ofU.S.
international policy. 13
This element of extending the peace is addressed at various points in the NSS
document. "Human dignity," an expression the document appears to equate with
human rights, and the promotion of democracy are given increased importance in US
bilateral relationships. It is assumed that US promotion of free trade will serve to
open markets for economically failed states. Finally, and significantly, over the next
12
Daalder, 3. Questions raised by international observers regarding the 2003 Russian parliamentary





three years the US will increase by 50% its financial aid aimed at assisting failed and
poor states to "become part of the larger group ofmarket democracies."14
National Security Strategy and the Nature of a Secure Peace
As Christian realism contemplates the peace that the National Security Strategy seeks
to defend, preserve and extend, Augustine reminds us that pride obscures and
perverts our most cherished ideals of peace.
For pride hates a fellowship of equality under God, and seeks to
impose its own dominion on fellow men, in place of God's rule. This
means that it hates the just peace of God, and loves its own peace of
injustice.15
Here we know that human finitude and egotism render "our" peace antithetical to
God's peace. If it can be said that there is "no man who does not wish for peace," it
is because like all creatures human beings seek a peace in which they and their own
kind are made secure.16 Thus a nation's ideal of peace inevitably reflects its own
interests and security needs. When any nation seeks to endue its particular ideal of
peace with universality it invariably impinges upon the peace of others and acts
unjustly. Ironically, pride thereby makes our ideal of peace hateful both to others
and to the just peace of God.
Similarly, Niebuhr had few illusions regarding the imperfect nature of worldly peace
and the imperfect means by which it was achieved. He accepted with Augustine that
earthly peace is often gained in conflict.17 Lasting peace, true community and real
18 •








Niebuhr, Power Politics, 28.
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peace in and among human collectives entails some balance of power. The powerful
might proclaim peace but for the powerless deprived of justice there is no peace. In
reflecting on The City ofGod Jean Elshtain observes that the Romans had created a
desert of injustice at Carthage and called it peace. A victor's peace of order without
justice is disorder; and a disordered peace may be less just than the disorder of war.
"Peace and War had a contest in cruelty," Elshtain notes of Augustine, "and peace
won the prize."19
Because neither the "peace" of Versailles nor the "peace" of Munich established a
more just social order, neither can be considered to have produced a true peace.
Rather both were bookends of an era in which injustice covertly festered until it burst
with unimaginable violence upon the "peace" of those who had dictated at Versailles
and surrendered at Munich. America, which had abandoned responsibility at
Versailles and sought security in neutralist irresponsibility, discovered the
disastrously meretricious nature of a peace that is merely the absence of overt
20 •warfare. Power that creates the "secure" desert of an unjust peace must be opposed
by power that knows true peace requires justice. Here Christian realism's recognition
of the ambivalence of all power serves to inform its use and to restrain its evil
consequences. But, "there is no escape from moral responsibility," Niebuhr wrote
following the attack on Pearl Harbor, "and no evasion of our duty toward our
neighbors in the community of nations."21
As in Niebuhr's time a Christian realism for today accepts the necessity of power in
establishing and preserving a just peace. It knows that the possession of power does
not guarantee a just peace; that, indeed, the power necessary to achieve the order
required for any peace threatens the justice of that peace. It knows, too, that how
power is used to secure peace shapes the peace to be secured. A relevant Christian
19 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: The Burden ofAmerican Power in a Violent World
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 50.
20 The US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and America did not join the League of
Nations. As the western democracies faced Hitler at Munich, President Roosevelt announced that his
government would "assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." Kissinger,
Diplomacy, 314.
21 "We Are at War," 2.
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realism rejects any formulae assuring that a wise use of power will produce the just
peace of God. But even as it speaks truth to power Christian realism today
understands that the peace of God "revealed in the Cross of Christ cannot be equated
22
with the peace of detachment."
1. A Distinctly American Peace
The peace the National Security Strategy would defend is to be pursued through "a
balance of power that favors freedom." Having abandoned or in the process of
abandoning the discredited totalitarianisms of the 20th century, the world is perceived
as moving toward greater economic freedom and social equality. America's vision
of the peace at the heart of a more secure international community is characterized
by "political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect
for human dignity." While national security entails cooperation with "other main
centers" of global power, US economic and military power will be engaged to
achieve and sustain a world order based upon a "distinctly American
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests." If,
as Niebuhr noted, US foreign policy was frequently characterized by schizophrenic
swings between the extremes of isolationism and moralistic crusading, the National
Security Strategy decidedly reflects the latter attitude.
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and
totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of
freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success:
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.24
Christian realism accepts democracy as the form of government most conducive to
balancing the requirements of human freedom with the requirements of equal justice.
22 Niebuhr, Discerning the Signs ofthe Times, 157.
23NSS, 1-2.
24 The President's September 17, 2002 letter covering the National Security Strategy. Niebuhr
frequently criticised his fellow-Americans for positing universal value to "free enterprise" and "the
American way of life." "The Idolatry of America," Christianity and Crisis 15, no. 2 (Spring 1950): 3.
265
Yet it knows that human experience, culture, faith traditions and natural resources
produce infinite possibilities for social organization. Reflecting Niebuhr, however, it
rejects the notion that any distinctly American ideal of "free enterprise" is a
universally valid requirement for a justly ordered peace. Christian realism
recognizes that there are varieties of economic systems, including socialism, that are
compatible with democracy; that, indeed, democratic socialism may restrict
economic freedoms more fully than America's free enterprise system in order to
promote more equal economic justice. Humility acknowledges that America is still
labouring at this balance. The "single sustainable model" that the NSS urges upon
the world appears to reflect a particularly American model. If I believe that this
model has produced a great and powerful nation, as I do, Christian responsibility
requires that I acknowledge its failings, attend to the criticism others offer it, and
speak truths discerned in faith to its power. In this regard the distinctly American
model of social organization offered by the NSS reflects an unmistakable air of
triumphalism.
Nevertheless, in appealing to human dignity, liberty and justice, the NSS reflects
essential requirements for a peace of just order. From the perspective of Niebuhr's
prophetic faith the strategy correctly recognizes that true peace must be based on
justice and freedom consistent with human dignity. It calls for international
cooperation ("diplomacy, arms and export controls, and dealing with failed states"),
"an appreciation of others' interests," and promises "consistent consultations among
partners with a spirit of humility."25 These points appear to reflect an understanding
that international security ultimately rests, as Christian realism insists, upon building
and affirming an international community ofjustice, trust and shared interests.
2. A Distinctly American Internationalism
But militating against this interpretation is the document's insistence that a





community of shared interests necessary for peace and justice to flourish.
Moreover, the spirit of international cooperation that the strategy embraces was not
reflected in the Administration's unilateral attitudes and actions immediately
preceding 9/11 nor subsequently in its initial approach to the second Gulf War. As
Marcus Corbin observed, "Saying the right things about collective action in this
27
document may play well at home, but will not convince U.S. friends and allies."
Thus while the NSS calls for a humble recognition of both the limits and
responsibilities of US power, Administration attitudes and actions have asserted an
ideal of peace reflecting a distinctly American "one size fits all" view of the world.28
Like most realists Niebuhr recognized that foreign policy had always to reflect the
national interest. Yet a persistent prophetic concern was that many of America's
values were based on circumstances so unique to the American experience,
producing a so narrow and exclusive understanding of self-interest, that they
ironically became impediments to the nation's long-term national interests. "We are
tempted to regard ourselves as a beacon light of liberty," he wrote in 1950, "whose
light shines so brightly that it naturally attracts all wayfarers."29 Here America's
sense of a divinely bestowed particularity converges with pride of power and wealth
to posit its partial values as universal truth.
Recurring in the incidental work is Niebuhr's denunciation of America's libertarian
ideal as the only true expression of a democratic order. The irrelevance of this ideal
to the democracies of post-war Europe, should US aid be conditioned upon it,
imperilled the rebuilding of that community of nations.30 On few issues was he more
26 "The strategy document explicitly puts the initiative in terms of the concept of American
exceptionalism—that with its democratic history and strength the United States has a unique role to
play in guiding the world towards a better future." Marcus Corbin, "The Bush National Security
Strategy: A First Step," Washington: Center for Defense Information (September 26, 2002): 2.
27
Ibid., 4.
28 Dimitri Simes, "America's Imperial Dilemma," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/December
2003): 102. Simes here criticizes the Bush Administration for following the '"one size fits all'
approach to democracy promotion pursued under Clinton."
29 "The Conditions ofOur Survival," Virginia Quarterly Review (Autumn 1950): 486.
30 "The Fight for Germany," Life2\, no. 17 (October 21, 1946): 68.
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prophetically testy than what he perceived as America's identification of democracy
with "free enterprise" and foreign policy prescriptions designed to impose an
American "way of life" upon the world. Here the contemporary Russian emigre and
political scientist Dimitri Simes cautions against the American ideal "that democracy
is a talisman for all the worlds ills, including terrorism, and that the United States has
a responsibility to promote democratic government wherever in the world it is
lacking."31
There is much in the NSS regarding international cooperation, multinational
decision-making and economic responsibility. But given the distinctly unilateralist
tenor of the Administration, the clear implication is that a "distinctly American
internationalism" has as its objective a distinctly America peace. As Americans we
may cling to the ideal of our nation's particularity and the benignity of its power but,
as Niebuhr often noted, much of the world does not. Rather, the world judges
America on the reality that it actions and attitudes may impose upon other nations
and cultures. It asks that American power recognize the variety of just "peaces" that
are constituent elements of the international peace in which our own peace is most
secure.
Few Americans would believe that their nation seeks, as Rome did, to create a desert
of injustice and call it peace. But Christian realism reminds us that power and wealth
do not make our peace your peace; and that we may best discern the possibilities of a
common peace through the attitudes of humility. Phillip Bobbitt affirms this in his
reflections on America's quest for security: "Not simply increasing American power,
but persuading others of our modesty, our benign intent, our deference to the
preferences of other societies will be an indispensable element in maintaining the
peace."32
31
Simes, "Imperial Dilemma," 97.
j2
Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles, 332.
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National Security Strategy and the United Nations
An economically interdependent world must in some sense become a
politically integrated world community or allow potential instruments
ofcommunity to become instruments ofmass annihilation.33
Reinhold Niebuhr
Having recognized the "ignoble failure" of its post-WWI isolationism, reflected in
its rejection of the League of Nations, the US attached something akin to spiritual
significance to the UN and its ideals.34 Though international political realities and
Cold War divisions prevented its becoming the predominant power essential to
secure a just international order, the UN nevertheless served important purposes.
During the Cold War it provided an international forum for both great power and
minor power disputes. If the UN lacked predominant power, Niebuhr believed that
"some frictions between the powers will be mitigated here which might otherwise
produce intolerable tensions."35 New states emerging from the colonial empires that
collapsed after WWII found a voice and role in the UN. It developed significant
humanitarian and peacekeeping capabilities and became increasingly important in
legitimising the international actions of member states. Although the US at times
acted without UN authorization (e.g., the Balkans) and occasionally ignored UN
resolutions (e.g. Israel), the UN retained a prominent place in US diplomacy.
Against this background the unilateral posture of the Bush Administration appeared a
significant shift from America's post-WWII multilateral foreign policy tradition.
This shift is reflected in the National Security Strategy.
1. A Question of UN Relevance or American Pride of Power?
In his September, 2002 letter covering the National Security Strategy the President
affirmed America's commitment to "lasting institutions like the United Nations."
33 "Pillars of Peace," 379.
34 "Moral Implications," 17.
35 "The United Nations," 3.
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The document itself devotes extensive discussion to international cooperation,
strengthening alliances, building new coalitions, and economic development, all to
be pursued in "a spirit of humility." Yet the NSS references the United Nations,
explicitly or obliquely—and always briefly—on but four occasions. Had the President
not mentioned the UN in the "lasting" company of the WTO, OAS and NATO, a
cynic might well conclude that lasting institutions are not necessarily the same as
useful institutions. Perhaps significantly the UN is not mentioned once in the
document's important chapter in which it outlines US strategy for cooperating with
other "main centers of global power." 36 This reading of the NSS implies that there
is little direct role for the UN in building coalitions of "the willing and able to
promote a balance of power that favors freedom."
The oblique place the NSS affords the UN in US security policy appears to reflect
the unilateralist posture evident in the early Bush administration. Writers close to the
administration have described the UN as "nothing more than a collection of states,
many of them autocratic and few of them as public-spirited as America." They
asked who, if not the US, will "uphold decency in the world?" Finding the UN often
impotent in crisis they believe that to assert American power is to assert not pride but
responsibility.
It is short-sighted to imagine that a policy of "humility" is either safer
or less expensive than a policy that aims to preclude and deter the
emergence of new threats, that has the United States arriving quickly
at the scene of potential trouble before it has fully erupted, that
addresses threats to the national interest before they erupt into full¬
blown crises.37
Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer voices unilateralists' frustration with
the UN Security Council. This frustration is neither new nor surprising. As Niebuhr
often acknowledged the operation of the Security Council itself reflects the political
j6 NSS Chapter VIII: "Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of
Power," 25-28.
j7 Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, "America's Mission, After Baghdad," The Iraq War Reader,
609. Kristol is associated with the "Project for the New American Century," a group that urged
President Clinton to make regime change in Iraq a focus of American foreign policy.
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reality and will (or lack thereof) of the international community. It appears as
unlikely today as in 1945 that any great power would agree to UN authority without
there being some veto power in Security Council decisions. Unilateralists like
Krauthammer reject the idea that the Security Council should hold a real or
constructive veto over US action or that its imprimatur confers a prima facie moral
authority.
How exactly does the Security Council confer moral authority on
American action? The Security Council is a committee of great
powers, heirs to the victors of the Second World War. They manage
the world in their own interest. The Security Council is, on the very
rare occasions when it actually works, realpolitik by committee. But
by what logic is it a repository of international morality? How does
the approval of France and Russia, acting clearly and rationally in
pursuit of their own interests in Iraq (largely oil and investments),
confer legitimacy on an invasion?38
A relevant Christian realism must address these issues. Here the initial task is to
refute the Kaplan/Kristol notion that equates humility with self-abnegation and
"safe" policies inadequate to protect the national interest. The real issue today, they
urge, is not American arrogance but the pervasiveness of American power. They
recognize that such power inevitably breeds resentment but believe it is delusional to
argue that a more restrained American policy would attenuate that resentment. Since
resentment is a concomitant of power in any case their prescription is the
development of yet greater military power, strengthened alliances and bilateral
agreements with powers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
Christian realism recognizes that the use of power is necessary to an ordered world.
It knows, too, that power inevitably creates resentment. But it rejects the peculiar
notion that the mere accretion of power ameliorates resentment or renders resentment
irrelevant to the pursuit of US national interests. Christian realism rejects the
apparent underlying assumption that resentment of American power has no basis in
some moral claim. It insists that all people have some claims that a just people must
38 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited: America, the Benevolent Empire," The
Iraq War Reader, 599.
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recognize even as it knows that all power entails some injustice. In leading to greater
self-understanding regarding our own resentment of injustice the attitudes of
humility illumine the underlying causes of others' resentments. Christian humility
requires that we distinguish between the just and unjust resentments of others
because just resentment indicates an irresponsible use of power. To ignore this
distinction is to abandon the moral authority on which all power must ultimately rest.
The humility of Christian realism leads neither to self-abnegation nor to political
impotence. Rather, it discerns the divine reality that power without justice provides
only an illusion of security.
In questioning UN moral authority Krauthammer, too, raises significant issues for a
relevant Christian realism. The question of the UN's role in the so-called war on
terrorism did not spring full-blown from the Bush security strategy. Political realists
like Niebuhr recognized from early days that the Security Council system did not
reflect their vision of a benignly cooperative "imperial" power center capable of
maintaining an ordered and reasonably just international community. Rather
Security Council membership and voting arrangements represented the only system
that could be cobbled among the victorious Allies that quickly dissolved into hostile
ideological camps following WWII.
While he encouraged important and constructive roles for the UN, Niebuhr insisted
on recognizing its inherent limits. Reflecting on the League ofNations experience he
warned against attributing to the UN powers and authority it did not possess.
Assigning responsibilities without concomitant resources and political will would, in
his view, presage UN failure. Moreover, he feared that imputing to the UN power it
does not possess might encourage great power irresponsibility. When the national
interests of Security Council members are not at stake or when their interests clash,
strong UN action is blocked, as in the case of Serbia, or delayed with catastrophic
results as in Rwanda. When NATO belatedly acted to prevent further Serb atrocities
against Bosnia's Muslim population it did so against Russian interests and therefore
without UN authorization. It is generally accepted by the West (including France and
Germany in this case) that stopping genocide bestowed a moral authority despite lack
of UN authorization. Similarly, the ill-fated US intervention in Somalia carried no
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UN authority but was seen as serving a humanitarian good that lent moral substance
to unilateral action.
One response to Krauthammer's question regarding the moral authority of the UN is
that ideals have power not necessarily because they are true but because some people
believe strongly that they are true. His view to the contrary does not change the fact
that this belief produces power that can affect the outcomes we may desire. In its
mixture of political, moral and theological realisms Christian realism recognizes that
responsible action must take the power of idealism into account. The appearance of
the President and Secretary of State at the UN to argue the case against Saddam
before the UN was an explicit recognition of this power. It was a recognition, too,
that the populations of most democratic states, including the US, believe that UN
approval does lend moral authority to action within the international community.
Leaders must take these factors into account as they consider the means by which
their national interests are to be secured. Nevertheless because Christian realism
knows that no human institution can possess absolute truth it must reject claims that
UN imprimatur is the sine qua non of just international action. It rejects as well the
notion that any human collective or nation, however powerful, can assert the claim of
absolute truth.
Christian realism stands in the King's court to rebuke the powerful when they
attempt to make moral absolutes of their particular interests. It knows that the true
moral authority of power ultimately lies in its just use. Discerning what is true and
just lies along the paths of Christian humility. Here truth that guides our power is
ever open to the divine perspective and is tested through the experience and interests
of others. A Christian realism for today follows Niebuhr's insistence that just power
promotes security because it builds a larger community of shared interests. The UN
is one of the instruments available to the international community for this task. If the
UN at times fails because of its inherent flaws humility does not require silence but
constructive action. No true purpose is served by ignoring corruption or the reality
that self-interested votes are cast in the Security Council. But the humility of
Christian realism requires that we recognize our own self-interested use of the veto
and complicity in the inherent weaknesses of the UN. It requires that we address
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these problems with toleration, patience and contrition even as we know that
perfection eludes all human endeavours.
2. Affirming the Relevance of the UN
The NSS also underscored the widening divergence between the US and its
European allies regarding the degree to which national sovereignty should be
surrendered to super-national institutions such as the UN, EU and the European
Court of Human Rights. As Michael Glennon notes, Europeans increasingly find
legitimacy in the will of the international community. "Thus they comfortably
submit to impingements on their sovereignty that Americans would find anathema.
Security Council decisions limiting the use of force are but one example." This
growing divergence is reflected in public opinion among some of America's
traditional democratic allies. A few days before the NSS was announced a Sky news
poll revealed that the British public saw George Bush, not Saddam Hussein, the
greater threat to world peace.40
International concerns regarding unilateral US power, as some of Niebuhr's earliest
work attests, are not a recent phenomenon. But in the post-Soviet world community
America's position as lone superpower intensified these concerns, even among US
allies.41 The oblique treatment of the UN in the NSS, despite its detailed calls for
international cooperation, appeared to confirm the unilateral direction of "a uniquely
American internationalism."
But in the event the Bush Administration appeared to recognize that the UN did
confer a degree ofmoral authority relevant to its purposes. At home, it was clear that
a majority of Americans believed UN approval important if not decisive. Perhaps
more to the point, publics in Europe and Turkey made UN approval necessary for
j9
"Why the Security Council Failed," Foreign Affairs 82, no.3 (May/June 2003): 21.
40 Cited in Krauthammer, The Iraq War Reader, 598.
41
Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," Foreign Affairs 83 (March/April 2004): 68.
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cooperation with any US-led invasion. Thus Bush appeared before the UN General
Assembly to present his case against Saddam. The President pledged to work with
the UN Security Council while challenging it to act in disarming Iraq; but he also
reserved the right to act independently if the UN did not. Just weeks later, as the UN
was debating its response to the President's challenge, Congress with comfortable
margins in each body passed H.J.Res. 114, "Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002." The first paragraph posits an historical link
between US national security interests and the enforcement of UN resolutions
regarding Iraq. It notes that the 1991 Congressional authorization of US force against
Iraq was pursuant to 12 UN resolutions and in support ofUN goals. It stipulates that,
On September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States
to "work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our
common challenge" posed by Iraq and to "work for the necessary
resolutions," while also making it clear that "the Security Council
resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and
security will be met, or action will be unavoidable." 42
Perhaps reflecting US public opinion, the Congressional resolution recognized an
important though not decisive UN role in determining American action. Here the UN
is afforded a significantly greater role in legitimating US action than is indicated in
the NSS. But H.J.Res. 114 did not make the President's use of force dependent upon
further UN approval. To some in the Bush Administration Congress had declared
that, "we don't need the Security Council."43 Nevertheless, US and UK efforts
produced UN Resolution 1441 that found Iraq in "material breach" of numerous UN
resolutions, called for new and unimpeded weapons inspections and, warned that
Saddam "will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations."44 All 15 member-nations of the Security Council supported this
resolution. Renewed inspections failed to find WMD but many components
remained uncounted for. Even as US and UK forces faced climate related battle
42 U.S. Congress. Authorization for Use ofMilitary Force Against Iraq Resolution of2002 (H.J.Res.
114), cited in The Iraq War Reader, 380. The resolution received a 296-133 majority in the House
and a 77-23 majority in the Senate.
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44 UN Security Council Resolution 1441, cited in The Iraq War Reader, 652.
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deadlines, France, Germany and Russia demanded more time for inspections to
work. Meanwhile the Administration announced its goal now included the removal
of Saddam (which was made a stated objective of US foreign policy during the
Clinton Administration) not simply the disarmament of his regime. After serial
failures to reach agreement among Security Council permanent members, France and
Germany announced they would oppose any resolution authorizing force. The
Security Council was deadlocked. Diplomatic efforts for a UN solution to the crisis
faded away.
Ironically, the threat of unilateral force contravenes the UN Charter but may promote
actions that affirm UN moral authority. This appears true in the case of the 1990-
1991 Gulf War when the aggression of a member state was checked under the aegis
of the UN. It appears true as well in the build-up to the US led invasion of Iraq in
2003. Michael Glennon notes the unlikelihood of Iraq's having accepted the
inspection regime required by UN Resolution 1441 without the threat of US
unilateral force. Yet such threats themselves violate the UN Charter. Thus 1441 was
a diplomatic victory for the UN largely achieved by the threat of unilateral force in
violation of its charter. "The unlawful threat of unilateralism enabled the 'legitimate'
exercise of multilateralism. The Security Council reaped the benefit of the charter's
violation."45 The US, on the other hand, having provided the threat of force that
made the exercise of legitimate UN authority possible, heightened the level of moral
reproach attached to its refusal to let inspections run their full course.
The Administration thus placed greater importance on securing a UN imprimatur for
action than a reading of the National Security Strategy might indicate. If some
observers viewed the President's appearance as merely perfunctory, others believed it
offered hope for a peaceful solution in Iraq that would strengthen the UN. "We want
the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful," Bush told the
General Assembly.46 Still others believed that the US viewed the UN as simply one
entity among others that assume its place within a "coalition of the willing" such as
45
Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed," 27.
46
George W. Bush, "A Grave and Gathering Danger," a speech to the United Nations General
Assembly, September 12, 2002, cited in The Iraq War Reader, 317.
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envisioned by the NSS.47 These views need not be mutually exclusive. Almost
certainly the President's UN appeal played well at home: there remains a strong
48
American attachment to the ideal if not the practice of the UN. When President
G.H.W. Bush placed the UN at the center of his diplomatic efforts in the 1990-91
Gulf War, his strategy was widely supported on Capitol Hill; indeed, the New York
Times saw this as an indication that the UN "was functioning as it was designed to
do."49 Even those who opposed war to remove Saddam from Kuwait called for
international solutions such as UN sanctions.50 Despite the unilateral posturing of his
early Administration, these lessons were not altogether lost on the younger Bush.
3. American Responsibility and Loyalty to the UN
When President George W. Bush appeared before the UN General Assembly on
September 12, 2002 he pictured Saddam's regime as a threat to UN authority and his
compliance with Security Council resolutions a test ofUN relevance. Given the short
shrift the UN receives in the NSS it is perhaps tempting for opponents of force to
dismiss this view as a cynical attempt to identify US and UN objectives. But any
president's appearance before the UN General Assembly, whatever the NSS might
imply, is a recognition of some UN relevance to US objectives. It is the recognition
that, at its most elementary level, the UN remains the great global forum for any
power seeking international legitimacy for its policies. It is here, too, that the
Security Council becomes a check on unilateral power by bestowing or withholding
that imprimatur. The UN may be unable to check the actions of a great power but it
can raise the strategic, economic and moral costs of defiance. A president's
appearance before the UN is an acknowledgement that even a hyper-power cannot be
oblivious to world opinion. Whether this was an act of necessity or of humility is
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30 See Congressional Record-House, January 12, 1991 for the debate on these issues as the first
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Yet, as Niebuhr understood, to ascribe to the UN a moral standing and a political
reality it does not possess risks making it a vehicle of international irresponsibility.51
Within the past two decades the national interests of Security Council members have
prevented or crippled UN action against politically engendered humanitarian
disasters in Africa, the Middle East and in the Balkans. In the latter crisis the
Security Council failed to authorize sufficient force to prevent Serbia's murderous
anti-Bosnian pogrom. Non-UN sanctioned force was required to stop ethnic
cleansing and to maintain the no-fly zones that protected Iraq's Kurd and Shiite
populations. Failure to act in such cases renders UN moral authority ambiguous. It is
an ambiguity that results from the limits imposed by the Security Council veto; a
• * 52
veto power often used in the pursuit of member-powers' unilateral interests.
The oblique position the NSS assigns the UN doubtless anticipates the role the
Security Council may play in thwarting US power. It also recognizes the reality that
UN power is what its strongest members choose to give it. What the NSS does not
appear to recognize, or at least ignores, is that the international community is less
threatened by the UN's inherent weaknesses than it is by a "distinctly American
internationalism" backed by American hyper-power. In this regard the NSS may be
said to reflect what Niebuhr called America's dangerous innocency regarding its use
of power. The NSS recognizes that the Security Council may be a tool used by other
members to balance US power and influence. Perhaps at times this balance comes at
the expense of the moral and humanitarian considerations much celebrated in the
NSS.
The NSS does not appear to recognize that its explicit claim to global hegemony,
however it might be couched in humanitarian language and cooperation, heightens
not diminishes the desire of others to thwart US power. Nor does it appear to be
concerned that diminishing engagement in the UN simply provides opponents
51
Stone, Prophet to Politicians, 117.
52 The interests of the US (e.g. Israel), Russia (e.g. Serbia) and France (e.g. Iraq) have been reflected
in their Security Council votes.
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uncritical access to the world's most public diplomatic forum. As a practical matter,
further American disengagement will enable nations such as France to pursue their
own interests with the added advantage of their being masked by a patina of moral
superiority. The unilateral attitudes of the Bush Administration, coupled with long-
simmering suspicions of US ambitions, appeared to invite the cynical view that even
the promotion of human dignity may be another guise that masks power. The real
and perceived arrogance of the Administration—its lack of the humility urged by
candidate Bush—has had the ironical consequence of masking the real and perceived
flaws of the UN while magnifying fears of American power.
A Christian realism for today requires loyalty to the UN without confusing the ideal
with the necessary. Its wariness of absolutes and insistence on context does not allow
it to present any US/UN policy blueprint. Nevertheless when this relationship is
viewed through the lens of humility we find prophetic guidance. Whereas power may
tempt us to define the UN by its limits, the attitudes of humility illumine the
relevance of its strengths. It is a global venue for the toleration, patience, and
cooperation that relate US interests with the interests of the international community.
It provides a continuing opportunity to discern the interests of others while allowing
us to see ourselves as others see us. The humble spirit of Christian realism requires a
self-critical assessment of the innocency that we are inclined to ascribe to our power
and interests. The humble spirit knows that our highest ideals are always tainted by
self-interest.
In the so-called unipolar age America's greatest spiritual challenge is to discern the
limits of its power. If UN approval cannot be enshrined as a moral absolute of
international responsibility, the attitudes of humility nevertheless afford the UN a
rightful role in illuminating the responsibilities and limits of US power. The UN's
inherent weaknesses make it a flawed instrument for that purpose but prophetic faith
knows that the divine will often works through human imperfection. We cannot use
the imperfections of the UN to escape the responsibilities of our power. Nor do our
imperfections disqualify us from acting when the international community fails to act
through the UN. But a more humble America will acknowledge that its sense of
divine particularity has not eradicated its own considerable imperfections. It will
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accept that the voices that speak essential truth to its power are not always friendly
voices. With Augustine America will accept that it is often the quarrelsome voices
that "bring us to correction."53
A humble America must patiently join with other nations in the tortuous but
necessary task of reforming the Security Council to make it reflect the economic and
political realities of the 21st century.54 Meanwhile, if America would ameliorate
unjust resentment of its power it must recommit itself to strengthening the UN
through the "daily acts of fidelity and forbearance" that serve to promote a more just
international community. In this regard a relevant Christian realism for today recalls
a truth that Niebuhr spoke to power six decades ago.
Perhaps no lesson is more important for a nation as powerful as we,
than the truth that even powerful nations cannot master their own
destiny; for they are in a web of history in which many desires, hopes,
wills and ambitions, other than their own, are operative.55
The National Security Strategy and "Preemptive" War
The bold assertion of the right to strike pre-emptively against suspected terrorists and
"rogue states" is the most controversial provision of the National Security Strategy.
Reflecting what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called an "anticipatory self-
defense," the NSS doctrine of pre-emption posits a responsibility to discern and act
upon security threats to the US, its allies and interests, "before they emerge."
Because terrorism presents a radically different challenge from those posed by nation
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a state) and containment (diplomatic and economic measures against a nation state
with sufficient power to control internal elements that may threaten US security) are
no longer viewed as sufficient to protect against "borderless states and stateless
aggressors."56
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.57
The doctrine ofpre-emption, usually and narrowly defined as a defensive first strike
against "an imminent, specific, near certain attack," is neither new nor necessarily
controversial. 58 As Clinton's Secretary of State Madeleine Albright observed, "the
Bush preemption doctrine will prove a departure from past practice only if it is
implemented in a manner that is aggressive, indifferent to precedent, and careless of
the information used to justify military action."59 The NSS itself argues that
international law has long accepted that nations need not suffer attack before they
can legally defend themselves. It affirms that legal scholars and international jurists
56
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"often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent
threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to
attack." But, the document argues, global terrorist organizations possess easily
concealed weapons of mass destruction that can be "delivered covertly, and used
without warning." This new reality requires that the US "adapt the concept of
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries." This may
require taking "anticipatory action...even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack." 60 Nevertheless, the adapted concept of pre-emption
does not imply that US force will be employed in all cases. Nor should other nations
use this adapted concept "as a pretext for aggression" in pursuit of their own
interests.
1. A Distinctly American Interpretation
In asking the international community to accept a distinctly American right of pre¬
emption, however, the Bush Doctrine appears to conflate a historically and legally
recognized doctrine with a right to conduct preventive war which international law
has not recognized. In employing the terms prevention, pre-emption and anticipatory
action interchangeably the NSS is neither new nor unique. But it nevertheless invites
significant confusion. Until recently, notes French scholar Francois Heisbourg,
"'preventation' was widely used in strategic discourse to refer to crisis prevention or
preventative deployment—as an alternative to the use of lethal force." He cites the
dispatch ofUN peacekeepers in the 1990s to Macedonia to prevent armed conflict in
that backwater area of the already inflamed Balkans. Such preventative action,
Heisbourg believes, is the "polar opposite of the prevalent interpretation of the Bush
doctrine, which assumes that the United States may use lethal force in cold blood to
accomplish its objectives."61
Heisbourg implies that the concept of preventive action that entails force is morally
distinct from preventative economic, social and political means to combat
60
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terrorism.62 This lends credence to his criticism that the conflation of pre-emptive
and preventative doctrines sows confusion regarding US intentions and attitudes. But
in that the National Security Strategy devotes two full sections to non-violent
preventative strategies, Heisbourg's statement that the US seeks primarily to justify
the use of "lethal force in cold blood" appears both unfair and hysterical. He
nevertheless makes the significant point that blurring the concepts of preemption and
prevention potentially revolutionizes the "legitimization of the use of force."
Moreover, "misusing the two terms is to confuse the public debate in the
international arena, inviting a confluence of worst-case political analysis and anti-
U.S. sentiment by both US allies and adversaries."63 In this regard, Heisbourg's
resort to emotive language lends weight to his own argument. But he and others
appear dismissive of the reality that internationally accepted preventative actions
such as economic sanctions often produce as much if not more human suffering than
the use of "lethal force."64 Nor are so-called non-lethal measures more justly
discriminating between the guilty and the innocent. Certainly in the case of Iraq it
was the Iraqi people not Saddam and his circle who suffered most from 13 years of
UN sanctions.
Nevertheless one need not accede entirely to views such as Heisbourg's to agree that
the NSS is asserting a preventative war not a pre-emptive war doctrine. The doctrine
62
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is clarified by events.
The term "pre-emption" is not an accurate description of the Bush
administration's doctrine. It implies taking action against a nation or
group that is about to strike. What the Bush administration did in Iraq
was "prevention," which implies taking action even before the
decision to strike has been taken by a potentially hostile power, and
perhaps well before. This is the harder case from a traditional
international legal point of view.65
Perhaps the NSS conflated the two terms hoping it might avoid making the harder
and greatly more unsettling case for preventative war doctrine. But it is increasingly
clear that it was not the mote of linguistic confusion but the beam of arrogance that
proved most harmful to the Administration's case. The unilateralist attitudes of the
Administration combined with its bold assertions regarding American power and
intentions projected an arrogance that lends moral authority to criticism such as
Heisbourg's. Had the Administration followed the promise of candidate Bush to
"humbly" project American power its case for the use of preventative force against
Saddam might not have stirred the degree of hostility that it did. James Rubin, a
senior figure in the Clinton State Department believed that the "pre-emptive" strike
controversy otherwise might have been "manageable." As it was the perceived
arrogance of the Administration led Richard Betts to observe that Washington
"seems to have forgotten Bismarck's characterization of preventative war as 'suicide
from fear of death.'"66
Whichever U.S. officials decided to include the now-infamous
language about preemptive strikes and the primacy of American
power in the annual document, and then singled it out as marking a
new U.S. doctrine, either did not consider or did not care how would
affect the debate....If gaining support for action against Iraq was truly
Washington's highest priority in the fall of 2002, it is hard to imagine
65 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power, 139. Kagan is one of the leading intellectuals associated with
the Bush Administration.
66 Richard K. Betts, "Suicide from Fear of Death," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (January/February 2003):
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has are dangerous enough to do tremendous damage—even if the worst estimates ofU.S. vulnerability
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a more counterproductive step than to initiate a debate over whether
the United States has the right to attack whomever it wants, whenever
it deems necessary."67
Indeed, the perceived arrogance of the Administration proved a gift to those seeking
to thwart US power. While capitalizing on the fears and hostility generated by the
Administration's arrogance France was able to claim the moral high ground while
obscuring its significant financial stake in sustaining Saddam's regime. This may be
interpreted as French cynicism in protecting its own economic and political
interests.68 But the Administration's prideful confidence that American power would
carry all before it is almost certainly a relevant factor in allowing cynicism to wrap
itself in a cloak ofmoral self-righteousness. Proof of French cynicism did not answer
the case of those opposing preventative strikes against Saddam, of course, but the
perception of Administration arrogance undermined its political and moral authority
to make that case.
Thus the largely moderate and inclusive language that characterizes much of the
National Security Strategy was obscured, in the eyes ofmany international observers,
by the "shock and awe" of the Administration's unilateral assertions of US power.
This was the immediate context in which the international community considered
America's case against Saddam; but the broader question quickly became, as Kagan
observed, "how can the world's sole superpower be controlled?"69
Here, as Niebuhr had cautioned seven decades before 9/11, a great nation's pride of
power "imperils the peace of the national community and destroys the security of the
wilful nation by the very actions which are meant to guarantee it.70
67 James P. Rubin, "Stumbling into War," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 57-58.
68 While the French government has significant financial interests in Iraq it also has political interests
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2. Niebuhr on Preventative War
71
"Men mayfall into evil by the very desperation oftheir effort to avoid it."
Reinhold Niebuhr
In The Irony ofAmerican History Niebuhr observed that, "a democracy can not of
course engage in an explicit preventative war." He subjectively defined preventative
war as the temptation "to bring the whole of modern history to a tragic conclusion by
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one final and mighty effort to overcome its frustrations." Here he dealt with the
causes of American Cold War frustrations but did not distinguish between
preventative war and pre-emptive war doctrines. His brief treatment of preventative
war in Irony had been more fully explored in his 1950 essay, "The Conditions ofOur
Survival," which appeared in the Virginia Quarterly Review. This essay treats with
the doctrine of preventative war as it is generally understood in international law and
as reflected in Kagan's brief definition.
Niebuhr here addresses the issue during the early Cold War before the world became
inured to the fifty-year US/Soviet balance of terror. In 1949 the communist
revolution triumphed in China. In June, 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea
fomenting a bloody and inconclusive "police action." Eastern Europe was being
absorbed into the Soviet bloc under the shadow of massive Soviet armies. Most
alarming, in 1949 the Soviets successfully tested their first atomic weapon and Stalin
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appeared determined to develop airpower necessary to deliver such weapons. At
the time the Communist bloc appeared both monolithic and irresistible. Niebuhr
discerned in America "obvious notes of hysteria in our national life." This hysteria
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was evident in the inordinate fear of communist infdtration of US government and
domestic institutions. It was an hysteria that led to a "false estimate of the foe's
power or cunning," with potentially catastrophic implications.
Perhaps the most serious form of hysteria is that which manifests itself
in the desire for a preventative atomic war...This form of hysteria is
akin to the curious impulse, which sometimes overtakes people,
walking on the edge of an abyss, to throw themselves into its
depths...This willingness to flirt with the awful consequences of an
atomic war is frequently justified by the dictum that total war is
inevitable in any event, and that we ought therefore to choose the most
propitious moment to initiate it. But the idea of inevitable war is itself
an hysterical notion. There are probabilities, but no inevitabilities, in
history; for history is never pure fate but a mixture of destiny and
human decision. Decisions which capitulate to the illusion of
inevitability are monstrous because they annul the character ofman as
a responsible agent.74
Here Niebuhr sees political hysteria as a failure of faith. It reflects the anxiety that is
the underlying condition of human sin. It is an acutely negative expression of the
anxiety arising from humanity's knowledge of its contingency and fmitude. Although
human beings find respite in faith, few ever completely overcome all anxiety. We sin
when we attempt through power and spiritual pride to be what we cannot be and
vainly seek to make ourselves and our own security the center of the universe. In
theological terms we become idolaters. Hysteria rejects the faith in which we accept
our finitude because we know that ultimate security rests with an infinite and loving
Creator. In rejecting such faith political hysteria seeks security in false gods that we
ourselves create and control. The idea of a preventative atomic war was, in Niebuhr's
view, was one such false god. This is the idol that vainly seeks to supplant God's
infinite and perfect justice with partial, finite and egotistical notions of justice. It is
the idol adored when we worship of our own power.
Nevertheless, his rejection of preventative atomic war represented no retreat from
Niebuhr's insistence that American and Western security required sufficient military
power to contain Soviet ambitions in Europe. In his 1950 essay, "The Hydrogen
74 "The Conditions ofOur Survival," Virginia Quarterly Review (Autumn 1950): 485-486.
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Bomb," Niebuhr fretfully supported US intentions to build the hydrogen bomb. It
appeared certain that the Soviets, having developed their own atomic weapon, were
working to develop the more advanced technology. He rejected the position that the
US could unilaterally renounce such a weapon because doing so risked rendering the
West's defense untenable. A responsible statesman could not knowingly place the
nation in such a position. While some individuals are capable of ultimate self-
sacrifice nations are not. He rejected the idea that a unilateral US renouncement of
this new weapon would "soften the Russian heart," particularly regarding Soviet
intentions to dominate Europe. Yet, he insisted, the development of the H-bomb
should proceed concomitantly with a "solemn covenant never to use it first." Such a
policy retrieved some moral authority from tragic necessity and would serve "to
counteract all those tendencies in our national life which make for the subordination
of moral and political strategy to military strategy."
The refusal to use the bomb first does have a further significance. We
would be saying by such a policy that even a nation can reach the
point where it can purchase its life too dearly. If we had to use this
kind of destruction in order to save our lives, would we find life worth
living? Even nations can reach a point where the words of our Lord,
"Fear not them which are able to kill the body but rather fear them
that are able to destroy both soul and body," become relevant.
The point ofmoral transcendence over historical destiny is not as high
as moral perfectionists imagine. But there is such a point, though the
cynics and realists do not recognize it. We must discern that point
clearly.75
Christian realism nevertheless recognizes that no nation will choose self-annihilation
rather than to produce a particular weapon, especially if it can be reasonably argued
that the possession of the weapon makes its use unlikely (an ironic point Niebuhr
apparently accepts). But nations have a concomitant moral responsibility to discern
the circumstances in which such weapons will not be used. The statesman is to be
held accountable for national survival but Christian realism discerns this
accountability through a prophetic faith that knows there is no ultimate security in
history. If Niebuhr's prophetic faith requires Christian responsibility for more equal
75 "The Hydrogen Bomb," Christianity and Society 15, no. 2 (Spring 1950), reprinted in Love and
Justice, 237.
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social justice in history, it knows as well that perfect justice is always beyond history.
For him prophetic faith requires a profound humility before God that acknowledges
both the responsibilities and the limits of human power. Here the attitudes of
humility reject any idolatrous worship of our own power and militate against a
hysterical response to the power of others.
3. Preventative War and Responsibility in Context
Christian realism requires attention to context and consequences. It was this
insistence that led Niebuhr to reject the adoption of moral absolutes as political
strategies: his proscription against preventative atomic war is as close to a moral
absolute as can be found in his work. He had very early rejected pacifism as such an
absolute for public responsibility.76 He could commend an individual's moral choice
to embrace absolute pacifism but believed that pacifism as public policy led to the
irresponsibility of injustice. During the 1930s some Americans embraced neutrality
as the nation's best option for avoiding the gathering turmoil in Europe. Some, in
their determination to remain aloof from international conflict, also made neutrality a
moral absolute of American foreign policy.77 They sought to avoid the inevitable
evil that war entails but incurred the guilt of irresponsibility in the face of a yet
greater evil. As the calamitous events of the late 1930s pointed inexorably toward
conflict with powerful and demonstrably evil adversaries, Niebuhr reflected upon a
concept of preventative war consistent with the responsibilities entailed by his
Christian realism.
Contemporary history refutes the idea that nations are drawn into war
too precipitously. It proves, on the contrary, that it is the general
inclination of democratic nations at least, to hesitate so long before
76 See "On the Ethiopian War," Radical Religion 1, no.l (Autumn 1935): 6-8; reprinted in Love and
Justice, 166-67. Here Niebuhr reflects on the moral quandary that proposed sanctions against Italy
posed for pacifists. This quandary proved "how hard it is to deal with political problems from the
standpoint of an absolute credo."
77 Niebuhr had embraced American neutrality as a means of forestalling his great fear in the 1930s
that the nation's economic and military power would lead it down the path to fascism. That he was
himself capable of an hysterical reaction is evidenced by his response to Roosevelt's 1938 call for
increased US defense spending. "BriefNotes," Radical Religion 3, no. 2 (Spring 1938): 7.
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taking this fateful plunge that the dictator nations gain a fateful
advantage over them by having the opportunity of overwhelming them
singly, instead of being forced to meet their common resistance. 8
His point here is not that war is ever good but that it might be the lesser of evil
choices confronting the responsible statesman. Doubtless recalling the "peace" of
Munich he reflected on a moral responsibility that recognizes "there can be no justice
. 79 . « .in the world if we resent only the injustice which is done to us." Nazi atrocities
were even then known. Most of the concentration camps were in operation. Civilian
populations were being indiscriminately attacked and displaced. Being unprepared
for war or unwilling to wage it the western democracies had sacrificed the peace of
others in order to secure their own. Moral guilt attached to this failure despite the
best intentions and hopes of those who sought to avoid armed conflict. Here Niebuhr
appears to believe that a preventative war before Nazi Germany could gain its
"fateful advantage" would have been morally justified.
Thus it is problematic to argue that Niebuhr's Christian realism would oppose
preventative war under any circumstances. His adamant opposition to preventative
atomic war thus does not necessarily imply opposition to preventative war within a
quite different context. Hovering over his discussion is the probability that any
nuclear attack entailed the kind of massive and indiscriminate killing for which he
condemned both sides in WWII. Such indiscriminate attacks moot the
considerations of justice that must characterize Christian responsibility in the
conduct of any war. Nevertheless, if justice requires that a nation's claim to survival
be considered, as Christian realism believes it does, then a preventative strike may
78 "To Prevent the Triumph of an Intolerable Tyranny," Christian Century 57, no. 51 (December 18,
1940) cited in Love and Justice, 272. [Note: D.B. Robertson's 1979 bibliography ofNiebuhr's works
lists this essay under the title, "If America is Drawn into the War, Can You, as a Christian, Participate
in it or Support it?" Reinhold Niebuhr's Works: A Bibliography (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1979), 62.]
Niebuhr prefaces this observation with the caveat that statesmen will seek "decent and honorable"
means to avoid war, a policy which American isolationists and pacifists believed Roosevelt was not
pursuing.
79 "We Are at War," 2.
80 "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis 4, no. 4 (March 20, 1944): 2.
290
• • *81fall within the realm of tragic choices that a just cause may at times require. Here
the statesman confronts the kind of morally ambiguous decision Churchill faced in
89
destroying the powerful French fleet at Oran. He believed that should this force
pass into Nazi control it would tip the naval balance in Germany's favour. Whether
this was a pre-emptive measure against a clear and imminent threat or a preventative
measure against a gathering but less immediate threat, this case underscores the
difficulty in making a clear distinction between the two doctrines. For Churchill this
was a "hateful decision" of the kind that necessity at times forces upon the
• 8^
responsible statesman.
Christian realism recognizes that responsibility at times might require such decisions.
It does not believe that morally responsible decisions necessarily entail a defensive
posture or that the foe always be allowed the initiative. Accordingly Christian
realism need not rule out specifically targeted preventative measures against terrorist
organizations or so-called rogue states. It accepts that moral responsibility might
require the use of preventative force in humanitarian crises. It cautions that there may
be crises in which United Nation's approval cannot be forthcoming and cannot be
determinate of international responsibility and action.
But Christian realism for today also confirms that great power entails great
responsibility and no more so than in the case of preventative war. Here it affirms
Niebuhr's prophetic witness against the moral and political hazards of all arrogant
power. Such hazards are reflected in the NSS' explicit embrace of preventative force
in the interest of a "distinctly American internationalism." Although the doctrine of
"pre-emption" is mentioned only briefly the NSS is perceived by many to be a
proclamation of the global hegemony of predominant US power. It reflects an
81 "Justice and Love, " Christianity and Crisis 15, no. 4 (Fall 1950), reprinted in Love and Justice, 28-
29.
82
Appearing before the Commons to report the matter, Churchill was observed "sitting there with
tears pouring down his cheeks." Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 2001;
London: Penguin Group), 622-625.
83 This action cost the lives of 1300 French sailors and understandably overshadowed Anglo-French
relations for many years. Though failing to destroy the entire fleet, the attack did seriously cripple it.
Moreover, through this "brutal rather than glorious" act Churchill signalled to a wavering America
that there should be "no more talk about Britain giving in." Ibid., 624.
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Administration whose actions and attitudes have marked a significant shift from the
multilateral traditions that have shaped US responsibility within the international
community. America's ties with the UN, NATO and other international bodies are
the means by which American power and responsibility are shared. These traditions
do not remove resentment of American power but they do ameliorate it. They are one
means through which we may distinguish between just and unjust resentment of our
power and thereby build a community of common interests.
Today's Christian realism recognizes that any government's first duty is to protect its
citizens. It accepts that terrorism and so-called rogue states that support it pose
serious threats to national security. But even as it supports responsible US measures
to counter these threats, Christian realism always stands in judgment upon their
justice and wisdom. It must remind us that times of great crisis are times that easily
betray just fear into hysteria. This hysteria betrays our legitimate national security
interests by obscuring the political and moral limits of power. Hysteria and great
power combine to make false absolutes of our own interests and security. Here we
destroy rather than build the greater international community of interest upon which
our national security ultimately rests.
The National Security Strategy's assertion of a distinctly American interpretation of
preventative war in pursuit of a distinctly American internationalism reflects a
destructive amalgam of hysteria and prideful power. As an exercise in public
diplomacy it reflects a disdain for world opinion and for the necessity of
distinguishing just and unjust resentments of US power. Its arrogant proclamation of
American power appears oblivious to the fact that most US allies are democratic
states whose governments rightfully rest upon popular consent. Though it speaks of
international cooperation the NSS appears to reduce old alliances and allies to tools
in the toolbox of American power. Because of its arrogant assertions of American
power the NSS has served less to unite the world against terrorism and rogue states
than to divide old alliances. There was much pride and little humility evident in
these assertions. Their costs are reflected in part in Iraq where much of the
international community appears more content with the humiliation of great power
than in rebuilding a devastated nation.
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The National Security Strategy and the Failure of Intelligence
Intelligence—and how we use it—is our first line of defense against
terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states.84
National Security Strategy
The events of 9/11 that gave rise to the National Security Strategy evidenced a
significant failure of intelligence with regard to internal US security. This failure had
little apparent impact on the credibility of intelligence that was used to justify, in
part, a US-led preventative attack to disarm Iraq and remove Saddam's regime. The
US and most Western nations believed that the regime possessed WMD. Though
their exact nature and quantity were unknown there was significant disagreement on
the degree of threat they presented to the international community. Suffering from
9/11 after-shock, however, America's Intelligence Community fell into what the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence labelled "group think," a corporate
mentality that uncritically accepted many worst-case estimates of Saddam's WMD
capability.83
While the issue ofWMD was not the Administration's only argument for the forceful
disarming of Iraq, in light of 9/11 it gave the issue immediacy. The Administration
argued as well that the removal of Saddam was justified by his failure to comply with
16 UN resolutions dating to 1990. In this regard, it argued that a failure to act would
consign the UN to the fate of the League of Nations. Saddam's execrable record of
human rights abuses provided further grounds for his removal. Nevertheless it was




85 Conclusions: Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2004.
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1. A Catalogue of Misjudgements
The events of 9/11 evidenced a massive failure of US intelligence that launched a
number of Congressional inquiries. The first was conducted by a Congressional
Joint Inquiry (a temporary joint committee composed of both House and Senate
O/-
Members) that released its report in December 2002. The Joint Inquiry report
found that US intelligence had failed on a number of fronts.
For a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to
capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of
available information that appears relevant to the events of 9/11. As a
result, the Community missed opportunities to disrupt the September
11 plot by denying entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least
try to unravel the place through surveillance and other investigative
work within the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened
state of alert and thus harden the homeland against attack.
No one will ever know what might have happened had more
connections been drawn between these disparate pieces of
information.87
The Joint Inquiry report revealed that US intelligence long had lacked a "domestic
intelligence collection capability" following revelations of civil rights abuses in the
oo
1950s and 1960s. That US intelligence lacked such a capability with regard to 9/11
was part of the price the nation paid for those abuses. But the report underscored the
point that even in the arena of domestic threats intelligence remains an ambiguous
enterprise reflecting uncertainty and risk of error.
86 Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December, 2002. The report includes the ironical note
that the US Intelligence Community had its origins in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attacks.
"Additional Views of the Members of the Joint Inquiry," 1.
87 Joint Inquiry, 33.
88
Ibid., 37. In 1963 the Kennedy Administration authorized FBI surveillance of civil rights leaders,
including Martin Luther King. FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover famously disliked King and distrusted the
civil rights movement. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 475-476. Hoover's abuses led to more
stringent controls on the collection of domestic intelligence.
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The July 22, 2004 Report of the Independent Bi-Partisan 9/11 Commission, with the
benefit of additional time and evidence, provided painfully detailed accounts of the
failures of intelligence examined by the earlier Joint Inquiry. This commission, co-
chaired by elder statesmen of each major political party, identified significant flaws
in domestic intelligence that allowed the 9/11 plot to develop and largely succeed. It
notes that terrorism was not the over-riding concern of the Clinton Administration or
of the Bush Administration until 9/11. "None of the measures adopted by the U.S.
government from 1998-2001 disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al Qaeda
plot."89 The disjoined nature of domestic intelligence gathering and assessment, the
failure to communicate intelligence among federal and other law enforcement
agencies, and the failure of front-line airport security measures all contributed to the
disaster. Thus known or suspected terrorists entered the U.S, undertook training in
flying large aircraft, and received substantial funds from terrorist organizations to
finance the plot. On 9/11, carrying box cutters and pepper-spray devices, terrorists
managed to board four fully fuelled commercial aircraft. Several had set off detection
devices, were searched and then allowed to board even though they continued to
trigger the devices.
The 9/11 Commission Report makes a number of recommendations addressing each
of these failures of domestic intelligence. But significantly the report emphasises the
relationship between America's domestic security and the manner in which it meets
its international responsibilities. Here the report calls for a relationship "beyond oil"
with Saudi Arabia (homeland to most of the 9/11 terrorists), a relationship that both
nations "can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform."
The report observes that "America must stand as an example of moral leadership in
the world" by pushing for reforms citizens of repressive Islamic regimes can see as
the means to a better future.90 American security requires drastic reforms in
domestic intelligence but better intelligence and military power themselves will not
guarantee national security.
89
Summary: The Independent 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, 9.
90 Ibid., 18.
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The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightfully included military
action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues.
But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national
power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement,
economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland
defense.91
Also in July, 2004 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its report on
US intelligence-related failures in Iraq. The focus of the Select Committee's report
was the failure of American intelligence regarding Iraq's possession of WMD and
related programs. Saddam's presumed possession of such weapons, in light of 9/11
and suspected ties with terrorist groups, lent immediacy to the Administration's call
for a preventative war to destroy Iraq's WMD and to remove Saddam from power.
The intelligence supporting the Administration's case was contained in the October,
2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "Iraq's Continuing Program for Weapons
ofMass Destruction."
The first conclusion of the Committee's report is that most "key judgments"
contained in the NIE, "either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying
intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to
the mischaracterizaton of the intelligence."92 The NIE's unequivocal position that
"Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons" overstated what was then known
about Saddam's WMD holdings. Most of what the Intelligence Community (IC)
knew with any certitude regarding Iraq's WMD programs apparently predated the
1991 Gulf War. Moreover, the IC lost its UN sources when Saddam ousted its
inspectors in 1998. As a second conclusion notes the IC failed to accurately and
adequately convey the uncertainties behind the judgments reflected in the NIE.
Intelligence analysts are not only charged with interpreting and
assessing the intelligence reporting, but with clearly conveying to




Summary: The Senate Select Committee Report, 1.
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what they don't know, what they think, and to make sure that policy
makers understand the difference.93
The report strongly criticised the institutional attitudes and assumptions that
fomented Intelligence Community errors in judgment:
The Intelligence community suffered from a collective presumption
that Iraq had an active and growing WMD program. This "group
think" dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and
managers both to interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively
indicative for a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize
evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding WMD programs.
This presumption was so strong that formalized IC mechanisms
established to challenge assumptions and group think were not
utilized.94
The Senate Committee found that the IC was under "tremendous pressure to make
correct assessments, to avoid missing a credible threat, and to avoid an intelligence
failure on the scale of 9/11."95 Although there had been allegations to the contrary
the Committee found no evidence that Intelligence Community judgments regarding
Iraq's WMD programs were changed under pressure from the Administration.
2. Contrition and the Lessons of Failure
As one who had read and believed privileged information regarding Iraq's WMD
program I found the Administration's assertions credible. Based upon my own
understanding of the destructive potential of these capabilities I believed it essential
that Saddam be disarmed. My conviction in this regard was heightened by the ease
with which the attacks of 9/11 claimed 3000 lives and the possibility that Saddam





Ibid., 28. Some attention was focused on personal visits Vice President Cheney had made to CIA
headquarters. According to the report participants in these briefing did not believe that Cheney
pressured analysts to change their assessments of Iraq's suspected WMD programs.
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subsequent investigation on Iraq's WMD program found no evidence linking Iraq to
the 9/11 attack, at the time I believed such a link plausible. With regard to American
intelligence on Iraq I confess with David Kay that "we were all wrong." 96
Although he does not use the term Kay reminds us of the relevance of contrition to
Christian responsibility. It is indispensable to Christian realism because it is an
attitude of Christian humility without which there is no truly Christian responsibility.
It is not indispensable because Christian realism excuses incompetence but because it
recognizes human finitude and accepts that mistakes are inevitable. More
importantly, contrition is essential because Christian realism is always mindful that
pride in its many guises betrays us into error. Contrition is essential because it
safeguards against self-righteousness and opens us to the lessons of our mistakes. It
is an acknowledgement of the fragmentary nature of our understanding of truth. We
remain responsible for our mistakes but in a contrite confession of our errors we
open ourselves to the divine forgiveness and a grace that illumines responsibility
anew.
Christian realism requires that we learn the lessons of history and experience. The
post 9/11 inquiries regarding US intelligence point to many such lessons. It is the
mark of a responsible democracy that the post 9/11 inquiries, particularly regarding
Iraq, have laid humiliating failures before the world. Perhaps we may call this a
secular expression of Christian contrition. Yet in the prophetic tradition Christian
realism seeks to discern the attitudes that lend a moral taint to the failure of
intelligence regarding Iraq. It is unfair to hold the Bush Administration exclusively
responsible for a decade of intelligence failures. The inquiries make this clear.
Moreover, any nation's responsibility to protect its citizens would be massively
underscored by the murder of 3000 people going about their daily tasks. Yet
Christian realism discerns in this Administration an arrogance regarding American
power that undermines its long-term ability to do that. Its apparent disregard for
America's multilateral traditions, its dismissal of international opinion, and a national
security strategy that proclaims a distinctly American internationalism all reflect
96
Kay Testimony, Senate Armed Forces Services Committee, January 29, 2004. Kay, a senior
member of the US Intelligence Community, had been head of the post-war Iraq Survey Group.
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pride that betrays power into weakness.
The National Security Strategy's assertion of American hegemony served to raise the
suspicions of a world already resentful of American power. This prideful and
gratuitous assertion was accompanied by the "shock and awe" of Administration
rhetoric preceding the invasion of Iraq. Intelligence regarding Iraq's WMD used to
give immediacy to this invasion has been proven largely wrong. The failure to
adequately provide for the post-invasion security and rebuilding of Iraq, the abuse of
prisoners and the failure of intelligence have combined to sap both the credibility and
moral authority of American power. From the perspective of Christian realism these
failures indicate an absence of humility; the attitudes that might have helped
distinguish between what we know and what we should know; a humility that
discerns responsibility in great crisis without succumbing to the irresponsibility of
either complacency or hysteria.
As he did in another great crisis of American history, Niebuhr's understanding of
humility's essential relevance informs a Christian realism for today.
The American situation is such a vivid symbol of the spiritual
perplexities of modern man, because the degree of American power
tends to generate illusions to which a technocratic culture is already
too prone. This technocratic approach to the problems of history,
which erroneously equates the mastery of nature with the mastery of
historic destiny, in turn accentuates a very old failing in human nature:
the inclination of the wise, or the powerful, or the virtuous, to obscure
and deny the human limitations in all human achievements and
- 97
pretensions.
National Security Strategy and the Abuse of Human Rights in a War for
Human Dignity




"non-negotiable" demands of human dignity.
In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand
for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these
principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation
owns these aspirations and no nation is exempt from them.98
Thus opens Section II of the document, "Champion Aspirations of Human Dignity."
"America," it declares, "must stand firmly for the non-negotiable demands of human
dignity" that include the rule of law, limits on the absolute power of the state and
equal justice.99 The United States will "speak out honestly about violations of the
nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international
institutions to advance freedom"100
The NSS posits America's support for human dignity as central to its national
security policies. The requirements of human dignity, it asserts, "will guide our
government's decisions about international cooperation, the character of our foreign
assistance, and the allocation of resources. They will guide our actions and our words
in international bodies."101 The strategy notes that history has harshly judged nations
that systematically violate human rights and deny the aspirations of their own people.
As the world grows smaller systematic human rights abuses are seen as affecting the
global community not simply the unfortunates who reside in totalitarian states.
Recent events confirm that in the age of global technology even weak states such as
Afghanistan may create a "crossroads of radicalism and technology" that threaten
• 109 •
US security. Human dignity accordingly is made a tenet of American international
responsibility. Such obligations, the strategy cautions, are "not to be undertaken












Niebuhr would have grimly appreciated the irony.
In its emphasis on the ideal of human dignity the strategy truthfully acknowledges
that "our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals." Events subsequent
to the attacks on the Taliban and on Iraq ironically confirm that this struggle
continues. The NSS' ideal of human dignity—intended to lend moral authority to the
pursuit of US security interest—has been made risible by prideful power. The
treatment of Guantanamo Bay internees, the abuses in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib jail,
and the lack of preparation for providing security in post-war Iraq are each failures of
American justice.
1. The Guantanamo Bay Internees
Early in the Afghanistan campaign the Administration determined that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to the great majority of internees confined at the US
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In response to criticism from human rights
organizations and some foreign governments, the President found that the
Conventions applied to Afghanistan Taliban fighters but not to al-Qaida internees.
However, this new determination did not confer Prisoner of War (POW) status on
captured Taliban because they failed to meet Convention standards as lawful
combatants. Because they represented no state signatory to the Conventions, al-
Qaida fighters remained outside Geneva Convention protections.
The Bush Administration has deemed all of the detainees to be
"unlawful combatants," who may, according to Administration
officials, be held indefinitely without trial or even despite their
eventual acquittal by a military tribunal. The decision with respect to
the application of the Geneva Conventions has thus not effected the
treatment of any of the detainees held at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and has not quelled the criticism. The
Secretary of Defense has reaffirmed that detainees will continue to be
treated humanely....
The U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR) and some
human rights organizations argue that all combatants captured on the
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battlefield are entitled to be treated as POWs until an independent
tribunal has determined otherwise. The U.N. Commission on Human
Rights Working Group on Arbitrary Detention deemed that the U.S.
detention of "enemy combatants," without determining their status in
accordance with international law, may be arbitrary....The
Administration's position [is] that, there being no doubt as to the
status of the detainees, individual legal procedures to determine the
status of the detainees are unnecessary.104
In late 2003 the US Supreme court heard amicus curiae briefs (including one
submitted by a former Japanese-American internee) and granted certiorari to hear
arguments as to whether US courts have jurisdiction to hear legal challenges on
behalf of the detainees. An earlier appellate court had found that it had no such
jurisdiction because the detainees are aliens and are being detained outside the
sovereign territory of the US. In July 2004 the US Supreme Court, while confirming
the President's right to hold combatants without trial, ruled that the Guantanamo Bay
internees have recourse to the US courts.
The treatment of these internees discredited the Administration claims that the war
against terrorism is "a fight for freedom, the rule of law and human dignity."105
Although the Department ofDefense persistently claimed that their treatment is fully
consistent with Geneva Convention principles internees were nevertheless denied
Prisoner of War status under the Geneva Convention.106 This was, according to the
New York Times, an arbitrary action that "rightly offended most ofAmerica's allies."
Moreover, the Times continued, "following the standards of the Geneva Convention,
a treaty signed and properly ratified by the Senate, does not require coddling violent
enemies of the United States. It simply requires applying America's proud standards
of justice to them."107 In the Administration's refusal to apply Geneva Convention
status to the Guantanamo detainees we see reflected the increasing divergence of US
attitudes on human rights from those shared by the wider international community.
104 Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in the War on Terrorism, A Congressional
Research Service Reportfor Congress, December 8, 2003, 1-4.
105 World Report 2003, Human Rights Watch , http:// www.hrw.org/wr2k3, 1.
106 Elsea, Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees, " 36. This analysis notes that "earlier reports that the
detainees were being treated inhumanely appear to be unfounded."
107 "Justice at Guantanamo," Editorial, New York Times (January 29, 2002).
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The majority of expert opinion, including that of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, opposed US policy.108
While there were both legal and practical grounds to deny POW status to
Guantanamo Bay internees,109 the Administration's efforts to justify its position on
the issue have been impeded by its real and perceived arrogance toward international
opinion.110 Given the methods employed in the 9/11 attacks and the possibility that
some detainees were similarly trained, extreme caution in their initial transport and
incarceration was reasonable and responsible.111 Yet the Administration's
intransigence has undermined its efforts to justify reasonable precautions for the
safety of both internees and US personnel. Even attempts at openness backfire as
photos of the hooded and manacled prisoners continue to be flashed into living
rooms around the world. Particularly in those areas of the globe where winning
hearts and minds is seen as imperative these recurrent images cannot be offset by any
112number of words. Allowed to fester for nearly two years, this issue smacks of an
arrogance that has sapped American moral authority and increased resentment of
American power. Normally US-friendly, The Economist observed that "even judged
by Mr Rumsfeld's lengthening list of Pyrrhic victories, this one particularly hurts
• 113America's reputation."
A Christian realist's perspective does not require hindsight to believe that humility
on the part of the Administration might have avoided, or at least ameliorated, this
108 See Joanne Mariner, "The Continuing Debate over the Legal Status of Guantanamo Detainees,"
Findlaw Forum (March 11, 2002): 1.
109 See Ruth Wedgwood, "Prisoners of a Different War," Financial Times (January 30, 2002). Yale
Law professor Wedgwood is an international law consultant to the Pentagon.
1,0 See Marjorie Cohn, "Bush and the Geneva Convention: Begging the Question," Jurist (February 8,
2002): 1.
111 In the course of my military service I once served as operations officer for an aerial transport
squadron. Knowing something of the hazards of all aerial transport I did not find that detainees being
hooded and manacled during flight to be inhumane treatment under the circumstances. Without
taking every precaution it would have been a dereliction of duty to order military personnel on board
transport aircraft.
1,2 "Torture! What's Next? Electrodes?" headlined one report. See "Rumsfeld, Myers Pentagon
Briefing," An International Information Program, U.S. Department of State, February 8, 2002: 2-3.
113 "Not Good Enough," The Economist (July 3, 2004): 12.
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disaster. If it understands the inevitability of some misjudgement in crisis, Christian
realism also knows that crisis presents and demands creative measures. The
Guantanamo Bay internee issue reflects lost opportunities for the kind of creative
public diplomacy called for in the 9/11 Commission report. The National Security
Strategy urges, ironically it now seems, that US security requires effective public
diplomacy "to help people around the world learn about and understand America."114
This was published even as the quandary of Guantanamo Bay became a diplomatic
Bay of Pigs. Certainly the Guantanamo Bay quandary involves significant
international legal issues that require international solutions. It also entails issues in
American law over which the Congress has significant legislative authority.115
This situation challenged the US to provide international leadership in finding these
solutions and it failed to meet this responsibility. The internees' case presented an
opportunity for America to set an example of democratic rule and open diplomacy. It
seemed to present precisely the kind of problem for which the NSS pledged
"consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility."116 Yet the
prideful and unilateral stance of the Administration regarding the Guantanamo Bay
internees has undermined its moral authority in a conflict it has itself defined in
moral terms.
2. Abuse in Abu Ghraib Prison
The obscene abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US military personnel in Saddam's most
notorious torture chamber was so grotesque as to constitute treason in a war for
human dignity. It has been a cruel gift to al Qaeda and other terrorists groups
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American sentiment and further endangered the lives of US military personnel in the
field.117 It has been a body blow to US prestige and moral authority, all the more so
because the Administration offered America as the model for others to emulate. That
Abu Ghraib, the symbol of Saddam's murderous regime, should become the symbol
of disgraceful conduct by US soldiers is one of the searing ironies of the war on
terrorism.
Yet if this damaging and humiliating episode serves to inspire humility in this
Administration it may serve constructive purposes. The President, the Secretary of
State, and the commanding general have each apologized to the Iraqi people and to
the international community. Nevertheless their expressions of contrition will be
given substance only if justice is served and is seen to be served. Here repentance
requires a comprehensive investigation embracing the entire military and civilian
chain of command. The prosecution of those found responsible must be open and
transparent. It must set an example of the democratic processes and values betrayed
by those who abused the Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib.
Christian realism discerns through the lens of humility another possibility for some
redemptive good to come of this disaster. In the immediate case repentance entails
justice for abuser and abused. Yet it may serve other essential and creative purposes.
Humility expressed through repentance is requisite to Christian responsibility in
conflict. It illumines the elements of common humanity that are the building blocks
of hopes for a better community beyond conflict. It points to a truth of faith that
rejects both despair and the vainglory of power. Here is a God's eye perspective that
allows us to acknowledge our fmitude and imperfections while discerning our
responsibilities to others.
Beyond all moral distinctions of history we must know ourselves one
with our enemies not only in the bonds of a common humanity but
also in the bonds of a common guilt by which that humanity has
become corrupted. The Christian faith must persuade us to be humble
117 Luke Baker and Alastair Macdonald, "U.S. Jails First Soldier Over Iraq Jail Abuse," Reuters (May
19,2004):!.
305
rather than self-righteous in carrying out our historic tasks. It is the
humility which is the source of pity and forgiveness.118
Conclusion
The National Security Strategy provides the Bush Administration's vision of 21st
century American power and international responsibility. Although it was most
immediately prompted by the 9/11 attacks, and proposes strategies to defeat
international terrorism, the NSS is more broadly a proclamation of a global
hegemony based on American military and economic power. Even as the NSS
speaks of international cooperation, economic development and the non-negotiable
demand for a universal respect for human dignity, it asserts the international primacy
ofUS interests and values.
Predictably the latter emphasis invited international resentment. The NSS'
proclamation of a "distinctly American internationalism"; the explicit embrace of
preventative war doctrine; and the unilateralist attitudes and actions of the Bush
Administration all gave new impetus to old suspicions of American power. For
many in the international community the policies, attitudes and actions of the
Administration reflect an arrogance that appears to threaten their interests more
immediately than international terrorism. The NSS and related Administration
policies have struck an ironically discordant note just as US and international
security requires unity of purpose. While the 9/11 attacks rightly would have shaken
the complacency of any government, the Administration's assertion of unilateral
power appears dismissive of the resentment it predictably created and oblivious to its
potential consequences. As Niebuhr's incidental work repeatedly reveals from 1932
onwards resentment of US power has been an enduring fact of international life.
There is little in the NSS that reflects either an awareness of this resentment or an
understanding that US attitudes and policies must take it into account.
Although candidate George W. Bush called for humility in the exercise of American
118
Niebuhr," Our Responsibilities in 1942," 1-2.
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power neither his Administration nor the NSS reflected the attitudes of humility
discerned in Niebuhr's incidental work. The gratuitous rejection of various
international agreements already mooted under President Clinton coupled with the
Administration's hostility to the United Nations indicated major shifts in America's
traditionally multilateral approach to its international responsibilities. Though after
9/11 there was broad international support for removing the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, this support faded as the Administration shifted its focus to removing
Saddam's regime in Iraq. At the same time the Administration promulgated its
National Security Strategy. Predictably Iraq is seen as a case study in the political
and practical implications of this assertive US strategy. Robert Kagan, a leading
intellectual close to the Administration, invites this view.
Even at times of dire emergency, and perhaps especially at those
times, the world's sole superpower needs to demonstrate that it wields
its great power on behalf of its principles and all who share them.
The manner in which the United States conducts itself in Iraq today is
especially important in this regard. At stake is not only the future of
Iraq and the Middle East more generally, but also of America's
reputation, its reliability, and its legitimacy as a world leader. The
United States will be judged, and should be judged, by the care and
commitment it takes to secure a democratic peace in Iraq. It will be
judged by whether it indeed advances the cause of liberalism, in Iraq
and elsewhere, or whether it merely defends its own interests.119
The outcome of the US-led effort to secure a democratic peace for Iraq appears
cannot be predicted. Yet even as its outcome appears distant and uncertain the Iraq
experience offers the lessons that history teaches those willing to learn them. As a
Christian realist I believe these lessons are most profoundly understood when viewed
through the lens of Christian humility. The work of this chapter has been to apply
that lens to the National Security Strategy.
If the NSS offers a bold assertion of US global hegemony the Iraq experience offers
essential lessons in the ways in which great power may be humbled. Perhaps the
119
Kagan, Paradise & Power, 154.
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most immediate of these lessons is that our failure to discern the political and moral
limits of our power is a failure of humility. Humility does not assume the fault is
always ours; such an assumption is an ironical expression of pride disguised as
humility. Rather Christian humility requires that we acknowledge the pride that
betrays our power into self-destructing error. Thus while the NSS posits "human
dignity" at the core of US foreign policy, the arrogant handling of battlefield
detainees in Guantanamo Bay became an international scandal that has damaged the
moral authority of our power. Although the NSS devotes considerable and thoughtful
comment to the importance of international cooperation it assigns an incidental role
to the UN, the most influential of multinational organizations. Events in Iraq reveal
that the price of this error is being paid in the increased suffering of its people and in
Coalition lives and resources. A state's right to use pre-emptive force in certain
circumstances has long been recognized. But the assertion of a distinctly American
preventative war doctrine in the cause of a distinctly American internationalism
appeared to frighten more allies than terrorists.120 Thus prideful assertions have
projected hysteria rather than power affirmed by an earned respect for its moral
authority.
In each of these cases prideful power appears to have obscured the reality that US
responsibility includes the humble recognition that all human power has its limits.
When both responsibility and limits are humbly acknowledged the nation more
clearly discerns its own interests and, through patience, toleration and contrition, the
interests of others. Just here the attitudes of humility must inform responsibility and
serve to guide American power in a time of terror.
We will be undone if we do not constantly overcome the two
temptations of nations in our situation. One is the temptation to flee
from the responsibilities which are inherent in our power....The other
temptation is to over estimate the degree of our power, more
particularly our moral authority, in the calculations of world
politics.121
120
Heisbourg, 4. Heisbourg contends, hyperbolically in my view, that the doctrine seeks to justify the
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In its appeals to freedom, democracy and human dignity the National Security
Strategy reflects cherished ideals that shape America's self-image. These are ideals
that Christian realism values because, however imperfectly, they reflect of God's
love, goodwill and respect for all human beings. Yet in its understanding of human
nature Christian realism knows that pride and irresponsible power inevitably taint
and betray our efforts to secure these ideals. Here it seeks the grace of humility that
is the source of forgiveness and the contrite spirit that discerns God's prophetic
judgment on all human power and pretension.
Humility attends to the obscure and fragmentary voices in which divine judgment
often speaks truth to power and pretension. Months following the "shock and awe"
visited upon Iraq one of its bewildered citizens asked an interviewer, "If America is
so powerful, why doesn't my telephone work?"
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Conclusion
The Attitudes ofHumility and a Christian Realism for
America Today
The best chance of our own powerful nation meeting the great
responsibilities which history has given us too briefa preparation, lies
in abjuring every temptation to regard our power and our favoured
position among the nations as proof of our superior virtue; and in
listening patiently to the mounting criticism of our life (even though
envy maypartly prompt it) in the hope that it may make us wiser in the




My understanding of a relevant Christian realism inescapably reflects a first career in
politics and public service as a professional staff member in the US House of
Representatives. In that this experience allows insights into the understanding and
use of power it complements and critiques a contemporary Christian realism. But
this experience also presents impediments to sounding a Niebuhrian voice for today.
Loyalty to structures of power and partisan ideologies become so identified with the
ego that the transcendent perspective required of prophetic truth is obscured or
perhaps un-recognized. That this was largely true ofmy own experience cautions me
in criticising those who bear political responsibilities. More to the point it is difficult
and painful to criticise those who now dominate a political party with which I have
long identified personally and professionally.
Nevertheless Christian realism demands a faith perspective that transcends partisan
loyalties and politics. It knows that it is only through politics that the relative justice
of Augustine's earthly kingdom is achieved. Thus while Niebuhr was often and at
"America's Precarious Eminence," Virginia Quarterly Review (Autumn 1947): 490.
times unfairly critical of politicians he never denigrated the necessity and importance
of the political calling. And while he could be bitingly partisan his political views
were shaped by a prophetic faith that always points to the requirements ofjustice, the
Christian's fundamental social responsibility. This is the faith informed by the God's
eye perspective through which Christian realism discerns just political action. It is a
faith perspective that must transcend and critique all political loyalties, one that I was
unable to manage while in the political trenches.
In my search for the origins of humility in Niebuhr's theology I have experienced a
spiritual conversion that I believe is essential to such a faith perspective. As Gordon
Harland observed, in asking that we face the truth about ourselves and our Christian
responsibilities, Niebuhr "does not point us to himself, but always to the Cross." As
discussed in Chapter Two, Niebuhr discerns the full significance of the Cross event
through his understanding of the Atonement. He follows Augustine's insistence that
humility, as revealed and exemplified in Christ's redeeming work, is a gift of grace.
This grace enables the profound experience of God in which we know and accept
ourselves as sinners. Yet it is the grace that offers divine acceptance, forgiveness and
mercy in which we know ourselves as his beloved and redeemed creatures. Thus
true Christian humility is not something we can possess or control: "It is ever a gift
of grace, appropriated in faith and renewed in love and obedience.'" Through this
grace I have experienced the profound and continuous encounter with God that I now
recognize as essential to discerning the truths ofChristian life and its responsibilities.
As Niebuhr cautions, I cannot claim these truths as my possession. Yet in faith the
grace of humility enables an understanding of Christian truth that has transformed
my spiritual life. Moreover, the profound encounter with the great good of divine
love illumines my judgment regarding the finite goods that may be achieved through
political action. Thus in faith I can acknowledge with Robin Lovin that my
responsibilities and hopes for a more just and peaceful world "must pass through
politics."4
2
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Reading Niebuhr for Today
For many theologians, public intellectuals and lay Christians Niebuhr's Christian
realism made his a recognized voice speaking truth to 20th century American power.
In this sense he was, as he intended to be, an American theologian relevant to his
time. Prophetic faith nevertheless must speak enduring truths to power in ways that
transcend time and place. Discerning the truths that faith must speak to contemporary
American power requires a Christian realism that reads the signs of our own times. I
believe that humility and its attitudes provide a lens through which we may read the
signs to guide superpower responsibility in un-charted waters. It is the grace that
illumines the errors of pride that betray power into weakness and irresponsibility. It
is the gift of grace through which we may glimpse the God's eye perspective from
which all human endeavours for good are partial and finite and stand under divine
judgment. Here the grace of humility issues in the courage of prophetic insight to
challenge and critique all power, particularly, and perhaps most difficultly, our own
use of power for "good."
This entails speaking hard truths about the self-interest and ideologies that inevitably
mask our use of power. The tradition of Biblical prophesy that Christian realism
reflects spoke its truths first and foremost against an ancient Israel whose slide into
pride and injustice was a betrayal of its divinely inspired responsibilities within
history. As then, a relevant prophetic voice for today will speak the truths of
humility and its attitudes to American power.
Niebuhr believed that relevance to social justice is an essential test of any theological
or philosophical system. While this conviction underlies his understanding of
Christian responsibility he offers no systematic approach to meeting this test. Rather,
his Christian realism discerns the attitudes of faith coupled with political
understanding that illumine Christian responsibility for justice within particular
circumstances. As I believe the case studies demonstrate, humility and its attitudes
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are pervasive, if not always explicitly so, in Niebuhr's incidental work. My task there
was to show that humility born of prophetic faith underlies Christian realism and
provides a lens through which its insights are relevant to our political responsibility
for justice.
If the case studies demonstrate the significance of humility in the incidental work
they confirm as well that Christian realism offers no facile answers to perplexing
questions regarding American power and responsibility. Rejecting moral absolutes
in public policy, wary of set rules and rigid formulae for right action, Niebuhr offers
no policy blueprint for addressing contemporary problems.3 Yet even as we accept
that Christian realism offers no such blueprint, indeed, that it requires action
attendant to circumstances, we must affirm its assumption that Christian
responsibility for justice entails the understanding and use of political power. This,
in turn, rests upon the Biblical understanding of human nature in which we discern
the "level of human possibilities and of sin."6 Christian realism always attends to
this understanding of human nature. It discerns on the one hand the unlimited
potential for greater justice in human freedom. On the other it knows that human
freedom perverted by egotism and pride always imperils justice. A Christian realism
for today accordingly understands that human nature makes the use of power
necessary for social justice but that all human use of power is morally ambiguous. As
is evident in the case studies Christian realism provides no theological or political
formula that, if followed, removes the moral ambiguity of power used in the more
just cause. Christian realism accepts that at times responsibility for justice may entail
the use of power in the lesser of evil choices.7
What the case studies do attest is an expression of Christian faith that serves to guide
both the ends and means of responsible action. To claim that the attitudes of
5 As noted earlier, Colin McKeogh offers a succinct analysis ofNiebuhr's aversion to the imposition
of moral absolutes in political decision-making. See The Political Realism ofReinhold Niebuhr, 109-
110.
6
Larry Rasmussen, "Reinhold Niebuhr: Public Theologian," Cross Currents 38 (Summer 1980): 204.
This is a recurring motif in Niebuhr's Christian realism and is the motif around which Ignatieff
constructed his 2003 Gifford Lectures, published as The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of
Terror (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). Niebuhr is not cited in the volume.
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humility are a resource of faith is not to preclude others, though I believe that
humility is central to Christian responsibility because it is organically related to
Christian love, faithfulness, obedience and forgiveness. We nevertheless must be
humble about humility. Certainly there is no basis in the case studies for any claim
that the attitudes of humility provide some philosopher's stone for right Christian
action. In humility we must confess the paradox of having yet not having the ultimate
truths that must illumine the ends and means of Christian responsibility. Humility
before God acknowledges our finitude but does not eliminate it. It opens us to the
possibilities of grace that is power beyond our power for good but offers no
guarantees. As a resource of faith the grace of humility illumines our responsibilities
in history but always reminds us of the divine judgment that transcends history.
Thus humility guards against the sinful egotism that identifies our finite perspective
with the divine perspective through which Christian realism must discern the
responsibilities of power.
We must be humble about humility but notions of humility as subservient, passively
compliant and perhaps obsequious are clearly inconsistent with the humility of
Christian realism.8 As the right relationship with God properly orders all human
relationships we discern as well our responsibilities to others. Thus true humility is
always in the service of those responsibilities as a divine grace that illumines
particular attitudes efficacious to meeting them. As the incidental work
demonstrates, humble responsibility at times requires patience and at times
impatience; it requires toleration of conflicting ideas but not connivance with evil; it
requires our creative best to find peaceful alternatives in addressing injustice but
8
Appealing to the significance of humility in Niebuhr is not to reject the feminist critique that his
fulminations against pride may "undermine the assertiveness that women need to escape the
subordinate roles in which they have been locked." Lovin, Christian Realism, 149. Like Lovin, I find
this a valid critique and correction ofNiebuhr's understanding of the relationship between pride and
power. But I do not believe this failure invalidates the essential role that Christian realism assigns to
humility and its attitudes. Indeed, the attitudes of humility that illumine Christian responsibility should
open us to the assertiveness and challenges of those that others' pride has excluded from institutional
and political power. In reflecting on a range of critiques of Niebuhr's work, Richard Hutcheson wrote
that, "I am not bothered by the fact that we take pieces ofNiebuhr's work while rejecting some of the
underlying assumptions, because those pieces are so important to the way we address public policy.
Those pieces help to provide an understanding of power, justice, the significance of sin, the relevance
of biblical images in public life, and the necessity of a prophetic critique along with active
involvement." In Reinhold Niebuhr Today, ed. Richard J. Neuhaus (EErdmans: Grand Rapids, 1989):
122.
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accepts that responsibility for others may require the use of morally ambiguous
coercion. The humility ofChristian realism can never be obsequious before evil but
neither can it be a ruse to mask irresponsibility or prideful self-interest. Humility
requires a decent respect for the opinions ofmankind but cannot allow those opinions
the last or only word in meeting our responsibilities. Finding the proper balance
requires political knowledge, an understanding of human nature and God's grace.
This may be a razor's edge endeavour with no guarantee of success. Yet as with
Lincoln we must humbly seek to do right as God gives us the right to see, and at the
end of the day know that humility "must temper, not sever, the nerve of action."9
Reading Niebuhr for today requires a necessary word about irony. He believed that
irony is a great teacher of humility to those willing to learn its lessons. In his
trenchant retrospective on the American experience, The Irony ofAmerican History,
humility and its attitudes are pervasive motifs that illumine the lessons of irony for
American power. While just power always entails commensurate responsibilities in
building a more just community irony teaches the humble that power imperils
community when pride obscures its political and moral limits. It is in its persistent
appeals to humility that Niebuhr's prophetic faith speaks both timely and timeless
truths to American power. He warned that America's power and idealistic
particularity regarding its own virtues might ironically coalesce as destructive pride.
An enduring truth of his prophetic legacy is that spiritual pride transforms political
strength into weakness.
That, in a word, is what Niebuhr meant by the irony of American
history—the tendency of American civilization to allow the decency
of its motives and the nobility of its intentions to blind it to the sins
and errors to which it is prone, and thereby allow its virtue to become
the source of its vice.10
As with Niebuhr in his time, Christian realism today seeks the lessons of irony for
American power today. In Chapter 10 I examined key elements of the National
9
Schlesinger, in Brown's Niebuhr and His Age, vii.
10 Wilfred M. McClay, "The Continuing Irony of American History," First Things 120 (February
2002): 23.
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Security Strategy, a document that provides the Bush Administration's vision of 21st
century American power and responsibilities. In some ways a remarkably honest
exercise in public diplomacy, this document is a bold assertion of global hegemony
based upon US military and economic power. It is honest in its stated intention to
maintain US military predominance. Likewise it is straightforward in asserting that
this power will be devoted to securing US global interests. Neither assertion is
uniquely new regarding the uses of national power. The national interest guides the
power of all nations and no nation is likely to announce in advance that it will
relinquish whatever power it possesses to secure those interests. Moreover, the NSS
devotes significant attention to international cooperation, economic development, the
advance of democracy and human dignity. As it reflects these traditional American
ideals, the NSS again reveals nothing particularly new. Nevertheless to many
observers, including some long-time allies, the NSS is an exercise in insolence that
confirms decades of suspicion regarding the ascendance of American power.
The great irony of the NSS is that its bold assertion of American power undermines
not strengthens national security. Two elements are particularly damaging and both
appear to stem from pride in its various guises. The first is the proclamation of a
"distinctly American internationalism," to which it is assumed that all but America's
sworn enemies would accede. The Administration's early unilateralist stance
regarding international agreements indicated the practical implications of this
proclamation. The second is the adoption of a uniquely American doctrine of
preventative war as one means through which this distinctly American
internationalism will be pursued. As discussed in Chapter 10, there are substantive
arguments to be made regarding preventative war and its uses against terrorism and
so-called rogue states. Yet for the Administration to assert this as a distinctly
American unilateral right when national security requires multilateral cooperation
appears self-defeating.
Perhaps this assertion reflects the sense of innocency that Niebuhr believed
Americans harbour regarding their use of power. In any event, the intent may have
been to intimidate current and potential enemies but its ironical effect was to alienate
a world already suspicious and resentful of American power. As Niebuhr reminded
America in his own time, it is our pride that betrays our power into weakness.
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Niebuhr's Christian realism required that those who support a particular war be ever
mindful of the truths of faith by which all Christian responsibility is measured. As
one who supported the war to remove Saddam I have a particular responsibility for
making such judgments regarding its prosecution. In this regard I must confess the
evil and injustice that all war entails, including those fought on behalf of what I may
believe is a just cause. Christian realism requires contrition for the pride that creates
errors in judgment and obscures the practical and moral limits of power. It requires
that we attend to the lessons humility offers for correcting mistakes and in renewed
discernment in meeting the responsibilities ofAmerican power today.
The Iraqi Conflict and Lessons in Humility for American Power
As discussed in Chapter 10, the conflict in Iraq is an ongoing test of the
Administration's National Security Strategy and of the attitudes it embraces. The
struggle in Iraq continues and its outcome remains fearfully uncertain. A relevant
Christian realism must stake out positions both within and above that conflict. Here
Christian realism draws upon the resources of faith that illumine a God's eye
perspective on human conflict. It must attend as well to the political realities and
particular responsibilities of American power in Iraq. It does not presume to offer a
blueprint for political action or a distinctly "Christian" solution to enormously
complex issues. Nor does it endow expertise in military strategy. What a relevant
Christian realism does offer are the attitudes of humility that illumine a path for
Christian responsibility between the irresponsible alternatives of vainglory and
despair.
1. Addressing Resentment of American Power
Despite candidate Bush's call for a humble projection of American power his
Administration's dismissive attitude toward international agreements lent it an
arrogance that strengthened suspicions regarding the world's remaining superpower.
Moreover, the Administration's unilateralist tone appeared to mark a distinct
departure from America's post-WWII multilateral traditions. The point in repeating
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this scenario is to underscore the damage that the Administration's pre-9/11 attitudes
inflicted on its efforts to meet post-9/11 responsibilities. The humble projection of
American power called for by candidate Bush would not have prevented the disaster
but it would have ameliorated some of the international resentments that continue to
plague the Bush presidency. The Administration was either oblivious to long-held
resentments of American power or it believed that great power rendered these
resentments irrelevant to US national interests.
While power inevitably creates resentment Christian realism requires that we
distinguish between just and unjust resentment because resentment indicates an
irresponsible use of power. An underlying assumption of the Administration's plan in
Iraq appears to be that gratitude for the removal of Saddam would largely erase the
history of Iraqi resentment of Western colonialism and US power. Such an
assumption reflects something of our innocence about how others view American
power. It discounts, for example, the cruel hardships that US/UN sanctions inflicted
on ordinary Iraqis even as these measures apparently served to thwart Saddam's
WMD programs. Post-war inspections indicate that those who championed economic
sanctions as an alternative to force may be entitled to feel some vindication. Yet it is
too easily forgotten that, as Niebuhr observed, economic sanctions tend to hurt most
those who have the least responsibility for the policies they seek to change.11 The
assumption that Saddam's removal would mitigate resentment of US power also
appears to have raised unrealistic hopes regarding the intractable religious and ethnic
strife that has plagued the Iraqi state created by the Western democracies after WWI.
Here prideful assumptions regarding the salutary effects of removing Saddam and a
display of technological virtuosity betrayed a significant lack of cultural
understanding and political realities.
It is difficult to conclude that an Administration of political realists was nai've about
such matters. Yet in its zeal for removing Saddam and the creation of a democratic
1 See George A. Lopez and David Cartright, "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," Foreign Affairs
83, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 90-103. Lopez and Cartright offer convincing arguments that sanctions
"did much to erode Iraqi military capabilities." They acknowledge that sanctions resulted in the
preventable deaths of several hundred thousand children but that the situation was "eased" by the oil-
for-food program instigated in 1996.
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Iraq it appeared to ignore or minimize the relevance of anti-US/Western political and
religious resentments. The Administration appeared to assume that the "shock and
awe" of American military power would carry all before it while somehow
ameliorating past resentments and avoiding the creation of new ones. Such an
assumption reflects a coalescence of spiritual pride and pride of military power that
always obscures its own moral and political limits. As Niebuhr had insisted in his
time and Michael Ignatieff in ours, the effectiveness of military action cannot be
i
evaluated apart from its political consequences. As events unfold in Iraq it appears
that our failure of humility in this regard has betrayed good intentions into further
resentments.
2. Recognizing the Limits of Military Power and Technology
Secretary Rumsfeld's shock and awe campaign underscored America's current
predominance in military technology and, as expected, quickly demolished Saddam's
decaying armed forces. While the insertion of live reportage among coalition forces
served to remind the world that combat is not a video game, the military outcome
was never in question. Unfortunately, the degree of military planning necessary to
achieving this certainty appears to have crowded out essential planning for the
critical phase that would follow. The shock and awe of the campaign to destroy
Saddam's military machine ironically heightened the expectations of many Iraqis
regarding America's ability to restore order, rebuild the nation's infrastructure and
help establish some form of democratic government.
As the National Security Strategy demonstrates, the Administration, or at least some
elements within it, recognized the importance of getting things right in post-war Iraq.
Certainly realists close to the Administration understood the degree to which the
moral and political authority of American power should and would be measured by
how and what it might achieve in Iraq. Robert Kagan observed in 2003 that what is at
stake "is not only the future of Iraq and the Middle East...but also of America's
12 The Lesser Evil, 82.
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reputation, its reliability, and its legitimacy as a world leader." Yet the
Administration's failure to plan carefully for the all-important post-war phase
became readily evident. Even as Saddam's statue was toppled in central Baghdad
wholesale looting began. Ordinary Iraqis quickly felt less secure in their homes and
possessions than when the tyrant was in power. As subsequent events demonstrate
the looting presaged far worse to come and revealed Administration miscalculations
that are now undermining America's ability to deliver on its promises in Iraq.14
Pride in its various guises appears to be at the heart of Administration
miscalculations. On the one hand pride of power greatly miscalculated the degree to
which an initial military success would assure political success in Iraq. The
Administration's shock and awe mantra reflected Secretary Rumsfeld's innovative
strategies designed to maximize US technological supremacy while tailoring US
forces to meet a variety of battlefield exigencies. Driving these new strategies was
the recognition that few nations or terrorist organizations are likely to confront US
power directly. More likely, Rumsfeld wrote in 2002, they will "seek to challenge us
asymmetrically by looking for vulnerabilities and trying to exploit them."15 That this
is precisely what has happened in Iraq invites Rumsfeld's critics to blast him with his
own petard.
Despite the likelihood of so-called asymmetrical tactics by a variety of insurgent
groups, the Administration refused to commit forces sufficient to provide the basic
security on which meeting its post-war political objectives in Iraq depended. Pride of
power, particularly the Administration's assumptions regarding US technological
supremacy and the appeal of America's democratic ideal, appears behind this failure.
With some apparent disdain for "nation-building" Rumsfeld and his senior civilian
leadership refused to recognize that security is the essential requirement in salvaging
a collapsed state. Ignoring extensive post-conflict planning in Colin Powell's State
Department, Rumsfeld and his staff insisted on military control of post-conflict Iraq.
13 Paradise & Power, 154.
14 See Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September/October
2004): 34-56. Diamond's analysis provides background for much of the following discussion.
13 Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002): 25.
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In Diamond's words this fundamental error with far-ranging consequences reflects
self-defeating "hubris and ideology"16
Thus the failure to provide for the security of the Iraqi people may be seen as failure
of humility. Here Rumsfeld's failure of humility was a failure to acknowledge the
limits of his own strategy. Few people doubted the ability of US military power to
destroy the Saddam regime. The greater and more difficult task, as even friends of
the Administration like Kagan affirm, is whether US power in its various guises can
rebuild a collapsed state amid the political, ethnic and religious turbulence of the
Middle East. Yet even as Iraq's internal security collapsed the Administration
refused to commit the number of properly trained troops necessary to provide the
security on which so much depended. This was a failure of humanitarian
responsibility to the Iraqi people. It has made the rebuilding of the Iraqi
infrastructure and a stable government immeasurably more difficult and costly. What
was intended to display the effectiveness of American power has ironically
underscored its limitations. And, as the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal attests,
the failure of planning in providing trained and disciplined personnel has shredded
the moral authority of American power.
The Intelligence Community's belief that Saddam possessed weapons of mass
destruction lent immediacy to the Administration's argument for armed intervention
in Iraq. When I had access to privileged information I found this intelligence
credible. That we now know this intelligence was largely wrong does not require that
I believe the Administration deliberately misled the American people regarding
Saddam's imputed WMD programs. Undeniably the discovery ofWMD would have
vindicated Administration action in one significant respect. Yet it is difficult to see
how this would have appreciably alleviated the lack of security occasioned by the
16
Diamond, 36. Before the war senior military commanders argued that hundreds of thousands of
coalition troops would be required to secure Iraq. Had forces been deployed in Iraq at the ratio that
NATO forces were deployed in Bosnia half a million coalition troops would have been required. The
number of troops deployed in Iraq has never exceeded one-third that level. According to Diamond,
their civilian chiefs silenced these commanders. "The coalition should have deployed vastly more
military police and other troops trained for urban patrols, crowd control, civil reconstruction, and
peace maintenance enforcement. Tens of thousands of soldiers with sophisticated monitoring
equipment should have been posted along the borders with Syria and Iran to intercept the flows of
foreign terrorists, Iranian intelligence agents, money and weapons." 35-36.
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failure of post-war planning. If the WMD issue gave immediacy to armed
intervention, the Administration's more strategic objective was to rebuild Iraq as a
democratic state. In the event, the failure of post-war planning has severely impeded
this objective. As Diamond notes, the failure to provide basic security has meant that
most of the $18.6 billion in reconstruction funds appropriated by Congress in 2003
has gone unspent.17
The prideful failures regarding post-war planning reflect a failure to attend the
lessons of history. Even as victory in WWII was a dim and uncertain prospect
Niebuhr insisted that the war be prosecuted in ways that anticipated a more just
world order beyond the conflict. He was particularly critical of what he considered
the American propensity to concentrate on military exigencies to the detriment of
post-war political planning. Moreover, as Niebuhr observed in 1952, America's
predominance in the age of technology tempts it to forget the lessons that such
failures may offer to the humble.
The American situation is such a vivid symbol of the spiritual
perplexities of modern man, because the degree of American power
tends to generate illusions to which a technocratic culture is already
too prone. This technocratic approach to the problems of history,
which erroneously equates the mastery of nature with the mastery of
historic destiny, in turn accentuates a very old failing in human nature:
the inclination of the wise, or the powerful, or the virtuous, to obscure
and deny the human limitations in all human achievements and
pretensions.18
If, as its advocates claim, technology reduces the collateral damage of warfare, Iraq
demonstrates that technology cannot substitute for proper planning nor overcome the
inclination of the powerful to believe that it can. Its precision may lessen the injustice
that warfare inflicts on the innocent but technology does not lend moral authority to
American power. Nor does it endow us with the political and cultural understanding
essential to rebuilding the so-called rogue states that it enables us to destroy. As the
17 Ibid., 38.
18 The Irony ofAmerican History, 147.
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Iraqi experience continues to demonstrate technology must not tempt us again to
obscure the tortuous task that nation-building entails. Here Ignatieff warns us this
cannot be done quickly or on the cheap, either economically or militarily. "To
exercise power in this way is to risk losing authority, and to risk losing everything
eventually, since peoples disillusioned with our promises will have enduring reasons
never to trust us again."19 Pride that obscures these truths betrays our power into
weakness and our search for security into insecurity.
3. Relevance of the United Nations
As discussed in Chapter Six Niebuhr always cast a realist's eye on the United
Nations. He recognized that post-WWII political realities and issues of national
sovereignty limited its role in maintaining international order. He accepted that its
power in this regard was essentially the power that Security Council members could
agree to give it. He had few illusions that it was or could be the world government
envisioned by some idealists of his day. Moreover he feared that attributing to the
UN power it did not possess might occasion irresponsibility on the part of those who
did possess the power essential to maintaining international order. In this regard
Niebuhr's Christian realism did not posit loyalty to the UN as the sine qua non of a
politically ormorally responsible American foreign policy.
Niebuhr nevertheless insisted that the UN had significant roles to play in relating US
power and wealth to an impoverished world. He saw the UN as a forum in which the
US might gain some of the political and cultural understanding essential to
exercising its power responsibly. He believed that America's loyalty to the UN was a
recognition that its power could serve the broader international interest in building a
more just and secure international community. Thus loyalty to the UN reflected
Americans' recognition that "they are in a web of history in which many desires,
hopes, wills and ambitions, other than their own, are operative."20 Approached
1' Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo andAfghanistan (London:
Vintage, 2003), 127.
20 Niebuhr, "Moral Implications of Loyalty to the United Nations," 20.
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through the attitudes of patience, forbearance and toleration America's loyalty to the
UN could serve to illumine the responsibilities of American power.
From early days the George W. Bush Administration appeared to mark a significant
departure from America's post-WWII multilateral traditions, including loyalty to the
UN. In its first six months the Administration rejected a number of multilateral
treaties and agreements, including the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto
Protocol. That Congress had rejected both agreements during the Clinton presidency
rendered the Bush Administration's action gratuitous while creating resentment
among key European allies. Moreover, unilateralists for whom the removal of
Saddam was a top priority were given senior positions in the Departments of State
and Defense. Following the 9/11 attacks the Administration developed a National
Security Strategy that gave short shrift to the UN while favouring "coalitions of the
willing" and a preventative war option in the pursuit ofUS security interests.
The President's appearance before the UN to argue the case for war nevertheless
reflected an awareness that Security Council action bore some relevance to US
strategy. It reflected an understanding that in both domestic and international public
opinion UN approval did carry moral authority. From its beginning the Iraqi crisis
has revealed the intricate ways in which the UN may be relevant to American
security interests. The failure to allow UN inspections to run their course
unquestionably weakened America's case for war in domestic and international
public opinion. Allies such as France, Germany and Turkey, all democratic states,
reflected the opposition of their people and thereby made specific UN approval a
condition of their support. While neither French nor German military support was
anticipated in any case, the compliance of Turkey played a key role in US invasion
plans. The failure to gain this compliance had a very material affect on invasion
strategies. Moreover, the lack of UN approval made it much more difficult for other
nations to provide troops and support following the collapse of Saddam's regime.
One might conclude that given French and Russian financial interests in maintaining
Saddam's regime the Security Council might never have approved a US led war to
remove him. As events in the former Yugoslavia attest, the interests and ethnic ties
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of Security Council members, including the US, may foreclose UN action in the most
desperate of humanitarian crises. This political reality militates against the notion
that UN authorization alone lends moral authority to the use of force in meeting
international crises. Yet, as events leading up to the Iraqi conflict demonstrate, UN
authorization is undeniably an important source of moral authority because many
people believe that it is. This belief may be given concreteness in the lending or
withholding of support necessary to any nation achieving its security interests.
Distrust of the UN appears to have exacerbated post-war conditions in Iraq. The
inadequacy of the Administration's post-war planning was compounded by its
prolonged refusal to accept any role for the UN in the political reconstruction of Iraq.
Though it lacked understanding of the cultural and religious elements within Iraq's
immensely complicated politics, the US-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority
appeared obsessed with maintaining absolute control to the detriment of establishing
political legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people.
The obsession with control was an overarching flaw in the U.S.
occupation from start to finish. In any post-conflict international
intervention there is always a certain tension between legitimacy and
control. Yet for most of the first year of the occupation, the U.S.
administration opted for the latter whenever the trade-off presented
itself.21
An apparent prideful belief in the sufficiency of American power and know-how
severely damaged the political transition process in Iraq. Only when the US-brokered
plan neared complete collapse did the Administration turn to the UN for assistance.
To its credit it sought a UN role in the transition process that led to Security Council
Resolution 1546 passed on June 8, 2004. This resolution sanctioned a June 30, 2004
turnover of political power to the Iraqi Interim Government and outlined further
plans for an elected transitional parliament and prime minister.22 Although it was
21
Diamond, 47.
22 As Diamond notes, it was widely believed that the June 30 date was driven by the 2004 presidential
election schedule. "But this criticism never made sense. In Iraq, it was always clear that Washington
was being driven by an even more palpable imperative: the need to give Iraqis back their dignity and
to empower them to determine their own course." 48. Of course, the more quickly a legitimate
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forced by circumstances to do so, the Administration came to recognize that the UN
could indeed play an essential role in the nation-building process.
However belatedly, the humble recognition of our limits enabled a result that our
own power and knowledge alone could not achieve. Whatever the outcome of the
Iraqi conflict this case presents one of the enduring lessons for America in meeting
its international responsibilities. A Christian realism for today neither idealizes the
UN nor dismisses its political and institutional limits. In speaking truth to American
power today Christian realism reminds us that humility discerns and accepts that
there is always some wisdom and some form of power beyond our own. The United
Nations can be a source of both as American responsibility seeks to build the more
just world community upon which its security ultimately rests.
Christian Realism and Christian Patriotism in a Time of Terror
Niebuhr was unquestioningly among America's most trenchant critics. His prophetic
calling was to attack the pretensions, ideologies and pride that engendered an
irresponsible use of power. He was particularly fearful that American power and
spiritual pride might coalesce into national self-righteousness. As his wartime
incidental writing reveals, this temptation is strongest in times of national peril when
we seek ever-greater accretions of power as proof against our insecurities. Though
his Christian realism accepts that responsibility for justice requires the use of power
it posits as well the moral ambivalence of all power. He was ever mindful of the
spiritual pride that tempts the power of "good" people in their desperate pursuit of a
"good" cause. Niebuhr's prophetic criticism of American power always sought the
God's eye perspective that illumines the limits of what we may call good and the
ambiguity and limits of our power to achieve it.
Yet in that his prophetic criticism seeks to illumine ever-greater possibilities for
government could be elected the more it was assumed that some semblance of order would be
restored. This, it was hoped, would hasten the day that American and coalition forces might be
reduced and eventually withdrawn.
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justice Niebuhr provides a model for an appropriate Christian love of country. There
can be no question that the Christian's ultimate loyalty is to God and the things of
God. Niebuhr's most wrathful attacks were directed at those who sought to identify
their finite notions of the good with God's infinite great good. For him this confusion
is a demonic expression of our spiritual pride that only the grace of humility may
overcome. Because humility is essential to the proper ordering of both our spiritual
life and our social responsibilities it is the foundation of any Christian patriotism.
Through the grace of humility we discern those qualities and goods that make a
nation worthy of a Christian's loyalty and sacrifice. This same grace nevertheless
illumines the great disparity between the relative justice we may achieve and the
perfect justice of God. It militates against the pride that obscures the partialness of
our achievements and that tempts us to the irresponsible alternatives of complacency
and self-righteous vainglory.
Informed by the attitudes of humility the patriotism of Christian realism always
attends its responsibility for shaping a national power that serves the cause ofjustice.
It knows that injustice may result from even the best-intentioned use of power. It is a
patriotism whose self-knowledge is always informed by the just criticism of others. It
understands that power disordered by spiritual pride leads to the sin of national
idolatry. Accordingly Christian patriotism can only be a humble love of country; a
love that challenges the prideful ideologies that betray us into the worship of gods
that we ourselves have made.
Christian realism is grounded in a faith encountered through the grace of humility.
Niebuhr's prophetic gift was to show the relevance of such a faith to a world that
exalts power. From his Biblical faith he understood that the exaltation of power
reflected the sinful egotism of human nature. Fie recognized that this fact of human
nature required power to balance power to achieve relative justice among people.
Christian responsibility for social justice thus entailed the understanding and use of
power. But his particular prophetic vocation was to remind the powerful of the moral
ambivalence of their power, particularly in the pursuit ofwhat they believed to be a
just cause. This prophetic truth glints throughout his incidental writing during the
20th Century's most tragic decade. It is Niebuhr's prophetic truth for American power
today.
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There is, in short, even in a conflict with a foe with whom we have
little in common the possibility and necessity of liviflg in a dimension
ofmeaning in which the urgencies of the struggle are subordinated to
a sense of awe before the vastness of the historical drama in which we
are jointly involved; to a sense of modesty about the common human
frailties and foibles which lie at the foundation of both the enemy's
demonry and our vanities; and to a sense of gratitude for the divine
23
mercies which are promised to those who humble themselves.
23 The Irony ofAmerican History, 174.
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Epilogue
Robin Lovin whose Reinhold Niebuhr & Christian Realism (1995) provides a recent
benchmark in Niebuhrian studies, suggests that if there is to be a future for Christian
realism its legacy must be examined critically. While his perspective is sympathetic
to the achievements ofNiebuhr and other Christian realists, Lovin insists on a critical
approach to assessing Christian realism's future as an option for Christian
participation in political and social decision-making. This insistence on assessing the
relevance to the human condition of any system of moral decision-making is
certainly one that Niebuhr himself would demand. In his 2000 essay, "Christian
Realism: A Legacy and Its Future," Lovin offers a post-Cold War but pre-9/11
critique in which he examines its past for clues that might help us discern whether
there is or should be a future for Christian realism.24 Lovin's post-9/11 essay,
"Reinhold Niebuhr in Contemporary Scholarship: A Review Essay," provides an
overview of recent critical studies, sympathetic or otherwise, of Niebuhr's particular
■yc #
expression of Christian realism. Here Lovin examines recent work that include
post-9/11 critiques of the theological grounding of Niebuhr's Christian realism or
that address the challenges to Christian realism in the age of terror.
We have earlier examined Lovin's account of the three realisms-theological, political
and moral-that he believes are the constituents of Niebuhr's Christian realism. Of
particular importance in "A Legacy and Its Future" is his account ofmoral realism in
Niebuhr's public theology. This emphasis reflects Lovin's conviction that Christian
realists must be full participants in the multi-disciplinary and continuous examination
of human experience to discern the goods essential to human flourishing. It is as
moral realists that Christian realists can participate in this enterprise even as they
recognize that others who share the task may not share their theological perspectives.
The fact that the Christian holds beliefs about human life and its ultimate
purposes that are not persuasive to the secular participants in discussions
of, say, medical technology, welfare policy, or human rights does not
mean that their moral discourses are incommensurable, only that their
24 The Annual ofChristian Ethics 20 (2000), 3-18.
25 Journal ofReligious Ethics 31.3 (2003): 489-505.
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moral knowledge is incomplete. The moral realist will not be surprised by
this, nor will she be deterred from continuing the discussion to see what
96
they can learn together.
An essential corollary to this attitude of participation is that a contemporary Christian
realist will expect that his attitudes may require change or correction. Christian
realists as theological realists accept that truths of faith always illumine what they
can and cannot follow by way of proximate moral choices; but Lovin insists that this
not be the "hermeneutical lens" through with the Christian realist examines every
opportunity to enter into the wider search for moral knowledge. The Christian realist
recognizes that there are times that require a stance reflective of the "Confessing
Church," but rejects the notion that there is ever a situation in which knowledge is so
complete as to make "some sort of moral deliberation in collaboration with others
unnecessary." Lovin posits this as a cognitivist and fallibilist approach in which
Christian realists know that moral knowledge is possible while accepting the
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possibility that they may get it wrong.
In this regard the future of Christian realism entails meeting three essential
challenges that may reflect its past failures or inadequacies. Here a relevant
Christian realism must accept the criticism of those who believe that it failed them
politically. These include African Americans, women and Latin American Christians
who found Niebuhr's Christian realism unhelpful in their own struggles for justice.
Second, Christian realism must also answer its postmodernist critics who reject its
modernist search for "human universals" and its confidence in "its own omniscient
perspective." Finally, with its past emphasis on the nation-state and balances of
power, Christian realism must now address the emerging realities of globalization
and the place of international institutions in its search for relative social justice.28
In meeting these challenges a relevant Christian realism will have to be a more
humble Christian realism, less certain of its own perspective, remaining open to
26





collaborative developments in moral knowledge, and in recognizing its past failures
and where it got it wrong. Here, Lovin believes, Christian realism was too often
applied to developing situations "without the participation of those new voices that
9Q
might have brought the realist's own biases and limitations into sharper focus."
The element so often missing in Christian realism's account of reality was the
element of hope sounded by these new voices. This hope is not derived from liberal
ideals regarding the perfectibility of human nature or the historical inevitability of
progress arising from historical conditions. Rather, the hope of those excluded from
power is "the awareness that something else is nonetheless possible." This is the
hope of those who have little stake in the world as it is. Lovin finds the element of
such hope deficient in the legacy of Christian realism but insists that it must have an
essential place in its future.
So the question at the beginning of the twenty-first century becomes,
"who is being unrealistic? Those who hope for changes that realize the
best possibilities they can imagine for themselves? Or those who expect
the institutional inertia to control the pace of events because everyone
prefers present order [to] uncertain possibilities?30
Of the challenges facing contemporary Christian realism, Lovin believes the most
difficult is posed by a postmodernism that questions even the possibilities of a
deliberative process in which its participants are so dissimilar in social perspectives
and in self-understanding. Indeed, postmodernists find moral vocabularies so
tradition-bound that even the rare appearance of consensus is illusory at best; the
result is the illusion of consensus that issues in as much moral confusion as the
conflict it attempts to address. If postmodernists are correct in these assertions then
just as our political realities are demanding an inclusive deliberative process their
philosophical attempts to interpret the process would tell us that "even the limited






Here Lovin reminds the postmodernist that Christian realism does not claim to
possess universally accepted rational rules governing its discourse. Moreover,
contemporary Christian realists are more keenly aware than in the past of the cultural
biases and subtleties of power that impinge upon the deliberative process; that,
indeed, they will demand that such a critique be built into the process itself. Christian
realism does not insist that this kind of inclusive approach to building moral
consensus is always possible, much less always successful. But it does hold some
promise, some hope. Lovin insists that Christian realism cannot accept any
postmodernist insistence that the conditions of success must be established before the
project can commence. For Christian realists the "question is not ultimate
commensurability, but practical agreements in which the parties share a working
understanding of the proximate terms and are committed to further discussions
shaped by that understanding."
Such expectations, Lovin observes, are Christian realism's legacy.
The task for the future is to put them into practice more fully than we have
yet done. We have that task in part because the critics of realism have put
us in a position to understand just how limited are previous achievements
have actually been.33
Events of 9/11 prompted renewed interest in the legacy of Niebuhr's Christian
realism while issues raised within the context of global terrorism underscore some of
its contemporary challenges. In this regard Lovin's insistence on a chastened
Christian realism's responsibilities in developing an inclusive process for moral
deliberation appears prophetic indeed.
In his subsequent 2003 essay, "Reinhold Niebuhr and Contemporary Scholarship,"
Lovin surveys the landscape of major works on Niebuhr, dating from 1997. These
works shed critical light on significant facets of Niebuhr's legacy, including the






With The Grain of the Universe (2001) and Langdon Gilkey's On Niebuhr: A
Theological Study (2001). Colm McKeogh's The Political Realism of Reinhold
Niebuhr (1997) offers an insightful analysis of Niebuhr's Christian realism and just
war traditions. In her Theologians ofa New World Order: Reinhold Niebuhr and the
Christian Realists, 1920-1948 (1997), Heather Wilson places Niebuhr in the broader
Christian realist movement as it developed within the context of three tumultuous
decades. Historian Mark Kleinman's A World ofHope, a World ofFear: Henry A.
Wallace, Reinhold Niebuhr, and American Liberalism (2000), examines liberal
conflict over post-WWII American foreign policy.
Hauerwas and Gilkey provide the two most significant of recent works to examine
Niebuhr's theological grounding. Hauerwas used the occasion of his 2001 Gifford
Lectures to critique the theological underpinnings of Niebuhr's Christian realism. In
With the Grain ofthe Universe, Hauerwas places his critique ofNiebuhr between his
treatments of William James' religious naturalism and Karl Barth's theology. That
Niebuhr wrote his Yale BD thesis on James' religious pragmatism provides the point
of departure for Hauerwas' examination of Neibuhr's theological assumptions. The
younger Niebuhr had joined with many contemporaries in rediscovering the Biblical
views on human nature and history with which they attacked the optimism and
confidence in reason of their liberal Protestant legacy. Niebuhr, however, went
further than most in his insistence that human experience itself refuted the claims of
liberalism and served to partially validate the Biblical perspective. Just here, Lovin
notes, Hauerwas asserts that "Niebuhr's account of what we can know about history
and human nature depends on William James's pragmatism."34 This establishes
Hauerwas' claim that, despite his prophetic remonstrance against prideful human
illusions, Niebuhr's theology actually reflects James' confidence in human reason.
Hauerwas traces this element of pragmatism well into Niebuhr's mature thinking on
the meaning of history and concludes that his "god" is simply an element found in all
human consciousness.
It appears that for Niebuhr God is nothing more than the name of our need
to believe that life has an ultimate unity that transcends the world's chaos




not explain why he thinks anyone would feel compelled to worship or pray
to a god so conceived.35
Yet ifwe find with Lovin that Niebuhr's mature work stresses the limited and partial
validation that history offers Christian faith, a different conclusion my be drawn.
Contra Hauerwas, Lovin suggests that Niebuhr reflects a Christian pragmatism that
believes we can systematize what we know about God even as God has a reality
beyond what we can know. This, Lovin asserts, is a theological realism that "can
speak of claims about God in human experience without supposing that human
experience exhausts the reality of God." Hauerwas wrongly identifies Niebuhr's
Christian pragmatism with the radical empiricism of James' pragmatic method in
which reality is established solely by rational investigation. By such a reading
Hauerwas sees no place for an active, immanent God in Niebuhr's theology; he
concludes that Niebuhr's Christian realism offers no distinctive perspective on
human experience. If all persons share this same, non-distinctive perspective then
Niebuhr's theology simply reflects what people already believe.
Niebuhr's work now represents the worst of two worlds; most secular
people do not find his arguments convincing; yet his theology is not
sufficient to provide the means for Christians to sustain their
lives...Niebuhr's theology reflects the loss of truthful Christian speech
and, hence, of faithful Christian practice.37
To the contrary Langdon Gilkey suggests that a careful examination of Niebuhr's
theology lends his ethics additional meaning for today. Gilkey's On Niebuhr: A
Theological Study, reflects a lifetime of critical Niebuhrian analysis and is in Lovin's
estimate the best systematic treatment ofNiebuhr's theology that has been written. If,
as we have seen, Niebuhr's dialectical approach often fails of precision, Gilkey
35 With the Grain ofthe Universe, 131, cited in "Contemporary Scholarship," 499.
36
"Contemporary Scholarship," 499.
'>7 With the Grain ofthe Universe, 139-140, cited in "Contemporary Scholarship," 500. Hauerwas
notwithstanding, the year 2004 saw the inaugural meeting of the Reinhold Niebuhr Society whose
members, including theologian Langdon Gilkey, find in Niebuhr "a guide to the present situation's
moral complexities." Among the "secular people" who still find Niebuhr's arguments convincing is
Jean Elshtain. See her Just War Against Terror (2003), 103, 106-111.
334
brings Niebuhr's theology into a more precise focus. This focus, Gilkey insists, must
be on Niebuhr's theological understanding of history.
Unless the meaning of life is in the midst of its passage perfectly clear and
fully secure-and [Niebuhr] has surely shown that it is not-then the
presence of the power and mercy of God at the Beginning and at the End,
to complete what we cannot complete and to purge what we have
38
corrupted, are the sole grounds for any real hope.
Unlike Hauerwas' empiricist reading, Gilkey's is a realist's interpretation of
Niebuhr's theology.
Essential to this, of course, is the reality of God. Niebuhr does not to my
knowledge discuss this point; he assumes it. In Niebuhr's theology, god
cannot be a projection, a human idea shone outward into the cosmos, an
ideal made transcendent by the creativity of human self-transcendence
(though many of his statements in his early writing seem to imply that
view).
Such a deity would for the mature Niebuhr be the creation of an ordinary
and all-to-common human idolatry, a product of a finite and so partial
cultural imagination and so no more transcendent than any other cultural
artifact.39
Hauerwas' contention is that it is James' empirical pragmatism that Niebuhr uses to
make sense of history; thus his argument that Niebuhr's theology is simply what
Gilkey, above, calls the product of a finite and partial cultural imagination. And this
is the basis for Hauerwas' claim that Niebuhr's theology simply mirrors what culture
thinks about God at any given juncture in history. Gilkey on the other hand insists on
a realist's reading of Niebuhr's idea of the "limited rational validation" experience
offers for Biblical truths about history and human nature. Gilkey's reading
emphasizes the importance of the word "limited." Thus the limited validation
afforded through the study of human experience does not make sense of history but,
38 On Niebuhr, 222, cited in "Contemporary Scholarship," 501.
j9
Ibid., 188-189, cited in "Contemporary Scholarship," 501.
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rather, provides guidance for the choices we must make within it. "It makes sense to
speak in such terms because we have to choose and act; but our hope does not rest on
the results of our actions. We hope in the power and mercy-in the reality-ofGod."40
Gilkey's emphasis on Niebuhr's theological realism stems in part from his agreement
with Hauerwas that many of Niebuhr's understandings have succumbed to cultural
and historical changes. Recent scholarship questions the idea of a unified Biblical
understanding of human nature and finds that the diversity of Biblical perspectives
undermines any understanding that there is a unified Biblical worldview. Gilkey
suggests that these and all human constructs must be constantly sifted in light of new
knowledge and understanding. "What matters theologically is the conviction that
none of these constructions provides history with a final validation, a meaning that
reaches beyond present needs and aspirations."41 Rather, as Gilkey insists, it is the
reality of the power and mercy ofGod that provides the sole grounds for real hope.
Hauerwas characterizes Niebuhr as a man of his own day whose theology was
largely a reflection of the culture of which he was a part. It is undoubtedly true that
Niebuhr insisted upon a theology relevant to human experience, one that sought to
provide human beings a sense of meaning and an understanding of moral
responsibility in their lives. But in his prophetic vocation Niebuhr always insisted
that our sense ofmeaning and understanding of moral responsibility remains partial,
subject to human finitude and human nature; that it is faith in a God who is both
within and beyond history that lends meaning and hope to our lives. The God we find
in Niebuhr's theology, the God revealed in both human experience and the atoning
work of Christ, is the God who Niebuhr worshiped, prayed to, and served far beyond
the often too comfortable, remote confines of academic theology. This is the God we
encounter through the grace of humility, the God before whom all human constructs-
including Niebuhr's-are judged and found wanting. But this is Niebuhr's God whose
ultimate revelation to humankind is not judgment but forgiveness and mercy.
40
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